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This thesis examines the relationship between employment and the social
identity of bank staff in Scotland during the period 1850 - 1939. Bank staff are used as an
example ofwhat is described as the lower middle class ofminor professionals and
dependent non-manual employees, a then growing social stratum that has received
limited academic attention. The thesis critically reassesses existing accounts by
incorporating a quantitative prospographical approach that utilises current information
technology, as well as economic theories previously unused in historical research, into
the analysis.
The thesis can be split into three sections. The first section (chapters 2-3)
outlines the business of banking at the level of the sector as a whole then in relation to
the Royal Bank of Scotland. This provides a context that informs the subsequent analysis
of employment and identity. Both chapters depict banking in Scotland as passing
through three stages distinguishable on the basis of the structure of the sector, the
organisational form adopted by the banks and the geographical scope of their business,
as well as the competitive arrangements reached and approaches to asset management.
In addition the conduct of banking, then the internal organisation and management of
the banks are outlined.
The second section of the thesis (chapters 4-6) examines the economics of bank
employment. Chapter 4 considers the establishment then development during the first
three quarters of the nineteenth century ofwhat is identified as an internal labour
market in the Royal Bank of Scotland, a concept introduced from the economics
literature. It concludes the arrangements reached - incremental salaries, stable, long-term
employment, internal promotion and a wide range of paternalistic benefits - were,
firstly, a rational means of encouraging loyalty and effort in circumstances where
opportunistic behaviour was potentially costly, but monitoring expensive and imperfect.
And secondly, a means of securing then facilitating the exercise of managerial authority.
Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss how Royal Bank staff fared up until WorldWar I. It
argues the standard of living experienced by bank staff and clerks more broadly can in
general be viewed in more positive terms than has previously been thought. Chapter 6
then considers a key trend identified in the preceding two chapters; a growing majority
of recruits left Scottish banking on or shortly after completing an apprenticeship. It
identifies this trend as integral to Scottish bank employment, then establishes where
staff went and why, arguing the prospect of higher salaries and better promotion
prospects pulled a majority overseas.
The third section of the thesis (chapters 6-8) analyses how the subjects of the
thesis understood and related to society as a whole. Chapter 6 continues by outlining the
place of emigration and the associated consciousness of empire in the psyche of Scottish
bank staff, arguing these formed a significant presence that supported an often critical
understanding of Scottish society. Chapters 7 and 8 then consider the social meaning
attached to institutions initiated by staff to act upon the internal labour markets
operated throughout Scottish banking. Chapter 7 uses professionalisation; the origins,
then development of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland, to examine how bank staff saw
themselves and were seen by others in society. In several key respects it refutes the
hypothesis that the social and economic life of clerks was determined by an acute status
consciousness, arguing instead that status devoid of any material foundation was of
limited importance. Moreover, it is claimed bank staff were never as intent on distancing
themselves from those they regarded as socially inferior, or attaching themselves to
those they regarded as socially superior as has been assumed for clerks in general.
Chapter 8 then considers the argument that clerical trade unionism was constrained by
status concerns. This is found to be of limited explanatory power. Additional factors,
including the geographical and hierarchical dispersal of staff, and routine career
mobility, are foimd to have been of significance. However, the vigorous opposition of
senior bank officials and inability of trade unionists to overcome this and the cultivated
belief that trade unionism was incompatible with career success and the professional
identity of bank employment, are identified as the most significant influences upon bank
trade unionism.
The thesis ends by considering the issue of social identity directly concluding
that of bank staff was shaped above all else by their employment. Professionalisation
and trade unionism are identified as attempts at forging new, independent ways of
being known. Both were unsuccessful. Instead bank staff remained dependent
employees, encouraged by paternalistic benefits and obliged by rules to live social,
political and economic lives that supported the business of banking. Thus, in the absence
of any plausible alternatives or salient external foci, the social identity of the subjects of
this thesis was defined by the institutions they worked for; they became of the banks
that employed them, rather than for themselves.
For George Dorward
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Chapter 1: Introduction
"With his features of clerical cut,
And his brow so grim
And his mouth so prim
And his conversation, so nicely
Restricted to What Precisely
And if and Perhaps and But ... ", T. S. Eliot, Collected poems, 1909 - 1939,
(1939)
"Remember that these clerks and typists who look so unpleasantly like ants
as they stream over London Bridge at the rush hour, these clerks whom you
in your superiority despise - they too are human - they too are romantic"
Review of Angel Pavement, George Orwell, An Age Like this: The collected
essays, journalism and letters of George Orwell volume I, (1968)
1.1 Social history and the lower middle class
Until recently the middle classes as a whole were a neglected
subject of historical enquiry. A number of important studies have done
much to rectify this omission. Morris, for example, has outlined the
formation of an elite led middle class in the first half of the nineteenth
century, while Trainor has examined how this elite subsequently
exercised its authority1. However, this interest has rarely extended to
include those lesser figures, the small businessmen, dependent white-
collar employees and minor professionals, who made up the bulk of the
middle classes2.
This is despite the growth in their number and growing use of
the term lower middle class to describe them and their world from the
1870s3. Table 1.1 below shows how rapidly both male and female
clerical employment increased throughout the period of this thesis in
1 R. J. Morris, Class, Sect and Party . The Making of the British Middle Class, Leeds 1820-
1850, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990); R. Trainor, Black Country elites : the
exercise ofauthority in an industrialized area, 1830-1900, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)
2 S. Nenadic, "Businessmen, the urban middle classes, and the 'dominance' of the manufacturers
in nineteenth century Britain', Economic History Review, XLIV, (1991), pp. 69-73
3 G. Crossick, "From gentlemen to the residuum: languages of social description in Victorian
Britain" in P. J. Corfield (ed), Language, History and Class, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991),
pp. 173-174
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Table 1.1. The Growth of Clerical Labour in England and Wales, 1851 - 19314
Total Number of clerks (000s) ALL clerks (000s)





1851 93 2 95 27 68
1881 294 14 318 45 273
1891 381 33 414 64 350
1901 530 83 613 94 519
1911 677 166 843 157 686
1921 792 502 1,294 268 1,026
1931 882 583 1,465 - -
Source: F. D. Klingender, The Condition of Clerical Labour in Britain (1935),
appendix II, p. 108
England and Wales. Clerical employment also grew in Scotland, so
much so in the 1931 census commerce and finance formed the largest
single source of employment, accounting for 16.36 per cent of the
workforce or more than mining, quarrying, textiles, chemicals, gas,
water, electricity, bricks and pottery combined5. Despite this numerical
significance Crossick suggests the lower middle class has received little
attention because it did not form a significant political presence6.
Without the wealth and authority of the capitalist or collective might of
the trade unionist, it was the also ran in the British polity, able to vote
yet without a distinctive voice. In light of this it seems understandable
that historians have focused on the leaders and ignored the led. Yet a
lack of presence political or otherwise has not prevented a substantial
literature developing on the history of women, indeed, the cultural,
political and economic subordination of women is a key theme in social
history.
4 The figures for clerical employment are derived from the following census categories:
national and local government officials, law clerks, bankers, insurance clerks, accountants,
railway clerks and commercial clerks. Apart from 1851
5 C. W. Munn, "Financial institutions and the Scottish financial centre in the inter-war years",
in S. J. Connolly et al (eds) Conflict, Identity and Economic Development: Ireland and
Scotland, 1600 - 1939, (Preston: Carnegie Publishing, 1995) p.231
6 G. Crossick, 'The Emergence of the Lower Middle Class in Britain: A Discussion' in G.
Crossick (ed), The Lower Middle Class in Britain, (London: Croom Helm, 1977)
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Rather, the limited attention paid by historians to the lower
middle class is a consequence of how social history has developed in
Britain. Historians are naturally drawn to those who shouted the
loudest and unavoidably to those who left behind records. Often,
though not always, these were the wealthy and the powerful. For this
reason the neglect of the lower middle class appears understandable.
However, it is more than a matter of sources, it is also because the clerk
in particular is incompatible with a mode of history Weeks describes as
"History as Exhortation"7. Above all this has been influenced by E. P.
Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class, a history to "rescue
the poor stockinger, the Luddite cropper, the 'obsolete' hand-loom
weaver, the 'utopian' artisan, and even the deluded follower of Joanna
Southcott, from the enormous condescension of posterity"8. This
laudable mission has influenced generations of historians whose
recovery of lost lives has broadened the scope of academic history
(though occasionally producing histories preoccupied with the tragic
and conflict, whereas compromise and consensus often formed the
more usual course of events9). The lower middle class is incompatible
with this mode of history largely because their lives have been deemed
insufficiently fraught or tragic10. The historian on a mission has little
time for the subtle difficulties of those whose greatest disaster was often
no more than the failure to receive a hoped for promotion. Such
experiences as well as the social origins, aspirations and working lives of
this stratum are uncomfortably close to those of present day academics,
7 J. Weeks, "Uses and Abuses ofMichel Foucault", in L. Appignanesi (ed) Ideas from France:
The Legacy ofFrench Theory, (London: Free Association Books, 1989),
8 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, (London: Penguin, 1980), p.
12
9 P. Joyce, 'Work', in F. M. L. Thompson (ed), The Cambridge Social History of Britain,
1750 - 1950, vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); R. J. Morris, Class and
Class Consciousness in the Industrial Revolution, (London: Macmillan, 1979), p. 30
10 This refusal to take the concerns of clerks seriously is arguably a distinctively British trait.
Compare for example the seriousness and sympathetic attention paid to minor officials in Franz
Kafka's novels with the pathetic figure of the insurance clerk Leonard Bast in E. M. Forster's
Howards End
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so much so Mayer suggests this is another reason why historians have
chosen to neglect the lower middle class11.
Before proceeding any further it is necessary to clarify what
"lower middle class" has been taken to mean. Within it a line has been
drawn between an old lower middle class of small businessmen and
shopkeepers and a new lower middle class of dependent white-collar
employees. It is the latter category due to its growth that concerns us
here. Despite its apparent precision, the term lower middle class mainly
serves as a repository for those deemed too different in their way of life
to be labelled working class and not quite affluent enough to rank
alongside the middle classes proper. Hence, Best and Perkin use the
income tax threshold of £150 to define the upper limits of the lower
middle class during the third quarter of the nineteenth century, an
approach that threatens to obscure more than it reveals12. By this
definition lower middle class individuals were only ever those of
modest means. Anything more would catapult them up into the ranks
of the middle class proper, a form of social mobility that derives more
from categorisation than the experience of those involved. Moreover,
the immobile are by definition (and at best) the average and the
ordinary. In other words used carelessly lower middle class is a label
that can prejudice more than it assists social analysis.
Prejudice is an important part of how contemporaries
understood the lower middle class. In nineteenth century West
Bromwich clubs dominated by clerks were the ones working men
avoided, while Pelling notes there was little working class support for
11 A. J. Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problem", Journal ofModern History,
47, (1975), p. 409; For example Sheridan describes the typical academic career in the following
terms "You spend your life trying desperately to say something new, but not so new as to
lessen your chances of a Chair. You have to publish to get promoted ... You have a salary with
tenure and the publisher is happy if the machine ticks over. Your book is published in hardback
at £19.50 - the book is called The Sociology ofDeviance. The book appears on colleagues'
reading-lists and is bought by students. The circle of mutual self-interest is complete and our
sociologist of deviance continues in his totally undeviant way, safe in the arms of his support-
network" A. Sheridan, "The Death of the Author", in L. Appignanesi (ed), op. cit. , p. 44
12 G. Best, Mid-Victorian Britain 1851 - 75, (London: Fontana Press, 1971), pp. 99 - 100; H.
Perkin, The Rise ofProfessional Society, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 78 - 79
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the Liberal welfare reforms partly because the intended recipients did
not want the accompanying intrusion of lower middle class officials into
their lives13. Yet there were unacknowledged parallels between the two
groups. In nineteenth century Scotland the first steps taken by
organised labour into local politics were in support of measures to
reduce the rates14. However, it was only those lower middle class
individuals who called for similar changes that contemporaries labelled
"dirty brigades"15.
Similarly in labour history when "history as exhortation" has
combined with the study of politics, neglect has often given way to
outright hostility. Marx dismissed the lower middle class because they
were "conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll
back the wheel of history"16. An uncomfortable mix of Marxism and
elitism has produced similar sentiments amongst historians, largely
because until recently the Marxist, the neo-Marxist and the anti-Marxist
wrote the social history of class in Britain17. Those lower middle class
individuals who overcame their supposedly reactionary proclivities to
participate in socialist politics have either been depicted as honorary
proletarians or as an unwelcome, distorting presence. The latter is the
more usual. For instance, in a classic study Hobsbawm identified the
Fabian Society as an organisation dominated by lower middle class
individuals, then chided it largely on the grounds that it was too
13 R. Trainor, op. cit., p. 57; H. Pelling, Popular politics and society in late Victorian Britain:
essays, (London: Macmillan, 1968)
14 W. H. Fraser, in G. Gordon (ed), 'Labour and the changing city', in G. Gordon (ed),
Perspectives of the Scottish City, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1985)
15 F. M. L. Thompson, The Rise ofRespectable Society: A Social History of Victorian
Britain, 1830-1900, (London: Fontana Press, 1988)
16 Quoted in M. Savage, 'Career mobility and class formation: British banking workers and the
lower middle classes' in A. Miles and D. Vincent, (eds), Building European Society,
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); see also K. Marx and F. Engels, Manifesto
of the Communist Party, in L. S. Feuer, (ed), Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and
Philosophy, (New York: Anchor Books, 1959); and R. Q. Gray, The Aristocracy of Labour in
Nineteenth-century Britain c. 1850 - 1914, (London: Macmillan, 1981)
17 R. J. Morris, (1979)
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successful in publicising the wrong type of socialism18. Similarly, Knox
concludes socialism in Scotland between the wars was corrupted by
unspecified petty bourgeois influences; "Scottish labour lost its former
idealistic drive, its sense of historical mission and its distinctiveness and
has found no substitute since"19. Alternatively these accounts reveal
lower middle class individuals were a significant though unappreciated
presence, and, contra Crossick, capable of influencing policies and
platforms. In keeping with this, Stedman-Jones notes the Edwardian
educational programme of the London School Board was
disproportionately geared towards meeting the demands of clerical
families20.
Nevertheless, this thesis was originally intended to be a work of
labour history that focused upon trade unionism. Somewhat naively I
envisaged clear lines being drawn between capital and labour then
battle commencing. The element of originality would be the fact that
those involved were clerks not working men. To be a trade unionist
more often than not meant to be a socialist and trade unions provide
perhaps the purest expression of working class consciousness. Or so it
once seemed. The inadequacies of this approach and associated
assumptions soon became apparent as even amongst the "traditional
working class" membership and voting figures reveal trade unionism
and socialism although important remained minority pursuits21.
18 E. J. Hobsbawm, " The Fabians Reconsidered" in E. J. Hobsbawm (ed), Labouring Men,
(London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1964)
19 That the labour leaders studied by Knox included the three former teachers John MacLean, the
revolutionary Marxist, James Maxton, who led the disaffiliation of the Independent Labour
Party from the Labour Party in 1933, and Emrys Hughes, a leading ILP member who chose to
remain with the Labour party after disaffiliation, is one indication social structure is of limited
worth when attempting to account for the different varieties of Scottish socialism. W. Knox,
(ed) Scottish Labour Leaders 1918-1939, (Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1984)
20 G. Stedman-Jones, "Working-class culture and working -class politics in London, 1870 -
1900: Notes on the remaking of a working class", in G. Stedman-Jones, (ed), Languages of
class: studies in English working class history, 1832 - 1982, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), p. 228
21 M. Savage and A. Miles, The Remaking of the Working Class, 1840 - 1940, (London:
Routledge, 1994), pp. 1-17 & pp. 76-77; A. H. Halsey, Change in British Society from 1900
to the present day, 4th ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 90
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At a more fundamental level the linguistic turn and the
associated interest in postmodernism in the social sciences has called the
historical significance of socialism and of class itself into question. Issues
of identity are central to postmodernism, which depicts them as
multiple, mobile, fragmentary and contradictory, privileging none over
any other22. Attention has been drawn to other ways of knowing and
the determinism derived from economic and social structures existing
outside discourse, that, however qualified, is integral to class analysis
has been challenged. Patrick Joyce in particular has examined how the
consciousness of a class - meaning a social collective defined by its
common relationship to the means of production - is not necessarily the
consciousness of class23. Historians have rightly become more
circumspect about using class to explain social and political action and
class is accordingly used in this thesis for the most part as convenient
shorthand for already familiar social groupings.
But other ways of knowing pose other problems. As one of the
leading lights of the linguistic turn has recently written:
"It would be foolish to deny that there are processes in the past which are
not encompassed - or at least sufficiently or adequately encompassed by the
languages and discourses of the past. Urbanisation and population change
would be good examples of processes to diffuse to be considered the product of
any particular set of discursively framed intentions"24.
This acknowledges a role for the material, but what this is remains
unclear, a problem a focus upon language or attempts at theorising the
economic out of existence merely avoid25. Conscious of such limitations,
22 C. Reed, 'Postmodernism and the Art of Identity', in N. Stangos, (ed), Concepts ofModern
Art, 3rd ed., (London: Thames and Hudson, 1994)
23 P. Joyce, 'A people and a class: industrial workers and the social order in nineteenth-century
England', in M. Bush (ed), Social Orders and Social Classes in Europe since 1500: Studies in
Social Stratification, (1992), Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of
Class 1840 - 1914, (London: Longman, 1991), and Democratic Subjects: The Selfand the
Social in Nineteenth Century England, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
24 G. Stedman Jones, "The Determinist Fix: Some Obstacles to the Further Development of
the Linguistic Approach to History in the 1990s", History Workshop Journal, (1996), no. 42,
p. 27
25 see for example W. H. Sewell, "A Post Materialist Rhetoric for Labour History", in P.
Joyce (ed.) Class, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 174 - 180
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Savage and Miles argue it is necessary to move beyond the formal
structures of language and concentrate instead upon the concrete social
situations that mediate its production and reception26. This is a useful
corrective taken from an approach that argues class in a sophisticated
and qualified form still matters (though without clarifying why more so
than other ways of knowing). Yet those who dismiss and those seeking
to reclaim class analysis remain attached to studying much the same
actors and events as previous generations of historians, seemingly
content to reinvent already familiar wheels.
Instead this thesis is concerned with the social identity of bank
staff, who provide a key example of the lower middle class. Social
identity is how people were known and knew themselves27. It is an
inescapable attribute of social existence and one that due to its
generality avoids both the overly academic strictures evident in the
linguistic turn and those assumptions about the nature and conduct of
social relations inherent in class analysis. Social identities are presented
and negotiated, they evolve in given situations; that considered in this
thesis is the workplace. As banking has provided a recurring example of
clerical employment in historical and sociological accounts it is an
appropriate vehicle for this necessary task28.
Using the experience of work to consider social identity is a well-
trodden path in the social sciences. In his seminal article "Sources of
Variation in Working-Class Images of Society" the Neo-Weberian David
Lockwood provides a sophisticated means of linking the experience of
work to broader forms of political and social awareness29. Work
matters, yet its consequences are not always so apparent. Forms of
26 M. Savage and A. Miles, The Remaking of the British Working Class, 1840-1940,
(London: Routledge, 1994), p. 18
27 R. Jenkins, Social Identity, (London: Routledge, 1996)
28 G. Anderson, Victorian Clerks, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1976).; D.
Lockwood, The Blackcoated Worker, 2n<^ ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989); S. Halford, M.
Savage and A. Witz, Gender, Careers and Organisation, (London: Macmillan, 1996)
29 D. Lockwood, "Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society", in A. Giddens
and D. Held (eds.) Classes, Power and Conflict, (London: Macmillan, 1982)
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consciousness and behaviour apparent in one environment need not be
of consequence elsewhere, a point Bailey has illustrated in an evocative
study of working class respectability using Goffman's interactionist
sociology to show how actors adapted to the situations and company
they found themselves in30. While bearing this qualification in mind, as
Grint makes clear work remains important:
"Work occupies a substantial proportion of most people's lives and has often
been taken as a symbol of personal value: work provides status, economic
reward, a demonstration of religious faith and a means to realize self-
potential".31
The position adopted here is that in complex, contingent ways work has
the capacity to constrain, shape and on occasion dominate, but need not
entirely determine social identity. Thus, work provides an important
and accessible, albeit partial perspective. When dealing with the history
of subjects who have received scant academic attention it provides a
beginning rather than an end.
1.2 An uneasy stratum? A history of the lower middle class in Britain
The neglect of the lower middle classes has not been absolute,
they feature in general social histories and dedicated studies have
occasionally appeared. In these attention has been paid to the apparent
dissonance between the economic position of clerks and their social
behaviour. Clerks were proletarians who depended on selling their
labour power to secure the wherewithal to live. In exchange they often
received rewards no greater than those paid to men in the upper
reaches of the "traditional working class". Yet clerks are regarded as
having strove to distance themselves from the working class, choosing
instead to ape the politics, dress and values of more elevated others; in
other words they aspired to live a middle class life on a working class
30 The original 1979 Journal ofSocial History Article has recently been republished as 'A role
analysis of working-class respectability', in P. Bailey (ed), Popular Culture and Performance in
the Victorian City, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
31 K. Grint, The Sociology of Work: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 1
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wage. The following section sets out then critically examines this
account, identifying the key issues to be addressed in this thesis.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the lower middle
class emerged as a distinctive social group, one that most obviously
dressed differently, but also played, read, ate, spoke and bred
differently as well. Comparing Paul Thompson's sketch of an
Edwardian clerk and his family with Hoggart's account of "traditional
working class" life illustrates this well32. The clerk's small family was
brought up in an environment concerned above all else with
establishing proper behaviour. The son was barred from playing in the
street. Instead he received an introduction to culture through piano and
violin tuition. His parents shared in this isolation, rejecting the
surrounding community central to working class life to form a social life
rooted in the home and a local Methodist chapel. The pub, the
continued sanctuary of the working class man, was noticeably absent,
indeed the clerk's family held a dread of alcohol and its effects. At the
clerk's dining table the strict observance of manners was insisted upon
and the food, supplemented whenever possible by home grown
produce constituted a routine frugality in contrast to the treats - the "bit
of what you fancy" - that broke the monotony of the working class diet.
This cultural distinctiveness became more pronounced over time.
Gray has charted the disengagement of the lower middle class from the
upper reaches of the working class in late-nineteenth century
Edinburgh33. Whereas in the mid-Victorian period skilled workers and
clerks were members of the same golf clubs, gardening societies and
mechanics' libraries, by 1891 none of these bodies had a membership as
occupationally mixed as it had been in 1871. Robert Roberts noted this
isolation and accompanying forms of behaviour and observed it gave
the lower middle class a distinctive place in early twentieth century
32 P. Thompson, The Edwardians, (1975), pp. 99-106; R. Hoggart, The Uses of Literacy,
(London: Penguin, 1957), pp. 72 - 94
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Salford34. Occupational segregation accompanied this growing cultural
divide. Miles argues there were much firmer boundaries between
working and middle class employment after than before 190035. When
working class children did eventually enter middle class work in
substantial numbers during the first half of the twentieth century it was
more a function of the expansion of the relative and absolute number of
such occupations than a breakdown in existing social barriers and was
typically confined to lower level forms of white-collar employment.
The physical manifestation of this separation, though it occurred
at different rates and to varying degrees throughout Britain, was the
movement of the lower middle classes out into the fringes of urban
centres. Along the London road in Manchester and in Hackney,
Islington and Holloway in London clerks began occupying a mass
suburbia, living in relatively homogeneous forms of housing36. After
the FirstWorld War lower middle class housing gained a distinctive
style when bungalows began being built in locations that embodied the
social position of their occupants37. On the outskirts of Glasgow
bungalows filled the gap between the substantial villas that made up the
wealthy suburb of Bearsden and the tenements and council estates that
dominated the nearby working class district of Maryhill. Thus, what
largely began as a product of the Victorian desire to categorise social
phenomena formed an increasingly distinctive social stratum on the
basis of its culture, lifestyle, location and values.
33 R. Gray, The LabourAristocracy in Victorian Edinburgh, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976),
pp. 106-109
-,4 R. Roberts, The Classic Slum: Salford Life in the First Quarter of the Century, (London:
Penguin, 1971), pp. 4-6
35 M. Savage and A. Miles, op. cit., p. 30; D. Baines and P. Johnson, "In search of the
'traditional' working class: social mobility and occupational continuity in interwar London',
Economic History Review, LII, (1999), pp. 692 - 713
36 F. M. L. Thompson, op. cit., pp. 172-175; M. Gaskell, "Housing and the Lower Middle
Class", in G. Crossick (ed), p. 163
37 R. Rodgers, "Urbanisation in Twentieth-Century Scotland", in T. M. Devine and R. J.
Finlay, (eds), Scotland in the 20th Century, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996),
pp. 141 - 143
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An important exception to the overall neglect of the lower
middle class is Anderson's study of Victorian Clerks, which argues the
culture of clerks was shaped by their declining economic fortunes38. The
rewards of clerical employment were never great to begin with,
however, from the 1870s clerical pay declined due to four factors, which
primarily served to increase the supply of labour ahead of demand.
First, greater access to secondary education following successive
education acts equipped more youths with the basic literacy and
numeracy skills necessary for clerical employment. Second, women
became an accepted source of clerical labour and were used in ever-
greater numbers to perform routine tasks. Third, the labour market
was swollen by the arrival of immigrant clerks who competed with
their British counterparts. Finally, whereas clerks had previously left
their employers to establish small, independent concerns, concentration
and reduced profit margins cut off this once important escape route.
More recently Guerriero Wilson has applied this argument to
Edwardian Glasgow, claiming the "ladder of success" once available to
clerks disappeared39.
In these accounts clerks form an increasingly uneasy stratum
whose declining fortunes provoked a "status panic"; a tendency to seize
upon minute cultural distinctions used to substantiate claims to a
superior social status that lacked economic foundation40. Driving this
behaviour was a desire to remain apart from the working class due to
fear, dislike and what Lockwood in a classic study described as an acute
status consciousness, wherein status was prized more highly than
economic rewards41. Accompanying it was a particular world view
dominated by a strong, moral commitment to the symbols and
institutions of the existing order, a perception of society as meritocratic
38 G. Anderson, ibid., 'The Social Economy of Late-Victorian Clerks', in G. Crossick (ed.)
39 R. Guerriero Wilson, "Office Workers, Business Elites and the Disappearance of the 'Ladder
of Success' in Edwardian Glasgow", Scottish Economic and Social History, (1999), 19, pp. 55-
75
40 C. Wright Mills, White Collar, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), pp. 239 - 258
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accompanied by an attachment to individual endeavour and a belief in
the innate worth of education42.
Variations of this "status panic" argument have been used to
explain the social and political behaviour of the lower middle class in
Britain and abroad. One argument is that as Marx concluded the lower
middle class formed a conservative influence opposed to any changes
threatening to their status and social position, hence the well-known
links between the lower middle class and support for conservative
politics43. Yet in a study of German politics Hamilton has shown the
assumed connection between clerks, or in the case of Germany the
Mittelstand, and reactionary politics is unfounded as National Socialism
appealed most to what he loosely describes as the upper classes44.
Closer to home, besides the Fabian Society the example of the Left
Book Club, the largest organisation to work in support of a popular
front against Fascism in 1930s Britain, reveals the lower middle class
was arguably the standard bearer of progressive politics. According to
one contemporary observer 75 per cent of the Club's members were
white-collar workers, for instance, one Essex group consisted of a
draughtsman, a doctor, a printer, a bank clerk, a dental mechanic, a
road mender, a teacher, a painter and several clerks45. Clearly, the
politics of the lower middle class were never entirely reactionary, nor
was there some reflex link between clerks, "status panic" and right-wing
politics. Therefore it is reasonable to question the explanatory power of
"status panic" more broadly in relation to the lifestyle decisions and
values of the lower middle class.
Moreover, on closer examination much of what is known about
the economic experience of clerks in Britain can be questioned, with
Anderson's account of economic distress open to various challenges. To
41 D. Lockwood (1989)
42 A. Mayer, op. cit.; B. Waites, op. cit., pp. 240-241
43 M. Savage, op. cit., p. 196
44 R. Hamilton, Who Voted For Hitler ?, (1982)
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begin with (as Anderson originally acknowledged) the threat of foreign
clerks was more symbolic than real46. Then there is his use as evidence
of the late-nineteenth century 'boy labour' problem - youths employed
without training in offices and warehouses to perform routine work
and frequently let go on reaching sixteen47. Although contemporary
investigations in 1904 and 1909 revealed a majority of Liverpool post
office messengers subsequently drifted into low paid, low skill work,
messengers were not clerks therefore their experiences while valid in
themselves are irrelevant48. This distinction is based on the fact clerks
frequently pursued formal careers during the course of their working
lives, routinely moving through a succession of hierarchically arranged
positions, exercising greater authority and earning progressively higher
rewards.
The significance of this distinctive occupational experience
becomes clear when we consider other ways in which the changing
structure of industry affected clerical employment. The suggestion by
Anderson that concentration meant clerks were no longer able to
establish their own concerns overemphasises the decline of small
business. More importantly, it only captures half of a broader transition.
In Westergaard and Resler's account as one door closed another
opened; "as the scale and complexity of organisation in both the public
and private sector grew ... promotion up the rungs of bureaucratic
hierarchies gradually displaced entrepreneurial activity"49. In other
words the ladder of success did not disappear, it changed as middle
management within a large organisation became an alternative to
command of some small concern.
45 S. Samuels, "The Left Book Club", Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 1, No. 2,
(1966), pp. 65 - 86
46 G. Anderson, (1976), p. 64
47 ibid., pp. 53-55
48 ibid., p. 55
49 J. Westergaard and N. Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society, (London: Heinemann, 1975) p.
326
14
However, Westergaard and Resler along with Lockwood
suggest promotion opportunities within the substantial bureaucratic
organisations that developed in Britain became rarer50. But, studies of
employment in the post office, the civil service and banking indicate
male promotion prospects were preserved and even enhanced by the
employment of women51. Typically, men monopolised the most
desirable positions, received higher salaries, held greater responsibility
and were promoted further and more rapidly (although this as with
the impact of female clerical employment in general is qualified by the
fact, as indicated in table 1.1, female clerical employment did not
become significant until the 1890s)52. Thus, in the absence of any macro-
studies of clerical pay or career prospects there are grounds for being
sceptical about the assumption clerical fortunes declined after 1870.
Certainly Hosgood in an examination of the work culture of
commercial travellers in Edwardian Britain found little sign of
insecurity53. Without such evidence the "status panic" thesis becomes
untenable.
Then there is the relationship between the lower middle class and
the middle class proper. In keeping with the status panic argument
Gray and F. M. L. Thompson suggest as the economic fortunes of the
lower middle class declined they adopted an archaic form of those
values they understood their social superiors adhered to54. The reasons
for this were straightforward; by aping the more affluent and socially
elevated clerks hoped to distance themselves from the working classes.
Due to the paucity of available research we simply do not know if this
50 ibid., p. 325
51 K. Grint, op. cit., pp. 83 - 84; A. Witz, "Gender and service-class formation", in T. Butler
and M. Savage (eds), Social change and the middle classes, (London: UCL Press, 1995), pp. 51
-52
52 For a recent discussion of the relationship between women and male careers see A. Witz,
ibid.
53 C. Hosgood. 'The "Knights of the Road": Commercial Travellers and the Culture of the
Commercial Room in Late-Victorian and Edwardian England', Victorian Studies, (1994), 37,
pp. 519-545
54 F. M. L. Thompson, op cit.; R. Q. Gray, "Religion, Culture and Social Class in Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Edinburgh', in G. Crossick (ed)
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was the case, but we can note imitation had limits. Seemingly oblivious
to the sensibilities of often-aloof observers, clerks in the comfort of their
own homes made their own amusements. As a bemused
Hammersmith vicar explained those living in his parish were
"quite quiet, respectable and inoffensive, but on warm evenings they will sit
at their open windows in their shirt-sleeves, drinking beer out of a pot, and
though they do it quietly it is not what I am accustomed to"55.
The charge of imitation also presupposes it was possible to chose.
The following exchange involving Dickens' Bob Cratchitt suggests
otherwise:
"The clerk in the tank involuntarily applauded: becoming immediately
sensible of the impropriety, he poked the fire, and extinguished the last
frail spark forever. 'Let me hear another sound from you ' said Scrooge 'and
you'll keep your Christmas by losing your situation'"56.
In this exchange the employer figures as an active and influential
presence in the lives of his subordinates, defining what was and was not
acceptable behaviour. In fact as in fiction masters often formed a near
omnipotent presence. Lockwood quotes one master who explained:
"Clerks, like officers in the army and navy, or like clergymen, have a
position as well as a salary. They pride themselves on that position. In
virtue thereof they indulge in much liberty of action, which other classes of
servants do not enjoy. They call themselves their masters' equals, and
demand recognition as such. And in dress, assumptions, everything within
their power, they follow this up, affording themselves much gratification,
and realizing substantial advantage from the nature of their vassalage.
Now, sir, let them consider this as part of their remuneration"57.
This provides prima facie support for arguments concerning the
importance of status. It also conveys an overbearing refusal to provide
any other rewards. Status may well have had some appeal, but on
occasion little else was on offer. Moreover, in this instance the observer
not the observed attached value to status without economic foundation.
55 H. Perkin, op. cit., p. 96
56 C. Dickens, A Christmas Carol, (London: Penguin edition, 1984) p. 15
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However, the problem of neglect is compounded by the
tendency of the lower middle class to maintain a polite silence. For
instance, Nenadic cites the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 as
an important example of that economic insecurity endemic to middle
class life as a whole58. To an extent it was. The City of Glasgow was an
unlimited concern brought down by years of false accounting and fraud
perpetrated by its directors and successive general managers. Its failure
ruined hundreds of shareholders and their families, prompting the
Reverend F. L. R. Robertson to accuse the culprits of having been:
"faithless to the high office to which they have been advanced by the
shareholders. They have been disloyal to the truth and to the first
principles of morality ... they trod the streets of the City, arrayed in the
garments of righteousness, making long prayers while they were devouring
widows houses and erecting churches while they were wrecking homes"59.
And so he should. The Reverend Robertson held £1,400 City Bank stock
on which £38,500 was eventually called. His ruination was the salvation
of the same widows and orphans he feared would be left destitute.
Unlimited liability in this instance reveals the often brute conflicts of
interest that existed within the middle classes. In this instance it served
to redistribute wealth from the top (the shareholders) to the bottom
(the depositors) of the middle class, guaranteeing the savings of
thousands at the expense of hundreds who until disaster struck had
been content to take dividends raised ahead of every other Scottish
bank - from 5 per cent in 1863 to an eventual 12 per cent in 1877 - to
silence critics60. We would be mistaken to ignore the inaudible sighs of
relief that must have accompanied such disasters in favour of often self-
serving public proclamations. A more definite example of tension
within the middle classes is provided by Hobsbawm's account of 1930s
57 quoted in D. Lockwood, (1989), pp. 30 - 31
58 S. Nenadic, The Victorian Middle Classes", in W. H. Fraser and I. Mavor, (eds), Glasgow
Volume II: 1830-1912, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 294-295
59 R. N. Forbes, "Some contemporary reactions to a banking failure", The Three Banks
Review, (1979), 121, p. 46
60 RB 419, "Dividends of the Scotch Banks"
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jazz aficionados, who he suggests were predominantly lower middle
class young men for whom jazz was a revolt "against the world of
upper-class culture, as reached through the public school and 'varsity"61.
Thus, as savers, employees and consumers the interests of the lower
middle classes were not always the same as the investors, employers
and producers presumed to have led them. For this reason a study of
employment is vital as it allows such conflicts of interest to be examined
along with the extent to which more powerful and affluent others -
employers - played an active part in the lives of clerks.
Before proceeding it is necessary to make one important
qualification; the issue of gender receives only limited attention in this
thesis due to the transitory employment of women and resource
limitations. This is not to say it is unimportant. Women began working
in Scottish banking during the FirstWorld War, then made way for
men returning from the trenches, until being permanently reintroduced
towards the end of the nineteen thirties. During this period the women
who worked in banks were known formally as lady clerks, informally,
they were the girls. Both labels reveal banking was regarded as a male
preserve, one where it was unnecessary to identify a clerk as a man.
Thus, bank employment was not gender neutral, rather it was defined
on the basis of distinct notions of masculinity. Women were only ever
present somewhere in the background, usually in subordinate roles as
housewives, mothers or girlfriends, each charged with facilitating male
careers62. And masculinity was an important part of how others
perceived clerks with clerking often regarded as being a less than manly
activity, an issue considered below, but only as part of the broader
concern with social identity.
To summarise the discussion so far, the previous section drew
attention to the fact the lower middle class has received scant academic
61 E. J. Hobsbawm ("Francis Newton"), The Jazz Scene, (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,
1989), pp. 238-242
62 A. Witz. op. cit.
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attention and identified this as a consequence of the ideological
development of social history in Britain. It also noted the term itself has
limited analytical worth. This section has examined what analysis there
has been, charting the emergence of the lower middle class during the
later nineteenth century as a culturally distinctive social stratum. It was
shown that "status panic", an argument that depicts the social and
political life of clerks as a reflex response to their declining economic
fortunes, has dominated what accounts there are of the lower middle
class. But, it was argued much of the evidence presented in support of
this does not withstand close scrutiny, nor, particularly in politics, do the
links between clerks and right-wing or elite politics appear as
straightforward as has been assumed. Similarly, a cursory examination
of contemporary events indicates relations within the middle classes
were more complex, or at least possessed more tensions than has been
assumed. In light of this the first task of this thesis is to establish what
the economics of clerical employment were and following on from this
to accurately describe the labour market experience of clerks. The
second task is to assess the importance of status as a means of
understanding the social and cultural life of clerks. The third task is
more diffuse; it is to examine how accurate a guide the key elements of
the clerical mentality set out above are to the values and behaviour of
the subjects of this thesis, and in so doing consider the content and
conduct of their relations with other groups in society.
1.3 Employment and identity in Scottish banking, 1850 -1939
Having identified the main issues to be addressed in this thesis
the remainder of this introduction outlines the necessary analytical
framework. This thesis examines a diverse range of issues using a
variety of methodologies and sources. Analysis occurs at the level of the
Scottish banking sector and in relation to specific institutions.
Consequently, this thesis is a wide-ranging study that adopts an eclectic
approach and is therefore not amenable to a broad methodological
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overview. Instead the following section outlines the specific topics to be
considered in individual chapters, indicating where appropriate the
approaches used to address them.
To begin with there is the belief derived above all from Marx that
the economic mattered. This and the centrality of economic rewards to
existing accounts combined with the latter's apparent limitations is why
the first chapters of this thesis are intended to support a more
convincing account than currently exists. The example of labour history
can assist in this process. Despite originating in Britain as the study of
the institutional development of trade unions, in recent years the role
played by management in shaping industrial relations has been
increasingly recognised. So much so there is arguably a new paradigm
wherein managerial concerns and the concomitant imperatives of
competition have taken centre stage63. This recognition of commercial
constraints as a significant influence upon employment practices is of
particular relevance. From a different perspective Milgrom and Roberts
explain "The decision about the number and sort of people to recruit
depends on an organisation's strategy, technology, and forecasts about
the future"64. Similarly, Moschandreas notes that to understand
employment arrangements "we must examine the nature of the
product produced and the conditions under which it is traded"65. These
assertions indicate that it is necessary to begin with an examination of
the business of banking in Scotland, which is undertaken in chapter 2.
This details the structure of the sector and bank organisations,
competitive arrangements, the services provided and the conduct of
banking, to provide a context that informs the subsequent analysis of
employment and social identity.
63 T. Adams, 'Market and institutional forces in industrial relations: the development of
national collective bargaining, 1910-1920", Economic History Review, L, (1997) p. 506
64 P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management, (London: Prentice
Hall International, 1992), p. 339
65 M. Moschandreas, Business Economics, (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 476
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However, before doing so chapter 3 considers the development
of the Royal Bank of Scotland. Our understanding of the lower middle
class is restricted by the paucity of available research, in particular what
are essentially quantitative statements concerning careers are almost
entirely based on impressionistic accounts. Yet various organisations
including the Scottish banks produced detailed staff records amenable
to quantitative analysis. Recent developments in information
technology make it possible to analyse the large volume of nominal
data these contain, allowing vague notions to be replaced with more
accurate conclusions. Even so, cost and time constraints restrict the
scope of any research project. In this instance it was deemed necessary
to concentrate on the records of a single bank. The Royal Bank of
Scotland was chosen because its records were suitable and available.
This specific focus makes it possible to examine how factors capable of
affecting change came into being as opposed to discerning general
trends in the population as a whole. But, such detail needs to be set
against problems of typicality. Therefore the primary purpose of
chapter 3 is to outline the development of the Royal Bank of Scotland,
to establish how representative it was of Scottish banking as a whole,
before proceeding to examine employment in chapters 4, 5 and 6.
The literature surveyed earlier in this chapter has identified a
transition in clerical employment from a partial reliance on external
markets to a near complete attachment to careers spent within
substantial organisations. This is a key component in what economists
describe as an Internal Labour Market (ILM). Competing theories
drawn primarily from the economics literature are used in chapter 4 to
account for the development of employment as an ILM at Royal Bank
of Scotland during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century66. It
is argued during this period that employment arrangements underwent
66 See the definition of an internal labour market given in chapter 4 and also P. Osterman,
(1984) 'The Nature and Importance of Internal Labor Markets', in P. Osterman, (ed), Internal
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significant change, before reaching a form retained until after the
Second World War.
Chapter 5 assesses the rewards of bank employment over the
period 1873 to 1914 in two ways. First, the dimensions of Royal Bank
careers - recruitment, tenure, geographical mobility and the rate and
extent of promotion - are examined quantitatively. Second, the
complete package of financial rewards staff received is identified and its
worth then estimated and assessed over the course of each career, and
by comparison between successive cohorts of recruits. The conclusions
reached are then related to the broader issue of clerical living standards.
Alongside the experience and rewards of bank employment in
Scotland an important aspect of Scottish bank employment regularly
noted by historians of banking is the mass emigration of staff67. This is
considered in chapter 6. Where staff went and what they did is
identified, as is how they got there and why they left to produce an
account of what is identified as a sophisticated, international market for
bank labour.
Chapter 6 then proceeds by considering the cultural
consequences of emigration, paying particular attention to perceptions
of other countries and of emigration itself. This is used to examine how
the subjects of this thesis perceived Scottish society, in particular to what
extent the praise of emigrants and other lands supports the contention
that the lower middle class adhered to a belief in the worth of
established institutions and regarded Scottish society as meritocratic.
In chapter 7 the history of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland is
used to consider the collective-status of bank staff. Professional
associations form an interface between social aspirations and economic
goals; professions operate by establishing controls over the market to
Labor Markets, (1984); Creedy, J. and Whitfield, K. 'The Economic Analysis of Internal Labour
Markets', Bulletin ofEconomic Research, 40, (1988), pp. 247-269
th67 see for example A. W. Kerr, The History ofScottish Banking, 4 ed. (1926)
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create an artificial scarcity in the supply of labour68. Status is integral to
this process serving to legitimise controls that confer economic
advantages, which in turn shore up the status claimed as well as the
independence, security and self-confidence necessary to make such
claims in the first place. Furthermore, professionalisation necessitated
discussion of where bank clerks were located in what was perceived as
a definite social order. Therefore, the history of the Institute is an
appropriate point (as well as a source of relevant material), at which to
assess the importance of status and consider the social identity of the
subjects by examining how they regarded and related to other social
groups.
The final chapter examines the emergence of bank trade
unionism between the wars, another area where "status panic" has been
used to explain the behaviour of clerks; trade unions were perceived as
working class and therefore something to be avoided. Yet the
formation of meaning is a more complex process than this (admittedly
simplified) argument allows; meaning is asserted, qualified and
contested through a dialogue wherein the resources interested parties
are able to deploy in support of their own interpretation constitute a
crucial element69. At its most basic trade union membership is evidence
of at least dissatisfaction with the status quo as it signals a felt need for
the intervention of another agent besides the employer and employee
in the employment relationship. Thus, examining the origins and
development of bank trade unionism is a means of considering the
conduct and content of the employment relationship. However, there
remains the specific meaning of bank trade unionism. An examination
of how this developed is again used to critically assess the role of status
in understanding the social behaviour and attitudes of clerks as well as
the accuracy of the clerical mentality set out above.
68 H. Perkin, op. cit.
69 R. Williams, Keywords, 2nd ed. (London: Fontana Press, 1983)
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In overview this section has outlined the three parts of this thesis.
The first (chapters 2-3) considers the business of Scottish banking and
of the Royal Bank of Scotland. The analysis uses existing historical
accounts and the records of the Royal Bank. It is intended to establish
what type of organisation banks were, what they did and how they
fared. The second part (chapters 4 - 6) is concerned with the economics
of bank employment and is based upon the records of the Royal Bank
of Scotland and the Institute of Bankers in Scotland. In general terms
this outlines the procedures used to recruit, train, allocate, motivate and
reward staff, then undertakes a quantitative analysis of recruitment,
staff tenure and promotion. In addition the related subjects of
emigration and the worth of bank employment are considered. The
third part (chapters 6-8) uses bank records alongside those of the
Scottish Bankers Association, the Institute of Bankers in Scotland and
the Ministry of Labour as well as contemporary banking and financial
journals. Here the goal is to critically assess the role of status in
understanding the behaviour of clerks as well as those key points set
out above regarded as making up the clerical mentality. The question of
social identity is then considered directly in the conclusion.
To clarify the broad aims of this thesis; it uses bank employment
as an example with which to consider the social identity of the lower
middle class in Britain during the period 1850 -1939. As such it is the
first major study of a then emergent social stratum in Scotland and will
provide a critical reassessment of existing British accounts. By utilising
economic and sociological theory it will break down disciplinary
barriers to produce a social scientific history, placing issues raised in
these other disciplines in historical perspective. As part of this
innovative use is made of information technology to allow the
quantitative assessment of staff records, which is in turn integrated with
a qualitative analysis ofwritten records.
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Chapter 2: The Business of Banking in Scotland, 1844 - 1939
2.1 Introduction
This chapter and the next provide a context that informs the
subsequent analysis of bank employment. They are concerned with the
development of banking in Scotland first at the level of the industry as a
whole then through a detailed examination of the Royal Bank of
Scotland. Andrew Kerr, banker, founder and first secretary of the
Institute of Bankers in Scotland pioneered the historical study of
banking in Scotland in the 1870s. Sydney Checkland in his Scottish
Banking: A History subsequently developed much of the methodology
and chronology Kerr introduced. This study draws on both authors,
ordering the history of banking over the period in question into three
successive phases set out below through which it is argued the sector
passed. These are differentiated primarily on the basis of industrial
structure, organisational form, competitive arrangements and
approaches to asset management. Where it can claim some originality is
in its detailed examination of relations between the banks. In particular,
it considers the origins and development of a bankers' cartel formed to
control competition by regulating interest rates and charges. It argues
the resultant commitment to collective agreement had a significant
impact on the structure and nature of banking in Scotland, contributing
to the great stability of the sector particularly after 1878, as well as
facilitating an apparent conservatism that acted as a brake upon
innovation and change.
Completing the system, 1844-78 - During the three decades after
the 1844-45 bank acts the structure, conduct and scope of Scottish
banking attained a form largely retained until after the Second World
War. Banking became a stable oligopoly dominated by a single tier of
joint-stock banks; substantial concerns organised as integrated
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hierarchies, with numerous shareholders, note issuing rights and a
national or at least supra-regional branch network. The distinctively
dominant figure of the Scottish general manager also emerged during
this period and - after the traumatic failure of the Western Bank of
Scotland in 1857 - began regularly meeting with his peers to set the
terms of competition between the banks in Scotland. The last major
addition to bank organisations occurred in the 1860s and 1870s when
the banks began opening London offices. This was accompanied by
English concerns about the geographical scope of Scottish banking
eventually resolved in the 1870s when both sides tacitly agreed to keep
to their respective sides of the border. This transitional era ended in
1878 with the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank, the last great
Scottish bank failure.
Control and competition, 1878-1918 - after the City of Glasgow
failure Scottish banking until 1918 was dominated by a commitment to
collective agreement. This varied in intensity over time, but proved
capable of withstanding internal divisions and deflecting external
attempts at inducing unacceptable forms of competition. The cost of this
stability was a degree of conservatism, which held innovation in check.
Using the annual accounts first published in 1865 and subsequently
compiled by Checkland it is possible to chart what effects this had upon
the growth and composition of bank assets within the constraints of the
Scottish economy. In this respect two characteristics are key: first, the
relative, then absolute slow down in their rate of growth; and second,
the increasing emphasis placed on holding reassuringly liquid assets,
which involved a shift from lending to investing in marketable -
typically local, national and international government - securities.
Transition, 1918-39 - the period between the wars was one of
continuity and change. The General Managers' Committee remained in
place despite the acquisition of 4 Scottish banks as affiliates by 3 English
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banks. The ongoing commitment to collective agreement and the
equilibrium it imposed thwarted and delayed proposals to alter the
range and marketing of bank services. In addition, proposed mergers
between the remaining Scottish banks that threatened to upset the
prevailing equilibrium also failed. All this was indicative of novel
tensions that saw competition between the banks in Scotland becoming
more intensive, but continuing to occur through prescribed channels,
primarily the opening of an ever increasing number of branches. At the
same time the conduct of banking became more professional as full-
time agents managed a growing majority of branches, working within
ever more elaborate organisational structures geared to encouraging
deposit gathering. Consequently, on a balance sheet basis the banks
grew ahead of the British economy. As the ability to lend constrains the
willingness to gather deposits, this was a notable achievement given the
sustained difficulties experienced elsewhere in the Scottish economy.
Indeed, the problem of finding suitable lending opportunities was a
recurring theme throughout the 1930s. The achievement of growth
despite this is explained here as primarily a result of the increased
availability of government securities and increased lending outside
Scotland undertaken at the banks' London offices.
2.2 Completing the system, 1844 -1878
Banking in Scotland began the nineteenth century as a hierarchy
of public, private and provincial banks. By 1850 it was dominated by a
single tier of joint stock banks. Driving this transformation was the
widespread adoption of branch banking, a process dependent upon
administrative innovation - the development of bureaucratic
arrangements that allowed the centralised control of entire banks.
However, completion entailed more than structural change, it also
involved permanent arrangements being reached for the conduct of
competition and inter-bank diplomacy in Scotland through what
became known as the General Managers' Committee. Finally, it saw the
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geographic scope of the banks' business being defined in the 1870s.
Thereafter, the banks were to experience decades of relative calm.
Joint-stock banking began in 1810 with the formation of the
Commercial Bank of Scotland whose founders from the outset made
innovatory use of branches. The first branches had primarily served to
increase the circulation of bank notes; subsequent branches added more
lending outlets. In both these ways branches often replaced local
correspondent arrangements, allowing administrative economies and
informational advantages to be achieved. At the same time a system of
round tripping had developed whereby those requiring credit would
approach one of the small Edinburgh based private banks, which if
agreeable would borrow the necessary funds from a public bank,
adding a few points to the credit in the process. Commercial Bank
branches were pointedly intended to end this. By allowing market-
based transactions to be conducted within the confines of a single
organisation, they enabled it and borrowers to side-step the private
banks. These new branches offered the complete range of banking
services; accepting funds on deposit receipt or current account and
lending via cash credits, overdrafts and bill discounting. However, their
primary purpose was to gather deposits to be lent elsewhere1. Gaining
access to greater lending resources in this way allowed a larger lending
business to be conducted more safely. The geographical dispersal of
branches gave insulation from the fortunes of individual regions and
industries, a spreading of risk and consequent scale of operations that in
itself increased public confidence and encouraged more people to open
bank accounts. These benefits were and remained a powerful impetus
to the adoption of the joint-stock form and during the period 1825 to
1844 20 concerns were formed along similar lines to the Commercial
Bank.
1 For a description of banking services see C. W. Munn, Clydesdale Bank The First One
Hundred and Fifty Years, (Glasgow: Collins, 1988A), pp. 22-26
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The intense competition that ensued drove out earlier forms of
bank organisation. Provincial banks, though comparable in structure to
joint-stock banks, were organised on a smaller scale and therefore
incapable of safely meeting the growing demand for larger individual
credits. They along with the private banks, out of favour with the public
and the public banks, retired from the scene. The three public banks
formed by state charter - Bank of Scotland, the British Linen bank and
the Royal Bank - already comparable in scale on a balance sheet basis to
the joint stock banks - having operated rudimentary branch networks
since the eighteenth century, adopted joint-stock banking. Thus, the
hierarchical structure of Scottish banking gave way to a single tier of
substantial private and public concerns conforming to the joint-stock
form. This transformation ended with the Bank Charter Act and
legislation of 1844-45. By removing the right to form new note-issuing
banks, without which no bank was considered tenable in Scotland, this
legislation posed a permanent and substantial entry barrier that
effectively ended the possibility of any more banks being established in
Scotland.
Thereafter the system was refined rather than altered. The last
private bank was acquired in 1843 and over the next two decades the
few remaining provincial banks and smaller joint stock banks
disappeared. Once Bank of Scotland acquired the Central Bank of
Scotland in 1868 all that remained were the five banks headquartered in
Edinburgh: the public banks, plus the Commercial Bank and the
National Bank; and in Glasgow the Union Bank, the City of Glasgow
Bank and the Clydesdale Bank; plus the smaller Northern banks - the
Town and Country and the North of Scotland in Aberdeen and the
Caledonian Bank in Inverness. Although minor changes involving the
Northern banks subsequently occurred (in 1907 Bank of Scotland
acquired the Caledonian Bank and in 1908 the North of Scotland and the
Town and Country Banks merged), this structure remained essentially
intact until after the Second World War. In a system dominated by the
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central belt banks, the failures of the Western Bank in 1857 and the City
of Glasgow Bank in 1878 considered below, were important exceptions
to this overall stability. However, in terms of structure these merely
served to tip the balance of the sector permanently towards Edinburgh.
But, even taking these failures into account, the structure of banking in
Scotland was largely complete by 1844 and virtually static after 1878.
Banks failed elsewhere, a continuous trickle in England, but not in
Scotland2.
General managers who enjoyed a degree of authority unique to
Scotland managed the banks. In England general managers became the
'great servants' of the banks, holding responsibility for daily managerial
matters, but leaving strategic decision-making to directors3. A Scottish
general manager instead viewed directors with a mixture of loyalty,
respect and occasional scepticism, and his board as something else that
required careful management. For instance, when discussing a venture
with his peers one general manager remarked "with boards of directors
having to be handled carefully, at the present stage of development the
bringing in of that side of the question too prominently might cause
some of them to go to bed for a month"4.
This separation of ownership from control was partly a
consequence of the increased scale and complexity of bank
organisations following the adoption of branch banking. The agents
who ran the first branches were controlled via financial disincentives;
they provided bonds and accepted partial responsibility for losses.
Administrative procedures were developed to supplement then replace
these and at Royal Bank a hierarchy of trust developed. Its Port
Glasgow and Rothesay branches were run as sub-branches to the
2 F. Capie and G. Wood "Money in the economy, 1870 - 1939", in R. Floud and D.
McKloskey (eds) The Economic History ofBritain since 1700, Volume 2: 1860 -1939, 2nd
ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 228(
3 Y. Cassis, "Management and Strategy in the English Joint-Stock Banks, 1890-1914",
Business History, 27, (1985), pp. 301-315,City Bankers, 1890-1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), pp. 115-121 and "Bankers in English Society in the Late Nineteenth
Century", Economic History Review, LXIII, (1985), pp. 210-229
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nearby Greenock branch whose agent was responsible for supervising
his sub-agents via their accounts and was responsible in turn to the
Cashier (the general manager) who periodically visited the branches to
inspect the books. The sheer volume of branches and business soon
made this too demanding a task for the Cashier to fulfil as well as his
other responsibilities. Instead supervision that had been indirect,
intermittent and fragmentary, became ongoing, penetrating and
routine. In every bank control was centralised and practical
responsibility delegated to specially devised head office departments
concerned with the administration of the entire bank. A contemporary
textbook identified these as the cheque office (responsible for current
accounts), the bill office, the correspondence office, the accountant's
office (responsible for entire bank bookkeeping), the law department
and the inspector's department5. The business of each branch was
monitored via a range of accounts sent to the inspection and
accountant's departments on a weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual
basis. These rendered immediately visible the inadequacies and
successes of individual agents, while making it possible to assess the
performance of the whole. Business was conducted in accordance with
specially devised regulations set out in the rule books produced at each
bank and issued to agents. These were updated by regular circulars,
which notified agents of procedural changes. Finally, inspectors
randomly descended on each branch at least once a year to inspect its
accounts, cash, staff, fixtures and fittings. These well-developed
monitoring procedures and the agents' continuing responsibility for
loans made without head office approval, plus the opportunity to
achieve scale economies in bank administration via task specialisation,
meant there was no aversion in Scotland as there was initially in
4 Letter to Commercial GM , CS 205
5 A. Kerr "Arrangements and Functions", in A. Kerr (ed) Scottish Banking During the Period of
Published Accounts, (1898), p. 112
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England to the opening of branches on the basis of agents being difficult
to control6.
However, organisational scale and complexity also featured in
England. What was different about Scotland was the particular
transformation the system underwent in the first half of the nineteenth
century. Private banks remained a constant feature in England and
private bankers subsequently gained a key role in the strategic
management of English joint-stock banks. Private bankers had also
formed an influential presence in the boardrooms of the Scottish public
banks. Beneath them the Bank of Scotland Treasurer and Royal Bank
Cashier as their titles implied were originally more clerks than
managers, primarily responsible for keeping an accurate record of cash
transactions. The disappearance of private bankers, and in the case of
Royal Bank their ejection from the board in response to shareholder
disquiet, left a vacuum the Cashier and Treasurer eagerly filled. In
doing so they remade themselves as general managers replete with
executive powers, leaving the directors, though retaining ultimate
authority, to accept a lesser role as advisors and confidants to their
executive.
To find men capable of combining the lending skills of a banker
with the mastery of administrative detail necessary to manage the
complex bureaucracies banks became, directors initially looked beyond
the confines of their own organisations. The Glasgow banks favoured
recruiting from the professions. The first manager of Union Bank was a
manufacturer and merchant, then from 1862 to 1910 it was managed by
one accountant, Charles Gairdner, then another, Robert Blyth,
previously manager of the Scottish Amicable Life Assurance Society7.
The public banks preferred recruiting already proven managers from
other banks. In 1886 Hamilton Hotson left the sub-managership of the
6 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp.78-79
7 N. Tamaki, The Life Cycle of the Union bank ofScotland, 1830 - 1954, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1984), p 190
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Bank of Liverpool to manage the British Linen Bank and was succeeded
in 1912 by James Tuke, formerly manager of the Union bank of
Australia. Similarly, Bank of Scotland recruited David Davidson from
the Bank of Montreal in 1863 and George Anderson from the North of
Scotland Bank in 1896. Although seemingly disparate, these men were
actually bound together by Scottish origins and close, often personal
ties. For instance, Thomas Smith began his banking career as a Bank of
Scotland apprentice and later worked alongside Hamilton Hotson in
London before being recommended for the managership of National
Bank in 1881 by the Bank of Scotland Treasurer David Davidson whose
brother was a National Bank director8.
The ultimate expression of the general managers' authority was
the General Managers' Committee where they met to set the
Agreements and Understandings (the 'A and Us'), which regulated
competition between the banks in Scotland. This was the product of
self-interest - the desire to protect profits by preserving an adequate
margin between rates paid and rates charged - underpinned by the
belief competition in banking was so fierce any competitive advantage
introduced by one would quickly be adopted by all eroding any
advantage and leaving market share unchanged, but acquired at
greater expense. The stable, oligopoly, which characterised the structure
of the industry after the early 1840s, favoured collusion, as did the close
ties between the general managers. Moreover, the branch networks
and the note issue presented substantial entry barriers no institution
was either willing or able to overcome, ensuring collusion could occur
with limited outside interference. Yet it still required the traumatic
failure of the Western Bank in 1857 before the general managers'
8 For biographical information on the general managers see Moneta, Scottish Banks and
Bankers, (Edinburgh, 1904); C. W. Munn (1988A); C. A. Malcolm The History of the British
Linen bank 1746 - 1946, (Edinburgh: T and A Constable, 1950), pp. 216-221; In addition every
issue of Scottish Bankers Magazine published during the period of this study began with a
career profile of a senior Scottish bank official.
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permanently agreed to avoid mutually disadvantageous price
competition.
To a large extent this was because opinions about what were
acceptable forms of competition varied on a regional basis. Edinburgh
bankers led various attempts to end competition on the basis of interest
rates and charges, striving to enshrine quality of service, access to
banking facilities and the willingness to lend as the sole points of
competition9. However, Glasgow bankers remained attached to price
competition - varying interest rates and charges - which made Glasgow
the most competitive as well as the largest market for banking in
Scotland10. Consequently, Edinburgh bankers arranged meetings
where Glasgow bankers set the rates. As the Commercial Bank board
informed its Glasgow Agent, regardless of their own opinions they
would abide by whatever he agreed to in Glasgow11. Committees were
established and agreements reached, however, as John Thomson the
Royal Bank Cashier until 1846, noted; agreement only lasted as long as
it suited any individual bank12. In 1850, for example, when the public
banks set new rates and arrangements for calculating interest favouring
banks over depositors, certain Glasgow banks rejected both and quickly
exploited the advantage this gave them to attract new business13.
Tensions emerged within and between the Edinburgh banks when the
Royal Bank Glasgow Cashier adopted Glasgow ways to the stated
displeasure of his board and Bank of Scotland14. Asked to explain
himself he explained as other gentlemen in the city were in the habit of
considering themselves free from any obligations whenever a meeting
failed to reach agreement, he considered himself similarly unobliged
9 S. G. Checkland, Scottish Banking A History, 1695 - 1973, (Glasgow: Collins, 1975), pp.
391-392
10 C. W. Munn, 'The Development of Joint-Stock Banking in Scotland, 1810 - 1845', in A.
Slaven and D. Aldcroft (eds) Business, Banking and Urban History, (Edinburgh: John Donald,
1982)
11 RBM 6th Jun. 1849
12 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p.391
13 RBM 16th-Jan. 1850
14 RBM 30th Nov. 1853 and 7th Dec. 1853
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and free to compete for business on their terms. The establishment of
the Glasgow clearing house in 1856 saw meetings became more settled,
but they continued being held in Glasgow, a symbol of the Edinburgh
bankers' willingness to meet Glasgow on its own terms15.
Historians have already detailed and debated the failure of the
Western Bank in 1857, but have not commented on its effects upon
subsequent inter-bank relations16. Yet it was arguably the catalyst that
enabled the Edinburgh view to be imposed on Scotland. The Western
Bank had been the main dissenter from the Edinburgh orthodoxy; its
failure removed a substantial barrier to collective agreement. However,
every Glasgow bank had at one time or another taken its side. The
details of the failure and accompanying damage done to the reputation
of Glasgow banking, which saw depositors running primarily to the
Glasgow banks to withdraw their savings, made this unlikely
thereafter. During the Western Bank's negotiations for aid the
Edinburgh banks promised assistance on the condition that it was
wound up. The Union Bank, also in a precarious position, sided with the
Edinburgh banks in exchange for substantial assistance. The City of
Glasgow was less fortunate and when depositors withdraw their
deposits en masse; it too closed its doors. Although the closure was
temporary, the damage to its reputation was permanent. Of the
Glasgow banks only the Clydesdale Bank emerged relatively
unscathed. However, subsequent events soon confirmed the newly
established Edinburgh dominance. In 1858 Clydesdale Bank
(re)introduced time deposits, paying a higher rate on deposits
repayable at one month's notice17. The facility was an immediate
success, but was withdrawn following pressure from the other banks.
This, Munn suggests, is evidence of a loss of confidence and of the
15 IOB letters 24th Feb. 1933
16 R. Saville, Bank ofScotland A History, 1695 - 1995, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University
Press, 1996); S. G. Checkland, op. cit.; N. Tamaki, op. cit. ; R. Campbell, "Edinburgh
bankers and the Western bank of Scotland', Scottish Journal ofPolitical Economy, 1, pp. 133-
148
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growing co-operation taking place between the banks18. Symbolically,
after 1857 meetings to set the rates were only ever held in Bank of
Scotland's Edinburgh boardroom.
Besides setting interest rates and charges what became known as
the agreements and understanding or 'A and Us' of the General
Managers' Committee provided Scottish banking with a code of
conduct. By 1901 the A and Us were set out in a nine-page booklet
containing fifty points for the guidance of agents and head office
officials19. Written without ambiguity, they were the cumulative
products of experience and an acute sensitivity to any act open to
interpretation as conferring a competitive advantage based on price.
Consequently, advertising, charitable donations and canvassing (or
poaching) customers were all prohibited. The 'A and Us' became an
ever more elaborate means of squeezing out that discretion, which had
existed in the relationship between a banks and its customers. Point
three, section one, for example, stated
"Under no circumstances are bills to be held over by a branch undiscounted, on
the understanding that in the event of a rise on the Bank of England rate
being announced, they are then to be discounted at the old rate"20.
In this way arrangements agents once made for preferred customers
(and themselves) gave way to uniform treatment.
The major exception to this self-conscious egalitarianism was the
banks' London interests. These were managed at the banks' London
offices, the last major addition to Scottish bank organisations during this
period. Bank of Scotland considered opening in London in 1844, as did
Clydesdale Bank in 1855 and Royal Bank in 185621. However, the first
bank to actually do so was the National Bank in 1864, quickly followed
17 C. W. Munn (1988A), p.53 - 54
18 ibid.
19 Agreements and Understandings Among the Banks in Scotland, 21st October 1901, RB
257/7
20 ibid.
21 S. G. Checkland, op. cit. pp. 481-482; C. W. Munn (1988A); p. 73; N. Munro, The
History of the Royal Bank ofScotland, (Edinburgh, 1928), p. 242
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by its Edinburgh and Glasgow rivals. A London office fulfilled three key
functions: it allowed the direct management of cash reserves and
investments; gave direct access to commercially relevant information;
and as at any branch took deposits and lent locally. Within a few years
these outposts of Scottish banking acquired a further defensive
function; they allowed banks to meet the needs of existing large
mercantile and financial customers finding a London account
increasingly necessary. In 1883 and left behind by its rivals, the
Commercial Bank opened a London office primarily to preserve its
Scottish interests due to fears that existing customers would be lost to
rivals eager to meet more than their London needs22. There it joined the
other Scottish offices as an accepted though periodically unwelcome
presence in the City, lending to English and international customers,
underwriting public and private share issues and investing overseas,
but, kept firmly outside the London clearing house, reliant on English
clearers for access to its facilities23.
After 1874 London was also the only location south of the border
where the Scottish banks were allowed to operate. This was a
consequence of the Clydesdale Bank opening branches in the North of
England in 1874, which prompted fears amongst English bankers and
their parliamentary supporters of a Scottish invasion. They united to
put pressure on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to end the Scottish
note issue which English banks were obliged to relinquish if they
wished to operate in London24. No bill was passed, instead, the other
Scottish banks, acting to protect their developing London interests,
persuaded Clydesdale Bank to curtail its English expansion25. Thereafter
22 CS 188 Report by Manager on a London Agency, March 1883,
23 For details of the often antagonistic early response to the Scottish banks in London see N.
Munro, op. cit. pp. 274-275; M. Gaskin, "Anglo-Scottish Banking Conflicts, 1874-1881",
Economic History Review, XII, (1959 -60), pp.445-455
24 S. G. Checkland, op cit., pp. 483-484; C. W. Munn (1988A) pp. 96-98. To an extent it was
an unfair advantage given that in accordance with the 1844-45 Bank legislation, any English
bank operating within 65 miles of London had to relinquish its note issue.
25 Minutes of Meeting of Scotch Banks in the Westminster Palace Hotel 17th Mar. 1875
contained in UGD 129/3/1/5 Clydesdale Bank Branches
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both sides tacitly agreed to keep to their own side of the border with
the London offices the only foray into England (apart from the
Clydesdale Bank's few northern branches) the Scottish banks were
allowed. Thus, the decision to retain the note issue locked the Scottish
banks out of England. The relative calm that ensued was subsequently
broken by the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878, an unlimited
concern brought down by fraudulent accounting practices that had
allowed substantial bad debts to be disguised as assets for years. The
failure ruined thousands of shareholders across Scotland; its impact is
discussed in more detail below.
2.3 Control and competition, 1878 -1918
After 1878 the control over competition achieved by internalising
market-based transactions and reaching formal, collusive agreements to
restrict competition, continued without any interference from new
entrants to banking in Scotland. The banks grew, but largely within the
confines of the Scottish economy and without undergoing any
significant change in their organisational form or the services provided.
The industry as a whole passed into a soporific state that remained
unbroken until after the FirstWorld War. During this period
administrative efficiency was seemingly prized more highly than
innovation, indeed, change when proposed was resisted and Scottish
banking became marked by an apparent conservatism that revealed
itself in various ways.
Continued restrictions on price competition encouraged other
forms of competition, particularly the expansion of the branch
networks. Consequently, the Scottish banks achieved then retained a
higher degree of market penetration than in England as measured by
the number of branches per 1,000 people (see table 2.1) This was a
notable development in a poorer country based upon several unique
features. Whereas in England the lack of capable branch managers was
held to be a restriction on branch banking in the first half of the
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nineteenth century, Scottish banks began branch banking using local
businessmen as part-time agents, paying them annual salaries of as little
as £50. The agents' own business premises were often used for the
conduct of bank business. This allowed branches to be opened at
minimal expense and the cost of investing in dedicated premises to be
delayed until a location proved itself worthwhile. In England part-time
agents came and went, in Scotland they persisted, accounting for 20 per
cent of all Agents in 192426. The Scottish banks also made intensive use
of apprentices as a source of cheap labour (this is discussed in more
detail in later chapters). Finally, the note issue remained a source of
cheap till money. It was only when the total worth of notes issued by a
bank exceeded the levels set in the 1844-45 legislation, that they
incurred the cost of being covered by balances kept with the Bank of
England; a cost an effective note exchange system kept to a minimum27.
The rate of branch openings varied over time (see table 2.1
below) indicating competition varied in intensity. After the City of
Glasgow failed the general managers divided its branches and deposits
out amongst themselves. Once this windfall was secured competition on
the basis of branch banking gave way to a series of mutually agreed
branch closures. For instance, in 1880 the Union Bank board resolved
that
"This Bank was to withdraw from Neilston in favour of the Clydesdale
Bank; and the Clydesdale Bank to withdraw from Bathgate in favour of
this Bank .... It was further agreed that a donation of £150 should be paid,
after the lapse of one year, to the present Agent of the Clydesdale Bank in
Bathgate, provided their deposits business shall then have been in main
transferred to this Bank28.
Such agreements continued throughout the 1880s and 1890s allowing
the branch networks to be consolidated; unsuccessful branches were
26 Scottish Banker, Nov. 1924, p. 146; W. F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of
Joint Stock Banking, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936), pp. 135 - 136 & p. 257
27 M. Gaskin, "The Profitability of the Scottish Note Issues", Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, 1, (1956), pp. 188-204
28 Minutes of the Board of Directors of Union Bank quoted in N. Tamaki, op cit., p. 151
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Table 2.1. The density of bank offices in Scotland, England and Wales, 1850-1937












1850 17 438 6500 426 1094 16129
1875 11 910 3800 358 1959 12346
1900 10 1078 4149 164 4570 7042
1912 8 1217 3846 57 5634 6452
1937 8 1888 2646 21 10118 4049
* The total number of joint-stock and private banks and bank offices operating in
England and Wales.
Source : Tables 2.4, 2.5 & 7.3 in M. Collins, Money and Banking in the UK A History,
(1988) and RB 419, A Statistical Analysis of Scottish Banking
closed and business gained elsewhere that rival banks agreed not to
poach.
However, more branches were opened than closed and an
element of chess featured in the siting of new branches, for example,
some branches were established solely to impede a rival's progress. But,
the notion Scotland had enough branches, which emerged alongside the
Clydesdale Bank's English invasion apparently persisted as the
subsequent growth of the networks was only sufficient to keep pace
with the Scottish population (see table 2.1 above). Whereas the number
of people per branch had fallen from 6,859 in 1845 to 3,800 in 1875, this
fell back to 4,193 after the 1878 failure where it approximately remained
until the 1910s29. This was despite or more likely because of the
increasing wealth of the population as well as the growth of the middle
classes - the main suppliers of bank deposits - and shift in age structure
towards middle-aged groups with a greater propensity to save and
invest, developments with the potential to increase the volume of
deposits held at existing branches30. Mutually agreed branch closures
ended in the 1900s when the North of Scotland Bank, having previously
confined its activities to North East Scotland, began opening branches in
29 RB 419, No. of branches of the Scottish banks, pp. 104-108
30 M. Edelstein, "Foreign investment and accumulation, 1860-1914", in R. Floud and D.
McCloskey, op. cit.
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central belt locations. In the more competitive climate that ensued, and
encouraged by the decline in total bank deposits (at current prices) that
began in 1900 and continued until 1905, the growth of the branch
networks accelerated once more. However, the ratio of people to
branches first reached in 1875 remained unsurpassed until 1921.
Acting together the general managers contained attempts by
outside bodies to induce unacceptable forms of competition. In the
1860s, 1870s and 1880s organisations engaged in substantial urban
development schemes successfully pitted banks against each other.
When the commissioners of the Dundee Gas company and Hamilton
town council put their credit needs out to tender, Royal Bank lost out to
the lower rates offered by Clydesdale Bank and only eventually won
some of this business after agreeing preferential rates for the Dundee
town chamberlain31. Thereafter, terms one bank might have no
alternative but to accept were collectively refused. At Musselburgh in
1891 rival agents drew up a roster amongst themselves for sharing out
the town council's accounts32. On a larger scale in Edinburgh the general
managers drew up their own list of customers whose accounts were
rotated between the banks and continued adding to this list throughout
the period of this study. Another threat resisted was the 1880 Savings
Bank Bill intended to lift the ceiling on savings bank deposits to £30033.
Restrictions on savings bank accounts prevented the more affluent,
who would otherwise be bank customers, from exploiting the
frequently higher rates paid on savings bank deposits. In response the
collective voice of the General Managers' Committee argued forcefully
against the proposal, which was subsequently dropped and only
successfully revived in 189334.
Compared to the often transitory price fixing agreements
reached in other industries, the over-riding impression is that the
General Managers' Committee constituted a stable, wide-ranging and
31 RBM 4th & 29th Sep. 1868 and 22nd Oct. 1873
32 RBM 2nd Nov. 1891
33 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 487-488
34 The same tactic was recommended when the limit on savings bank accounts was reconsidered
three years later; Letter to Bank of Scotland Treasurer on Interest Rates, dated 14th Apr. 1884,
NS 227
41
influential arrangement35. Towards the end of the nineteenth century
managers no longer even needed to attend to consider themselves
bound by its decisions and only once did a bank leave the 'A and Us'
following a dispute over the interest paid on deposits. After 1865
interest on deposit receipts fell from an average of 2.67 per cent during
the years 1866 to 1875, to 2.54 per cent over the subsequent decade,
then to 1.93 per cent during the years 1885 to 189636. When the rate was
to fall below two per cent for the first time in 1885 the Inverness based
Caledonian Bank refused and left the "A and Us"37. This and the
payment of a higher deposit rate won public support, but achieved little
else. The Caledonian was too small and its business too geographically
confined to have much effect beyond discomforting the Inverness agent
of the Town and Country Bank. In 1888 the Caledonian returned
somewhat chastened to the fold38. Thus, ended the only serious revolt
against the 'A and Us'.
This imposed order did not go unnoticed or escape criticism. In
public the banks were regularly criticised by the Glasgow Chamber of
Commerce for operating a stultifying monopoly39. In private, a
manager of the main Royal Bank Glasgow office argued "the Banks
should adapt their rules to the requirements of their customers and the
public and not require the public to shape their business methods to suit
the banks"40. However, the London interests of the banks remained an
important exception to the "A and Us". There - as the Secretary of the
Commercial Bank explained - "the banks were "not Scotch but English
Banks .... when money is abundant they undersell the Bank of England
and compete for discount business .... according to the judgement of its
officials"41. Discussions about London revealed further limitations. On
the eve of opening its London branch the Cashier of Royal Bank had
35 O. M. Westall, "The competitive environment of British business, 1850-1914", in M. W.
Kirby and M. E. Rose (eds) Business Enterprise in Modern Britain: From the eighteenth to the
twentieth centuries, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 223-230
36 A. Kerr, "Characteristics of the Period", in A. Kerr (ed), pp. 9-10
37 RB 438 15th Jun. 1885
38 RB 438 19th Nov. 1888, North British Economist, No. 2, 1889
39 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1885, p. 170; North British Economist, No. 11,
1889, No. 2, 1892 & No. 10, 1896
40 RB 61/3, Memo for Mr. Wright on Interest on Deposit Accounts, 13th Sept. 1912
41 Memo on Interest Rates CS 187
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asked his National Bank and Bank of Scotland counterparts about their
London affairs. The National Bank Manager gave the following curt
response: "while as a matter of courtesy and with a desire to meet this
enquiry I have done this, I do not feel myself to be under any obligation
to answer special questions"42. London became an outlet for
competitive pressures otherwise constrained in Scotland, and as
business there grew further tensions emerged concerning the
preferential terms given to Scottish customers in London and whether
this was a means of circumventing the 'A and Us'. Various agreements
addressed this issue, but were unable to completely resolve it given the
need for such activity to be voluntarily disclosed and for at times
arbitrary distinctions to be drawn between Scottish and London
business43.
Nor do Scottish customers appear to have suffered unduly at the
hands of a bank cartel. A winning entry to the 1904 Institute of Bankers
in Scotland essay competition compared the rates and charges of the
Scottish banks with those of unnamed English country banks during the
period 1895-1903, and concluded credit in Scotland tended to be
cheaper44. Although Scottish rates had taken their lead from the Bank of
England since the mid-nineteenth century, Scottish discount rates
tended to remain lower, there was no charge for operating a current
account and overdraft rates averaged the same. However, Scottish
deposit rates, while tending to rise higher also fell further so that over
the longer term deposits were less remunerative.
Rather, the primary cost of co-operation was the rigidity it
imposed. Whereas in the 1830s and 1840s unrestricted competition
encouraged experimentation in forms of acceptable lending and
security, after 1857 such initiative was stifled45. The fate of time deposits,
first introduced by the Western and Clydesdale Banks in 1847, then
42 RB 153, copy of letter dated 19th Oct. 1873 and reply included in minutes dated 23rd Feb.
1874
43 for example in 1930 the general managers agreed to try and restrict the transfer of Scottish
business to London solely to get better rates; NS 210, Minutes of Meetings of Bank Managers,
6th Oct. 1930
44 IOB 2/1/17 anon., "The Scottish Banks in their Relations with their Customers and the
Public" (entry to the 1904 Institute of Bankers in Scotland annual essay competition)
45 C. W. Munn (1982), p. 117
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temporarily reintroduced by Clydesdale Bank in 1858, exemplifies
this46. Time deposits when available proved highly popular and the
depositors who rushed their savings from one bank branch across the
street to another to secure the extra half percent on offer, proved
acutely price sensitive. The withdrawal of the facility left an unsatisfied
demand eventually met by the Edinburgh agents of foreign banks.
Whereas in January 1891 the Scottish banks paid 2 per cent on deposits
lodged for at least a month, the New Oriental Bank paid 5 per cent on
deposits lodged for at least 3 years and the Commercial Bank of
Australia 4 and a quarter per cent on deposits lodged for at least
eighteen months47. However, foreign banks lost much of their lustre
after the Australian bank crisis in 1893. Banks there had invested heavily
in land, railways and agriculture, sectors that earned low returns in the
1880s, then the Australian economy fell into a recession that culminated
in 54 of the 64 Australian Banks operating in 1891 closing their doors in
189348.
Charles Gairdner used the Australian crisis to defend the Scottish
position. In his influential opinion time deposits were unnecessary in
Scotland49. Australia lacked a financial market comparable to London,
thus Australian banks, lacking ready access to liquid assets, used time
deposits to limit the reserves necessary to maintain liquidity (it is
noteworthy that the Western Bank, regularly chastised for operating
with minimal reserves, was the joint-pioneer of time deposits in
Scotland). This critique exemplified both an attachment to liquidity and
the importance of tradition in determining the parameters of banking
as in Gairdner's opinion there were certain things a Scottish bank
simply did not do; time deposits were a "modern deviation from the
ancient principle" (meaning mutually self-liquidating advances and
deposits; all deposits and advances are repayable on demand, therefore
the liquidity of assets and liabilities are perfectly matched), suitable for
mortgage or investment companies, but not banks. His response
46 RBM 29th Dec. 1847
47 see the various rates advertised in the North British Economist, Jan 1891
48 G. Jones, British Multinational Banking 1830-1990, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp.
63-65; D. Greasley & L. Oxley, "A tale of two dominions: comparing the macroeconomic
records of Australia and Canada since 1870", Economic History Review., LI, (1998), p.304
49 North British Economist, No. 10, 1893
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typified the view of financial services as a segmented sector wherein
specialised companies offered a particular range of services in
compartmentalised markets50.
However, the stasis that affected banking in Scotland was not
entirely self-imposed as whatever the general managers might agree to
another more implacably conservative influence emerged towards the
end of the nineteenth century. In 1896 D.R.W. Huie, then Royal Bank
Cashier, proposed charging customers who deposited shares for safe¬
keeping and accepting partial responsibility for the shares. He had
unsuccessfully proposed the scheme before (and it was considered
again after the FirstWorld War), but did not expect it to succeed for, as
he confided to the Treasurer (general manager) of Bank of Scotland:
"I know that even though my views are approved by the Scotch banks, no
real progress can be made until the English banks are also convinced"51.
The English banks, then also in the process of replacing competition
with co-operation, rejected such a radical change.
Geographically and competitively constrained, the relative scale
of Scottish banking declined. Whereas until the 1880s to be 'of Scotland'
denoted a bank unmatched in size anywhere else in the world,
thereafter it signalled a more regional status. The City of Glasgow Bank
when it failed with total liabilities of £12.4 million and 133 branches, had
dwarfed the substantial English Bank brought down in its wake, the
West of England and South Wales District Bank, which held total
liabilities of £3.4 million and operated 49 branches52. However, by then
a sustained process of concentration driven by merger was already
underway in England53. As in Scotland, small country banks gave way
to joint stock banks operating at a regional then national level.
However, the process went further in England, culminating in the
emergence of the Big 5 during the FirstWorld War. Concentration and
the greater scope for business in England saw English banks overtake
then dwarf the Scottish banks. For example, in December 1917 the
50 M. Collins, Money and Banking in the UK A History (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 201-
202
51 RB 474, Letter from D. R. W. Huie to Sir George Anderson, 5th Oct. 1896,
52 M. Collins, "The banking crisis of 1878", Economic History Review, XLII, (1989), p. 530
53 F. Capie & Rodrik-Bali, G, "Concentration in British Banking 1870-1920, Business
History, 24, (1982), pp. 280-292
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1865 693 59.62 5.33 2.77 9.43 3.10 80.26 1040
1870 772 63.23 5.51 5.08 9.40 3.63 86.85 1153
1875 910 81.54 6.59 8.21 9.79 4.99 111.11 1317
1880 891 77.92 5.58 4.87 9.05 5.05 102.48 1379
1885 934 81.52 5.76 3.98 9.05 5.76 106.09 1315
1890 975 91.93 6.50 5.05 9.05 5.73 118.26 1468
1895 1013 94.34 7.27 4.61 9.30 6.86 122.38 1546
1900 1075 107.35 8.09 4.89 9.30 8.06 137.69 1922
1905 1159 100.95 7.54 5.48 9.30 9.08 132.35 2088
1910 1221 106.48 7.13 5.32 9.23 9.50 137.65 2216
1915 1251 140.41 12.55 6.53 9.23 8.10 176.82 3183
1920 1283 279.23 29.36 11.37 10.08 9.13 339.17 5982*
1925 1536 240.94 21.67 9.68 11.41 14.13 297.84 4644
1930 1659 256.08 21.40 7.88 13.10 19.02 317.49 4685
1935 1868 308.50 21.89 15.25 13.52 19.87 379.03 4721
1939 1854 331.06 26.24 18.24 15.29 20.61 411.45 5958
. * Southern Ireland excluded from this point.
Sources: Table 44 in S. Checkland, Scottish Banking A History, 1695-1973, UK GDP
at Market prices derived from National Accounts Table 5, B. R. Mitchell, British
Historical Statistics
Midland Bank held £220,552,000 on deposit and in 1919 operated 1,444
branches compared to the Scottish banks' combined deposits of
£196,540,000 in 1917 and 1,264 branches in 191954.
Within this framework of relative decline the annual accounts
published by the banks from 1865 allow the growth and changing
composition of Scottish bank liabilities and assets to be examined (see
tables 2.2 above and 2.3 below)55. Collins explains that in English
banking "as the banks became larger and the business of banking more
secure, a smaller capital base would be needed to maintain public
confidence or to act as a buffer against future losses"56. Similarly, in
Scotland capital declined almost continuously from 15.62 per cent of
54 Figures for Midland Bank derived from W.F. Crick & J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., p.323 &
347; Scottish figures derived from S. G. Checkland, op. cit., table 44, p. 745
55 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 729 - 751
56 M. Collins, "The Business of Banking: English Bank Balance Sheets, 1840-80", Business
History, 26, (1984) p.49
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total liabilities in 1865 to 10.74 per cent in 1914, despite frequent
additions to reserves. This left deposits, the banks' primary lending
resource, the largest single form of bank liability. Deposits increased
gradually from 74.28 per cent of total liabilities in 1865 to 77.36 per cent
in 1910, then 78.94 per cent in 1914. Adjusted to 1913 prices, deposits
grew at 1.99 per cent per annum from 1865 to 1885, increasing as a
percentage of UK Gross Domestic Product from 7.72 per cent to 8.07
per cent. From 1886 to 1914 growth slowed to an average of 1.24 per
cent per annum, consequently the banks held a declining share of
British bank liabilities, while deposits fell to 6.21 per cent of UK GDP in
1910.
That the banks held a smaller slice of a growing British cake
before 1914 is unsurprising given the growth of banking in England and
the development, expansion and diversification that occurred across the
financial services sector in which Scottish entrepreneurs and companies
were leading figures. Life assurance companies offering pension
schemes and annuities prospered and in 1887 the three largest Scottish
companies were the largest in Britain. Investment trusts, pioneered in
Dundee and Edinburgh in 1873 to channel funds overseas, increased in
number, while the share manias witnessed earlier in the century had
given way to professional stockbrokers catering to the needs of clients
on stable local exchanges where dealing took place in a growing range
of stocks and shares57. All these developments increased competition
for the surplus funds of the middle classes at the same time as
competition for the smaller saver intensified. The Post Office savings
bank established in 1861 joined the thriving savings bank movement of
which the Glasgow Savings Bank was the largest and most influential of
57 For the development of the Scottish financial sector see R. Michie, Money, Mania and
Markets (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1981); C. W. Munn, "Financial institutions and the
Scottish financial centre in the inter-war years", in S. J. Connolly, R. A. Houston and R. J.
Morris (eds), Conflict, Identity and Economic Development Ireland and Scotland, 1600-1939,
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1995); and "The emergence of Edinburgh as a financial centre", in A.
J. G. Cummings and T. M. Devine (eds) Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since
1700\ (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1994); C. Schmitz, "The Nature and Dimensions of Scottish
Foreign Investment, 1860 - 1914", Business History, 39, (1997), pp. 42-68
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its kind in Britain58. Friendly societies offering a range of saving
schemes for avoiding the economic consequences of illness, short-term
unemployment and the ignominy of a pauper's grave also attracted a
growing number of members.
These developments constituted a phase of 'financial
sophistication' wherein a range of financial services and institutions
developed in response to the needs of a maturing and increasingly
sophisticated economy's demand for a variety of financial assets59. But,
in an increasingly competitive and diverse market the actions of the
banks undoubtedly contributed to the relative decline in deposits. The
consolidation of the branch networks, the sustained reduction in
interest paid plus the collective refusal to diversify the range of services
on offer increased the appeal of alternative methods of saving and
investing. As deposits were only sought when they could be profitably
and securely placed, this apparent reticence is best explained by a
combination of conservatism and the self-confessed difficulties
experienced in finding suitable lending opportunities in Scotland60.
Fewer deposits avoided the pressure faster growth would have placed
upon the banks to find new lending opportunities or additional lines of
business. Therefore, it was in keeping with the apparent conservatism
of the banks and ensured the 'A and Us' remained intact and in place.
On the other side of the account the changing composition of
bank assets provides further evidence of cautious conservatism. In
theory the Scottish adherence to the principle of mutually self-
liquidating assets and liabilities obviated the need to hold liquid
reserves. In practice advances were never perfectly liquid and banks
58 On savings banks in Scotland see A. Slaven and M. Moss, "From Ledger Book to
Laserbeam", (Edinburgh: TSB Bank Scotland, 1992)
59 For a discussion of 'financial sophistication' see M. Collins, 'The Growth of the firm in the
domestic banking sector', in M. W. Kirby and M. E. Rose op. cit.
60 For a brief survey of how bankers saw their prospects in Scotland at this time see the
selected comments from annual reports included in A. Kerr, "Profit and Loss", in A. Kerr (ed);
A. Cameron, Bank ofScotland 1695 - 1995 A Very Singular Institution , (Edinburgh:
Mainstream, 1995), p. 146 & p. 161, refers to the "continued difficulty of finding profitable
new lending opportunities in Scottish industry"
48
Table 2.3. The Assets of the Scottish Banks 1865-1939, (in Emillions at current
prices)
Invest¬ Liquid Total
Year Advances ments Assets Property Assets
1865 56.78 10.64 11.75 1.08 80.26
1870 61.54 11.48 12.61 1.21 86.85
1875 80.78 13.77 14.99 1.58 111.11
1880 65.01 16.66 18.15 2.66 102.48
1885 65.70 18.58 19.07 2.74 106.09
1890 63.94 26.97 24.28 3.07 118.26
1895 67.61 26.17 25.20 3.41 122.38
1900 74.88 25.94 32.81 4.06 137.69
1905 74.72 24.00 29.22 4.41 132.35
1910 75.79 26.16 31.07 4.63 137.65
1915 68.29 60.86 43.04 4.64 176.82
1920 145.21 113.08 76.38 4.50 339.17
1925 129.33 103.24 60.34 4.93 297.84
1930 142.62 106.38 63.80 4.68 317.49
1935 115.88 182.59 75.87 4.70 379.03
1939 130.74 187.01 88.87 4.83 411.45
Source: table 44 in S. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 743-746
operated with what Presnell describes as a 'basket of assets' of varying
degrees of liquidity used to meet routine demands for cash61. Cash
(gold and silver coin, the notes of other banks and of the Bank of
England and balances with the Bank of England), money at call and
short notice (loans to other banks and financial institutions for very
short periods and readily convertible to cash if needed) and negotiable
securities (primarily British government Consols) formed the liquidity
reserve.
Once the reserve was set the remaining assets were used for
lending, which took three main forms. First, banks discounted bills of
exchange. As cheques largely replaced bills of exchange in British
commerce, the discount business of the banks was increasingly
concerned with bills used in international trade. Properly managed, bills
made up a portfolio that regularly turned over. A certain proportion
61 quoted in J. E. Wadsworth, "Banking Ratios Past and Present", in C. R. Whittlesey and J.
S. G. Wilson (eds), Essays in Money and Banking, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 230
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were due each day, while a bill issued by a firm of good reputation was
potentially a highly liquid asset as it could be re-discounted - sold on to
another party before payment was due - although on principle banks
refused to do this for much of the period62.
Second, banks lent against stocks and shares, a practice
pioneered in Scotland by the short-lived exchange banks specifically
formed to lend against railway shares63. Initially it was feared this
would encourage gambling in shares and the banks remained formally
aloof until the winter of 1847-8 when the exchange companies,
inherently unstable due to the narrow scope of their business, collapsed.
Thereafter, the banks cautiously adopted this line of business.
Third, banks lent to individuals, trade, industry, voluntary and
public sector organisations via cash credit and advances. Both facilities
were repayable on demand. The cash credit functioned in much the
same way as an overdraft, customers were granted a credit line they
were free to draw on and repay at will. Ideally, cash credits covered
timing differences between cash entering and leaving a business,
however, Munn has shown accounts often acquired outstanding debits
that remained unpaid for years64. Thus, banks to an unknown extent
provided medium, possibly even long-term capital besides meeting
working capital requirements.
As a general rule the more liquid an asset; the ease and rapidity,
with which it was convertible to money and available to meet the
withdrawal of deposits, the less remunerative it was, placing
profitability in potential conflict with security. With no legal guidelines
or restrictions in place the banks were formally free to set their own
liquidity ratios: the relationship between the liquidity reserve and the
total balances customers held in their accounts. Until 1878 the Scottish
62 M. Collins, (1988), op. cit., pp. 106-111
63 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 342-345; A. Kerr op. cit., pp. 213-17
64 C. W. Munn, "Aspects of Bank Finance for Industry: Scotland 1845 - 1914", in R.
Mitchison and P. Roebuck (eds) Economy and Society in Scotland and Ireland 1500 - 1939,
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1988B)
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banks adhered to what Checkland named after the general managers of
Bank of Scotland and the British Linen Bank the Blair-Corrie doctrine65.
This held a bank should hold assets in highly liquid forms to the value
of a quarter to a third of the sum of its note issue and deposits, with the
remainder available for lending. Only the ill-fated Western Bank
dissented from this doctrine, indeed, until 1878 the overall tendency was
to err slightly on the side of caution as the liquidity reserve generally
accounted for slightly more than a third of deposits plus notes.
The high proportion of bank assets held in highly liquid forms
reassured the public until the City of Glasgow Bank failure sparked off
what Collins identifies as a British-wide liquidity crisis66. With self-
conscious calm the general managers acted to restore public confidence.
However, the content of internal discussions belies the carefully
projected calm exterior. Even at Royal Bank, which operated with state
sanctioned limited liability a substantial memo was prepared with
outside legal advice detailing precisely the nature of its limited status67.
The memo was soon used to reassure concerned shareholders at the
next annual general meeting68. Every bank introduced a range of other
measures to restore confidence: they stopped dealing in their own
shares, a practice brought into disrepute by the City of Glasgow Bank;
and appointed independent auditors to inspect their annual accounts.
The audit became what Power describes as a ritual of "risk reduction"; a
transparent means of inhibiting such deviant behaviour as had been
exhibited at the City of Glasgow Bank to the satisfaction of shareholders
and customers69. The unlimited concerns also adopted limited liability
under the terms of the 1879 Companies Act, itself a response to the
failure, establishing reserve capitals to be called upon in the event of
65 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 448-450
66 M. Collins (1989), op. cit.
67 RBM 23rd Oct. 1878
68 RBM 22nd and 25th Nov., 1878
69 M. Powers, "The Audit Society", in A. Hopwood & P. Miller (eds), Accounting as Social
and Institutional Practice, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
[X
51
failure to meet the liabilities of the banks beyond the value of their
existing capitals.
Besides these tangible effects the failure had further
psychological consequences. Checkland described it as the great event
in the lives of Scotland's bankers, one "conditioning thought and
actions, placing a great premium on safer and more conservative
banking"70. The failure was accordingly followed by a long-term shift in
the composition of bank assets towards more liquid forms. By 1888
investments plus liquid assets (including cash and money at call) had
increased to 49.94 per cent of deposits plus notes. This prompted Kerr
to conclude that amongst the general managers "(t)here appeared to be
a consensus of resolution towards strengthening their position"71. A
larger liquidity reserve became the new orthodoxy while investments
grew to an extent that prompted Kerr to suggest in the 1890s:
"the conduct of investment threatens to become as outstanding a department
of the banks' business as their legitimate vocation of banking" (meaning
advances)72.
This change was institutionalised by the first generation of clerks sent to
work in the London offices where they gained experience in this style of
banking, returning to Scotland in the 1880s to manage the banks. Until
then Glasgow (Edinburgh and Leith served a similar purpose for the
Glasgow based banks) had been the training ground for future general
managers, afterwards London replaced it and by the 1900s all the major
banks were part of this trend.
Checkland suggested this shift in assets was an excessive
reaction; having lent to the hilt until 1878 the banks swung to the other
extreme. In mitigation Collins notes British banks understood their
public preferred to see them holding a substantial proportion of their
assets in highly liquid forms, which the publication of annual accounts
70 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p.478
71 A. Kerr, "Characteristics of the Period", in A. Kerr (ed), p. 11
72 A. Kerr, "The General Position", in A. Kerr (ed), op cit., p. 24
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allowed to be readily assessed73. Perhaps the banks were also conscious
of who their shareholders were, for example, two fifths of Bank of
Scotland and Commercial Bank shareholders in the 1870s were women,
two-thirds of whom were single74. Whereas Argentinean tramways
were for the adventurous, a bank was something a maiden aunt could
feel safe investing her life savings in, and rightly so given the retention
of public confidence was essential to banking. Moreover, after 1878
bank liquidity was repeatedly subject to critical inquiries prompted by
events the banks had neither control over nor much involvement in,
including the Barings crisis in 1890 and the Australian crisis in 189375.
Furthermore, the formal freedom implied by self-regulation occurred
within tacit parameters set by government. Bank legislation remained
predominantly reactive throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries; however, the threat of legislative intervention was used to
steer banking. Thus, in 1907 the Chancellor of the Exchequer sent for
the general managers of three London banks and explained to them
that he preferred not to legislate if the banks voluntarily strengthened
their positions by holding 12 and a half per cent of their assets in cash,
12 and a half in money at call and 25 per cent in investments and loans
on the stock exchange leaving the remaining 50 per cent left over for
advances76. Finally, bank deposits changed in nature. In the more
complex and competitive financial services sector of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries Kerr explained:
"the character of the deposit money has largely changed. The investment
deposit which used to lie year after year undisturbed, except for interest
calculation, is a thing of the past. Bank deposits are now funds in transitu, or
at best, awaiting a more favourable opportunity for investment."77
73 M. Collins (1988A), pp. 241-242
74 E. J. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, (London: Penguin, 1969), p. 119
75 J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., p. 234
76 On the reactive nature of bank legislation see the numerous excerpts included in B. L
Anderson and P. L. Cottrell (eds), Money and Banking in England The Development of the
Banking System, 1694-1914, (London: David and Charles, 1974)
77 A. Kerr, "The General Position", in A. Kerr (ed), p. 16
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Greater volatility made an enlarged liquidity reserve necessary to
ensure any sudden large-scale withdrawals could be readily met.
Even so some doubts must remain. The use of time deposits to
maintain or even reduce pre 1878 liquidity ratios was rejected, while the
growing emphasis on investment persisted despite the falling worth of
Consols following the 1888 conversion of the national debt78. The scope
of bank investments was broadened in response, but only so far as local
and foreign government securities, and British and Indian railway
debentures, each a highly secure and liquid asset79. However, although
conservatism played a part so did the economic logic of the competitive
environment the banks maintained. Credit is only ever provided in
exchange for a promise to repay, while price is an insufficient means of
eliminating opportunistic behaviour; a promise to repay at either a high
or low rate is not proof of repayment80. Nevertheless, the risk of
default or loss attached to individual credits varies, for example, in
relation to the adequacy and realisability of the security held. Yet the
setting of common rates by the "A and Us" left little or no incentive to
diverge from what were judged acceptable forms of lending as there
was no scope for factoring assessments of risk into the cost of individual
credits. Long term lends, for instance, as a rule entail higher risk due to
the greater scope for default to occur, yet were no more remunerative
than short-term credit facilities despite the greater likelihood of bad
debt being incurred.
After decades of stable, but uninspired growth, the FirstWorld
War presented an opportunity taken to reflect upon the future direction
of banking and in expectation of this a number of general managers
retired, making way for younger men. Various schemes were
discussed, the most significant being the proposal to establish a joint
78 C. K. Harley, "Goschen's Conversion of the National Debt and the Yield on Consols",
Economic History Review, XXIX, (1986), pp. 101-106
79 RB 419 Annual accounts
80 A. Godley and D. Ross, "Introduction: Banks, Networks and Small Firm Finance", Business
History., 38, (1996), pp. 1-10
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foreign bank. However, this produced few tangible results. But,
regardless of this the financial environment the banks operated in
underwent fundamental change due to the increase in government
borrowing to finance the war effort. The volume of government debt -
financed by Ways and Means advances and Treasury Bills, the
traditional source of bank liquidity - increased from £16million just
before the outbreak of war, to an eventual £1.4 billion in March 191981.
This development quickly, then permanently registered in the Scottish
banks' balance sheets as every bank played a part in helping to finance
the war.
Transition, 1918 -1939
Scottish banking was subject to a series of profound challenges
between the wars. Its independence was threatened by a series of
affiliations with much larger English banks immediately after the First
World War. The world economy entered into a period of prolonged
depression. Competition in the financial services sector became more
intensive, with various new ventures, including the development of
Municipal Banks by local government as an alternative to borrowing,
and occasional forays into commercial lending by insurance companies,
challenging the banks' dominance of short-term credit provision. Yet
the banks emerged relatively unscathed towards the end of the 1930s,
indeed, most were much larger organisations. However, whereas
Checkland suggests "(t)he inter-war years brought a curious confirming
of the Scottish banking pattern"82, the following section identifies a
number of significant developments. Competition intensified and began
finding new outlets and each bank rediscovered a degree of
individuality by adopting a unique strategy in pursuit of the common
goal of scale. However, this proved an often frustrating process as
various proposals and initiatives were held in check by the continued
81 F. Capie and G. Wood, op. cit., p. 233
82 ibid. p. 717
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commitment to collective agreement. In addition it is argued that the
conduct of banking gradually changed during the Edwardian and inter-
war eras.
The English affiliations were the first significant development
between the wars. An early sign of English intentions came in 1916
when the Midland Bank purchased premises in Glasgow, a gesture used
elsewhere to encourage smaller banks to consider amalgamation or
face intense competition. Then, in 1917Midland Bank acquired the
Belfast Banking Company as an affiliate, a novel arrangement that
preserved the separate identity, semi-independence and note issuing
rights of the smaller concern83. The 1918 decision by the Governor of
the Bank of England to bar any further mergers or acquisitions in
England due to public fears over the emergence of a money trust,
confirmed the English interest in expansion elsewhere in the British
Isles84. First, Lloyds Bank affiliated with the National Bank in 1918, then
Barclays Bank affiliated with the British Linen Bank in 1919. Finally
Midland Bank acquired the Clydesdale Bank and North of Scotland
Bank as affiliates in 1920 and 1924 respectively. Affiliation prompted
fears among the unaffiliated banks that the 'A and Us' would no longer
be workable. However, the autonomy enjoyed by the affiliated banks
quickly allayed this fear, indeed, the 'A and Us' remained in place until
they were ceremonially burned and the ashes placed in an urn in 196585.
The 'A and Us' also continued despite tensions, which emerged
primarily in response to initiatives emanating from the Union Bank of
Scotland. To a greater extent than any of its rivals Union Bank,
managed by Arthur Gairdner until 1920 then by Norman Hird, proved
a source of new ideas. It was Gairdner who pioneered the provision of
83 For discussions of affiliations see C. W. Munn (1988A),pp. 155-162; W.F. Crick and J. E
Wadsworth, op. cit., (1936), pp. 360-362 & pp. 405-406
84 Even before the bar on further concentration, bank mergers in England were subject to
intensive scrutiny and delay, see for example the merger of the Midland Bank and the London
Joint Stock Bank only eventually allowed in 1918; W.F. Crick & J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit.,
p.347
85 A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 215
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trustee and executry services in 1917 (English banks had done so since
the Public Trustee Act of 1906). He also proposed forming a joint-bank
to deal exclusively in foreign business. Instead, this revealed how the
personal preferences of the general managers and the politics of their
committee acted as a brake on change. Proponents of the venture
explained "we all know that Mr. Cockburn [the National Bank manager]
will not do anything to help things on ... his attitude is quite plain, that
he is coming near the end of his term and does not want to be bothered
with anything new"86. In 1920 a frustrated Gairdner left to manage a
bank dedicated to foreign business formed largely under the auspices of
the Union Bank. Hird was as innovative as his predecessor and
subsequently scoured the US for 3 months in search of new ideas.
However, he was also more forthright and having spent most of his
career in London had little experience of the subtle competition
practiced in Scotland, plus a willingness to take unilateral action that
provides evidence of vision, but insufficient tact87. For example, in 1924
Union Bank began advertising despite this activity being proscribed by
the 'A and Us'. The adverts were quickly withdrawn following protests
from other general managers. Modest cracks eventually appeared in
the 1930s when banks began placing a carefully watched quota of
adverts in a limited number of Scottish journals and were given
discretion to advertise locally where the cost did not exceed £588. In
addition the official bank histories published during this period
provided a novel means of circumventing advertising restrictions as
deluxe editions were given and lent to specially selected existing and
potential customers.
86 CS 205, Letter to Commercial Bank General Manager; for an outline of this scheme see S.
G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 561-562
87 For accounts of Norman Hird see S. G. Checkland, "Foreword" in N. Tamaki, op. cit.; A.
Cameron, op. cit., pp. 177-179
88 Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of Scottish bank General Managers, dated 12l Oct.
1936 and 10th Oct. 1938, NC 25
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However, Union Bank was not the only independent bank to
seize the initiative. The general managers of Bank of Scotland and Royal
Bank made clear to the Macmillan Committee in 1931 the benefits of
moderate size - flexibility and the greater proximity of decision makers
to customers. Yet their actions betray an often frustrated concern with
the achievement of scale. The independent banks opened on average
115 branches each during the years 1918 to 1938, compared to the 50
opened by the affiliated banks89. The most vigorous in this respect was
the Commercial Bank, which opened 174 branches during this period,
making it the largest bank in Scotland, though not the largest Scottish
bank90.
Other unaffiliated banks pursued additional strategies. Bank of
Scotland unsuccessfully sought to merge with other Scottish banks.
Negotiations with the North of Scotland Bank ended when the smaller
concern chose semi-independence with the Midland Bank. Subsequent
negotiations with the Union Bank failed largely because of personality
differences; in 1930 the Bank of Scotland board refused to accept the
possibility of Norman Hird becoming manager of the merged bank,
leaving Union Bank to pursue its uniquely innovative ventures detailed
above.
Whereas Bank of Scotland remained a frustrated suitor, Royal
Bank achieved more success through a unique strategy of acquiring
English banks, which saw it remade as Scotland's largest bank. In this
way it overcame the reduced scope for a Scottish merger following the
English acquisitions and circumvented the restrictions on competition in
Scotland. In what commentators described as a turning of the tables
Royal Bank first acquired the London based private bank Drummonds
in 1924, affiliated with Wm. Deacon's Bank, a joint-stock concern
89 In descending order the number of branches opened by each bank c. 1918-1938 were
Commercial Bank 208, Bank of Scotland 99, Royal Bank 90, British Linen 68, National Bank
68, Union bank 61, Clydesdale Bank 50 and North of Scotland Bank 14., RB 419 "Number of
Branches of Scottish Branches", pp. 104-108
90 ibid.
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operating in the North of England, in 1930, then acquired the largest
surviving London private bank, Glynn Mills and Co. in 1939.
This pursuit of scale by various means was successful to the
extent that by the standards of industrial enterprise in Scotland banks
were substantial concerns. For instance, each began the interwar period
employing approximately a thousand staff. But they remained modest
by international standards. A table compiled by an American bank in
1929 ranked the 150 largest American, British, Colonial and Dominion
banks by deposits; the English Big 5 came first with Midland Bank
leading at $1,920,278,206, while the largest Scottish Bank, Royal Bank,
was fifty-third with $217,406,75691.
Minor innovations and tensions aside competition continued to
occur through prescribed channels, though more intensively than
before. The increase in the number of bank branches was a notable
development given the depressed state of the Scottish economy
between the wars. The density of banking increased once more (see
table 2.1) and by 1937 each branch served on average 2646 people, a
level unmatched anywhere else in the British Isles, while the size of each
branch network became something of a status symbol92. More
practically the expansion of the networks was integral to the
introduction of savings accounts in 1928, the most significant service
innovation between the wars. In the nineteenth century banks had
prided themselves on their use by all sectors of society, rich and
(relatively) poor. However, the expansion of the savings bank
movement made banks increasingly exclusive places. The introduction
of savings accounts offered to reverse this process. They earned higher
interest than funds held on deposit receipt and were carried to their
intended market by the opening of branches in the growing suburbs
91 "The Deposit Liabilities of One Hundred and Fifty of the Largest American, British,
Colonial and Dominion Banks" included in the letters of the General Manager of Royal Bank,
RB 61/9, letter no. 1726
92 ibid. As well as branch totals over time the table includes data on the ratio of people to
branches
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and bungalow belts surrounding major towns and cities93. The facility,
complete with account books instead of deposit receipts and money
boxes (piggy banks) for children, replicated what was already available
from savings banks, though without the austere concern with
inculcating thrifty habits. Although first proposed before the War, it
was not until an anonymous contributor to the Scottish Bankers'
Magazine drew attention to the success English banks had already
achieved in this area that the banks introduced savings accounts94.
In mitigation the banks were rightly concerned that savings
accounts would result in existing deposits being transferred to the more
highly rewarded account, increasing the cost of attracting the same
volume of deposits. But, this argument also applied to England. Rather
the unwillingness to introduce savings accounts provides further
evidence of the collectively induced caution Scottish banking was
subject to, and which rendered the banks followers rather than the
leaders they had once been.
2.5 The conduct of banking
As banking became a more pervasive feature of Scottish society,
the conduct of the banks' main representatives in towns and cities
underwent subtle changes. In the branches banking was an intimate
affair originally conducted by part time agents drawn from the
communities they worked in. These were "men of business" whose
occupational promiscuity deifies any precise label95. Most operated in a
range of capacities as intermediaries between local clients and national
institutions. Approximately a third of Royal Bank's agents in 1869 were
lawyers, but they do not seem so different from the remainder.
Drawing upon their professional expertise and financial acumen the
93 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1925, no. 68; On the development of urban settlements in
Scotland see R. Rodger, "Urbanisation in Twentieth-Century Scotland", in T. Devine and R. J.
Finlay, (eds) op. cit.
94 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1925, no. 68
95 A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 206; Calculation based upon information contained in RB 309
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agents at Arbroath, Brechin and Forfar were also agents for the
Northern Assurance Company96. The economic geography of Scotland
intervenes to add colour as at Maybole, a rural town in Ayrshire, where
the agent was also factor to a local landowner and at Port Glasgow
where the agent in the 1850s was also agent for a firm of sugar
merchants97. Others added income yielding public duties. At
Lossiemouth the agent combined banking with the collection of
harbour dues and at Perth the agent was clerk of the peace98. Others
owned and controlled capital in their own right. There was the render
income derived from owning shares and the petty capital of the small
businessmen; at Stirling the Bank employed an ironmonger and at
Dalkeith a farmer and merchant99. To these small interests a Bathgate
agent added his partnership in the Mid-Calder Mineral Oil Co.; a
substantial concern judging by the £20,000 advance it received in
1866100. This ability of agents to acquire interests in accordance with
their qualifications and opportunity made branches; usually with the
bank office downstairs, the agents' chambers on the first floor and his
living quarters above, centres offering a range of professional and
financial services. Indeed, the banks' dense branch networks were
ready-made outlets for other service providers and educated
consumers in the use of financial services. This prevents the under-
representation of service sector employment in Scotland relative to
England translating directly into lesser access to professional and
financial services101.
Business was expected to flow from an agent's connections and
other interests as under the terms of the "A and Us" agents were barred
from canvassing or even leafleting the customers of rivals. To be
%RBM 13th Jan. 1858
97 RBM 14th Feb. 1849 and the 9th Oct. 1861
98 RBM 19th Sept. 1855 and 30th Jul. 1856
99 RBM 9th Sept. 1846 and 10th May 1848, RB 307 entry for Stirling
100 RBM 18th Apr. 1865 and 13th Mar. 1866
101 C. Lee, "Modern Economic Growth and Structural Change in Scotland: the Service Sector
Reconsidered", Scottish Economic and Social History, 3, (1983), pp. 5-35
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successful agents were obliged to become social entrepreneurs who
pursued public life for profit, becoming "well kent faces" in earshot or in
mind whenever a business opportunity arose. Agents were stalwart
supporters, members and, in a self-conscious display of financial
acumen, treasurers of numerous local societies where they hoped to
meet the ideal customer; one who would attach his interests and those
of his associates' to a branch. Hence a Duns agent described a
connection he had formed as follows: "gradually becoming a good
customer and bringing a number of good people about us"102.
However, playing an active part in small-town society was always more
than a matter of being seen and known. An agent's place in public life
gave access to local knowledge concerning the character of customers
and their businesses. For instance, when asked by the Royal Bank
Cashier about a proposed guarantor the Duns agent, after confessing
the subject was a stranger to him, compiled the following details; he had
moved to Duns the previous May from Calcutta where he had been a
merchant with an estate worth thousands of pounds, which, in a matter
still to be resolved, had been improperly sold by the Oriental Bank. His
style of living suggested an annual income of £1,000 to £1,500 and he
had taken the tenancy on a farm and laid out substantial sums on it,
indicating he was intent on remaining to remain in Duns for some time.
But, although his annual accounts at the grocers and the butchers had
been paid, other accounts remained outstanding and the stranger's
apparent independence was difficult to reconcile with the handsome
annuity he was thought to receive from his mother in Carluke103. This
compilation of facts and gossip was the work of an agent eager to
please, however, its concerns; the income, assets, past-behaviour,
prospects and connections of the stranger, were universal and remained
the substance of bank inquiries. Gaining access to such information
enhanced the banks' ability to lend safely.
102 B976/1 letter dated 14th Apr. 1857
103 Duns branch letter book B 976/5/2, letter dated 30th Jan. 1862
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An agent's reputation largely determined the success of his
branch. This became evident in Hawick where the Royal Bank agent
James Carmichael alienated much of the town after became involved in
a series of public disputes. Carmichael initially appeared an ideal agent;
he was clerk to a local gas company, a Procurator Fiscal, a Justice of the
Peace and treasurer of the Hawick Corn Exchange104. His public life was
just as active and when a local volunteers regiment was formed in 1860
he became its honorary secretary. Then in 1861 the regiment split over
the appointment of officers and dissatisfied volunteers, led by a
Councillor George Fraser, established a rival regiment105. The second
regiment collapsed following a high-spirited disagreement at a New
Years party, which resulted in Fraser being expelled from the volunteer
movement. But, with Fraser cheered on at a public dinner, the split was
maintained by the establishment of a breakaway Masonic lodge to rival
the existing lodge also formed in 1860. In 1868 the town divided once
more over the appointment of its Liberal parliamentary candidate106.
Carmichael was associated with the provost who favoured George
Trevalyan; George Fraser preferred a Mr. George Elliot and organised a
committee of over 200 townsmen to win him the nomination.
Trevalyan won the candidacy and the election, shortly afterwards
Fraser became provost. Table 2.4 below depicts how Carmichael's
troubled public life adversely affected his branch. Unlike Jedburgh and
Galashiels the population of Hawick increased in the 1860s, yet the
deposit figures for 1858 and 1869 indicate that of the four main Royal
Bank borders branches Hawick was uniquely unsuccessful in attracting
104 for details of the various positions held by bank agents and bank accountants in Hawick see
The Southern Counties Register and Directory (1866), pp. 307-323; James Edgar, Hawick in
the Early Sixties, (Hawick: 1913), pp. 55-56 & 87-90; The Provosts ofHawick, 1861-1931,
(Hawick: 1933)
105 J. Edgar, op. cit., pp. 129-157
106 See issues of the Hawick Advertiser from July to November 1868 for details of the dispute.
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Table 2.4. Deposits and Competition at Royal Bank branches in the Scottish borders,
1858-1872 (£s at current prices)
Hawick Melrose Galashiels Jedburgh
Year A B C A B C A B C A B
1858 10,000 - 4 - - 2 12,000 - 3 29,000 -
1869 11,785 97 74,761 535 40,015 211 30,279 198
1870 20,526 124 63,016 550 37,608 229 32,725 212
1871 30,806 - 71,738 - 29,955 - 31,285 -
1872 41,992 222 4 61,246 617 2 20,545 189 4 39,032 234
A: Total deposits (from 1869 equals total amounts held on current
account + deposit receipt)
B: No. of deposit accounts (on current account and deposit receipt) held
at each branch
C: No. bank branches in each town
Source: RB 307, RB 309, & Glasgow Post Office Directories
deposits107. When it appeared in 1870 that the Clydesdale Bank was
about to open a Hawick branch the board asked Carmichael to
resign108. Local politics now provided a solution to the branch's
problems. Walter Haddon, then a young solicitor, had come to
prominence as the secretary of the George Elliot campaign committee
and was appointed agent109. Where Haddon went his associates
followed. The year he was appointed deposits rapidly increased and
within three years had almost quadrupled.
The business of a branch, then, was attached to the agents first
and the banks second with consequences for the outline of bank
bureaucracy given above. Banks were bureaucratic organisations to be
sure, governed by rules and operating with clearly defined areas of
command and responsibility. However, local connections gave agents a
degree of discretion sufficient to render head offices administrative
107 For the population of towns in the Scottish Borders see Herdman, J. (ed) The Third
Statistical Account ofScotland Volume XXVIII The Country ofRoxburgh, (Edinburgh: Scottish
Academic Press, 1992)
108 The entry for Hawick in RB 309 notes the existence of a Clydesdale Bank branch, however,
no branch appears to have been opened; RBM 27th and 31st May 1870
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cores, which merely stewarded the activities of agents in their personal
fiefdoms. This was problematic as the interests of agents did not always
coincide with those of the banks110. Branches, although primarily
established to gather deposits to be lent elsewhere, were run by agents
who regarded an agency as an income yielding activity that
complemented their existing range of interests, giving them and their
associates direct access to banking facilities, including credit. A historian
of the British Linen Bank conveyed the resultant conflict of interest:
"Agents, supreme in their several communities did as they thought proper,
advancing money to those whom they trusted without bothering overmuch
about securities and allowing debts to remain unpaid for long periods. They
were immensely popular among their fellows but sometimes less so at Head
Office"111.
This was the situation at Brechin, the fiefdom of the Guthrie family who
from the 1850s until the 1930s held the Royal Bank agency in
conjunction with a legal practice and involvement in the EastMill Co.,
Guthrie, Martin and Co. (a distillers), Guthrie & Co. (based in
Singapore) and Messrs. Guthrie, Craig, Peter & Co. (paper makers),
substantial concerns that received Royal Bank credits ranging from
£8000 in 1858 to £20,000 in 1907112. The Guthries were aware of their
importance and of their appeal to rival banks and regarded the branch
and its business as belonging to them113. Thus, they were difficult to
control and on occasion resisted head office instructions, for example, in
1884 the agent was repeatedly ordered "to stop further exertions" on
behalf of the EastMill Co. and its individual partners"114.
109 RBM 8th Jun. f870. By 1870 Haddon was already a Sheriff Clerk Depute, a collector and
distributor of stamps and taxes and an agent for the West of England Fire and Life Assurance
Co. The Southern Counties Register and Directory (1866)
110 For a discussion of the Principal-Agent relationship see T. L. McCoy and D. L. Fisher, "A
case of an early 1900s principal-agent relationship in the Mississippi lumber industry" in
Accounting, Business and Financial History, 8, (1998), pp. 14-17
111 C. A. Malcolm, (1950), p. 177
112 RBM. 1st Feb. 1858, 6th Nov. 1866, 13th. Jan. 1873 and 9th Dec. 1881
113 For example, the agents described the branch as "our agency" RBM 12th Dec. 1860
114 RBM 9th Jul. 1884
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This was never a wholly rural phenomenon. City branches
tended to have a greater proportion of their business conducted via
current accounts, which made them busier places than rural branches.
They also served to gather deposits and performed the supportive
function of carrying bank facilities to customers at the banks' major
offices to ensure their business was retained. But, the first city agents
were also men of business and exhibited a similar degree of discretion
in their head office dealings. During the third quarter of the nineteenth
century Alexander Waddel had his brother John appointed to assist
him, then ran what was almost a bank within a bank; in 1870 their four
branches in the East End of Glasgow held £227,000 on deposit,
comparable to the £248,000 held that year by the Sheffield Union
Banking Co.115. In 1876, with Alexander the dominant partner and John
specialising in the cattle trade, the brothers persuaded an unwilling
board to agree to advance £20,000 to a cemetery company they were
involved in116. The proposition was unappealing because the bulk of the
security offered was the intended cemetery, which, once the first body
was buried, had no other legal use.
The administrative and accounting procedures of the banks were
shaped by this tension between local interests and head office authority
and cumulatively came to favour centralised control over local
discretion, with consequences for the conduct of agents. After Walter
Haddon's appointment Royal Bank staff were barred from taking any
active part in parliamentary or municipal politics117. Thereafter the
financial interests of agents were also made subject to head office
approval, although this was negotiable when business was involved.
Thus, after complaining an Ayton agent was allowed to maintain his
involvement in the Fifeshire companies Messrs. Thomas Spowat & Co.
115 The four branches were at Calton, Duke St., Gallowgate and Bridgeton in the East end of
Glasgow and their business is detailed in RB 309. Information on the Sheffield Union Bank
derived from W.F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., p. 240
116 RBM 9th and 16th Aug. 1876
117 RBM 14th Jun. 1870
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Collieries and the Lasodie Colliery Co118. Gradually, various incentives
were introduced linking pay to deposit gathering. Branches were placed
in classes according to the volume of deposits they held and agents paid
according to the class of branch they managed. They were also paid
commissions on the deposits they attracted and internal credit markets
were devised wherein branches that advanced more than they held on
deposit were charged punitive rates for the necessary funds, cutting the
profits used as an indicator of agent performance119. Often such
measures were introduced after a part-time agent's disastrous
involvement in a local business, indicating the experience of bad debt
encouraged tighter central controls over branch lending.
The eventual solution to the problem of local discretion was the
replacement of part-time agents with full-time officials, which reduced
monitoring costs and opportunism as full-time agents lacked the other
interests that had made their predecessors so appealing in the first
place, but difficult to control. However, this transition, though
encouraged and welcomed by staff, proved gradual120. Andrew Kerr
argued that the banks:
"
were supporting a large array of country lawyers and tradesmen for the
sake of their 'countenance' (the work being done by bred bankers in a
subordinate capacity), they were yearly accumulating in their service, at
slowly increasing salaries, large bodies of men who, qualified by years of
service, would gladly have undertaken both the responsibilities and the
duties for the same remuneration as is paid the agents, and leave their
clerical duties to be performed by younger men at smaller salaries .... Branch
work would be cheaper and better done, as, with professional agents, extra
assistance might to some extent be dispensed with"121.
118 RBM 14th Sep. 1859
119 RBM 17th Sept. 1873. The order the scheme imposed can be seen in RB 484/S; The first
agent appointed on these terms is described in RBM 30th Mar 1891, by the 1920s
approximately a third of the Bank's agents were on commission; IOB 2/1/22, anon., "The
Practical Administration of a Branch Bank Office", 1901 Prize essay (2nd place), p. 17
120 Scottish Banker, vol. V, No. 2, Feb. 1927, p. 23
121 A. Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. Kerr (ed) op. cit., p. 137
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But besides their countenance part-time agents often received
lower salaries than full-time officials and remained an inexpensive way
of opening branches. Consequently, part-time agents were confined to
a specific stage in the life cycle of a branch; a local businessman would
open a branch, then make way on his on retirement for a full-time
official.
This transition constituted a change in the attributes deemed
necessary for business success. The loyalty and technical expertise of
full-time staff, assessed throughout their careers, was rarely questioned.
These attributes gained precedence over the part-time agents' business
acumen and local connection, a transition that paralleled the emergence
of the career general manager. Few of the well-connected Scottish
professionals previously recruited possessed the experience necessary
to manage what had become substantial organisations operating at a
Scottish, British then international level. The poor performance of the
Stirling solicitor appointed to manage Clydesdale Bank in 1880 probably
encouraged every bank to confine itself in future to trained bankers122.
The general managers became men who began as apprentices then
worked their way to the top of the banks they eventually managed.
Their knowledge of banking and the banks they managed was assured,
their abilities, gauged over decades of loyal service, undoubted, and
they were unembarrassed by any of the personal dealings their
predecessors had once had with customers. Thus, at a greater remove
the career general manager and full-time agent constituted an ideal of
the disinterested professional only ever guided in his actions by what he
considered to be in the best interests of his bank123.
However, the greater distance between agents and communities
strained the ties that had previously attached customers to the banks. It
122 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 316-319
123 However, Cameron notes full-time agents also became attached to local interests, which
could result in a lax approach to lending. To rectify this a small number of staff were sent to
perform the unpopular task of 'clearing up' lending at a branch after a long-standing agent retired
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fell to their replacements to recreate them. One tactic was to share
agencies, an arrangement that allowed the head office appointee to be
gently introduced to his new customers124. More importantly new and
aspiring agents were encouraged to add to the business of their
branches through active participation in public life. Since the 1880s
Andrew Kerr and others had advised:
"a banker should be a "known man". He should be seen at "Kirk and market"
as the saying is; his name should appear in connection with religious and
philanthropic objects, he should not hide his light under a bushel.... Social
functions should be his natural habitat, and if he have the gift of speech or
other accomplishment, it is well that it should be in evidence. Unknown
bankers may be as wise as Solomon, but they will do little towards extending
their business compared with their brainless rivals who are known to every
one"125.
A popular textbook published between the wars conveyed the same
message more bluntly; play golf126. The increasing number of
professional agents heeded the advice. The successful made themselves
integral to the communities they worked in, adapting and conforming
to live out inoffensive private lives in public to the benefit of the banks.
Guided by personal preference and rules governing acceptable
behaviour, this new breed of agents replaced their part-time
predecessors as church elders, agricultural society and chamber of
commerce treasurers, Rotarians, Masons, Burns clubs speakers, charity
givers and avid golfers. In the absence of other business interests re¬
establishing the links between a bank and its customers on these
explicitly neutral terrains remade banking in part as a social service and
bankers as social servants. For example, a branch manager at Lerwick
in the 1960s was a noted raconteur, Honorary Treasurer of the Lerwick
and would then be moved elsewhere, allowing a new agent to take their place and restore the
banks' reputation, A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 207
124 For example, the Royal Bank agent at Hunter square in Edinburgh explained to a customer:
"You will have noticed that a Joint Agent has been appointed here, this is in anticipation of my
retiral however I will be here some little time yet", B561/3/8, letter dated 21st Apr. 1921
125 A. W. Kerr, "Bank Agents", in A. W. Kerr (1898), p. 134
126 R. S. Sayers, Modern Banking, 7th. ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1951), p. 25
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Lifeboat Society, Scout Commissioner for Shetland, a president of the
local Rotarians and an enthusiastic supporter of the local "Up Helly A"
festival127. His interests were distinctively of their time, yet the place he
made for himself in his local community was little different to that
which his full-time predecessors had occupied in increasing numbers
since the beginning of the twentieth century.
2.6 The assets and liabilities of the Scottish banks, 1914 -1939
Turning now to examine the assets and liabilities of the banks,
the growing number of branches, broader range of savings facilities
and greater emphasis on deposit gathering unsurprisingly saw deposits
increase between the wars. After rapid inflation masked the real decline
in total bank liabilities during theWar, these grew ahead of the British
economy, increasing from 5.67 per cent of UK GDP in 1920 to 6.9 per
cent in 1939. Moreover, the banks held a near constant share of British
bank deposits. That this increase in the volume of savings held occurred
despite persistently high rates of long-term unemployment in Scotland
is unsurprising128. Those sectors of employment worst affected,
primarily the heavy industrial, had never been a particularly important
source of depositors, while those areas of employment the banks did
draw customers from, including local government, financial services
and commerce, expanded throughout this period129. The ability of the
Scottish banks to hold a near constant share of UK bank deposits was
also because Scotland, unlike England, was less affected by the
expansion of building societies, although competition from other
financial service providers intensified130. What is less clear is why the
127 "Willie Reid Manager 1962 - 1980" summary of Oral History by Vicki Wilkinson, Royal
Bank of Scotland Corporate Affairs, 1996
128 T. Hatton, "Unemployment and the labour market in inter-war Britain", in Floud and
McCloskey, (eds), op. cit.
129 On changes in the occupational structure see C. Lee, op. cit.; J. Foster, "A Proletarian
Nation? Occupation and Class since 1914", in A. Dickson and J. Treble, (eds.), People and
Society in Scotland Vol. Ill, 1914-1990, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992)
130 On house building and building societies between the wars see S. Pollard, The
Development of the British Economy, 3rd ed., (London: Edward Arnold, 1983), pp. 162-167;
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Table 2.5. The Profitability of Scottish Banking, 1865-1939 (in Cmillions at current
prices)
PBT as %
Profit Retained Distributed Average Capital +
Year before tax pro/H Profit dividend reserves
1865 1.155 0.251 0.901 9.55 9.22
1870 1.184 0.113 1.068 11.37 9.09
1875 1.395 1.253 0.141 12.80 9.44
1880 1.240 0.126 1.110 12.27 8.79
1885 1.222 0.068 1.154 12.75 8.25
1890 1.260 0.179 1.079 11.92 8.53
1895 1.348 0.224 1.114 11.98 8.34
1900 1.729 0.350 1.357 14.59 9.96
1905 1.779 0.325 1.431 15.38 9.68
1910 1.880 0.341 1.513 16.40 10.04
1915 2.241 0.748 1.319 14.29 12.93
1920 3.272 1.257 1.477 14.66 17.03
1925 3.212 1.121 1.850 16.21 12.58
1930 3.415 1.043 2.164 16.52 10.63
1935 3.426 0.903 2.261 16.72 10.26
1939 3.737 0.921 2.263 14.80 10.41
Source: table 44 & 45 in S. Checkland, op. citv pp. 743 - 749
banks were so eager to increase deposits given the self-professed
difficulties experienced in finding new lending opportunities between
the wars.
One reason was more deposits enhanced profitability. The capital
(capital and reserves) involved in banking continued to decline as a
percentage of total liabilities, reaching 5.66 per cent in 1920, recovering
to 10.12 per cent in 1930, before falling back once more to 8.73 per cent
in 1939. Thus, although each pound of deposits lent in the 1930s earned
less than in the 1860s, as the banks lent an increasing amount of other
people's money their total earning capacity increased (see table 2.5
above).
H. Ashworth, The Building Society Story, (London: Franey and Co., 1980), pp. 73-98; the
increase in funds held by Scottish insurance companies and investment trusts between the wars
is listed in J. Scott and M. Hughes, The Anatomy of Scottish Capital, (London: Croom Helm,
1980), tables 2A sections C & D and 2B sections C & D
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Table 2.6: Sectoral Distribution of English and Scottish Bank Lending, 1929 -1930
English Scottish
Sector Banks Banks
Textiles 8.3 % 4.7 %
Heavy industries (iron, steel, 6.4 7.3
engineering & shipbuilding)
Agriculture & fishing 6.9 7.2
Mining & Quarrying 3.0 2.3
Food, drink & tobacco 6.4 5.7
Leather, rubber & chemicals 2.2 1.4
Shipping, transport (including 2.5 3.3
Railways)
Building trades 4.8 1.5
Miscellaneous trades (including retail 14.8 8.6
trades)
Local government & public utilities 5.3 6.3
Amusements, clubs, churches & 2.7 0.7
charities
Financial (banks, discount houses, 14.4 23.8
stock exchange & building societies)
Other advances 22.1 27.1
Total 99.8 % 99.9 %
Source : submission to Macmillan Committee reprinted in M. Gaskin, Scottish
Banking a Modern Survey, (1965), table XXII, p.156
Nevertheless, the pursuit of deposits remained constrained by
the ability to lend. Figures displaying the sectoral distribution of bank
lending were compiled for the first time in 1931 in response to a request
for this information from the Macmillan Committee on Finance and
Industry (see table 2.6 above). They reveal bank finance featured in
virtually every form of economic activity in Scotland. What is surprising
given the emphasis on heavy industry in Scottish economic history, is
other financial institutions - including insurance companies, investment
trusts and individuals speculating in shares - were the single most
important source of private demand for credit and to a greater extent
than in England. The individual credits this involved were often
substantial, for example, in 1922 the Standard Life Assurance Company
received a £4.5 million credit from Bank of Scotland, the largest single
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advance in its history131. Thus the relationship between banks and other
financial service providers was not simply based on competition and
was often mutually beneficial. However, the figures presented in table
2.6 are a snapshot and a poor guide to change over time.
More certain were the economic consequences of the First World
War, which brought about a permanent shift in bank assets from
advances to investments. The banks took substantial holdings of
Treasury bills during the War and increased their investment in Consols
as well as lending to individuals, companies and local government to
finance the purchase of shares in successive war loans. During the short¬
lived post-war boom private sector demand for credit rose sharply and
private sector advances increased, although this was also partially war-
related as many customers borrowed due to the liquidity problems
created by the imposition of special taxes on profits made on wartime
contracts132. However, investments (dominated by government debt),
having increased from 27.31 per cent of deposits in 1914 to 51.14 per
cent in 1918, only fell back as far as 40.50 per cent in 1920. Increased
government borrowing together with post-war optimism, symbolised
above all by the decision to return to the Gold Standard at the pre-war
parity, perhaps best explains why the banks continued their eager
pursuit of deposits even after the post-war boom ended. Thereafter the
banks operated in a Scottish economy dominated by export-oriented
heavy industries crippled by insufficient foreign demand and sustained
low prices133. The banks were left dealing with troubled customers in
need of first aid not credit and watched as substantial loans became
locked up for years. For instance, in 1921 the National Bank lent the
131 A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 176
132 On cost-plus contracts and charges of profiteering during the war see A. Loft, "Accountancy
and the First World War", in A. Hopwood and P. Miller (eds), op. cit.
133 For recent surveys of industry in Scotland between the wars see P. Payne, Growth &
Contraction Scottish Industry c. 1860-1990, (The Economic and Social History Society of
Scotland, 1992) and 'The Economy' in Devine and Finlay (eds), op. cit.
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steelmakers Colvilles £800,000134. From 1927 the Bank was insisting on
repayment, yet by 1930 £670,000 remained outstanding.
The fortunes of heavy industry went from bad in the 1920s to
worse in the early 1930s following the worldwide depression. The
inability to translate Scottish technological successes in heavy
engineering into the production of new mass produced and mass
marketable goods, already apparent before 1914, was confirmed in the
1920s and a cause for government concern in the 1930s, culminating in
the creation of industrial estates to attract light industry to depressed
areas. The Clydesdale Bank general manager's 1933 comment that "The
banks cannot induce borrowers to take our money. We are at all times
ready to assist enterprise but we cannot create it" expressed the
frustration, which Scotland's bankers experienced in trying to find
suitable lending opportunities135. Bank investments accordingly
increased once more from 35.52 per cent of total deposits in 1929 to an
unprecedented 60.16 per cent in 1936. Despite the conversion of the War
Loan in 1932, which reduced the rate of return from 5 per cent to 3.5 per
cent, with few alternatives on offer during a period of low interest rates
this retained some appeal. It required rearmament in preparation for
the Second World War before heavy industry in Scotland began to
recover and lending switched back once again to the private sector.
Thus, the growth of banks between the wars was largely founded upon
increased holdings of government debt, which involved them to an
unprecedented extent in transferring surplus funds from the personal
sector to the state.
134 p payne> Colvilles and the Scottish Steel Industry, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1979), pp. 185-186
135 quoted in C. W. Munn (1988A), p. 154
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2.7 Conclusion
Above all else Scottish banking was shaped by a competitive
environment that was as much as possible of the general managers'
own making. The emergence of joint-stock banking derived from
administrative innovation in the first half of the nineteenth century. The
resultant recreation of banks as integrated hierarchies gave rise to
intense competition on the basis of interest rates, charges and the
willingness to lend. Competition swept away alternative forms of bank
organisation, encouraging ultimately successful attempts at establishing
collusive agreement. This transition in structure and conduct occurred
during the first developmental phase detailed above when Scottish
banking became a stable oligopoly. The structure of the sector, the
existence of substantial entry barriers and a developing infrastructure
based upon common interest as well as close links between the general
managers favoured collusion. However, with approaches to banking
varying on a regional basis, it required the collapse of the Western Bank
and accompanying damage done to the reputation of Glasgow banking,
before permanent agreement on the terms of competition in Scotland
was reached. Bank organisations were completed when London offices
were opened in the 1860s and the geographical scope of Scottish
banking was clarified in the 1870s following the Clydesdale Bank's
English invasion in 1874. The City of Glasgow Bank failure in 1878
ended a phase during which Scottish banking attained a form largely
retained until after the Second World War.
The wide-ranging controls over competition established in the
third quarter of the nineteenth century were perfected and extended
throughout the subsequent three decades. During this second phase
collusion encouraged competition by means other than price; primarily
on the basis of establishing branches and the willingness to lend, though
this was constrained by the inability to factor risk into the cost of credit.
The former made banks ever-larger organisations, but at a rate that
varied over time indicating competition also varied in intensity. Even
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so, Scottish banking sustained a uniquely high degree of market
penetration. Collusion also fed into and encouraged a collectively
agreed conservatism that emphasised the importance of liquidity at the
same time as it acted as a brake upon innovation. However, the
growing emphasis on bank liquidity, though a consequence of
conservatism to be sure, was encouraged by additional factors: public
concern prompted by intermittent crises; tacit state approval; and the
limited availability or appeal of alternative assets. Then in the 1900s an
unprecedented decline in bank deposits followed by the hiatus caused
by war prompted a modest revaluation of the status quo.
Change occurred during the final phase, but within carefully
monitored parameters. The English affiliations were the most significant
as they threatened the continuation of the General Managers'
Committee. However, the "A and Us" remained intact while affiliation
reduced the scope for mergers in Scotland. Then after decades of
relative decline a concern with scale amongst the remaining unaffiliated
banks provoked various, often novel proposals including merger and
product innovation. Existing controls over competition loosened and
new services were introduced; though this was often piecemeal and, as
in the case of savings accounts, not until they had already shown
themselves to be worthwhile elsewhere. Hence change occurred, to a
greater extent and more rapidly than it had done for decades, but
remained subject to collective sanction.
Two points are of particular importance for the broader aims of
this thesis. First, early on joint-stock banking posed the challenge of
devising means of managing and administering a large number of
geographically dispersed staff responsible for undertaking a high
volume of routine transactions. Indeed, joint-stock banking was
founded upon the creation of well developed hierarchies used to
oversee task specialisation within a complex division of labour. Thus, it
entailed the creation of a distinctive work regime and working
environment. This took place in organisations that, due to their scale
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and scope of operations were inherently and increasingly stable.
Moreover, towards the end of the nineteenth century banking became
geared more towards administrative efficiency than innovation or the
achievement of rapid growth. Consequently, banking during the
second and third phases detailed above constituted a stable,
conservative, somewhat predictable sphere. Second, Scottish banking
constituted a highly managerial capitalism. The scale and complexity of
bank organisations as well as the particular developmental path
followed by banking in Scotland led to the sector being dominated by
general managers who enjoyed an unprecedented degree of authority
and independence of action within their own banks. However, the
independence enjoyed by agents meant the practical authority of the
general managers was on occasion more theoretical than real. It
required the centralisation of control and discretion as well as the
extension of rules governing the private and public lives of staff and
with this the conduct of banking in the branches, before the general
managers eventually emerged as authoritarian, distant, figures. In other
words banking underwent a process of bureaucratisation intended to
bring all staffwithin the ambit of a vigorously exercised hierarchical
authority.
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Chapter 3: The Royal Bank of Scotland, 1850-1939
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter examined the business of banking in
Scotland c.1850-1939 over three distinct stages throughout which the
banks operated as substantial, private bureaucracies. The importance of
the general managers in strategic decision making was considered a
distinctive feature of banking in Scotland as opposed to England, with
inter-bank relations dominated by the agreements they reached on
interest rates, charges and acceptable forms of competition. All this
served to render Scottish banking a stable oligopoly.
This chapter continues the analysis of the business of banking
with specific reference to the Royal Bank of Scotland. The quantitative
analysis of careers undertaken in subsequent chapters is based solely
upon Royal Bank records, therefore it is necessary establish how
representative the subject organisation is of Scottish banking as a
whole. In other words in what ways if any did Royal Bank differ, why
and how significant is this in relation to the overall aims of this thesis?
Classical economic theory depicts firms and the people running
them as being substitutable for each other, with both, when subject to
the same stimuli in comparable circumstances, reacting in much the
same way1. The resultant tendency is towards a homogeneous
equilibrium produced by individual decision-makers driven by
competition. This provides the beginnings of an explanation, however
four qualifications are necessary. First, circumstances change and with
them the means available for achieving strategic goals. In Scottish
banking the most obvious example of this concerned the pursuit of
scale. Whereas this was commonly achieved early on in the nineteenth
century via mergers and acquisitions, as the century progressed the
number of concerns that could be acquired rapidly diminished, hence
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organic growth - opening branches - became increasingly significant.
Second, competition after 1857 was rigidly controlled, for instance, the
range of services banks provided, were collectively agreed, hence, the
visible hand of the General Managers' Committee was a key influence
on the evolution of banking in Scotland. Third, history was a factor. By
this I mean the institutional legacy with which a business operates: the
internal arrangements inherited from a previous era as well as the
connections, reputation and areas of expertise deployed in a given
competitive environment2. Finally, there is the question of
entrepreneurship: the ability to overcome historical and competitive
constraints by creating, identifying and acting upon commercial
opportunities. This sees those individuals able to take strategic decisions
as shaping the internal organisation, strategy, growth and efficiency of
a business in potentially unique ways3.
Bearing these points in mind the following chapter depicts the
history of Royal Bank as a variation on a common theme. In broad
terms it depicts Royal Bank as passing through the three developmental
stages set out in the previous chapter, moving rapidly towards a
common model that was adhered to, then departed from in key
respects between the wars.
During the first phase landmark events already described in the
previous chapter reoccur, but acquire a particular meaning. The failure
of the Western Bank was an opportunity taken to rapidly acquire a
substantial branch network for much the same reasons as every other
bank had adopted branch banking during the previous four decades.
Central to the resultant transformation of Royal Bank was the contested
emergence of the Cashier as an official possessed of executive powers.
1 S. Pollard, "Entrepreneurship, 1870 - 1914", in R. Floud and D. McCloskey, (eds)
2 O. M. Westall, "Invisible, Visible and 'Direct' Hands: An Institutional Interpretation of
Organisational Structure and Change in British general Insurance", Business History, 39,
(1997), no. 4, pp. 44-48
3 For a useful discussion of entrepreneurship see P. Payne, British Entrepreneurship in the
Nineteenth Century, (London: Macmillan, 1988)
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In the second phase it is argued that Royal Bank shared in the
great stability that affected Scottish banking after 1878 and lasted until
after the FirstWorld War. However, it is suggested that Royal Bank
was affected by a certain inertia that derived in part from its distinctive
regional identity as an Edinburgh bank and also from management
limitations. An examination of the performance of the main lending
branches reveals a range of difficulties were identified, yet seemingly
tolerated until the end of the nineteenth century. Consequently, Royal
Bank lost ground to its rivals in terms of its share of deposits and
advances. The one positive development during this period occurred at
London where business grew in volume, scope and profitability.
The final section considers the experience of the Bank between
the wars when it rapidly acquired the largest shares of Scottish bank
deposits and advances. Key to this was the entrepreneurial ability of the
Cashier to circumvent the constraints on competition in Scotland and
pronounced difficulties that affected much of the Scottish economy, by
embarking on a unique policy of English acquisitions and affiliations.
This strategy derived from Royal Bank's status as an independent
Scottish bank and was facilitated by the earlier difficulties experienced in
lending to trade and industry in the west of Scotland.
3.2 Transformation, 1850-1878
Royal Bank was transformed during the third quarter of the
nineteenth century. In 1850 it consisted of a grand, Edinburgh head
office, a substantial Glasgow office and 5 smaller branches; a structure
more of the early than the mid-nineteenth century, which uniquely
reflected the axes Scottish banking revolved around. However, within a
decade a substantial branch network had been established and in 1874 a
London office was opened. All this rendered the organisation of the
Bank indistinguishable from its peers. This transformation was the
work of two Cashiers: Laurence Robertson and John Fleming. Three
factors were central to their achievements: the campaign conducted by
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Robertson to persuade the board to adopt branch banking; his building
of a branch network using the remains of the Western Bank; and
Fleming's ability to persuade English bankers and politicians to allow
another Scottish bank into London.
Integral to the adoption of branch banking in 1854 was the
contested emergence of the Cashier as an official possessing executive
authority. After opening the first Glasgow office of an Edinburgh bank
in 1783 the Royal Bank board became a barrier to further change. To
maintain its authority the board subsequently created the position of
Permanent Director; effectively a chief executive appointed from its
ranks on an annual basis. This arrangement ended once the Glasgow
Cashier, the strong-willed and autocratic John Thomson, became
Cashier in 1828. However, Thomson shared the board's disinterest in
branch banking. The small number he opened were primarily political
gestures intended to show a willingness to play an active part in Scottish
economic development4. Political or not those at Leith and Dalkeith in
the east and at Rothesay, Port Glasgow and Greenock in the west
survived, becoming permanent additions to the organisation. However,
further expansion posed an administrative challenge, which the Bank
lacked the means to resolve. But when an Inspector of Branches was
appointed in 1837, the incumbent appears to have been overshadowed
by Thomson who retained practical responsibility for branch
supervision alongside his other duties5. Thomson eventually alienated
the board and was asked to resign in 1845 to be replaced by Robert
Wilson who saw benefits in branch banking. When Wilson was sent
with a director to arrange the closure of the Port Glasgow branch he
returned convinced of the need for more not less branches. But, with
the board once more in the ascendant, Wilson, more tactful than his
4 S. G. Checkland, op. cit. p. 357
5 RB 709 Miscellaneous Notebook
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predecessor, did not press his case. The Port Glasgow branch remained
open, but no more were added6.
The initiative for change now passed to the Glasgow Cashier
Laurence Robertson, who was already proving to be another strong
willed servant of the Bank. It was Robertson who, exposed to the
intense competition between the banks in Glasgow, had cajoled the
board into lending on the security of machinery, mill properties,
warehoused pig iron and stocks and shares, and antagonised Bank of
Scotland by adopting Glasgow ways (see chapter 2)7.
Already instrumental in changing how the Bank conducted its
business, Robertson began campaigning for the adoption of branch
banking and in 1843 and 1844 proposed establishing branches in Paisley
and Lanark8. Both were rejected. Paisley was judged too dangerous a
place to bank and as for Lanark, the board was of the opinion "any
reasons that may be urged in its favour might apply as well to other
places where they would be very unwilling to plant branches"9.
However, this reluctance derived from a time when Royal Bank held
the "chief command of the Glasgow business, and finding that
sufficiently remunerative, did not care to cultivate connexions
elsewhere"10. Yet there was mounting pressure to open more branches.
Rival banks had opened in Glasgow and counted former Royal Bank
customers amongst their founders. By not opening branches Royal
Bank risked being locked out of the rest of Scotland and confined to
increasingly competitive locations. Furthermore, the capital of the Bank,
which at £2million was the largest in Scotland, was an additional
concern. In 1846 the Secretary noted the difficulties it created in making
the dividend; a director was more forthright, describing the dividend as
6RBM24th Dec. 1851
7 RBM 25th Apr. 1859, 16th Jul. 1851 and 1st Oct. 1851 for examples of the various forms of
security Robertson recommended the board accept
8 RBM 1st Nov. 1843, 3rd Jan 1844 & 25th Feb. 1852
9 ibid.
10 Comments by the secretary of Royal Bank included in "Alexander Blair Memo on Merger",
UGD 129/111/7
82
a "dead weight" and Royal Bank as a result more susceptible to
downturns in saving and interest rate margins, because of its substantial
capital ratio11. Eventually, in the buoyant trading conditions of the early
1850s the profits to be earned emulating the Glasgow banks'
developing practice of discounting London bills prompted a change in
policy as to do so required more deposits12. Cost and the Edinburgh
commitment to common interest rates prevented competitive rates
being used to draw in more funds leaving opening branches the only
means of increasing deposits. Thus, when Robertson again proposed
establishing a Lanark branch in 1854 the board agreed13.
Driving the board towards branch banking gave Robertson a
dominant position in the Bank. After succeeding in Lanark, Robertson
took off across Scotland, appointing agents at Dumbarton, Stirling,
Hamilton and Falkirk, then sent back instructions to Head Office
explaining how the new branches could be reached14. Such enthusiasm
quickly antagonised the Deputy Governor who took exception to the
establishment of a Doune branch and reaffirmed the board's authority
by establishing a sub-committee of directors to consider all future
proposals15. This and an apology from Robertson saw a Doune branch
opened for a one-year trial period. A somewhat chastened Robertson
next proposed establishing a Campbletown branch in a detailed report
submitted to the new committee16. Although certain directors clearly
held reservations about Robertson his dynamism was suited to the task
at hand. In February 1857 Wilson was promoted to the board allowing
Robertson to become Cashier, a change followed by the Deputy
Governor's resignation17. As this new managerial order was being
established applications for agencies were received from aspiring agents
11 ibid.
12 R. Saville, op. cit., pp. 387-388
13RBM 31st May 1854
14 RBM 26th Jul., 23rd Aug., 13th Sept. & 11th Oct. 1854 and 6th Jun. 1855
15 RBM 6th Jun., 13th Jun., 4th Jul., 11th Jul., 5th, 19th and 26th Sept. 1855
16 RBM 19th Sept. 1855
17 RBM 30th Apr. 1856 & 23rd Dec. 1857
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across Scotland, the most significant coming from a Mr. Primrose
Kennedy in Ayr18.
The appointment of Kennedy as Deputy Manager for Ayrshire
on the 10th of October 1855 began a raid on the establishment of the
Western Bank. Kennedy was formerly managing partner in the
Ayrshire Banking Company and having taken that bank into the
Western Bank in 1845, brought much of it with him to Royal Bank,
including agents and branches at Ayr, Maybole, Girvan and Irvine,
which in 1858 held £348,900 on deposit and £116,000 on advance. The
£37,000 advance Kennedy received was the probable reason for his
defection; to avoid the charge of poaching a rival's agents the board
made it clear that "no premium or consideration whatever is to be
allowed for the goodwill of the business"19. Next, on the 24th of October
Walter Denham, the accountant at Western Bank's Glasgow
Cowcaddens branch, was temporarily appointed to Royal Bank's head
office before returning to Cowcaddens as a Royal Bank agent20. The
week after Denham left Glasgow, Alexander Waddel, then joint agent
of the Western Bank Glasgow East End branch, became the Royal Bank
East End Agent21. Clearly the Western Bank was uniquely considered
fair game and the antagonistic relationship between it and at least one
Edinburgh bank reciprocated. The raid ended with the appointment of
John Bishop from the Western Bank inspection department to the Royal
Bank head office.
Branches continued being opened, their location a product of
luck and personal ambition within the remit of an overall policy.
Kennedy, newly elected as Provost of Ayr and eager to extend his
Ayrshire interests, competed and in one instance clashed with
18 RBM 18th Jul., 3rd Oct. and 10th Oct. 1855
19RBM 10th Oct. 1855
20 RBM 24th Oct. 1855, entry for Glasgow Cowcaddens in RB 309
21 RBM 31st Oct. 1855; profile of Alexander Waddel in the series "Men You Know", The
Baillie, 24th Oct. 1877
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Robertson over the establishment of new branches22. Meanwhile the
Elgin and Falkirk agents established sub-branches attached to their
own, while aspiring agents continued applying to the Bank23. The
purpose of the branches was made clear when John Bishop applied to
become an agent in Dundee in 185624. The board acknowledged a large
discount business could be conducted with a respectable class of
customer in the city, but refused because
"as a general rule all parties in extensive business in Dundee require large
advances from their bankers .... besides this is not the kind of business the
bank has more particularly in view in setting down new branches"25.
Thus in 1857, Royal Bank began operating 34 branches across Scotland
primarily to gather deposits. Notable gaps remained in the network. In
particular there were no branches in Aberdeen and Dundee. To rectify
this in September 1857 Robertson attempted to acquire the Town and
Country Bank for which Royal Bank already acted as Edinburgh
agents26. The offer of £10.5s. per share being considered insufficient
negotiations ended though channels were to be kept open. Then the
Western Bank failed.-
Whether the decision to end negotiations was linked to the
Western Bank failure is unclear. Regardless of this, Royal Bank was
uniquely well placed to take advantage. Its change in policy placed it
publicly in the market for newly unemployed agents, while a number
of its existing agents were well connected to Western Bank. Most
important of all Royal Bank employed John Bishop who knew every
Western Bank agent (one was his brother-in-law) and their business
intimately. The Western Bank permanently closed its doors on
November the ninth. On the eleventh Bishop submitted to the board a
shopping list of its branches holding an estimated £1,133,000 on
22 RBM 28th Nov. 1855,
23 RBM 1st and 3rd Dec. 1857
24 RBM 3rd Dec. 1856
25 ibid.
26 RBM 9th , 23rd and 30th Sept. and 8th Oct. 1857
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deposit27. Thus equipped, Royal Bank in competition with every other
bank captured the largest share ofWestern Bank branches. After this
the decision was taken to halt expansion and with John Bishop's
assistance the organisation was consolidated and head office adapted
(the changes made are discussed in more detail in chapter 4) to
administering a branch network that had grown from six to over sixty
branches in under four years28.
The main purpose of the branches was to gather deposits to be
lent elsewhere, the resultant flow of money from net debtor to net
creditor regions has been studied in detail by Tamaki at Union Bank
c.1860-186529. Tamaki established that money was transferred from the
north and east of Scotland to the west and concluded that surplus funds
raised in agricultural areas were used to provide credit facilitating
industrial development in Glasgow and London investments. Munn in a
study of the Clydesdale Bank reaches a similar conclusion30. Limited
data is available on the Royal Bank head office or London office, but
systematic information available for a majority of its branches has been
used to produce table 3.1 below. The figures for 1858 were calculated by
subtracting the annual figures for total advances from the total deposits
held at individual branches, those for 1869 to 1872 reproduce the results
of a similar calculation contained in the original source.
The figures presented in table 3.1 are incomplete and therefore
qualified, but nevertheless show Tamaki's findings are generally
applicable to Royal Bank, though with some modifications. Glasgow
again appears as the major outlet for funds with Dundee, following the
acquisition of the Dundee Banking Company (see below), also a net
debtor to the network. The ports of Leith in the east and Greenock and
Port Glasgow in the west, and branches in border towns of Hawick,
Galashiels and Jedburgh, each then developing specialist lines in textile
27RBM llth Nov. 1857
28 RBM 9th and 16th Dec. 1857 and 2nd Jan. 1858
29 N. Tamaki, op. cit., pp. 88-91
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Table 3.1. The Royal Bank of Scotland lending Branches and their debts to the
network 1858-1872, (£s at current prices)






1858 N/A. N/A. 47,000 20,000 15,000 51 57
1869 899,927 N/A. 51,358 37,561 811 80 88
1870 968,768 240,840 140,792 23,603 1,409 80 85
1871 864,243 182,686 97,500 39,853 3,625 80 89
1872 N/A. N/A. 50,840 46,569 0 76 92
The specific identity' of these branches is given in the text below
Source: RB 307, RB 309, and RB 419 " Number of Branches of Scottish Banks"
Manufacturing, also advanced more than their deposits31. These were
the lending branches. The "others", Cupar, Haddington, Blairgowrie and
Elgin moved between net debtor and net creditor status. Although the
amounts involved were relatively small, they indicate that the system
was flexible and Royal Bank willing to meet the demand for credit
wherever it arose to an extent that the savings of local populations or at
least local customers, were unable to meet. However, although the
available data is fragmentary, the reduction in the amount owed by
"other" branches to the network suggests that this tolerance declined.
After building a branch network Robertson was charged with
finding outlets for the increased deposits. First, he went on a fact¬
finding trip to the north of England in 1859, visiting banks in
Manchester and Liverpool, "the object being to learn the principle upon
which these banks conduct their business"32. With introductions
provided by Glasgow customers Robertson met a number of Liverpool
merchants and arranged discount accounts for them via Royal Bank's
30 C. W. Munn (1988A), p. 102
31 R. J. Morris, Urbanisation and Scotland in W. H. Fraser and R. J. Morris (eds) People and
Society in Scotland Vol. II, pp. 80-82, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1990)
32 RBM 13th Dec. 1859
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London correspondents. Second, he sought to increase lending in
Scotland. A Dundee branch had already been opened at the bidding of
Primrose Kennedy who requested the engagement of a former
Western Bank agent in the city. However, this branch, with deposits of
£83,000 and advances of £25,000 in 1858, was a modest venture for
Scotland's fourth city, comparable in size to branches in Brechin and
Arbroath further along the north east Coast33. To play a part in meeting
the demand for credit in Dundee, Robertson negotiated the acquisition
of the Dundee Banking Company in January 1864 through an exchange
of stock, the only acquisition Royal Bank made in the nineteenth
century34. When acquired the Dundee Bank operated a small branch
network, held deposits of £722,219 and, more importantly, bills, loans,
credits and overdrafts worth £689,934. The deal also included two sets
of golden handcuffs, one apiece for the manager, Charles Boase, and his
brother and deputy George who were paid £5,000 and promised
pensions on the understanding that the accounts were correct and that
they would resign after three years "never to take service with any
other bank in Forfarshire"35. Robertson and the board clearly valued
the brothers' connections, but wanted to manage Dundee as they saw
fit and in 1867 it was suggested to the brothers that they might retire to
which they agreed after Charles secured an extra £1,000 and George an
enhanced pension36. Four years later Robertson followed them into
retirement after a period of ill health, to be replaced by John Fleming.
Fleming, who had taken charge of the Western Bank as it failed,
was the final link between that bank and Royal Bank. His first years in
office were dominated by attempts at completing the transformation
begun by his predecessor. His major achievements came early and
involved enhancing the Bank's representation in Scotland and opening a
London office.
33 RBM 2nd Jan. 1858; see entry for Arbroath, Brechin and Dundee in RB 307
34 RBM 13th Jan. and 23rd Feb. 1864, N. Munro, op. cit, pp. 251-257
35 ibid.
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In certain respects Fleming proved no more successful than
Robertson. After the acquisition of the Dundee Banking Co., Aberdeen
remained the last major omission in the network. An Aberdeen branch
had in fact been opened in 1862 with the law firm Messrs. Smith and
Lochan as agents37 (out of courtesy while making these arrangements
Robertson called on the manager of the Town and Country Bank who
expressed his surprise that Royal Bank had not opened in Aberdeen
sooner38). The branch proved a modest affair that contributed more
deposits than advances39. To change this Fleming made another
attempt to acquire the Town and Country Bank shortly after being
appointed40. Negotiations continued for a month until the offer of stock
was refused leaving Royal Bank to build its own Aberdeen connections.
More by default than intention the Royal Bank's presence in the
north of Scotland subsequently benefited from the City of Glasgow
failure. There was no scramble to acquire its branches after it failed.
Instead, the general managers shared the branches out among
themselves, with Royal Bank reopening six of those it had been
allocated41. However, there was more to the failure than this. Former
City Bank agents were appointed joint-agents at six branches in
Glasgow and also in Paisley and at Hunter Square in Edinburgh42. Royal
Bank also became involved in a dispute with the Caledonian Bank; an
unfortunate victim of the failure after it unwittingly acquired City of
Glasgow stock and became liable for its losses. On discovering this
Caledonian Bank shareholders panicked, throwing their stock onto the
market and forcing that Bank to close its doors. The general managers'
at their committee recommended that the Caledonian Bank enter into
36 RBM 6th Nov. 1867
37 RBM 28th Mar. 1862
38 ibid.
39 see entries for Arbroath and Aberdeen in RB 309
40 RBM 24th Nov. and 13th, 20th and 22nd Dec. 1871
41 RBM 22nd Nov. 1878, the branches reopened were at Cumbernauld, Douglas, Islay, Kilsyth,
Tighnabruaich and Tranent
42 RBM 1st Nov. 1878
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liquidation and arranged to distribute its assets among themselves43.
The Caledonian directors had other ideas and set about reopening their
bank, somewhat naively asking for branches to be returned once they
were ready to recommence business. This, Royal Bank under the
auspices of the general managers' agreement, refused to do. It had
gained important connections in and around Inverness for the first time
and was eager to retain this business44. Thus, when the Forres agent
announced he was returning to the Caledonian Bank, he was quickly
replaced by his former City Bank rival, much to the annoyance of the
Caledonian Bank board45. Doubtless this encouraged the Caledonian
Bank directors to seek other partners when they eventually
relinquished their independence in the 1900s.
Thus, the development of the Royal Bank in Scotland confirmed
the Scottish status quo. It became a larger and more complex
organisation, but within the terms set by the 'A and Us'. These had the
effect of squeezing competition out into the margins, the ultimate
expression of which was the opening of the London offices, an area
where Fleming's efforts proved an unqualified success. Opening in
London required an ability to negotiate a course through the politics of
banking, which Robertson apparently lacked. When National Bank
opened in London in 1864 the Royal Bank board decided to replace its
London correspondents Capel and Co. with an office and sent
Robertson down to purchase suitable property46. Offices were secured,
but the Royal Bank charter, which legally entitled it to conduct business
"in Scotland only", meant that a special act of parliament was needed to
commence business. Robertson failed to secure this in 1866, as did
Fleming in 1872, before finally succeeding in 187347. While Fleming was
in London arranging the opening of the London office the Clydesdale
43RBM 12th Dec. 1878
44 RBM 14th Oct. and 18th Oct. 1878, 25th Jun. and 18th Jul. 1879
45 RBM 9th Jul. 1879
46 RBM 23rd Nov. 1864
47 For a summary of the Bank's interests in London before 1874 see RBM 3rd Mar. 1875
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Bank mounted its English invasion, forcing Fleming to move back and
forth between the London office and the general managers'
negotiations with the Clydesdale Bank. Finally an agreement was
reached, which left Fleming free to open the London office at an annual
cost of £6,501 for salaries and accommodation48.
3.3 Stability and stagnation, 1878-1918
Compared to the transformation undergone in previous
decades, after 1878 Royal Bank conformed to the soporific state that
affected every bank and remained unbroken until 1918. Fleming
oversaw this transition from competition, expansion and diversification
to conservatism and consolidation. His successors, David Huie and
Adam Tait, appointed Cashier in 1892 and 1907 respectively, proved
largely content to manage the bank as they inherited it. No significant
alterations or additions were made to the organisation or services
provided. Indeed, a certain inertia is discernible. Problems concerning
lending at Glasgow and Dundee emerged in the 1870s yet took decades
to resolve. Consequently, Royal Bank entered a period of relative
decline. Having begun the 1870s holding the single largest share of
Scottish bank deposits and advances, by the 1900s it had fallen to fourth
place. The only exception to this gloomy account was the growth of the
London office. This section proceeds by examining the development of
the organisation in relation to deposits, then considers lending with
specific reference to the main lending offices; Dundee, Glasgow and
London. Finally, events during the FirstWorld War are briefly
described.
The branch network, which Robertson established made Royal
Bank Scotland's leading deposit-taking institution. Royal Bank deposits
more than doubled from £3.8 million in 1845 to £8.4 million in 1870,
increasing
48 RBM 11th Oct. 1874 and 11th Oct. 1875; CS 188 Report on London (1880?)
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ches Deposits Capital Reserve Notes
Total
liabilities
1865 74 8,127,791 2,000,000 332,437 11,452,653
1870 85 8,394,160 2,000,000 400,000 672,763 12,073,654
1875 106 10,588,334 2,000,000 500,000 878,278 14,666,386
1880 121 12,279,592 2,000,000 725,469 744,783 16,333,939
1885 126 12,027,481 2,000,000 761,636 767,246 16,073,660
1890 123 12,844,269 2,000,000 794,691 843,995 17,236,646
1895 127 13,061,341 2,000,000 757,638 910,079 17,449,470
1900 137 14,157,122 2,000,000 844,078 1,056,670 19,100,153
1905 147 13,606,172 2,000,000 933,439 996,431 18,660,453
1910 158 13,920,173 2,000,000 1,013,565 976,860 18,501,829
1915 167 19,144,394 2,000,000 800,986 1,640,239 24,695,787
1920 167 39,114,127 2,000,000 1,082,276 3,539,685 47,460,685
1925 207 40,790,229 2,500,000 2,464,704 2,663,730 50,128,390
1930 242 50,387,090 3,362,442 3,580,926 2,773,277 61,561,346
1935 253 64,009,174 3,780,192 3,857,143 2,812,642 79,028,165
1939 257 68,973,438 4,250,000 4,125,965 3,301,123 85,089,984
Source: RB 419
as a share of the Scottish total from 6.66 per cent to 13.31 per cent (see
table 3.2 above). This served to reduce the capital and reserve from
34.87 per cent of the Bank's £6.3 million total liabilities to 20.85 per cent
over the same period. Consequently, there was less pressure on
subsequent Cashiers to increase deposits. Indeed, after securing the
deposits and branches of the failed City of Glasgow Bank, Fleming was
of the opinion that more deposits would be an unwelcome gift. In a
report to the board in 1880 he identified deposit growth as a long-term
trend driven in more recent times by trade inactivity, the unwillingness
of the public to speculate and a difficulty in finding suitable, permanent
investments49. These same factors also constrained the demand for
credit.
Instead of waiting for demand to recover Fleming then Huie
restricted deposit growth by adopting a conservative branch expansion
49RBM 9th Nov. 1880
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policy. Both Cashiers signed up to the "Arrangements between Banks
for the Suppression of Branches" (see chapter 2 above), and from 1880
to 1900 closed 11 branches. 27 branches were also opened, a net increase
of 13 per cent on the 121 branch network operated in 1880, which was
substantially less than the 21 per cent increase in the total number of
Scottish bank branches (from 891 in 1880 to 1075 in 1900).
Unsurprisingly, deposits grew relatively slowly. Whereas Royal Bank
deposits increased by 15.45 per cent (at current prices) from £12.3
million in 1880 to £14.2 million in 1900, total Scottish bank deposits
increased by 37.77 per cent over the same period.
After decades of growth in the 1900s deposits declined absolutely
from £14,157,122 in 1900 to a trough of £13,606,172 in 1905. This and the
break down in mutually agreed branch closures encouraged more
branches (29) to be opened during the period 1900 to 1914. Moreover,
notable gaps in the network were filled for the first time. Branches were
opened in important industrial centres including Motherwell,
Clydebank and Methil. The network grew by 21 per cent - ahead of the
17 per cent Scottish average - from 137 branches in 1900 to 166 branches
in 1914. However, with Scotland already densely banked and many of
the new branches opened in highly competitive locations, the relative
standing of the Bank remained unchanged and in terms of deposits it
remained in fourth place until the outbreak of the FirstWorld War.
The willingness to gather deposits was largely determined by the
ability to lend. Unsurprisingly the relative decline in Royal Bank
deposits was accompanied by a declining share of Scottish bank
advances (see table 3.3 below). Here too Royal Bank fell from first to
fourth place. Although the percentage fall was slight - from 13.79 per
cent in 1870, to 12.60 per cent in 1910 - the scale of this decline was in
fact pronounced due to the removal of the City of Glasgow Bank
during the intervening period. The reticence shown towards gathering
deposits before 1914 suggests that Royal Bank experienced difficulties in
finding suitable lending opportunities. However, this overall trend
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Table 3.3. Selected Assets of the Royal Bank of Scotland 1865-1939, (in £s at
current prices)
Liquid
Year Advances Investments Assets Total Assets
1865 8,206,984 974,245 568,811 11,452,653
1870 8,486,477 1,863,145 766,231 12,073,654
1875 10,460,163 3,087,337 942,664 14,666,386
1880 10,154,220 1,892,674 3,378,074 16,333,939
1885 9,529,921 2,649,488 3,191,104 16,073,660
1890 10,128,042 3,034,080 3,661,328 17,236,646
1895 9,504,960 3,919,167 3,224,665 17,449,470
1900 10,807,891 3,052,478 4,122,367 19,100,153
1905 10,684,367 2,823,888 3,987,168 18,660,453
1910 9,551,607 3,529,049 4,579,650 18,501,829
1915 9,294,496 7,959,893 6,375,595 24,695,787
1920 25,379,893 7,766,284 10,709,657 47,460,685
1925 22,828,674 15,147,061 10,454,186 50,128,390
1930 30,009,032 15,180,252 12,455,874 61,561,346
1935 26,417,602 30,045,248 14,595,081 79,028,165
1939 31,209,758 27,517,124 15,981,838 85,089,984
Source: RB 419
contained a significant regional dimension, which is explored below
using the separate histories of the main lending branches. At Glasgow
in particular difficulties were experienced attracting new business.
Perhaps the gradual nature of this problem explains why it took
decades before any response was made, whereas at Dundee dramatic
events provoked more drastic measures. In Andrew Kerr's opinion
Laurence Robertson acquired bad debt at a lower rate than his peers, a
prudent legacy, which successive Dundee agents proved incapable of
matching50. But, while Glasgow proved a frustrating place to bank and
Dundee a dangerous one, London emerged in the 1890s as the single
largest source of profits, a development that subsequently impacted
upon the development of the Bank's Glasgow interests.
After dismal trading conditions in 1892 -3 the Cashier undertook
a special investigation into the Glasgow business, which produced
findings that made for depressing reading. For decades the main
50 A. W. Kerr, "Profits and Loss", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 42
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Glasgow branch had declined relative to the growing wealth of the city
and the business of rival banks. Furthermore, "a decided shrinkage is
observable under all departments"51. In part, the problems were more
apparent than real. A number of substantial Glasgow customers had
transferred a portion of their business to London for convenience and
to take advantage of London rates. To an extent Royal Bank was also a
victim of circumstance. Business activity in Glasgow had shifted
westwards to the area in and around St. Vincent Street leaving the main
Royal Bank office behind in Buchanan Street. Furthermore, structural
change served to redistribute business. For example, the decline of the
cotton industry and the growth of the Paisley thread manufacturers J. P.
Coats to a dominant position in what remained of it in the West of
Scotland effectively transformed its bank; Bank of Scotland, into the
industry's bankers52. While these developments affected every bank,
Royal Bank uniquely suffered due to its relative failure to secure new
business from the closely linked industries that developed along
Clydeside in the second half of the nineteenth century. Shipbuilding, for
example, emerged as a major contributor to the Scottish economy in
the 1870s and continued to expand until 1913. Shipbuilding companies
tended to remain small and numerous, in theory presenting a
substantial opportunity53. Flowever, the minute books indicate that few
Clydeside shipbuilders borrowed from Royal Bank. Instead, Union
Bank was the most active lender to this sector, while the closely linked
shipowning companies provided the Clydesdale Bank with its largest
source of new business during the last quarter of the nineteenth
century54.
The cause of the problem identified in successive investigations
was the increasing distance between Royal Bank and businessmen in
Glasgow. The board of a bank marked out its regional identity. Those
of the Glasgow banks were dominated by that city's business elite,
whereas the Royal Bank board was dominated by leading figures
51 RBM 13th Dec. 1893, see also 11th Dec. 1895
52 P. Payne (1992), pp. 9-11
53 ibid., pp. 21-23; R. Campbell (1985), pp. 170-174
54 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 119 - 121
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drawn from Edinburgh's tightly knit financial community55. Directors
gave more than advice; they formed channels that business and
information concerning new opportunities flowed through56. A few
well-chosen directors could make a significant difference when, as the
uniquely detailed records of Bank of Scotland show, in March 1879 as
few as 48 companies could borrow £5,975,639 (approximately two
thirds of the lending book)57. Thus, Royal Bank benefited from having
the leading accountant George Auldjo Jameson and financier Sir George
Warrander serve as directors from the 1860s until the end of the
century58. Connected in this way Royal Bank made substantial loans to
investment and property companies, including a £200,000 advance for
the Australian Mortgage Land and Finance Company in 187759. Other
boardroom connections solidified the long-term links between Royal
Bank and ScottishWidows, the largest of the giant Scottish life
assurance companies until the 1920s60. Scottish Widows formed a
constant presence, with routine short-term borrowing requirements
that took two steps forward and one back to reach £250,000 in 1887,
then £400,000 in 191261. However, few industrialists became Royal Bank
directors.
In the absence of such strategically important boardroom links it
fell to the Glasgow Cashier to bridge the gap between Royal Bank and
businessmen in the West of Scotland. Archibald Robertson, Glasgow
Cashier from 1857 to 1890, appeared well suited to this task; he came
from a family of Glasgow and Liverpool merchants, was the son of a
55 See for example, the chairmen of the Clydesdale Bank, C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 308 -
309; for Royal Bank see the list of directors contained in N. Munro, op. cit.
56 The use of boardroom appointments to attracted business as well as gaining expert advice
reoccurred in general insurance where "large tariff companies packed their boards with directors
whose main role was to influence the insurances of their companies or estates", O. M. Westall,
The Provincial Insurance Company 1903-1938 Family, markets and competitive growth,
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 289
57 R. Saville, op. cit., table 17.3 Bank ofScotland advances over £50,000 at March 1879, p.
432
58 J. Hughes & M. Scott, op. cit., p. 25; C. Schmitz, "George Auldjo Jamieson" and C. W.
Munn, Banking, Insurance and Finance", in A. Slaven and S. G. Checkland (eds), Dictionary of
Scottish Business Biography Volume II, Processing, distributing, services, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen
University Press, 1990)
59RBM 29th Jun. 1877
60 J. Scott and M. Hughes, op. cit., see Table 1A Scotland's Top Companies (1904-5), Section
C Insurance Companies and pp. 23-53.
61 RBM 2nd Mar 1887 & 25th Nov. 1912
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Greenock banker and worked as a merchant in Glasgow for 16 years
before entering banking62. Moreover, assisting him from 1857 to 1874
was Hugh Cowan, another former Glasgow merchant and the son of
an Ayrshire banker. Together they preserved long-standing
connections with, for example, the Glasgow merchant house James
Finlay and Co. and when James Finlay and Co. diversified, moving
from the importation and processing of cotton into that of tea, jute and
shipping as well as owning tea plantations, Royal Bank remained in
place to meet its growing credit needs63. Such long-term links conferred
important advantages. They allowed a bank to acquire confidence in its
customers and a greater understanding of their needs, while the
frequent intimacy of the business relationship facilitated detailed
monitoring of customer behaviour. But, although able to maintain long-
term links, the overriding impression is that Robertson and Cowan
were well thought of and well connected (Robertson's retirement was
celebrated at a dinner organised and attended by the city's leading
citizens), but by and too the leading businessmen of an earlier era.
Towards the end of the century an ageing senior management team
exacerbated this problem. In 1889 Robertson's assistant died and was
replaced by a 67 year old who died in 1892 and was in turn replaced by
a 66 year old who lasted until 1896; then in 1897 the Accountant died64.
New or at least younger blood was needed if only to achieve some
semblance of stability. One proposal was to appoint a special inspector
who would "by mixing freely with the public endeavour to discover
fresh sources of business"65. Another solution intermittently considered
at Bank of Scotland was the establishment of a Glasgow board.
However, head office would apparently not contemplate such a dilution
of its authority or appoint a special inspector.
Instead, the task of finding new business fell to A. S. Michie who
was brought up from London and appointed Glasgow Cashier in 1890.
62 Archibald Robertson "Men You Know", The Baillie, 16th Jul. 1890; RBM 2nd and 9th
Nov. 1853, 1st May 1857.
63 J. Scott and M. Hughes, op. cit., pp. 34-35; For examples of advances made to James
Finlay and Co. see RBM 13th Oct. 1882, 15th Jun. 1898, 7th, 12th and 21st Dec. 1898, 10th
Dec. 1902
64 Data derived from the 2nd, 8th, 12th and 23rd entries in the staff books.
65 RBM 13th Dec. 1893
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Michie drew upon his London experience to inaugurate a new style of
banking, actively increasing lending against shares to individuals and
companies. Throughout the next two decades this form of lending was
the main source of new business at Glasgow. Ideally lending against
shares was an outlet for deposits when the demand for credit from
trade and industry was low. For example, in 1898 when a Glasgow
stockbroker requested the continuation of a client's £50,000 advance
while holding other Royal Bank loans on his books, Michie refused as
demand from mercantile customers was then increasing66. Lending
against shares was judged a problematic activity, not least because of its
association with speculation. Borrowers were considered fickle in their
attachment to a bank and a poor source of introductions to other
customers. Shares were a labour intensive security requiring vigilance
to ensure a sufficient margin was maintained between their realisable
worth and the amounts they were held against. Then there were those
delicate situations that arose when a banker's opinion of a share's future
worth differed from a customer's. Finally, lending against shares
exposed a bank to whatever was fashionable to invest in as in 1900
when £307,000 of the £1,100,000 advanced at Glasgow was against
mining securities67. The board noted that there were no immediate
dangers, but were concerned such a position might cause difficulties in
the near future. Despite this lending against shares increased as a
percentage of total bank advances from approximately 9 per cent in the
1880s to 13 per cent in the 1890s and 14 per cent in the 1900s68.
In the 1900s concerns about lending in Glasgow shares ended
after a new two-track approach was adopted. In 1903 the last critical
report on Glasgow was compiled, then Archibald Dennistoun was
brought up from London to deputise for Michie, eventually replacing
him in 191069. The appointment of Dennistoun strengthened the
capacity of the main Glasgow office to manage lending against shares,
leaving the hoped for expansion of lending to trade and industry to
occur at the St. Vincent Street branch under the charge of James Macara.
66 R. Michie, op. cit., p. 186
67 RBM 5th Dec. 1900
68 RB 419 Balance Sheet of the Royal Bank of Scotland
69 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1914, no. 23
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Macara had been carefully groomed to fulfil this task. After coming to
prominence in 1890 as the Glasgow Accountant he ran a Glasgow
branch, then spent three years in the Head Office Inspection
Department where he implemented head office guidelines and gained
experience in every form of lending undertaken in Scotland. A safe pair
of hands, Macara returned to Glasgow in 1902 to successfully take
charge of the St. Vincent Street branch. His success was such that St
Vincent Street regularly earned more on a smaller volume of lending
than the main Dundee office70.
Lending at the main Dundee branch became a recurring concern
following the retirement of the Boase brothers in 1867. Their deputy
George MacKenzie, who was assisted by the nephew of Charles Boase
to ensure local connections were retained, replaced them71. MacKenzie
was not given to following orders or cautious banking and in 1871 the
board judged overdrafts at Dundee too many, too large and too often
permanent in nature72. Despite repeated warnings MacKenzie
maintained this approach to lending and from 1871 to 1883 Dundee
acquired bad debts at a higher rate than any other branch, losing twice
as much in total as the main Glasgow office on a far smaller volume of
business. Nor was MacKenzie an effective manager as during his time
in office an agent under his authority committed a notable fraud73.
However, what he could do was find new business. Lending at Dundee
increased and with this in his favour MacKenzie remained in place until
forced to resign due to ill health in 188574. When replacing MacKenzie
the board sought to balance local connections with restraint by
appointing the nephew of Charles Boase to a joint agency with an agent
70 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1921, no. 50. That Alexander Wright recommended Macara to
the secretary of the Institute of Bankers as a suitable subject of a profile in Scottish Bankers
Magazine, an honour usually confined to senior head office officials and the managers of the
main Glasgow, Dundee and London offices, is a measure of the high regard in which he was
held. On the profits earned at St. Vincent Street see for example RB 484/25, Establishment
Book of the Royal Bank ofScotland
71 RBM 6th Nov. 1867
72 A detailed report on lending at Dundee was presented in 1883, see RBM 9th May 1883, for
earlier comments see for example 29th Nov., 4th and 24th Dec. 1872, 3rd Sept. 1873, 27th Jul.
1877, 9th & 14th Aug. and 4th Sept. 1878 and 27th Aug. 1884
73 RBM 26th Jun. 1878
74 RBM 24th Aug. 1877, 13th Dec. 1882, 12th Nov. 1883 and 24th Jul. 1885
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brought in from Arbroath - an indication of head office doubts about
the nephew's abilities that soon proved justified75.
The new arrangement quickly proved unworkable. A report
later noted that there was "an unmistakable want of harmony between
these gentlemen" sufficient to leave a sub-agent under their authority
considered amiable, trustworthy but physically incapable of actively
representing the Bank's interests, free to manage his lending as he saw
fit76. Consequently, unsecured lending reoccurred on a scale that
resulted in the Bank recording its first internal annual losses in 189477.
Royal Bank may also have shared in the Clydesdale Bank's misfortune
of lending to an unscrupulous Dundee jute broker who forged his
accounts and bills of exchange78. However, the minutes do not detail
the transactions on which losses were made, only that all three agents
were asked to resign and replaced by staff brought in from Head Office,
Glasgow and London who introduced a more orthodox approach to
lending79.
Business at London was by comparison developed with
deliberate caution. In 1874 J. T. Horley was recruited from the Bank of
England to manage the office and expected to adhere to strict lending
principles set out by the Cashier and the board. Growth was to be
achieved by the "careful selection of accounts rather than an anxiety to
do a large business"; speculation was to be avoided; small bill brokers
with whom only Horley was familiar, were discouraged; and it was
"Scotch customers who have the first claim on the bank's Scotch
resources"80. Daily correspondence with head office, regular inspections
and Horley's noted caution ensured that these principles were adhered
to. After James Finlay and Co. opened the first London account, new
customers were quickly found in English trade and industry, enabling
the branch to generate a net profit of £5,838 in its third year on 450
accounts81. Lending was predominantly to bill-brokers, Scottish firms
75 RBM 17th Aug. 1885
76 RBM 23rd Feb. 1894
77 RB 419, p. 136
78 C. W. Munn (1988A), p. 119
79 RBM 5th & 12th Dec. 1894
80 RBM 25th Oct. 1876 and 16th Nov. 1877
81 RBM 10th Oct. 1877
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issuing London bills and other banks. In 1898 the largest accounts
belonged to the Cumberland Union Bank, the Bank of British North
America and Scottish Widows82.
In the 1900s Horley's successors deepened the involvement of
the London office in city finance. Private banks, which borrowed to
support their business arranging loans for foreign local and national
governments, began offering Royal Bank shares in these and other
ventures alongside other banks83. Syndicate lending became a routine
part of the Bank's London business and between the wars Royal Bank
began participating in underwriting syndicates, which facilitated foreign
government and railway share issues84. All this made the office very
much a part of the city, however, providing London facilities for other,
mainly foreign banks remained the source of its largest accounts. These
included the Bank's foreign correspondents the Bank of British North
America, which began operating a record £1,100,000 credit in 190985.
Such connections also facilitated lending overseas. For example, the
Bank of British North America held shares used as security for Royal
Bank advances to companies in New York86.
The contrasting experience of the Bank in London, Glasgow and
Dundee from 1902 - 1918 is depicted below in figure 3.1 using internal
data, which recorded the annual profits earned at each office. Annual
profits fluctuated widely in each location, however, important trends
are discernible. At Dundee, although modest growth occurred, the
losses recorded in 1905 show it remained a dangerous place to bank.
Even so, it avoided the dip in profits that occurred in London and
Glasgow in 1909 and 1911, indicating that it followed a regionally
distinctive business cycle. Profits generally declined at Glasgow after
1902, a trend exacerbated by rising prices. Despite some recovery
towards the end of the period, most likely due to the upturn in
industrial activity in the run up to the FirstWorld War, profits remained
82 RB 684 letters from London manager to the Cashier dated 12th Aug. and 16th Nov. 1898
83 for example see RBM 11th Oct. 1907, 6th May 1908 and 25th Jun. 1909
84 For various examples of this before and after the First World War see RBM 29th May 1912,
28th Jul. 1913, 30th Jul. 1924, 29th Jun. 1927, 17th Dec. 1930 and 23rd Jan. 1931
85 RBM 2nd Jun. 1909
86 RBM 3rd May, 5th Jun. 1912, 29th Oct. 1913, 23rd Jan. and 3rd Jun. 1914
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Figure 3.1: Annual Profits earned at the main Dundee and Glasgoiu offices and at the








Source: RB 484/S The Establishment Books of the Royal Bank of Scotland
at a lower level (at current prices) than in 1902, a sign of the relative
failure to participate in lending to trade and industry in the west of
Scotland. Strong growth was confined to the London office where the
Bank capitalised on connections made through the provision of
standard banking facilities by using these to cautiously adopt new lines
of business. Indeed, by 1914 the London office contributed more than
double the combined profits earned at Glasgow and Dundee. This
success most likely underpinned the decision to transfer London ways
to Glasgow detailed above.
The onset of the FirstWorld War halted the expansion of the
branch network and Royal Bank joined the Scottish banks in lending to
government to finance the war effort. Shares were taken in successive
war loans, credits were arranged at London to finance the import of
meat and sugar, and securities lent to assist in the regulation of the
American Exchange87. At Royal Bank the inquest into how Scottish
banking should be conducted after the war saw Adam Tait resign in
87 N. Munro, op. cit., pp. 302-309
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favour of Alexander Wright who on acquiring the new title Cashier and
General Manager quickly made his presence felt at the General
Managers' Committee88. There he opposed the proposal to establish a
Joint Foreign Exchange Bank, then joined in the politics of the General
Managers' Committee by requesting a joint submission from the
Commercial and Union Banks during a debate on altering the method
of calculating discount rates. His peers regarded this as little more than
a delaying tactic89. However, his abilities (see below) were soon
recognised and he was invited to represent the Scottish banks on the
influential Cunliffe Committee on currency and the foreign exchange in
1919. There he displayed an attachment to tradition and a concern with
inflation. In a submission largely confined to a defence of the Scottish
note issue, he argued that it should be retained and stated that he did
not trust Bank of England notes because the government controlled
"the printing press"90. This combination of new contacts and respect for
tradition became the hallmark of Royal Bank between the wars.
3.4 Turning the tables, 1918-1939
Despite the problems of the Scottish economy Royal Bank
entered one of the most successful phases in its history between the
wars, regaining the single largest share of Scottish bank deposits and
advances. This success rested on several factors. First, the greater role
played by government in the financial system and the economy more
generally was key. As at every bank government debt became the
foundation of bank assets, not just the main source of bank liquidity.
Government guarantees also propped up a number of substantial
industrial customers, while government sponsored industries provided
new business. Second, and unique to Royal Bank was an ability to
capitalise upon its continued independence and the greater freedom it
enjoyed following the earlier difficulties experienced in lending in the
west of Scotland. This meant it had a smaller proportion of its assets
88 RBM 21st Feb. 1917
89 CS 205 letter to Commercial bank general manager about proposed foreign exchange bank,
1918; CS 207 (and 208) Notes on a joint foriegn exchange bank compiled by the general
manager of the Commercial Bank, letters on discount rates, dated 23rd Jul. 1919
90 RB 475 Notes of Evidence for Submission to the Committee on Currency and Foreign
Exchange on Behalf of the Scottish banks
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locked up in lends to troubled industrial customers. The architect of this
success was Alexander Wright who found innovative ways of working
with the grain of the 'A and Us' by augmenting the Bank's English
interests through acquisition and affiliation. Acquiring three English
banks gave Royal Bank access to new markets as well as scope for
administrative efficiencies and scale economies in the delivery and
marketing of services. In addition, acquisition left Royal Bank better
placed to take on larger lends individually or in conjunction with other
banks, increasing its range of possible customers.
Royal Bank shared the unaffiliated banks' concern with scale and
in Scotland embarked on a sustained branch network expansion
programme. When an application was received from an aspiring agent,
the nearest agent would investigate the location and the applicant then
report back to head office. As every bank adopted this strategy
competition intensified to a point where the personal failings of a rival
agent were reason enough to open a new branch. For instance, a
branch was opened near Battlefield in Glasgow after the Union Bank
agent was identified as "an energetic individual... but who is not
entirely popular"91. A number of other locations were already known,
for example, a Kirkconnel branch was considered in 1908 and again in
192592. A note was kept of each location and potential agents in the
hope they might eventually be called upon to open a branch. The
purpose of the branches was made clear when a branch at Tollcross in
Glasgow was discussed: "an industrial district mostly of the working
class, except further east where a better class of people and houses is
apparent" and where a branch could expect to secure "Savings accounts
from the newer population in the nearby housing scheme"93. To secure
savings accounts the network was increased from 167 branches in 1918
to 257 branches in 1938 (a majority being opened in the 1920s), the third
largest network in Scotland94. In addition more intensive use was made
of the existing network. To encourage deposit gathering an increasing
91 RB 406/15




number of agents - a peak of 54 in 1920 compared to 17 in 190195 - were
paid a commission according to the volume of deposits they attracted.
These two factors helped Royal Bank acquire the second largest
share of Scottish bank deposits in 1919 and the largest in 1922. The
English acquisitions discussed below merely enhanced this lead. The
acquisition of Drummonds in 1924 plus the continued expansion of the
branch network raised deposits to £64.01 million in 1935, an
unprecedented 21.29 per cent of Scottish bank deposits and well ahead
of the £40.78 million (13.62 per cent) held by the Commercial Bank in
second place96. Deposit growth also reduced the capital ratio. Wartime
inflation had previously reduced capital and the reserve from 13.47 per
cent of total public liabilities in October 1914 to 6.99 per cent in October
1919. Subsequent additions to capital restored the ratio to a more
reassuring 12.33 per cent of total public liabilities in 1931, before it was
allowed to reduce once more.
Although these developments were no doubt gratifying the
main head office concern between the wars was lending. As at every
other bank, lending to government increased with holdings of treasury
bills and other government securities growing from £1,385,933 in 1911
to £10,821,798 in 1929, proportionately well ahead of the increase in
deposits from £14,455,195 to £46,235,129 over this period. In general
lending to government, depicted in figure 3.2 below, followed the
Scottish (and English) pattern of rapid growth during the FirstWorld
War, decline throughout much of the 1920s - though remaining at a
higher level than before 1914 - before reviving once more in the 1930s.
However, government debt remained a substantially smaller
percentage of Royal Bank assets than was the norm for a Scottish bank,
a reflection of Alexander Wright's more adventurous approach to
banking. For example, at a meeting of the general managers Wright
noted: "The Scottish Banks have always, we consider, been strong on
the liquid side"97. However, to put this into practice required
opportunities to lend to the private sector.
95 RB 484/S Establishment books of the Royal Bank of Scotland
96 RB 419 "Deposits of the Scotch Banks"
97 NS 210 Minutes of Meetings of Bank Managers, 4th Feb. 1931
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Figure 3.2 Royal Bank of Scotland Lending to Government, 1911 - 1938
(£s at current prices)
Year
Source: "Liabilities and Assets of the Royal Bank of Scotland", RB 419
The experience of lending in Scotland between the wars can be
judged mixed at best. Royal Bank shared in the common experience of
propping up troubled industrial customers, including Beardmores, a
heavy engineering conglomerate, and Harland and Wolff, a Belfast firm
with substantial interests in the Scottish shipbuilding and steel
industries98. Both companies expanded rapidly immediately after the
war then experienced profound and prolonged difficulties. Harland and
Wolff acquired a number of established companies and their bankers,
operating accounts with eight Scottish, English and Irish banks during
the 1920s. This arrangement both complicated and limited the security
available, while preventing any one bank from knowing precisely the
state of the company's entire affairs or exercising much leverage for
98 M. Moss and J. R. Hume, Shipbuilders to the World 125 Years ofHarland and Wolff,
(Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1986), pp. 138-346 and Beardmores The History ofa Scottish
Industrial Giant, (London: Heinemann, 1979), pp. 171-233
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fear of losing the account to a less opinionated rival. The stasis this
induced became particularly uncomfortable at Beardmores, which
operated accounts with Royal Bank, National Bank and Lloyds Bank.
Inter-bank tensions complicated matters when the company became
insolvent in the late 1920s. Royal Bank and National Bank met to discuss
their shared client while allocating funds to special contingency reserves
to accommodate the expected bad debts. Relations became strained
when the chairman of Beardmores', Lord Invernairn, began playing the
banks off against each other during his campaign to retain control of a
company he had hastily grown into an unwieldy industrial giant. When
National Bank secured an apparent advantage and Wright learned that
Royal Bank was not (as he had been led to believe) the only recipient of
Lord Invernairn's personal guarantee, he noted "we have a serious
grievance against him in this respect"99 as besides the issue of trust, this
threatened to compromise the security for the debt.
More positively, Royal Bank benefited from state intervention
and was able to overcome long-standing limitations in its Scottish
organisation. Treasury guarantees eventually underwrote the
substantial advances tied up in Harland and Wolff and Beardmores,
which came good in the thirties. Of more immediate benefit was the
state sponsored creation of a British sugar beet industry once the
Glasgow based Anglo Sugar Beet Corporation became a borrowing
customer100. Elsewhere, a concerted effort was made to improve the
Bank's presence in Aberdeen. New branches were opened and the main
agent vigorously cultivated local connections, becoming a leading
Rotarian and member of Aberdeen University Court. On his retirement
in 1929 the same agent noted:
"When I count the changes in Agencies of the South Banks since I came here
it suggests that Aberdeen is an exacting centre: the Clydesdale Agent died in
harness, the Union Agent was scarcely at business in his last year, the
99 notes on Beardmores dated 20th Nov. 1927 included in RB 684 London Manager's Letters
1897-1898
100 S. Pollard (1983), pp. 83-84. For examples of the loans made see RBM 21st Feb. and 28th
Oct. 1925 and 28th Jul. 1930
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National Agent retired at 60, while two British Linen Agents went wrong
and were dismissed"101.
Benefiting from the misfortune of others, substantial loans finally began
being made at Aberdeen to customers including companies operating in
the important fishing industry102.
The merger wave that affected British industry between the wars
had more ambiguous consequences, severing long-standing
connections, while creating significant new opportunities. Whereas
Harland and Wolff saw banks being brought together, elsewhere
business was lost to the acquisitive company's bankers. The affiliated
banks were at less of a disadvantage in this respect. While Union Bank
lost the Tennants Chemical Company accounts when it became part of
ICI, in 1928 Sir Harry McGowan, the architect of ICI and a Midland
Bank director, promised to promote connections between the chemical
industry in Scotland and the Clydesdale, the Midland's Scottish
affiliate103. However, Royal Bank's independence saw it benefit from
Scottish business concerns about the loss of autonomy following the
English affiliations. It lent to Scottish companies involved in mergers in
papermaking and gained its largest ever borrower when Distillers was
remade as an industrial giant104. Only the demand for shipbuilding fell
further than the demand for whisky, yet Distillers was able to expand,
reorganise and diversify its interests to become the sixth largest British
company in 1930105. Beginning with a £2 million advance granted in
1922 Royal Bank credit financed Distillers' acquisitions policy106. Half
was quickly repaid using the cash reserves of the acquired companies
with the remainder repaid over five years at £200,000 per annum. Then
a further £1 million advance was granted for nine months to finance
101 RB 61/9 letter no. 1728 dated 6th Mar. 1929
102 for example see RBM 4th and 9th Nov. 1921
103 Munn, also notes, however, that the Midland Bank attempted to poach the more profitable
customers of the Clydesdale Bank, C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 160-161; A. Cameron, op. cit. p.
180
104 for examples of loans used in mergers and acquisitions in the paper industry see RBM 20th
Sept. 1922, 8th Jul. 1925 and 17th Aug. 1927
105 R. Weir, "Rationalisation and diversification in the Scotch whiskey industry, 1900-1939:
another look at 'old' and new industries", Economic History Review, XLII, (1989), pp. 375-
395; L. Hannah, The Rise of the Corporate Economy, 2nd ed, (London: Metheun, 1983), p.73
& 102
106 RBM 5th and 19th Jul. 1922
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more acquisitions107. Distillers subsequently used internal funds to
finance a move into the manufacture of industrial alcohol, then it and
associated companies returned in 1937 and 1938 to secure three credits
of £400,000, £500,000 and £1,000,000 operated at the London office and
used to finance overseas trade108.
The unique strategy pursued at Royal Bank of expansion and
diversification through acquisition becomes intelligible in light of this
Scottish experience, even more so given the growth in profits earned in
London immediately before and after the war. The damage done by the
war to international German financial interests saw new business found
at London serving English and international customers. London links
were cultivated with banks and businesses in central and eastern
European countries including Latvia, Estonia and Czechoslovakia,
independently and in conjunction with various private banks. Moving
north to Scandinavia, business was found in Sweden, Norway and
Iceland. A cluster of Finnish firms engaged in the production and export
of timber products - a good fit for the Bank's papermaking customers -
provided the largest single source of new business, operating discount
accounts and borrowing sums that ranged from £150,000 to £400,000 in
the 1930s109. Their importance is evident in the career of WilliamWhyte
who built his reputation as an expert on the "Finnish position" while in
charge of the London foreign department before replacing Wright as
Cashier and General Manager110.
Of course, success in London and the desire to find new business
outside Scotland was not unique to Royal Bank. What set it apart was its
relatively light exposure to bad debt in Scotland and Alexander Wright's
personal reputation and close links with London's financial elite111. The
former lent a degree of flexibility and was most likely a consequence of
the earlier difficulties experienced in lending to trade and industry in the
west of Scotland. The latter at first sight appears surprising given
Wright spent his entire career in Scotland. However,Wright stood out
107 RBM 22nd Jun. 1927
108 RBM 3rd Nov. and 22nd Dec. 1937, 31st Mar. 1938
109 see for example RBM 11th Apr. 1934, 10th Apr. 1935, 2nd Dec. 1936, 14th Apr. 1937 and
27th Apr. 1938
110 RB/61/9 letter nos. 1676 & 1677; RBM 27th Sep. 1933
111 R. Saville, op. cit., p. 543
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amongst his peers. While working as a head office clerk he took a first
class degree in law and economics at Edinburgh University in his spare
time and was soon recognised as an expert on law as it affected banking
in Scotland112. Then, during the FirstWorld War as Secretary of the
Bank he chaired the National Savings Campaign in Scotland, for which
he received a knighthood. Further honours followed including service
on treasury committees immediately after the war and in 1923 and
1925, as well as the vice-presidency of the then newly formed British
Bankers Association113. Fearned, public-spirited and in command of
Scotland's second oldest bank, Wright enjoyed an unparalleled
reputation outside Scotland that brought him into close contact with
leading financial figures who were to play a key role in almost every
English acquisition.
The expansion of Royal Bank's Fondon interests began in 1924
with the acquisition of the long established Fondon private bank
Drummonds114. No clear rationale for the take-over from the
Drummonds perspective appears in the Royal Bank minutes leading up
to the acquisition. However, the death of an elder member of the
Drummonds family shortly afterwards and a number of issues raised
by the Royal Bank board about the personal finances of surviving
members indicates succession was a concern and probable motive. To
ensure Drummonds distinctively aristocratic clientele was retained a
joint letter was issued to customers emphasising Drummonds' Scottish
origins and describing the takeover as a fusion115. The continued
involvement of the Drummonds family was a condition of the purchase
and they remained involved in the day-to-day business of what
effectively became another branch, though with a local board116. The
appointment of a Royal Bank official to a senior position at
Drummonds, the integration of its accounts with Royal Bank and the
direct supervision of the Drummonds' personal dealings supplemented
112 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1912, no. 12; IOB letter bk.3, 15th Nov. 1897
113 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1933, no. 99
114 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p.578
115 letter dated 2/1/24 included in RB 116/2
116 2/1/24, 16/1/24 and letter dated 22/12/23 included in RB 116/2,
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this arms length control117. The arrangement worked and for perhaps
the first time in its history the Royal Bank board found itself assessing
the value of a diamond and a tiara offered as part security on a £204,000
advance to a Duke118.
The financial benefits of acquiringWm. Deacon's Bank, a joint-
stock bank operating primarily in the North of England and
comparable in size to Royal Bank, were less apparent. The involvement
ofWm. Deacon's in Bank of England sponsored attempts to rationalise
the depressed Lancashire cotton industry left it carrying £4 million in
bad debts in 1928 and close to collapse119. Failure would have damaged
confidence in the banking system and threatened any future
government sponsored attempts at reorganising depressed industries.
To avoid this Montagu Norman recommended it be taken over, but
having barred further concentration in English banking could not
involve an English bank or its Scottish affiliates. The involvement of
Royal Bank provided an ideal solution. The acquisition of Drummonds
had raisedWright's standing in the Treasury, bringing him into favour
with Montagu Norman. Moreover, as a merger would raise questions
about the Royal Bank note issue, the Scottish desire to preserve this
right now allayed English fears about the separate identity of a bank
being lost120. Royal Bank potentially stood to benefit from the politics of
banking; however, its directors were understandably less sure. It
required a £4 million contribution from the Bank of England and the
opportunity to purchase its London West End branch on generous
terms to convince them121. The latter lent the Bank's growing London
operations, including new branches on Bond Street and inWest
Smithfield, an unmatched status rendered tangible by the temporary
117 a substantial file was compiled on the personal activities of members of the Drummond
family, see for example RB 116/8
118 RBM 18th. Aug. 1926
119 RBM 23rd Jul. and 20th Aug. 1930; S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 578-580; R. Saville, op
cit., pp. 542-544; M. Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance 1800 - 1939, (London: Macmillan,
1991), pp. 77-78; R. S. Sayers, The Bank of England 1891 - 1944, vol. I, pp. 253-259,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)
120 In 1922 the desire of the Wm. Deacon's directors to retain the separate identity of their bank
blocked a proposed merger with the Midland Bank, see S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 578-579
121 for example Bank of England retained responsibility for the pensions of its former staff after
they transferred to Royal Bank, see letter dated 14th Jul. 1930 included in RB/19/S
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right to use the Bank of England brass plate attached to the doorway
and remaining supplies of Bank of England stationery122.
These acquisitions introduced Royal Bank to new and profitable
markets in England. After acquiring Drummonds Royal Bank began
financing the personal and social needs of the English upper classes,
including the relatives of deceased aristocrats confronted by death
duties, and various gentlemen's clubs123. Besides the reputational
benefits likely to have accrued from this, Royal Bank was well-placed to
meet the financial and commercial banking needs of its newly acquired
clients. For instance through Drummonds Bank and the Drummonds'
personal interests Royal Bank became involved in property
development, including a £330,000 advance for a property company in
1935124. Towards the end of the 1930s the benefits of acquiring Wm.
Deacons became apparent. The affiliation reduced running costs by
giving Royal Bank direct access to the London clearing house,
enhancing the facilities offered to existing foreign bank customers. Scale
economies were achieved when the two banks began building upon
their respective foreign services and sharing marketing costs125. Finally,
the two banks began sharing advances, for example, in February 1938
Royal Bank took half of a £400,000 Wm. Deacons lend and a £150,000
share of another in May126. Such arrangements allowed both banks to
retain the advantages of moderate size, while being able to lend larger
sums safely.
The affiliation with Glynn, Mills and Co., then the largest
remaining London private bank, provides a coda to the development of
Royal Bank between the wars. Glynn, Mills and Co. worked alongside
the Big 5 as second banker to a number of industrial customers. It was
not in any difficulties, however, the youthfulness of its senior partners
prompted concerns about succession and the effect of death duties as
the Second World War approached127. Once again Montagu Norman
acted as matchmaker for a deal completed in 1939 using an exchange of
122 see letters dated 30th Mar. and 3rd Apr. 1933 in RB/19/s
123 RBM 9th May 1934 and 25th Feb. 1935
124 RBM 30th Jan. and 31st Jul. 1935
125 detailed in a joint brochure issued in 1931 (RB 275)
126 RBM 21st Feb. and 25th May 1938
127 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 579-580
112
shares that served to enhance Royal Bank's English interests and
reputation at a time when much of the Scottish economy had only just
emerged from the doldrums128.
3.5 Conclusion
Royal Bank followed a distinctive path to reach much the same
destination as every other Scottish bank. This distinctiveness can best be
understood in terms of the Bank's particular identity and the ability of
successive Cashiers to identify and act upon opportunities so as to
profitably exploit their chosen markets, within the constraints imposed
by collective agreement in Scotland.
The transformation undergone in the third quarter of the
nineteenth century was unique only to the extent that its timing and
method saw Laurence Robertson build a branch network upon the
carcass of the Western Bank of Scotland. With the acquisition of the
Dundee Banking Co. in 1864, Royal Bank finally participated in the
series of mergers and acquisitions that had transformed the structure of
the Scottish banking system129. By doing all this Laurence Robertson
established the Cashier as an official possessed of executive authority,
which John Fleming subsequently used to complete the organisation of
the Bank by opening a London office in 1874.
Thereafter, Royal Bank yielded to the carefully guarded co¬
operation that dominated Scottish banking after 1857 and served to
render one bank largely indistinguishable from another. However, on
another level its Edinburgh head office, royal charter and tradition of
appointing successive Dukes of Buccleuch as Governor of the Bank,
ensured there was no mistaking Royal Bank's distinctive regional
identity and prestige. These same factors contributed to the sustained,
relative decline in the Bank's fortunes; close links with Edinburgh and
Scotland's financial and aristocratic elite carried the opportunity cost of
distancing Royal Bank from trade and industry in the west. There was
also an apparent loss of initiative. Tellingly, the men who had
128 RBM 26th Jul. 1939. The role of Montagu Norman is referred to in R. S. Sayers, op. cit.,
p. 251
129 For a summary of take-overs, mergers, retirals and failures involving provincial banks c.
1826 to 1864 see tables 9 and 10 in C. W. Munn (1981), pp. 86-87
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transformed the Bank had both learned their trade in the highly
competitive Glasgow market. Neither were great innovators, rather
their shared achievement was to inject current ideas into head office. In
doing so they displayed a vigour and initiative, which their head office-
bred successors lacked.
The initiative was only regained between the wars when Royal
Bank embarked on a unique strategy of English acquisitions and
achieved an unprecedented level of success as measured by its share of
Scottish bank assets and liabilities. Much of this stemmed from the close
links, which AlexanderWright formed with leading financial figures,
above all with Montagu Norman. Identity was also important, but at a
national rather than regional level as Royal Bank's independent Scottish
status saw it benefit from nationalistic concerns about the independence
of the affiliated Scottish banks. For the same reason it was able to
pursue a policy of acquisitions that left concentration in English banking
largely unchanged. The other major development between the wars
was the increase in lending to government. Royal Bank shared in this,
but to a lesser extent than its rivals, most likely because the significant
additions made to its London interests introduced it to a wide range of
new, private customers.
A point of importance to the argument of this thesis is how
typical Royal Bank was of Scottish banking as a whole, particularlywith
regards to employment. The early organisation of Royal Bank
developed in a unique way and certainly assumed a unique form
following the English acquisitions. However, these remained separate
entities, which with few exceptions, continued to be staffed by those
working in them when they were acquired. Therefore, acquisition only
impacted upon employment in Scotland to the extent that by enhancing
lending it supported the parallel expansion of the branch network. A
final example is provided by the apocryphal story told in every bank
about some inspectors who descended upon a country branch to
conduct an inspection. The chief inspector found everything to be in
order, but noted the safe and the teller's draw contained too many rival
bank notes. Eventually, it dawned on the inspector that he was in a
branch of the rival bank. Even to the expert eye it seems one bank was
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indistinguishable from another. This story supports the conclusion that
Royal Bank, in its organisation, methods, administration and services,
can be considered representative of Scottish banking as a whole.
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Chapter 4: Employment at the Royal Bank of Scotland, 1800-1873
4.1 Introduction
The internalisation of the market is central to the history of
employment in the later nineteenth century with the institutions where
this occurred located at the heart of first Victorian then Edwardian
society. George Square in Glasgow provides a notable example of this.
By the 1880s buildings housing the great bureaucracies of the
nineteenth century, a railway station, a post office headquarters,
municipal buildings and bank offices surrounded this focal point of
public life. In each of these locations employees were ordered and
rewarded, not according to the market, but in line with carefully
devised rules and regulations. Thus, much of the institutional
infrastructure of nineteenth century life, it seems, was at a partial
remove from the market. While numbers employed in these locations
increased, comparable arrangements already existed or were
introduced in a growing and eclectic range of other locations including
the civil service, the Churches of Scotland and England, the steel
industry1 and the armed forces; an early example of large scale
bureaucracy and important inspiration to the entrepreneurs of the
industrial revolution who strove to come to terms with problems of
scale and distance in their organisations2. Employment in all these
locations continued to increase and by the end of the nineteenth century
railway companies were second only to the post office, an industry in
itself, as the single largest employers of labour in Britain. Yet, historical
research has focused primarily on manual work, particularly that of
1 B. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance A History ofBritish Insurance 1720 to 1970
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); On employment in the steel industry see A.
McKinlay, "Philosophers in overalls ?: Craft and Class on Clydeside", in W. Kenefick and W.
Mclvor, Roots of Red Clydeside 1910-1914 ?, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1996)
2 On the development of bureaucracy in capitalist enterprises in the nineteenth century see S.
Pollard, The Genesis ofModern Management, (London: Penguin, 1965); T. R. Gourvish,
"Captain Mark Huish: A Pioneer in the Development of Railway management" Business
History., 12, (1970), pp. 46-58; and C. Dandeker, Surveillance, Power and Modernity,
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990)
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men engaged in manufacturing and extractive industries, detailing the
market for their labour, its rewards and the meaning and organisation
of their work3. Consequently the history of employment remains
seriously incomplete.
What employment in these other locations shared were some or
all of the characteristics of an internal labour market (ILM), which can
be defined by four basic features4. First, administrative procedures take
the place of market forces; the employment relationship is partly
governed by impersonal, bureaucratic rules with the pricing and
allocation of labour occurring within organisations not in external
markets. Second, employees are recruited at a limited number of "ports
of entry"; usually lower level positions. Consequently, internal
promotion is used instead of external recruitment to fill higher-level
positions. Third, this assumes the existence of hierarchies and implies
employment is long term, possibly lasting entire working lives during
which participants pursue formal careers moving along well defined
career paths within individual firms. Finally, employees frequently
receive other benefits in addition to pay. As well as secure employment,
these can take the form of employer welfare provision, another symbol
of the long-term nature of employment and of particular importance in
a historical study due to the limited availability and worth of state and
voluntary welfare provision in the past.
The account of how the business of banking was conducted
given in chapters 2 and 3 indicates banking provides a suitable example
with which to examine the establishment and development of ILMs in
Britain. Banks operated using a clearly defined hierarchical division of
labour and authority. In each head office a general manager oversaw
the daily management of the bank, beneath him senior officials assisted
3 A. Calder, "Workers' Culture/Popular Culture: Defining our Terms", Scottish Labour History
Journal, 26, (1991), pp. 64-77
4 For definitions of internal labour markets see J. Creedy and K. Whitfield, "The economic
analysis of internal labour markets", Bulletin ofEconomic Research, 40:4, (1988), p. 247, P.
Milgrom and J. Roberts, op. cit., p.359
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by clerks, functioned as departmental heads; the secretary attended to
legal matters affecting the whole bank, the accountant supervised the
internal accounts and the superintendent of branches oversaw business
in the branches. Tellers handled cash while other clerks and apprentices
undertook elementary bookkeeping and attended to routine office
matters. In the branches agents oversaw business assisted by
accountants, clerks and apprentices. All these positions were in theory
linked by channels of promotion making careers central to
employment, indeed towards the end of the nineteenth century it was
possible to enter a bank as an apprentice, progressing from one stool to
the next until reaching the managership of a bank without taking
employment elsewhere.
This chapter examines the dynamic development of employment
as an ILM at Royal Bank, focusing on the Mid-Victorian era when
arrangements for ordering and rewarding staff were transformed. Few
of the surviving sources record the rationale for the arrangements
reached. Due to this and the limited historiographical context available
accounts of ILMs drawn primarily from the economics literature are
surveyed in section 4.2. Factors relevant to interpreting the
development of employment are identified and their applicability
assessed in subsequent sections concerned with three successive
periods: 1800 to 1857; 1857 to 1871; and 1871 to 1873. These are
distinguished primarily on the basis of the different approaches to
employment taken by successive Cashiers. Section 4.3 details
recruitment, training and career processes in the first half of the
nineteenth century, identifying long-term employment and internal
promotion as established attributes of bank careers. The style of labour
management is also considered and characterised as a benevolent
autocracy geared to securing faithful and loyal service in circumstances
where opportunistic behaviour was possible, yet monitoring imperfect
and costly. Section 4.4 examines how the adoption of branch banking
impacted upon established arrangements and discusses those trends,
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which emerged in career patterns: first, the transition to a near
complete reliance upon internal promotion; and second, the emergence
of a high turnover rate amongst new recruits. While these
developments are depicted as a rational response to cost, this section
also identifies the informal ability of staff to influence the distribution of
pay and promotions as a significant factor in the allocative process.
Finally, section 4.5 considers the changes implemented by James
Fleming on becoming Cashier, arguing these were part of a broader
series of measures driven by cost concerns and put in place to provide
an effective means of managing what had become a substantial and
complex organisation. However, what was unique about their timing,
content and form was the desire to secure greater managerial authority
over staffing matters.
4.2 Theory and internal labour markets
ILM theory is one response to the observation that labour
markets do not clear in the way classical economic theory otherwise
predicts. But, whereas Keynesian economics, for instance, seeks to
explain persistent unemployment in relation to macro-economic
imperfections, ILM theory has focused more upon micro-economic
phenomena, in particular the confinement of certain individuals to
particular sectors of the labour market and the structuring of
employment within individual organisations. The apparent absence of
market forces has seen interdisciplinary approaches developed to
explain this along with the existence and operation of ILMs. However,
Osterman notes an apparent tendency in sociological studies to accept
ILMs as a given and concentrate instead upon the social consequences
for the individual of participation5. For this reason this section examines
different theories drawn primarily from the economics literature that
have been advanced to explain the existence of ILMs.
5 P. Osterman, "White-Collar Internal Labour Markets", in P. Osterman, (ed.), op. cit.
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As to why ILMs occur in some organisations and not others
Williamson, working within the transaction cost approach (wherein the
boundaries of the firm are seen to occur at that point where it is more
efficient to replace market transactions with internal organisation)
provides a list of necessary preconditions, which although read back
into existing structures remain plausible6. He notes ILMs typically
appear in large, diversified firms that benefit from stable demand for
their products, where a diversified line of products are offered and at
least some workers are transferable between lines. Such firms possess
the capacity to offer the long-term employment that characterises ILMs,
while remaining able to accommodate shifts in demand. The details of
Scottish banking set out in previous chapters match this profile in
several key respects. The adoption of branch banking made them
substantial organisations and provided insulation from cyclical
variations experienced by individual regions and industries. The
carefully managed broadening of the bank customer base and capacity
to shift lending from more or less speculative activities in accordance
with demand, therefore smoothing earning profiles, lent additional
stability. Finally, the establishment of the General Managers'
Committee in 1857 served to contain the potentially destabilising effects
of unrestricted price competition.
Kanter provides a more dynamic account wherein ILMs are
shaped by the changing structure and technology of organisations, and
develop in response to commercial pressures within the confines of a
given social and regulatory environment7. What is important in this
account is the pace of change not change itself. Where change is rapid or
unpredictable, then the stability presupposed by the basic characteristics
of ILMs is unlikely to be sustainable. Recourse is then made to the
6 O. E. Williamson, "Efficient Labour Organisation", in F. Stephen, (ed.), Firms, Organization
and Labour, (London: Macmillan, 1984)
7 R.M. Kanter, "Variations in Managerial Career Structures in High-Technology Firms: The
Impact of Organizational Characteristics on Internal Labour Market Patterns", in P. Osterman,
(ed.), op. cit.
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external labour market, as internal resources cannot supply the
necessary quantity or quality of labour demanded. This in turn has
repercussions for established hierarchies and career paths, which are
likely to be disrupted. On the basis of this interpretation we would
expect to find the administrative challenge posed by the adoption of
branch banking had significant consequences for employment, with the
stasis that characterised the subsequent organisation and technology (as
well as legislation) accompanied by a corresponding stability in
employment arrangements.
These accounts provide clues as to where to find ILMs and why
they change, but do not establish why they are implemented in the first
place. To do so Williamson uses a neo-classical approach to argue ILMs
provide an efficient means of managing labour, with skill specificity and
monitoring as key variables8. First, where skills are firm specific then
the prospective rewards offered in an ILM will encourage workers to
invest in acquiring them, while employers benefit from reduced
training and turnover costs. The second variable derives from the
assumption that economic actors are opportunistic in their pursuit of
individual self-interest. In particular, when workers are able to acquire a
monopoly of knowledge regarding their jobs due to "task
idiosyncrasy", then theywill not willingly disclose all the information
they have and exploit their position to secure higher returns. In
circumstances where monitoring is not possible and/or costly then an
ILM provides an efficient solution by engendering a "social contract"; a
shared belief that opportunistic behaviour is against the interests of the
organisation in which all have a common interest.
Williamson purposefully makes no allowance for other,
sociological factors, particularly the single-minded pursuit of power,
which he dismisses as an irrational distraction that, if present, will
eventually disappear during the pursuit of optimum efficiency,
8 O. E. Williamson, op. cit.
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although what constitutes efficiency remains unspecified. Radical
economists instead argue that sociological factors are the primary
determinant of ILMs. Edwards contends that such arrangements
embody a strategy of divide and rule; they prevent the development of
class-consciousness amongst workers, allowing employers to maintain
control over the production process9. Similarly, on the basis of a
historical case study of the North American steel industry, Stone argues
that employers followed up a violent strike by imposing an ILM to
break militant trade unionism10. As in Edwards' account homogeneous
work groups conducive to the formation of a collective consciousness
were replaced by individual workers scattered across intricate pay and
promotion ladders unrelated to the actual content of their work. In a
variation on the Marxist false consciousness argument, both authors
contend that in firms where ILMs are established the fundamental
struggle over control of the productive process is replaced by
individuals exclusively concerned with the operation of company rules
and the allocation of rewards.
However, Radical approaches can be criticised on various
grounds. Whereas they take class-consciousness and class action for
granted, class is a vigorously contested source of social identity and
explanation of social behaviour11. Similarly, the priority given to
conflicts over production as opposed to the allocation of rewards is
largely a matter of political conviction. Moreover, different theoretical
orientations have produced conflicting accounts. The neo-Weberian
Lockwood, for example, in his classic account of white collar class-
consciousness depicts the introduction of arrangements similar to those
Edwards describes as facilitating the development of trade unionism12.
Clerks who once worked alongside their masters were alienated by the
9 R. Edwards, Contested Terrain, (London: Heinemann, 1979)
10 K. Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry", Review ofRadical Political
Economics, Summer, 1974
11 For an introduction to recent debates over class see R. Crompton, Class and Stratification
An Introduction to Current Debates, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) and P. Joyce (1995)
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introduction of bureaucratic rules and procedures governing working
conditions. Placed at a social and organisational remove clerks
responded by taking part in trade unionism. Furthermore, the job
security and stable wage rates available within ILMs were and are
valuable prizes in a free market economy and neither need be
compatible with maximising profit, which as Grint notes is the primary
concern of employers13. Thus, Rubery argues that in Britain organised
labour has played an important part in the development, shaping and
retention of ILMs and proved able on occasion to resist employer led
changes, which threatened their continuation14. However, radical
approaches remain important because they emphasise the potential
divergence of interests between employers and employees and unlike
Williamson, do not assume that social contracts can be achieved and
maintained (or are even desirable).
Although critics have established that the development of ILMs is
a more complex and contested process than Radical accounts initially
assumed, we need to establish whether the "divide and rule" thesis is
appropriate to banking in any form. A tendency among proponents
and critics of the radical approach is to equate the ability of workers to
influence managerial decisions with the existence or not of trade unions.
For instance, as these did not exist anywhere in banking before the
twentieth century Seltzer dismisses the possibility that staff influenced
the development of ILMs in Australian banking15. Yet the strike record
among female workers in the Victorian and Edwardian Scottish textile
industry, for example, is evidence of a capacity for militancy and self-
organisation, albeit spontaneous and short-lived, at a remove from
12 D. Lockwood (1989)
13 K. Grint, op. cit., p. 196.
14 J. Rubery, "Structured Labour Markets, Worker Organisation and Low Pay", in A. Giddens
and D. Held, (eds.), op. cit.
15 A. Seltzer, "The Nature and Causes ofWhite-Collar Internal Labour Markets: Historical
Evidence from the Union Bank of Australia", (unpublished paper 1998?)
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organised labour16. Of more immediate relevance is Tamaki's
description of a series of joint applications for salary increases sent by
staff to the board of the Union Bank of Scotland in the 1850s as an
example of collective bargaining17. Therefore, the absence of trade
unions in itself does not provide immediate grounds for dismissing the
"divide and rule" thesis, or in a modified, more plausible form, the
ability of employees to influence the terms of employment, advancing
their interests at the expense of their employers.
Institutional analyses exchange the coherence of transaction cost
and radical approaches for an ad-hoc range of factors to account for the
existence of ILMs. The emphasis on skill specificity originated in the
institutional analysis of Doeringer and Piore who also gave credence to
the influential role of labour and the importance of custom and tradition
in the operation of ILMs18. Although Creedy andWhitfield note this
approach fails to establish the relative importance of the various factors,
the significance of this limitation in historical analysis is not immediately
apparent, given sophisticated methods of calculating labour costs within
bureaucratic organisations are largely a twentieth century
phenomenon19. Moreover, in a study of employer welfare provision in
Edwardian Britain Melling concludes, "general efficiency and loyalty was
seen as more important than the specific productivity of a workman"20.
Similarly between the wars Lord Nuffield, owner of the Austin Motor
Company, attached greater importance to the loyalty of his senior
managers than their technical or managerial ability21. Thus, those
charged with managing Royal Bank lacked detailed means of assessing
16 E. Gordon, "Women's Spheres", in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser, (eds.), op. cit., pp. 221-
223
17 N. Tamaki, op. cit., p.63
18 P. B. Doeringer and M. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis, (Lexington,
Mass.: DC Heath, 1971)
19 ibid.
20 J. Melling, "Industrial strife and business welfare philosophy: the case of the South
Metropolitan Gas Company from the 1880s to the war", Business History., 21, (1979), p. 174
21 R. Church, "Deconstructing Nuffield: the evolution ofmanagerial culture in the British
motor industry", Economic History Review, XLIX, (1996), pp. 577-579
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individual performance at a time when greater importance was
typically attached to general attributes than specific results.
Furthermore, institutional approaches have the advantage of
acknowledging the importance of economic factors while taking
organisational culture seriously. We can crudely define organisational
culture as "how they do things around here"22. Culture in this sense is
unavoidable, omnipresent and of broader meaning than the 'social
contract' proposed byWilliamson. In Barnes's formal account of culture,
the rules crucial to the operation of an ILM lack any inherent meaning
and instead require interpretation23. Consequently, organisations are
the ongoing achievement of agents who sustain a shared sense of what
rules and procedures "really mean". Custom and tradition are central to
this, as a restrictive set of assumptions inherited from an earlier era to
be sure, but also as a source of models, techniques, procedures and
practices constantly applied, reapplied and subjected to modification.
Therefore, rather than extricate an organisation from the constraints of
tradition, this presents management the challenge of shaping and
communicating an appropriate set of shared values24. In other words,
to manage the culture of an organisation in circumstances where
interests need not always be compatible and meanings remain
ambiguous and require elucidation.
In summary, while there is a general consensus of opinion
regarding the existence and form of ILMs, there is no consensus as to
why they are established or what purposes they serve. This review has
identified circumstances where they are likely to occur and a range of
factors that can account for their establishment. The latter in part derive
from the nature of the tasks performed with skill specificity and
monitoring being of particular importance. The conduct of employment
22 M. Lebas and J. Weigenstein, "Management Control: The Roles of Rules, Markets and
Culture", Journal ofManagement Studies 23:3 May 1986, pp. 259-272
23 B. Barnes, The Elements ofSocial Theory, (London: UCL Press, 1995)
24 For a discussion of management and culture see T. J. Watson, Management, organisation
and employment strategy, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 66-71
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relations within a firm, and more broadly organisational culture, have
also been identified as significant factors, while the assumption these are
reflex responses to the pursuit of profit questioned on theoretical and
empirical grounds.
4.3 A benevolent autocracy: employment before 1857
An investigation in 1837 revealed that the Royal Bank, which
oversaw the largest share of Scotland's banking business in the first half
of the nineteenth century, was a small, intimate organisation with
approximately 60 staff25. Unfortunately, until the 1870s information
concerning salaries and tenure is fragmentary and incomplete. What is
significant, however, is that in key respects the employment
arrangements that can be identified comply with the definition of an
ILM set out in the introduction. First, staff regularly pursued lengthy,
formal careers involving promotion up hierarchies and along
incremental pay scales; and second, staff received a range of
paternalistic benefits in addition to their salaries. This section sketches
out the processes involved in recruiting, training and rewarding staff,
then argues that a combination of incremental and paternalistic
incentives combined with rules governing behaviour inside and outside
the office were used to elicit loyal and faithful service. Furthermore, it is
argued this approach, characterised as an autocratic yet benevolent
paternalism, with only minor modifications, persisted throughout the
subsequent history of employment at the Bank.
Careers typically began with the recruitment of youths from an
exclusive pool already connected to Royal Bank as the friends and
family of customers, shareholders, staff and directors. These youths
commenced work as apprentices, a formal arrangement introduced in
the eighteenth century that usually lasted three years. At some point
thereafter an entry exam was introduced, which applicants had to pass
25 RB 709, Miscellaneous Notebook
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to qualify as an apprentice (these are discussed in more detail in chapter
7). After completing an apprenticeship youths found to be satisfactory
joined the permanent clerical staff of the Bank. The scramble for
employment following the failure of the Western Bank in 1857 exposed
the role of connections in recruitment. A Western Bank apprentice who
applied to Royal Bank was identified as the son of a Commercial Bank
customer at Crieff26. That Bank's Crieff agent, however, did not have an
opening for an apprentice, but supported, possibly even suggested,
applying to the Western Bank. Equipped with this and a testimonial
from a family friend who explained if he had known the Bank's
directors personally he would have addressed them on the youth's
behalf, the apprentice gained a position in theWestern Bank. This use of
connections was the norm, without them it was necessary for a senior
official to make further inquiries. Once Laurence Robertson had found
the applicant to be quiet and steady and was able to reassure the board
as to his sobriety and industry, he was appointed to head office on a
salary of £25.
The resultant exclusivity of recruitment served a variety of
purposes. Prior connections were important because the character of
the father was used as a guide to that of the son. Moreover, taking on
an apprentice was frequently an act of patronage used to cement the
relationship between banks and their customers. In light of this the
following English example is of interest as it expressed a sentiment
likely to have offended customers engaged in "trade":
"are any of your clerks the sons of shop-keepers?' demanded the Civil
Service Inquiry Commissioners of the Secretary of the London and
Westminster Bank, in 1875. 'I should say none', he judicially replied. 'We
may have had one or two when we were not so rigid as we are now, but I
should say that now, as a rule, we should not introduce the son of a
shopkeeper"27.
26 "An application for a job", RB 403
27 G. Best, op. cit., pp. 273-275
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Clearly social concerns influenced recruitment. But, as banking involved
regular dealings with the public a self-conscious concern with status and
social origins - in Scotland a note was taken of how each apprentice's
father earned his living - ensured staff possessed those social attributes
and manners deemed necessary by customers as well as senior officials.
Here too the former Western Bank apprentice had scored highly. He
was a good "figurer" and penman, had the benefits of a liberal
education, including Latin and geometry, personally provided by his
assiduous father, who was a teacher, and a carefully attended to course
of religious instruction provided by his uncle, who was a minister.
Finally, the exchange taken from the Civil Service Inquiry suggests
standards were varied in probable accordance with demand and the
ability of families belonging to preferred social strata to produce new
recruits.
The use of prior connections in recruitment made Royal Bank an
intimate place to work, one where the hierarchy of the family
frequently underpinned that of the bank. Staff drawn from the same
families provide the clearest examples of this. At head office Andrew
Kerr worked beneath his father, then one of the bank's highest officials.
Beside him was a clerk engaged after his brother-in-law had asked a
director to find him a "stool in the Royal Bank"28. At Glasgow in 1859
two brothers held the third and fifth highest positions in the office and
oversaw the work of a long serving clerk and his apprentice son29. This
pattern reoccurred in the branches. At those opened before 1854, a Port
Glasgow agent managed to secure his son an apprenticeship in the
nearby Greenock branch before being asked to resign30. Similarly in the
new branches, at Bathgate in the 1860s and 1870s, for example, those of
the Royal Bank and National Bank, were run by fathers assisted by their
28 RB 399, letter dated 8th Jan. 1858, RBM 28th Sep. 1864
29 See the list of staff at the main Glasgow office in RB 307
30 RBM 21st Feb. 1855
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sons31. Familial concerns influenced career decisions. At Dalkeith in 1855
the agent asked the board for his son, who he had employed as a clerk
since 1845, to be made joint-agent or at least accountant. Initially the
directors would only agree to the lesser appointment, but relented in
1857 and appointed the son joint-agent where he was well placed to
become sole agent after his father died in 185932.
The training Scottish apprentices received provided a wide-
ranging introduction to bank work, as opposed to the narrower
experience gained in English Banking33. This was partly due to
necessity; Scottish branches tended to be smaller with fewer staff than
their English counterparts. But in both locations training remained ad-
hoc. Promoted staff: senior clerks and tellers in the main offices; agents
and accountants in the branches, held practical responsibility for
ensuring that staff could perform their duties as part of their overall
responsibility for ensuring that work was done. When this involved
training then training was given; when it did not training was left to
chance and the inclination of superiors. The eagermight ask questions
their superiors did not always deign to answer, for instance, one
Edinburgh Union Bank agent regularly sent unoccupied apprentices out
to watch the grass grow by a canal34. Thus, it was often left to the
initiative of staff to acquire more than a mechanical knowledge of
banking. Although banking was viewed as a trade and as such
something to be learnt by doing35, textbooks began being published
including J. W. Gilbart's Practical treatise on banking in 1828 and W. H.
31 RBM 4th Sep. 1861, National Bank of Scotland records, NS 228/13
32 RBM 19th Dec. 1855, 26th. Aug. 1857 & 13th. Jul. 1859
33 I would like to thank Professor Charles W. Munn of the Chartered Institute of Bankers in
Scotland for drawing my attention to the distinctive nature of Scottish bank apprenticeships
34 Moneta, op. cit., p. 48; IOB letter bk. 5, letter dated 22nd Feb. 1911
35 On training in banking see E. Green, Debtors to their Profession, (London: Metheun, 1979)
and C. W. Munn (1981), op. cit., p. 167. For training in business more generally see S.
Pollard (1965), p. 147
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Logan's The Scottish Banker in 184536. Armed with these the studious
with time on their hands could learn the broader principles of banking.
Due to source limitations it is impossible to state precisely how
many staff were recruited or how long they stayed, but it is possible to
note that a number enjoyed lengthy careers. Approximately forty-nine
clerks, tellers and senior officials served at head office in September
1859, of which fourteen had worked there since the period 1806 - 184537.
The distribution of their salaries matched the hierarchical structuring of
labour and authority. Staff in the two main offices were placed along a
descending scale in approximate accordance with their hierarchical
position and length of service. During the first half of the nineteenth
century salaries appear in general to have increased. The eleven tellers
and clerks serving at Glasgow in 1801 received salaries ranging from
£50 to £100 p.a. plus bonuses of £6 to £3038. The ceiling on salaries
gradually rose and by 1857 tellers were paid £180 to £300 and clerks £50
to £25039. By this time a distinctive group of senior officials - the
departmental heads identified in chapters 2 and 3 - had also emerged.
At Glasgow in 1857 these included a sub-cashier, a clerk with authority
to sign pro-cashier and an accountant who received £500, £450 and £400
p.a. respectively, while the secretary at head office received £900 p.a.40.
A substantial margin between the salaries of senior officials and the
cashiers reflected the latter's importance in the strategic management of
the Bank in addition to their administrative responsibilities. Thus, on
moving from Glasgow to head office in 1857 Laurence Robertson's
salary increased from £1,370 plus a rent allowance to £1,600, and by
36 On nineteenth century developments in the study of banking see M. Collins (1988), pp. 85-
86. As we shall see in chapter 5, however, Collins overestimates the initial impact of
theoretical as opposed to practical approaches to banking.
37 See list of staff working at head office in September 1859 detailed in RB 307
38 Anon., "The Glasgow staff of the Royal Bank a century and a half ago", The Three Banks
Review, no. 42, June, 1959
39 RBM 25th Mar. 1857
40 ibid.
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1859 he was receiving £1,800 p.a. or sixty times the lowest head office
clerical salary41.
In a study of employment at the Bank of Scotland head office
Boot argues incremental salaries were introduced during this period in
response to the short-run inelasticity in the supply of labour with
appropriate skills during the Scottish joint-stock banking boom (and we
can add to this the sustained proliferation of bank branches), which
increased demand ahead of supply42. Although apprentices were
probably the main source of staff, banks also poached experienced staff
from rivals during this period, indicating skill specificity did not play a
significant part in careers during the first half of the nineteenth century.
High demand for new recruits and poaching contributed to a clerical
labour market where, as Mill noted in 1848:
"Until lately, all employments which required even the humble education of
reading and writing, could be recruited only from a select class, the majority
having had no opportunity of acquiring these attainments. All such
improvements, accordingly, were immensely overpaid"43.
Yet before the permanent establishment of the General Managers'
Committee intense competition reduced profits, constraining the ability
of banks to pay higher salaries. Boot argues incremental salaries were
introduced to surmount this problem; they minimised immediate
staffing costs, while the prospective rewards on offer improved staff
retention, reducing recruitment, turnover and training costs. In
addition, the prospect of regular salary increases served as an effort
incentive. This analysis is convincing in many respects and appears
broadly applicable to Royal Bank. However, it pays insufficient
attention to the consequences of promotion. Boot, acknowledges, but
does not take sufficiently into account the range of positions the single
title clerk referred to and through which staff moved during their
41 RBM 25th Feb. 1857, RB 307
42 H. M. Boot, "Salaries and career earnings in the Bank of Scotland, 1730-1880", Economic
History Review, XLIV, (1991), pp. 629-653
43 quoted in H. M. Boot, op. cit., p. 648
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careers. Consequently, it is unclear whether incremental salaries were
paid to staff who remained where they were, were promoted to more
responsible and highly rewarded positions in the developing bank
hierarchies, or, and this is the most likely scenario, were a consequence
of both these factors.
Unfortunately the Royal Bank records offer little assistance in this
respect, but it is apparent employment was predicated upon the
assumption that staff would be promoted. This is despite promotion
fulfilling the two not necessarily compatible functions of providing an
effort incentive and allocating skilled labour possessing relevant skills to
key positions. For example, in a London private bank promotion was
not always deemed desirable as:
"a clerk might be taken from work for which he is particularly fitted and
moved to that which would be unsuitable, a step which would tend to
disorganise our system"44.
Instead clerks remained where they were receiving gradually increasing
salaries as they acquired more expertise. However, this arrangement
also preserved promoted posts for owners and their families, whereas
the managerial capitalism practiced at Royal Bank left greater scope for
promotion, indicating this was a distinctive feature of joint-stock as
opposed to other forms of banking. Arrangements introduced at head
office in 1843 used a combination of salary scales and promotion to
motivate staff. Ranges of salaries were attached to distinct clerical
grades and once a ceiling was reached further increases required
promotion to a higher grade. To operate effectively this system
required regular vacancies or else "there might be very long service
with out much promotion"45. To ensure staff unlikely to be promoted
due to old age, limited ability or lack of opportunity could still look
forward to an eventual salary increase, a £50 p.a. long-service allowance
44 RBM 21st Jul. 1874
45 For a detailed account of the arrangements reached in 1843 see RBM 30th Dec. 1885
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was introduced alongside this scheme for all staff who had served thirty
years at either head office or Glasgow46.
The long service allowance was part of an intimate, paternalistic
order wherein the personal circumstances of staff were allowed to
influence the terms of employment. On their part staff made sure that
senior officials were kept aware of their personal circumstances. For
instance, of two clerks a Glasgow Cashier wrote "Peterkin and Scott
make me despair. They are always complaining on the smallness of
their salary which should be ample for their wants"47. Small salaries
could produce a poorly motivated staff. Of the same two clerks it was
noted "neither will submit to afternoon attendance {i.e., after 4 o'clock}
nor the drudgery of sorting their notes, which they leave to the
Porters"48. Such intransigence and its toleration were luxuries afforded
by a favourable labour market position as well as the vested interests
recruitment created.
A broad range of benefits paid in addition to salaries gave fuller
expression to the paternalism of the Bank. These included sick pay,
bonuses, paid holidays, free accommodation in bank buildings and
overtime allowances. Perhaps the most important benefit was the non-
contributory retiring allowance (or pension). Staff did not retire as there
was no distinct notion of retirement, instead they were frequently
moved to lighter duties as they aged, before eventually resigning on
the grounds of old age or ill-health. After this they received an
allowance set according to their length of service, age and final salary,
though the actual amount remained open to negotiation49. The
paternalism of the Bank extended to include the families of staff and the
board intermittently received applications for assistance from the
relatives of staff, for example, the deserted and destitute wife of a
46 RBM 31st May 1843
47 ibid.
48 ibid.
49 See for example the teller who negotiated an enhanced retiring allowance detailed in RBM
29th Mar. 1854
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former Glasgow teller who applied for help and received a £100 grant50.
However, once a contributory staff widows' fund was established in
1820, the board felt able to reject the widow of a former clerk who
subsequently applied for aid51. The preference it seems was to provide
staff with the means of taking care of their families while the Bank
would take care of them, although occasionally granting assistance to
suitable victims of circumstances beyond their control.
Paternalism is a method of control, paternalistic understanding of
a kind that allowed a teller to receive an extra £10 "because of his large
family and great usefulness"52, was tempered by the board's formal
retention of absolute discretion in staffing matters. Benefits were only
ever presented as rewards not rights, each was granted on the
condition it would be stopped or reduced if recipients behaved in a
manner deemed prejudicial to the interests of the Bank. The most
notable example of this involved the former Cashier John Thomson
who was asked to resign aged 62 in 184553. Thereafter Thomson
received a £600 p.a. allowance on condition he did not take any other
employment, an agreement that
"shall not be held as limiting in any way the power of the Court of Directors
to withdraw the said allowance in whole or in part at leisure, without
assigning reasons for so doing"54.
Thomson's experience, expertise and connections quickly attracted
offers of employment including managerial positions in a proposed
Glasgow based Exchange and Investment Bank, a bank to be formed
issuing Bank of England notes, an insurance company's Glasgow office
and a short-term position winding up a bankrupt Newcastle business55.
Each time Thomson applied for permission to accept a position and
50 RBM 7th May 1862
51 RBM 21st Mar. 1865
52 Quoted in Anon., (1959)
53 For an account of John Thomson's resignation that emphasises the importance of the former
Cashier's personality, see S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p. 393. However, events discussed later in
this chapter indicate Thomson was perhaps a better banker than he was manager or administrator
54 RBM 10th Dec. 1845
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retain his allowance he was refused. An increasingly bitter Thomson
complained "I was the medium through which you are now in
possession of a very large fortune", before accepting the manager-ship
of the ill-fated Edinburgh and Glasgow Bank in 1850 at which the board
promptly stopped his allowance56. Thus, the retention of discretion
allowed paternalistic rewards to be used to elicit appropriate behaviour
inside and outside the workplace with loyalty as well as productivity a
key managerial concern.
Loyalty was particularly important because the assets and
reputation of a bank were susceptible to theft, fraud and
embezzlement, recurring events during the first half of the nineteenth
century. In 1822, for example, the East Lothian Banking Co. collapsed
after its cashier ran off with the contents of the safe57. Royal Bank
intermittently shared in this misfortune, particularly when the
responsibility for issuing and recording withdrawals was, as one
inspector wrote:
"placed in the hands of the same individual, who, if unprincipled, had an
important facility given him for dilapidating the Bank's assets"58.
This occurred at Glasgow in 1845 when the Assistant Accountantwas
discovered to have stolen an estimated £7,900 over a 20 year period by
making withdrawals from an account he operated in his other capacity
as collector of subscriptions for an Episcopal Church fund59. When the
relevant voucher passed before him he replaced it with a cheque drawn
on another account for the same amount to disguise the transaction. A
more modest example occurred the following year when a Glasgow
teller was found to have taken £120 and unsuccessfully tried to disguise
his actions by bulking out a bag of silver with copper coin60.
55 RBM 20th Jan. & 14th Apr. 1847 and 29th Jun. 1848
56 RBM 15th Aug. 1849 and 23rd Jan. 1850
57 C. W. Munn (1981), pp. 73-75
58 RBM 19th Nov. 1845
59 RBM 12th and 19th Nov. 1845
60 RBM 9th and 16th Sep. 1846
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In a comparable study of Australian banking Seltzer asserts that
developments in inspection and accounting procedures made security a
factor of minimal importance in the development of bank ILMs61.
Human nature and actual events belie this assertion. One inspector
observed:
"to audit even one single class of accounts so as to produce a moral conviction
of accuracy is necessarily the work of considerable time"62.
Monitoring was constrained by cost and inspection remained a time
consuming and expensive business. Thus, one of the tasks of
management was to strike a balance between cost and security. This
was not always achieved, nor was the Bank made progressively more
secure. As the (former) Assistant Accountant explained, his scheme
commenced after John Thomson altered arrangements at Glasgow
"with the view of saving the salary of a clerk", but rendered the
accounts less secure than they were made in 1816 following the
discovery of an earlier deficiency63. Eager to excuse himself Laurence
Robertson, then Glasgow Cashier, reached a similar conclusion:
"a change took place in the system of checking the books soon after Mr.
Thomson came to Glasgow which has led mainly to the disaster that has
happened"64.
Following events at Glasgow the accounting and inspection procedures
were overhauled: additional ledgers were introduced; the handling and
recording of cash transactions was separated; and more intensive
random inspections were carried out. But, while theft became harder to
accomplish and easier to detect it remained possible as a Dundee agent
proved in 1878 when he disappeared with £20,50065. Despite the
substantial sum involved, after careful consideration of the inspection
61 A. Seltzer, op. cit.
62RBM 19th Nov. 1845
63 RBM 19th Nov. 1845 and 4th Feb. 1846
64RBM 19th Nov. 1845
65 RBM 26th Jun. and 11th Sep. 1878
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system, the Cashier concluded, "I have no change to suggest in this
respect"66.
Another problem was poor record keeping, or in a more
extreme form the deliberate sabotage of records by clerks who used
their experience to avoid detection. There is no recorded incidence of
this at Royal bank, but other banks were less fortunate. Between the
wars the Glasgow Savings Bank suffered a lengthy campaign involving
the disappearance of ledgers and false entries67. After a ledger was
found in the men's lavatory the Actuary (general manager) was sure no
lady clerks were involved, but this still left eight suspects until the
qualified report of a handwriting expert finally saw the culprit
dismissed.
As detailed monitoring was labour intensive, costly, yet
ultimately imperfect, theft, inaccuracy and sabotage remained recurring
concerns. In these circumstances, security considerations both drove the
development of inspection and accounting procedures, and
underpinned bank paternalism. The discretionary use of deferred
compensation: incremental salaries; the possibility of promotion; and a
range of additional benefits that increased in value with length of
service, discouraged criminal behaviour by increasing the cost of
dismissal. Staff who pursued a Royal Bank career effectively posted a
bond, which they expected to be repaid in the future and would forfeit
if found guilty of any serious misdemeanour68.
Paternalistic incentives worked in conjunction with rules
governing behaviour outside the office geared to preventing any
activity likely to increase the temptation to steal. On learning a teller
was speculating on sending goods to the West Indies the directors
instructed him to choose between that and his position in the Bank69.
The teller protested that he only engaged in this other interest outside
66 ibid.
67 TSB 63/1/15/34 Desk Diary, entries dated 7th Feb. & 4th Dec. 1936 and 2nd Jan. 1937
68 M. Moschandreas, op. cit., pp. 461-462
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office hours and it did not affect him in the performance of his bank
duties. Eventually he relinquished the venture to concentrate on his
bank career. Later, when investigating the Assistant accountant's
activities at Glasgow in 1846 the Cashier discovered he had lent money
to other members of staff and observed this "must to a certain extent
have had the effect of placing them much under his control, and of
inducing them to overlook many things"70. Thereafter, staff were
barred from lending to one another and informed that "they are bound
by their agreement to give the whole of their time exclusively to the
business of the bank"71. As these preventative measures stripped away
any other interest, the other benefits staff received offered some
compensation for the income foregone.
However, rules governing behaviour also reflected social
expectations, though the exclusive nature of recruitment was probably
more important in this respect. Banks were an important part of
Scotland's business communities and bank staff as participants in this
world were subject to its social conventions. Consequently, deviations
from the acceptable took place under the watchful gaze of customers as
well as senior officials. Thus the profitable sidelines staff occasionally
pursued could offend the sensibilities as well as the finances of
customers engaged in the same line of business72. Accordingly in
October 1846 a customer, a Sir, informed the Cashier "I do not know if
you, or your directors are aware of the fact"73. The directors were not
aware and after being informed by the "Sir" that two clerks and a
porter at Glasgow had each paid 50s. to purchase railway shares issued
the following circular:
"that they highly disapprove of such transactions where the risk of loss
may eventually bring the individuals concerned into serious difficulties, and
69 Anon., (1959)
70RBM 25th Mar. 1846
71 RBM 25th Mar. 1846
72 W.F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., p.73
73 RBM 21st. Oct. 1846
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be the means of incapacitating them for performing their respective
duties"74.
The importance of security in this instance later became apparent when
British Linen Bank staff were found to have stolen £31,000 to speculate
in railway shares75. However, the aggrieved "Sir" had taken particular
offence at the clerks and the porter signing themselves esquires on the
relevant documents. The renewal of this ruling in 1873 and its extension
in 1877 to include any involvementwith investment trusts ensured such
impudence was not repeated76.
Yet rules remained open to interpretation. Even the
unambiguous rules governing the handling of cash were periodically
contested. The Glasgow teller described above accepted his actions were
wrong, but did not consider himself disloyal. In a (successful) plea for
reinstatement he compared his momentary transgression to a career
throughout which he had "endeavoured to perform his duty and
promote the interest of the Bank to the best of his ability", insisting
"nothing could have been further from my mind than an intention to
wrong the Bank"77. The teller's pleas reveal that the Bank itself formed
an important presence in its organisational culture, one possessed of a
separate identity and traditions it was possible to identify with and
vicariously share in. In this instance the teller's willingness to formulate
alternative interpretations of what was in the Bank's interests
threatened the mutual understanding necessary for the effective
functioning of hierarchical authority. Faithful service instead meant
accepting those meanings defined by the Cashier and the board who
where located somewhere between staff and the Bank, and which
remained the ultimate source of authority. Indeed, the charismatic
senior official who possessed the unquestioned loyalty of his
subordinates was a potentially dangerous transgression. Hence, when
74 ibid.
75 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p. 394
76 RBM 3rd. Dec. 1873 and 19th Dec. 1877
77 RBM 16th Sep. 1846
139
describing the activities of the fraudulent assistant accountant at
Glasgow the Cashier noted disapprovingly: "being a rather smart man,
altho' he writes an exceedingly bad hand, he was looked up to by the
Tellers"78. Instead of "smart men", paternalism encouraged staff to
subordinate their judgement to that of the Bank, which in exchange
would take care of them from the time they entered its service until
death. Used with discretion paternalism generated a common sense
compatible with the exercise of hierarchical authority.
To summarise; Royal Bank staff were typically recruited as
apprentices through pre-existing social and commercial channels and
selected according to ability and social compatibility. The training
apprentices received, although broad was often ad hoc and almost
wholly dependent on gaining practical experience. Once accepted as
permanent staff recruits embarked on careers that frequently lasted
their entire working life. Central to this process was the payment of
incremental salaries. These were a product of the desire to retain and
reward staff whose skills proved highly transferable in a market where
demand exceeded supply at the same time as unrestricted competition
reduced the ability of banks to make widespread additions to salaries.
The prospective reward of incremental salaries, promotion and
paternalistic incentives were coupled with rules prohibiting participation
in unacceptable social and economic activities. The latter, for reasons of
propriety, security and good business, was used to elicit loyalty in
circumstances where the costs of opportunistic behaviour were high,
but monitoring expensive and imperfect. On the whole the approach
was successful. Theft was not only rare, senior officials operated with an
often misplaced confidence that the Bank possessed the unquestioned
loyalty of staff. What shocked the Cashier when he investigated the
fraudulent Assistant Accountant's activities was that the changes made
to the accounts had gone unreported for so long:
78 ibid.
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"altho' the Officers situated nearest to (the Assistant Accountant) in the
office seem rather ignorant men, I am totally at a loss to understand why
these erasures did not attract their notice"79.
The head office view of disloyalty was that it was not so much
inconceivable as incomprehensible.
4.4 Core and periphery, 1857 - 1871
In broad terms rapid organisational change - the adoption of
branch banking - transformed employment at Royal Bank. Hundreds of
staff scattered across Scotland joined the few dozen working in the two
main offices. This posed unprecedented problems of control over scale
and distance met in two ways. At the Bank's largest offices in Edinburgh
and Glasgow, authority was exercised in accordance with the principles,
structures and expectations of the previous era. However, the extension
of the Bank's benevolent autocracy stopped at the city boundaries. In
the branches, subject to head office approval, authority over staffing
was delegated to agents who held practical responsibility for
recruitment, training, work allocation and setting salary levels. Thus, in
its staffing arrangements as in its business Royal Bank constituted a
bureaucratic core that supervised activities in a dispersed periphery. Yet
identical changes simultaneously occurred in both locations. External
recruitment to promoted posts ended and a distinctive tenure pattern
emerged; a minority of recruits stayed to enjoy long careers while a
majority left on, or shortly after, completing an apprenticeship. These
changes saw employment acquire all the characteristics of an ILM set
out in the introduction to this chapter and were ultimately decided on
the basis of cost. However, staff, particularly at the two largest offices,
were an important influence on the distribution of pay and promotion
and therefore a significant factor in the development and operation of
the ILM.
79RBM 19th Nov. 1845
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i) Core employment
One of Laurence Robertson's first acts on becoming Cashier in
1857 was to recommend a general increase in salaries at head office; his
priorities require some explanation80. The gracious letter the board
received in 1853 from a Glasgow teller requesting permission to resign
(retire) suggests an executive able to impose its will on a supine staff81.
Yet once the impending retirement became known the board was
placed under the scrutinising gaze of staff attentive to the age and
health of their superiors and of their own claims to promotion82. As the
matter was considered further clerks began applying for the post. On
such occasions the clerical will was expressed in discontented mutters
that occasionally surfaced as joint petitions to the board wherein staff
expressed their preference for seniority (length of service) as the
deciding factor in staffing decisions; when one man left the next in line
expected to replace him. This shared attachment to seniority overcame
self-interest by ensuring that all would eventually be rewarded. The
intimacy of the office made seniority an important influence on all
staffing matters. Moreover, it was in keeping with the premium the
directors' attached to loyal and faithful service as well as their wish to be
perceived as fair. As for the teller, the directors avoided reaching a
decision until winter when the old man's failing eyesight finally forced a
decision. Working by gaslight the teller became prone to making
expensive mistakes. After he misplaced £100 the board finally allowed
him to resign, moving each teller up a grade and promoting the most
senior clerk to the vacant space at the telling table.
Thus, staffing decisions were reached through a dialogue
conducted by the board and the Cashier with the perceived will of the
staff. Despite having served as Glasgow Cashier from 1827 to 1857,
Robertson was an outsider to head office whose appointment
80RBM 25th Feb. 1857
81 RBM 25th May 1853
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prevented staff taking the step up the hierarchy they would otherwise
have expected. The salary increases he authorised, beginning with a 200
guinea bonus for the Secretary as a mark of the directors "entire
confidence and satisfaction in his acting as Cashier" followed by a
general round of increases, appear as conciliatory gestures intended to
smooth the way for the subsequent reorganisation of the head office
administration83.
The task of adapting the Bank to branch banking revealed both
the influence and limitations of seniority. John Bishop was charged with
devising new procedures to enable the centralised control of the branch
network. He was a notable choice for this important task because his
original recruitment from theWestern Bank had divided the Bank.
While contemplating this the Secretary had observed:
"how can it be done without injustice to some who have been long in the
Bank's service and deserve well? Of course we cannot supersede our present
Inspector nor ifMr. B were conjoined with him can we give him less than Mr.
B ... to say nothing of the umbrage which would be sure to arise in the breasts
of old officers"84.
Supporting Bishop were Primrose Kennedy and another Ayrshire agent
who, it was made clear only remained in banking out of loyalty to
Kennedy. One proposal was to appoint Bishop a Glasgow agent from
where he could cultivate links with otherWestern Bank agents:
"as the need for his experience and peculiar qualifications would then be
special (underlined in original) we could so employ him without incurring
any imputation of injustice "85.
Instead Bishop was appointed to head office to a subordinate post,
which Laurence Robertson eventually freed him from by charging him
with drawing up plans for adapting the administration to branch
banking. Once freed from constraints imposed by the attachment to
82 Events surrounding the retirement and replacement of the teller are detailed in RBM 25th
May, 7th Sep., 19th & 26th Oct., 9th Nov. 1853
83 RBM 25th Feb. 1857
84 RBM 14th Nov. 1855
85 ibid.
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seniority Bishop became the architect of the new administration. In a
report submitted to the board he recommended establishing
progressive ledgers to record lending at each branch, holding
discounted local bills of exchange at head office until due and producing
weekly branch returns in addition to the existingmonthly and annual
returns to allow a weekly statement to be presented to the board86. The
zealous policing by staff of the Bank's hierarchy had limits then, but
certainly discouraged the use of external recruitment to promoted
posts. Ultimately, however, cost and the need for expertise, which
existing staff lacked proved the deciding factor.
To implement the changes Bishop set out D. R. W. Huie was
recruited from an insurance company and, to avoid offending the
sensibilities of the staff, appointed Assistant Accountant; a completely
new post specifically designed to exclude any internal candidates87.
Thereafter, experience came at a cost the Bank was unwilling to meet. In
1859 the board debated appointing a new inspector. Whereas the
external candidate expected a salary of £275 to £300, the internal
candidate would only receive a small addition to his existing £130
salary88. Although the external candidate's suitability was undoubted,
the internal candidate was appointed with the expectation that he would
"turn out as well as any clerk of equal standing that can be got from any
other bank"89. This had the further advantage of confining senior
positions to those whose loyalty had already been assessed at close
quarters. Once a cluster of strategic appointments was made and the
capacity to train junior staff for promoted posts acquired, the board
permanently opted to confine the senior ranks to internal appointees.
Seniority had a settling influence, yet prevented the allocation of
salary increments and promotions being used selectively as an effort
incentive. The resultant tension between managerial discretion and
86 RB 357, Report on Inspection, 16th Dec. 1857
87 RBM 9th Jan. 1858
88 RBM 4th Jan. 1859
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seniority persisted throughout Laurence Robertson's term as Cashier.
Head office staff lists compiled in 1857 and 1864 reveal salaries matched
length of service almost perfectly90. Consequently, seniority rendered
careers a matter of waiting to fill "dead men's shoes". For example, in
1854 when a clerk in the Accountant's department at Glasgow died
Laurence Robertson explained "The next in order is Mr. X who will
expect to succeed Mr. Y"; Mr. X received the promotion91. Ten years
later when contemplating another promotion the Glasgow Cashier
explained "according to former precedent {emphasis added} the other
four tellers should rise up in seniority" 92. A new teller was accordingly
found among the clerks; "the next in seniority, moving the other clerks
up in rotation". Thus, seniority held the status of a tradition that
informed promotion decisions at all but the very highest levels.
New arrangements introduced in 1867 proposed to structure
entire careers in a way that offered a compromise between seniority
and discretion in the allocation of pay and promotions93. The 37 clerks
then working at head office were placed in four classes arranged in
ascending order. Clerks would progress along the salary scales devised
for each class on the basis of seniority, but on reaching the maximum
salary, further increases required promotion to a higher class on the
basis of merit. In theory, with £10 increments being paid almost every
two years, it would take a clerk approximately twenty years to advance
from the £80 maximum salary paid in the fourth class, to the £200 salary
paid in the first. However, the scheme quickly fell into disarray when as
James Fleming subsequently explained:
89 ibid.
90 For details of clerical salaries at head office see RBM 17th Sept. 1858, 14th Sep. 1859, 15th
Feb. 1861, 17th Sep. 1862, 27th Sep. 1864, 2nd Jan. 1867 and 17th Sep. 1873
91 RBM 29th Mar. 1854
92 RBM 22nd Jun. 1864
93 RBM 2nd Jan. 1867
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"it was found at the very first revision in 1869 that from the growth of the
establishment and other circumstances the scheme of 1867 was not
sufficiently expansive to meet the necessities of the office"94.
The problem was straightforward; although promotion was key,
promotion opportunities were limited. Indeed, the 1867 arrangements
put in place a bottleneck by firmly attaching salaries to hierarchical
positions. With thirty-two clerks in the second, third and fourth classes,
but only seven in the senior and first classes, there were already more
candidates than openings at the higher levels. The bottleneck was
exacerbated by a blockage due largely to the good health and
compromises enjoyed by senior officials. For instance, D.R.W. Huie was
a young man when appointed and went on to enjoy a lengthy and
successful career (he eventually resigned as Cashier aged 76 in 1907)95.
In 1874 Huie clashed with John Bishop over who would succeed the
retiring Secretary of the Bank. When Bishop became Secretary, Huie
informed the board he was considering other offers of employment96.
As a compromise Huie was appointed Joint-Secretary and Accountant
(taking Bishop's recently acquired place at board meetings) and Bishop
became Joint-Secretary and Superintendent of Branches where he
remained until resigning due to old age in 188697. Thus, two incumbents
held three senior positions for over a decade, preventing those beneath
them taking one more step up the hierarchy. Andrew Kerr, then a head
office clerk described the consequences this had upon the staff:
"The root of all the nerveless languor, hopeless discontent, and spasmodic
dissatisfaction so often displayed by bank clerks is to be found in the absence
of promotion"98.
Once again the Cashier fell back on granting widespread salary
increases allowing seniority to continue earning a reward.
94 Quoted in RBM 17th Sep. 1873
95 For details of D. R. W. Huie's career see Moneta, op. cit., pp. 14-19, RBM 9th Jan. 1907
96 RBM 22 Jul. and 13th Nov. 1874
97 RBM 13th Nov. 1874 and 2nd Jul. 1886
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Table 4.1. Entry period of clerks working at the head office of the Royal Bank of
Scotland in 1857, 1859 and 1867
Period entered
head office 1857 1859 1867
Before 1850 8 8 6
1850 -1857 15 10 5
After 1857 0 21 28
Total 23 37 39
Source: RBM 16th Sep. 1857 & 2nd Jan. 1867 and RB 307
The combination of seniority and limited promotion
opportunities had other longer-term consequences. Table 4.1 above is
based on three lists of head office clerks given in the minute books,
which detail when staff entered head office (an approximate guide to
their age and length of service). As few staff moved from head office to
the branches it can be assumed that those who stopped being listed had
left the Bank. Table 4.1 therefore indicates that a gradually shrinking
minority of long serving clerks remained at head office, while younger
clerks confronted by limited career opportunities and salaries and
promotions distributed largely in accordance with seniority,
increasingly opted to leave rather than wait their turn.
This turnover pattern had significant cost benefits. Because
salaries tended to increase with length of service, less experienced and
therefore (initially) cheaper clerks replaced those who left (in addition
those who left were no longer eligible to receive the other benefits of
bank work). Therefore, rewarding seniority, while a constraint on
managerial authority, preserved a core of senior clerks and officials able
to train the growing volume of young clerks passing through head
office, a trend, which due to the payment of incremental salaries, served
to minimise staffing costs. We can note that at Bank of Scotland during
this period Boot has shown that a similar pattern developed and that
98 A. Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. Kerr, (ed.), op. cit., p. 136
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senior officials helped staff unlikely to be promoted find employment
elsewhere". It is probable that similar steps were taken at Royal Bank
to avoid clerks remaining where they were to become increasingly
frustrated, while receiving gradually increasing salaries.
ii) Employment in the periphery
Before 1857 head office lacked the administrative capacity to
manage staffing in the branches. Inspection arrangements were
rudimentary and until John Bishop was appointed no senior official was
experienced in managing a branch network. This was initially
compounded by a lack of clear leadership due to the then Cashier
Robert Simpson suffering bouts of ill health during his last years in
office. Yet even after the adaptation of head office to branch banking
agents retained a high degree of discretion over staffing matters. This
was due to the complexity, scale and cost of the alternative, as well as
the internal politics of the Bank.
To begin with information on staffing in the branches was
fragmented and incomplete. To rectify this Bishop compiled an
establishment book that listed the salaries, positions and, in the majority
of cases, names of all those working in the branches in 1857 and 1858.
The exercise revealed that a probable 170 staff, approximately three
quarters of the total, worked in the branches100. Not all of these were
bank staff. At Galashiels, for example, a lawyer-agent used an
apprentice in his writing office as a branch clerk101. Others simply
moved the clerks and apprentices engaged in their other interests onto
the Bank's staff, as at Aberdeen where the advocates appointed agents
arranged for their confidential clerk to become the branch
" H. M. Boot, op. cit.
100 Estimate derived from analysis of RB 307
101 RB 325, Letters to John Bishop, 25th Feb. 1858
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Table 4.2. The structure of agents and accountants salaries at the Royal Bank of
Scotland c.1858 to 1870 (£s at current prices)
Agents Accountants
Year 1858-59 1869-70 1858-59 1869-70
Range of salaries £50-500 £50-£600 £20-150 £10-250
No. of salary levels 17 26 17 19
Mean salary £227 £274 £76 £85
Median salary £200 £250 £75 £80
No. of examples 64 80 33 66
Source: RB 307 & RB 309
accountant102. This movement worked both ways. Alexander Wright
later recalled that he spent much of his time in Perth as a bank
apprentice working on his agent's legal affairs. This movement
complicated an already complex division of labour. For example,
arrangements at those branches acquired from the Western Bank and
the Dundee Banking Co. were left untouched, so that in keeping with its
status as the former Ayrshire Banking Co. head office the Ayr branch
was one of only four in the network to have a dedicated teller and the
only branch with a porter. By comparison at four other branches the
agents had no staff. Between these poles various combinations of
agents, accountants, clerks and apprentices moved between the
different areas of bank work on an hourly basis, blurring the division of
labour.
Nevertheless, table 4.2 above reveals that the hierarchical
distribution of authority was broadly reflected in the distribution of
salaries. Although the range of salaries, which agents and accountants
received overlapped, this never occurred within the same branch, while
the average (median) salary paid to accountants in 1858-59 was only 38
per cent of the (median) average salary agents received. The
compilation of the establishment book also revealed salaries were the
main cost involved in running a branch; the examples given in table 4.3
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Table 4.3. the cost of running two branches in 1856 and 1857 (£: s at current prices)
(1856) (1857)
Item of expenditure Alyth Galashiels
Salaries 300:00 175
Rent - 25
Fuel, light & cleaning 22:15 7
Local taxes 4:11 3




Source: RB 325, correspondence of John Bishop
above suggest as much as 70 to 80 per cent of the total, making them a
key managerial concern. Of this total agents were by far the single
largest item of expenditure. At Campsie, for example, the agent was
paid £200 p.a. and the accountant £40 p.a., leaving £60 to cover all other
expenses103.
Different approaches were taken to setting the salaries of agents,
accountants and clerks. An agent's salary was set on the basis of three
factors. The most important was the volume of business an agent
attached to the Bank, followed by the degree of competition between
banks for his services. At Forfar, for instance, the agent was awarded a
£50 increase because he was:
"a good agent and has brought a good business to the Bank. The Bank of
Scotland tried hard to secure him and offered him 1% additional on his
(£8,000) deposits"104.
Similarly, the salary of the former agent for the Western Bank in
Kilmarnock did not change after he became a Royal Bank agent in the
smaller town of Stewarton because "The Clydesdale Bank have been
102 RBM 28th Mar. 1862
103 RB 325 John Bishop's (the inspector of branches) correspondence
104 RB 394, Inspector's report, March 1858
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endeavouring of late to induce him to return to Kilmarnock"105. In this
instance the agent benefited from the strategic desire to preserve the
interests of the existing Kilmarnock branch by spoiling the progress of a
rival. Finally, agents were often expected to meet routine running costs
from their salaries, which were adjusted accordingly. For instance, the
Leven agent's £300 salary included an allowance for rent and the
salaries of any clerks he chose to employ106.
By comparison the salaries of junior branch staff were regarded
as a necessary evil somewhat akin to taxes and were set by agents in
negotiationwith the Cashier. Typically, an agent suggested what his
staff should receive after taking into account age, effort, ability and local
living costs. However, it was in an agent's interest to keep junior
salaries to a minimum. High salaries increased the branch costs used to
assess the performance of agents, while low salaries left a degree of
"slack" from which additions could made to an agent's own salary.
Where there was no slack, for example at Biggar where a former
member of staff was granted a £150 pension, the agent's salary was "left
lower than it should have been"107.
The treatment of junior staff also differed in that they were
regarded as expendable and readily replaceable. In 1858, for instance,
the Campsie accountant resigned after his application for a £10 salary
increase was rejected108. This was not always the case. Before 1850 and
again during the rush to establish branches after 1854 high salaries were
used to attract staff from other banks, especially to work in branches
run by agents with only limited bank experience. Thus, to find an
accountant to run the branch opened by part-time agents at Dumfries
branch in 1856 a teller was poached from a Bank of Scotland branch and
appointed accountant on £140, the second highest salary paid to an
105 ibid.
106 Entry for Leven in RB 307
107 RB 394, Inspection Report, Mar. 1858
108 RB 394, Inspection Report, Mar. 1858
151
accountant in the 1850s109. However, the subsequent failure of the
Western Bank created a glut of experienced staff, which was taken
advantage of at Lockerbie where a former Western bank agent on £100
p.a. replaced the accountant on £160 p.a.110. More importantly the
failure gave Royal Bank the capacity to meet staffing needs internally.
Building a branch network using former Western Bank branches and
agents equipped Royal Bank with a national network of experienced
staff able to recruit and train apprentices, allowing the cost of external
recruitment to be avoided.
Salary ceilings encouraged junior branch staff to seek
employment elsewhere. Charles Boase reflected on this before he
retired:
"I suppose the great number of new banks in England will draw away our best
clerks from Scotland ... a very promising clerk with us has just got an
invitation to go to London with offer of £100 at once and suitable increase
when they see what he is worth"111.
However, regret rarely translated into higher salaries. Instead the
branches also gained a stable core of senior officials who oversaw an
increasingly transitory mass of junior staff. That the salaries of junior
staff should be restricted was accepted in principle as early as 1852 when
to the disappointment of his Agent, the Leith teller left to seek his
fortune in New York112. The board promptly investigated bank salaries
in Leith, but decided that only the agent deserved an increase113.
Limited promotion opportunities and the lack of clear career
structures exacerbated the situation. It was possible to become the
accountant of a branch on or shortly after completing an
apprenticeship. Indeed, of the 72 apprentices recruited during 1860 to
1870 (these records were started in 1873 and therefore do not include
staff who left the bank before this date, behaviour likely to have been
109 RBM 23rd Apr. 1856
110 RB 401, Inspection Report, 16th Jun. 1858
111 RBM 22nd Jun. 1864
112 RBM, 16th Jun. 1847 and 17th Nov. 1852
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influenced by promotion), after five years 31 were accountants and only
eleven were still clerks after eight years. Thereafter careers came to an
abrupt halt. Full time staff did become agents. Some benefited from
local connections as in 1856 when a Bank of Scotland head office clerk
became a Royal Bank agent at Alyth where his family originated and
still resided114. Others benefited from exceptional circumstances, for
instance, when the Duke of Buccleuch asked for a branch to be opened
at Granton to support his redevelopment of the harbour, the board,
unable to find a suitable local agent, refused until the Duke intimated
another bank might prove more amenable115. At this a branch was
quickly opened and a Dalkeith branch accountant brought in as agent.
However, these were the exceptions and Tamaki's suggestion that
amateur (part-time) agents were eclipsed during the period 1865 to 1879
appears too hasty a conclusion in light of the discussion of this issue in
chapter 2116. Rather a tacit line continued to separate full-time staff from
branch management positions during this period. Confronted by this
junior staff began leaving the Bank in increasing numbers.
Approximately half the full-time staff named in the 1858 establishment
book were not recorded in the second establishment book first
compiled in 1869; it is reasonable to assume that they left the Bank's
service during the intervening period117. By comparison, of the 60
agents listed in 1858,43, or 72 per cent, still worked for the Bank in 1873.
Before proceeding to examine employment at Royal Bank after
1871 one final development requires attention. Before 1854 clerks had
frequently travelled the short distance between head office and the
Leith branch. After 1854 they began moving further afield, for example,
a head office clerk became an agent at Drymen in the rural west of
Scotland after the board failed to find a suitable local agent to run a
113 RBM, 1st Dec. 1852
114 RBM 6th & 13th Jun., 12th Mar. and 10th Sep. 1856
115 RBM 3rd Jun. 1863
116 N. Tamaki, op. cit., p. 116
117 Estimate based on analysis (nominal record linkage) of names listed in RB 307 and RB 309
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branch requested by the Duke of Montrose118. Thereafter, staff began
moving in both directions once the recruitment of apprentices to head
office and the main Glasgow office effectively stopped. These locations
became dependent on clerks drawn in from the branches on the
recommendation of their agents. In the branches too once the network
was established staff began being transferred between previously
isolated offices. This movement oiled the workings of the ILM. More
than this, it became integral to careers as for a growing number
promotion also required a transfer between the various offices of the
Bank, rendering careers a fusion of hierarchical and geographical
mobility.
To summarise, rapid organisational change; the adoption of
branch banking, made Royal Bank a substantial employer and posed
novel administrative problems of scale and complexity. Existing
techniques were used to govern employment at the major offices, while
in the branches authority over staffing was delegated to agents subject
to head office approval. Yet in both locations a concern with cost saw
external recruitment to promoted posts (with the exception of agents)
ending once the capacity to support internal promotion was established.
Despite this advance, limited promotion opportunities due to the
retention of part-time agents in the branches and the significance of
seniority in the allocation of promoted posts in the largest offices, plus
ongoing efforts to minimise salary costs, saw junior staff begin to leave
in increasing numbers.
4.5 Employment as system, 1871 -1873
Although employment at Royal Bank by 1871 possessed all four
characteristics of an ILM, the bureaucracy of the Bank remained
reactive, intermittent and fragmentary; staffing decisions were typically
taken only after needs arose. The changes subsequently made to
118 RBM 12th Oct. and 3rd Nov. 1871
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employment by John Fleming were part of a broader programme of
measures reflecting the new Cashier's concern with cost, control and
efficiency. They proved notable in that they rendered employment an
integrated system. Fleming oversaw the development and
implementation of new, sophisticated and continuous methods of
scrutinising and recording organisational processes that stretched from
staffing to lending. In his first year he overhauled procedures for
counting the cash at head office, simplified book-keeping arrangements
at Glasgow, reworked arrangements with the London correspondents
and saw to it that a number of "irregular" agents and an inspector
resigned119. Such vigour was in marked contrast to the ill health that
marked his predecessor's last years in office. Indeed, there is the sense
that to fresh eyes Royal Bank was perceived to have fallen into a state
of administrative disrepair. It was also an organisation apparently
bereft of new ideas as within a year of being appointed Fleming
embarked on an investigation into staffing at Bank of Scotland, the
Bank of England and various other Scottish and English banks120.
However, the changes Fleming made were not just about novelty and
efficiency. They were predicated on an attempt to rework the principles
informing the allocation of salaries and promotions, by replacing
seniority with managerial assessments ofmerit and ability.
The reconstruction of employment at Royal Bank as system
entailed integrating the exercise of authority with career processes.
Careers were to be managed not just left to unfold, while introducing
an element of discretion would allow the rewards on offer to be used as
incentives and to reward individual effort and ability, as well as
engender loyalty. Moreover, the administrative resources Fleming put
in place were never merely neutral documents; rather they constituted
an expression of managerial authority.
119 RBM 27th Sep., 18th Oct., 8th & 22nd Nov. 1871, 12th Jan., 26th Apr., 17th Jul. and 7th
Aug. 1872
120 RBM 18th Aug. & 6th Dec. 1871
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Fleming's working life began when he qualified as a lawyer; later
he became secretary then manager of the Western Bank. This made him
another outsider to head office whose appointment predictably clashed
with the constraints imposed by seniority; a round of conciliatory salary
increases at head office accordingly followed121. The new Cashier
thereafter sought to ensure this gesture was the last of its kind and set
about securing the right to manage staffing as he alone saw fit. In
passing Fleming noted the use of junior staff to record career
information had unintended consequences:
"Hitherto the salaries have been paid by one of the Tellers and have passed
through the public books of the Bank and so have been disclosed to every
Clerk. This leads to inexpedient comparison and is an unusual course"122.
On Fleming's orders after December 1871 only a quarterly aggregate of
salaries was recorded in the public books, the Secretary and the
Accountant assumed responsibility for payment and individual details
were kept in a private book. Thus, change began with measures
intended to undermine the ability of staff to express an opinion about
pay and conditions. "Divide and rule" offers a melodramatic
interpretation of this; nevertheless, the express desire to end
"inexpedient comparison" lends some support to radical accounts of
ILMs where these are depicted as a strategy for removing collective
constraints on managerial authority. Head office staff records had
unofficially provided staff with ammunition for their complaints with
the practice of noting the date of entry to head office besides the names
of staff a precise means of checking seniority was earning its reward.
On Fleming's orders this information was placed beyond the reach of
staff and followed by a rule barring the discussion of salaries, which
completed the transformation of an impolite topic of conversation to
the illegitimate123. Shunting information concerning pay and promotion
up the Bank's hierarchy in this way was a tactic used to reduce the
121 RBM 13th & 20th Sep. and 29th Dec. 1871
122 RBM 6th Dec. 1871
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ability of staff to influence the allocation of pay and promotions; staff
could no longer complain about what they did not and were not
supposed to know.
Minor administrative alterations accompanied by conciliatory
salary increases went some way towards securing the Cashier a degree
of unquestionable authority, which his predecessors had lacked.
However, complete autonomy in staffing matters required the removal
of seniority from the allocative process, a more radical and contentious
change that culminated in a new scheme for the governance of pay and
promotion throughout the Bank introduced in 1873. Most of this
scheme is reproduced below. The fifty-five clerks then serving at head
office were placed in five classes, with similar arrangements introduced
shortly afterwards at the main Glasgow office:
Scheme introduced in 1873 to arrange the establishment at the head office of the
Royal Bank of Scotland
Senior Clerks - to be specially dealt with when necessary by the
Court, and the number if necessary may be increased
beyond three.
First Class Clerks - maximum salary £200. To increase biennially by £15
till the maximum is reached.
Second Class Clerks - maximum salary £130. To increase biennially by £15
till the maximum be reached.
Fourth Class clerks - minimum at entrance £60. To increase by £10
annually till salaries reach £80 and thereafter by
£10 biennially till maximum of £100 be reached124.
Besides the new salary ceilings this new scheme differed from previous
arrangements in that it formally disconnected promotion from
positions. No limits were placed on the membership of each class with
123 RBM 7th Sep. 1875
124 RBM 17th Sep. 1873
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Table 4.4. The structure of agents and accountants salaries in 1873 (in £s at current
prices)
Branch Deposits Agent salaries Accountant salaries
class (£ooo) Min. Max. Min. Max.
I over £100 £300 £500 £120 £200
II £60 to £100 £200 £400 £90 £150
III £30 to £60 £150 £300 £70 £110
IV under £30 £100 £200 £50 £80
Source RBM 17th Sep. 1873
movement between them possible on the basis of "distinguished merit"
alone. Therefore it gave scope for promotion bottlenecks to be eased, as
there was no longer any need to wait for a position to fall vacant before
a promotion could occur.
The 1873 scheme also standardised employment in all but the
largest branches for the first time. Branches were placed in one of four
classes according to the volume of deposits they held and agents and
accountants salaries set according to the class of branch they worked in
(see table 4.4 above). The scheme held out the prospect of higher
salaries if a branch moved to a higher class, encouraging all branch staff
to gather deposits. As a national salary scale it also simplified the
process of setting individual salaries, although in practice Fleming
explained "It is perhaps impossible to lay down any rule as to the
salaries of agents"125 and "As regards the staff at the Branches there will
no doubt always be exceptional cases arising from local circumstances
requiring exceptional treatment"126. Only apprentice salaries were
inflexible; each would move along a three-year salary scale of £10, £20
then £30.
The new scheme also put in place definite career structures for




arranged in a hierarchy of authority and reward, through which staff
would move in an orderly, predictable fashion. This would begin on
completion of an apprenticeship when the names of those considered
qualified and intending to remainwith the Bank were placed on a list
kept at head office of staff waiting for promotion to branch accountant.
Until then the eligible would serve as a clerk "either at the Branch where
he was trained or elsewhere"127. On becoming an accountant further
promotions were "to be given by transfer from branches of a lower to
branches of a higher class". This movement as well as the name, age and
annual salaries all full-time staff recruited in the branches received
during the entire course of their Royal Bank careers were subsequently
recorded in half page entries in what became a series of staff books128.
However, once the position of accountant at a first class branch was
reached the possibility of further promotion formally ended. Although
accountants did become agents, no allowance was made for this
occurring.
By rendering employment an integrated whole Fleming sought
greater authority over staffing matters. The arrangements he set out
required that staff adopt a new set of values as throughout the Bank
seniority was repeatedly rejected as a criterion on which to base staffing
decisions. At head office and the main Glasgow office, except for the
long service allowance, salary increases were to be "allowed only where
the head of department reports satisfactorily as to conduct and
efficiency" and as for promotion; "No claims for more rapid
advancement to be entertained on the grounds of seniority merely"129.
In the branches too: "salaries not to be raised except where agent
reports satisfactorily as to conduct and efficiency" with "seniority merely
to give no claims to promotion"130. Stripping seniority from staffing





incentives and as a means of discipline. The complacent would not
suffer; no allowance was made for salary reductions or demotions, but
they would not prosper either. Instead, they would experience the
ignominy of being left behind by their peers performing the low paid
and mundane duties young clerks regarded as a penance to be endured
on the way to better things.
The response of the head office staff was rapid, but unsuccessful.
The ever-increasing number of young men from the branches passing
through head office had diluted the once close links between staff.
Simultaneously, the market for bank staff had moved against labour.
As no Scottish banks were formed after 1844, there was no longer a
Scottish market for the experienced clerks and tellers previously
poached to devise accounting and administrative procedures for newly
established banks, while banks operating elsewhere tended to confine
their recruitment to younger members of staff (staff turnover and
emigration is considered in more detail in chapters 5 & 6 below). In
these circumstances seniority had remained an influence largely because
a Cashier and board unwilling to implement change and intent on
maintaining amicable staff relations tolerated it131. Fleming, at a remove
from a staff increasingly at a remove from each other, would not
tolerate this or any other challenge to his authority. The memorial staff
sent to the board132 criticising the new arrangements was
acknowledged and some minor concessions made, otherwise the board
stood firm; "In all other respects we recommend the scheme to be
adhered to at least until it has had a fair trial"133. It received this and
more, remaining in place largely intact until after the FirstWorld War.
The removal of seniority and recreation of employment as a
bank-wide scheme also involved altering the scope of the employment
130 ibid.
131 On the importance of good staff relations see the comments of Charles Boase, RBM 22nd
Jun. 1864
132 RBM 25th Mar. 1874
133 ibid.
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relationship. Each of the paternalistic benefits staff received were
scrutinised, then reformed. To assist in this process Fleming
investigated arrangements elsewhere. For example, he introduced Bank
of Scotland holiday arrangements to Royal Bank:
"tellers on average and senior officers to get four weeks, special time of
absence to be arranged amongst themselves; Clerks who have served ten
years to get three weeks, and younger clerks generally to have a fortnight, a
few days more on special application not objected to"134.
As one aspect of employment was changed, another became subject to
review, lending the process its on bureaucratic momentum. For
instance, as a security measure staff provided bonds guaranteeing any
monies lost in the course of their duties. The more senior the position
the larger the bond, for instance, in the 1850s a Glasgow teller provided
a £1,000 guarantee, whereas a Dundee agent provided a £2,000 bond135.
Difficulties arose when the circumstance of guarantors changed, when
guarantors were reluctant to meet their obligations and when staff
were promoted to positions requiring larger bonds than their
guarantors could hope to meet. The use of British Guarantee
Association bonds overcame these restrictions. But, in 1853 a dispute
arose when the board refused to furnish the Association with the
information it requested to assess the risk involved in a £1,000 bond136.
To prevent such disputes and restrict access to potentially sensitive
business information, Fleming introduced a contributory Royal Bank
Staff Guarantee Fund in 1872137. Once the fund reached £10,000, the
surplus was carried over to a newly created Officer's Benefit Fund that
contributors and their dependants could apply to for small grants
awarded at the board's discretion. The guarantee fund was notable
because all staff were obliged to join, so that for the first time branch
staff were directly involved in the paternalistic process.
134 RBM 30th May 1871
135 RB 307
136 RBM 23rd Mar., 6th & 13th Apr. 1853
137 RBM 6th Dec. 1871 and 2nd Oct. 1872
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The guarantee and benefit funds made employment as well as
the Bank's paternalistic regime more inclusive in other ways. By
replacing the personal bond agents previously provided, the guarantee
fund in theory left branch accountants the main restraining influence
over agent behaviour. However, this arrangement was compromised
when agents selected, paid or assessed their own subordinates. To
resolve this all those working in the branches were moved onto the
Bank's permanent staff and existing benefit arrangements brought into
line with the guarantee and benefit funds. The widows' fund was
originally confined to Edinburgh and Glasgow staff, until in 1877 its
trustees decided that all staff should be eligible to join. To ensure this
took place the board resolved:
"that every person who may be hereafter appointed an officer, agent, clerk,
or porter in the service of the Bank shall become a contributor ... if he be
married at the time of his appointment, or, if he should afterwards marry
while in the service of the Bank"138.
This was no great hardship. Unlike the retiring allowance widows'
pensions were awarded as a right and paid out of funds lodged in an
account that benefited from employer contributions and a preferential
interest rate.
However, greater inclusiveness widened the distances between
the different levels of the Bank hierarchy. Until 1854 the board had been
involved in setting the salaries of every member of staff on an
individual basis. After the establishment of the network applications for
salary increases became a regular and unwelcome distraction at board
meetings. To relieve the board of this burden the Cashier assumed sole
responsibility for setting all but the salaries of the most senior staff, a
task undertaken at the end of each calendar year. The salary review
joined the annual balance in setting the rhythm of work, becoming a
ritual event imposed from on high and approached by staff with
trepidation. It also served to remove staff from board meetings as
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individuals, replacing them with a collective abstraction - the staff, an
item of expenditure largely devoid of personality. Similarly, the benefits
fund and the widows' fund also reduced the intimacy that previously
figured in staff relations. The widows' fund, for instance, was altered as
"It is manifest that such a result would be very advantageous to the Bank as
it would prevent appeals to the Charity of the Directors being made from
time to time on account of families left wholly unprovided for "139.
Such reforms rendered the various funds and their rules and
regulations, not the board, the focus of staff attention.
While Lockwood describes such changes as the bureaucratization
of clerical employment and argues this alienated subordinates from
superiors, we need to be careful to avoid confusing people with
positions140. The majority of staff who worked at Royal Bank after 1854
had never experienced the intimacy that characterised employment
relations before then, while those who had; senior officials, senior clerks
and agents, continued receiving the personal attention of the board.
Rather, the nature of the employment relationship changed over the
course of each career, with staff gradually moving into view of the
board if or as they ascended the hierarchy.
This raft of changes cumulatively transformed the culture of the
Bank, altering the content and scope of the employment relationship by
inaugurating a style of management whereby the Cashier held
unquestioned and unquestionable authority. Fleming acquired a status
subsequently conveyed by the anonymous Moneta who described a
Scottish bank general manager as:
"the Mhadi of the Soudan, the Grand Llama of Thibet, the sublime Porte of
Turkey, and the Czar of Russia all rolled into one"141.
Such grand figures were unwilling to tolerate the negotiation that once
featured in staffing decisions. For instance, after 1873 staff were
138 ibid.
139 RBM 21st Feb. 1877
140 D. Lockwood, (1989); G. Anderson (1974)
141 Moneta, op. cit., p. 42
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informed "that they may be transferred from one Branch to another at
the pleasure of the Head Office"142. This example introduces one final
development. "Head office" itself became an important element in the
culture of the Bank. Head office was where the Cashier resided and
decisions concerning every aspect of the bank were taken. Authority,
though remaining the prerogative of the Bank, emanated from head
office via numerous circulars, rule books and instructions. This
proliferation of paperwork made for a more pervasive and militaristic
form of control all were obliged to comply with. For instance, a circular
issued in 1875 informed agents they had been judged lax in their
supervision of petty running costs and would in future provide
inspectors - the embodiment of head office authority - with detailed
records and explanations of their expenditure143. One final change, then,
concerned attitudes at the highest levels of the Bank towards staff.
Whereas loyalty had previously been assumed, though it was
periodically deemed necessary to cosset and cajole staff to elicit
appropriate behaviour, in this new regime staff were simply expected
to do as they were told without question.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has depicted the formation of an ILM at the Royal
Bank of Scotland as a dynamic process that occurred over three phases.
A complex phenomenon, no single explanatory factor drawn from the
economics literature discussed above appears capable of explaining its
occurrence. Rather an eclectic approach that draws upon a range of
factors, which varied in importance over time, provides the most
convincing explanation. In an industry where the technological and
legislative environment as well as the services provided remained
essentially static, three factors provided the necessary dynamics of
142 RBM 17th Sep. 1873
143 RB 375/1, Circular dated 18th Oct. 1875
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change: industrial structure, organisational development; and the
interaction between managerial innovation and staff expectations.
The structure of banking was particularly important in the first
half of the nineteenth century when the joint-stock banking boom as
detailed in previous chapters intensified competition at the same time as
increasing the demand for bank labour ahead of supply. During this
period the transferability rather than the specificity of skills was key as
it prompted the introduction of incremental salaries served to reduce
staff turnover at minimal expense. No new banks were formed in
Scotland after 1844 and after 1857 the General Managers' Committee
controlled competition. In these changed conditions the various
incremental rewards remained in place to encourage loyal and faithful
service in circumstances where monitoring was expensive and
imperfect. Used in conjunctionwith rules governing the economic,
political and social lives of staff inside and outside work, they
contributed to the generation of a common sense compatible with the
exercise of hierarchical authority.
In keeping with Kanter's account of rapid organisational change;
the adoption of branch banking transformed the scope of Royal Bank,
but it has been argued the resultant organisational complexity in itself is
an insufficient explanation of those changes made to employment.
Although branches were firmly attached to the Bank, agents retained a
significant degree of autonomy due to their market position and the
limited administrative capacity of head office. Definite limits on head
office authority left employment occurring within a bureaucratic core
and branch network periphery, wherein branch staff were subject to an
ad-hoc range of measures as opposed to the formal schemes
implemented at the major offices. However, in both locations there was
a common concern with minimising staffing costs that resulted in
internal promotion being adopted as a means of avoiding the cost of
appointing already experienced staff from outside to promoted posts.
There was also an acceptance of the principle that salaries were often an
165
insufficient incentive for junior staff to stay. This, plus the limited
promotion prospects on offer, due to the role of seniority in deciding
the distribution of promoted posts and use of part-time agents, which
reduced the availability of managerial positions, resulted in a high
turnover rate developing amongst junior staff.
All these factors contributed to employment at Royal Bank
acquiring the characteristics of an ILM. However, it remained for John
Fleming to implement the broader programme of changes necessary to
render this an integrated whole. Fleming acted to place employment at
Royal Bank on a par with rival institutions following a period of
apparent neglect. The apparent economic rationale for change as part of
an overall concern with efficiency and reduced running costs, appears to
have been to harness those trends in staffing that became apparent in
the 1860s: first, the transition to a near complete reliance on internal
promotion; and second the high rate of turnover amongst junior staff.
Both these developments, due to the payment of incremental salaries,
served to minimise staffing costs.
However, the changes Fleming implemented were also a critical
response to the culture of the organisation he took charge of. He
pursued an ideal subsequently described by Andrew Kerr:
"bankers. From the time of their entrance into the service they should have
reason to feel that they are in a current of promotion, from the benefits of
which only their own incompetence can exclude them. A heartfelt esprit de
corps should be carefully encouraged in each establishment"144.
This necessitated a change in organisational culture. The attachment of
staff to seniority had seriously impeded the operation of those schemes
introduced in 1843 and 1867 to regulate employment at head office.
Fleming purposefully removed seniority from the allocation of salaries
and promotions, undermining those practices that supported it and
refusing to accept it had any legitimate role to play. At the same time
Fleming sought to create a more inclusive culture. All those working in
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the Bank became eligible to receive the paternalistic benefits on offer,
but as part of a new, more authoritarian regime that lacked the
previous element of negotiation and where managerial estimates of
effort and ability were posited as the sole criteria on which allocative
decisions were to be made.
144 A. K. Kerr, Bank Officers, in A. W. Kerr, (ed), op. cit., p. 138
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Chapter 5: Employment in the Royal Bank of Scotland and clerical
living standards, 1873 -1914
5.1 Introduction
When the course of clerical living standards after 1870 has been
considered the conclusions reached have tended to be pessimistic.
Gregory Anderson has argued, and it has been broadly accepted that
the salaries, job security and promotion prospects of clerks declined
after the 1870s1. This was due primarily to the increased supply of
appropriate male labour in an increasingly literate country as well as the
employment of women; factors that tended to increase supply ahead of
demand. At the same time opportunities to move from being a clerk to
an independent businessmen, for instance, from a tea-broker's clerk to
tea-broker, declined due to the increasing scale and cost of capitalist
enterprise. Consequently, an increasing number of clerks were confined
to a poorly paid economic dependency. Yet Stewart, Prandy and
Blackburn suggest standards were often low to begin with, while
drawing attention to the disparate range of positions lumped together
under the single heading clerk, which impedes the generation of
broadly applicable conclusions2. Then, there is a disparate body of
optimistic suggestions made by Crossick, Gourvish and Anderson
based on examinations of pay and conditions in insurance and railway
companies, examples of the large organisations Anderson first
identified as a cause of declining clerical living standards3. Each author
1 G. Anderson (1976) and "The Social Economy of Late-Victorian Clerks", in G. Crossick
(ed.), op. cit. For the acceptance of this view see for example D. Lockwood (1989) p. 251. For
pessimistic accounts in keeping with Anderson's argument see H. Perkin (1989), pp.78-101;
and J. Harris, Private Lives Public Spirit: Britain 1870-1914, (London: Penguin, 1993), pp.
130-132
2 A. Stewart, K. Prandy and R. M. Blackburn, Occupations and Social Stratification, (London:
Macmillan, 1980)
3 G. Anderson, "The Labour Market", in C. J. Wrigley, (ed.), A History ofBritish Industrial
Relations, (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982); T. R. Gourvish, "The Standard of Living, 1890-
1914", in A. O'Day, (ed.), The Edwardian Age: Conflict and Stability 1900-1914, (London:
Macmillan, 1979); and the discussion of Crossick in H. Kaelble, Industrialisation and Social
Inequality in 19th - Century Europe, (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1986), pp. 68-69.
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notes the benefits of employment within what was identified in the
previous chapter as an ILM; stable employment, opportunities for
promotion to highly rewarded managerial positions and salaries that
tended to increase incrementally during the course of a career. The
more optimistic view, which these studies support ties in with a
developing international body of literature, suggesting a new
orthodoxy perhaps wherein the development of organised capitalism
facilitated greater upward social mobility, more narrowly understood
here as enhanced promotion prospects within public and private sector
bureaucratic hierarchies and consequently improved living standards4.
The present chapter attempts to resolve some of these issues
using the example of employment at the Royal Bank of Scotland. It
begins by reviewing those changes made to the ILM established during
the third quarter of the nineteenth century. In itself this is significant
because as the raison d'etre of an ILM is allocative decisions are made
by administrative means, participants are insulated from the full effects
of the free market. Therefore, the existence and operation of an ILM
undermines accounts of clerical living standards primarily dependent
upon market based explanations. This is followed by a quantitative
account of bank careers, which identifies the volume of recruitment and
tenure patterns as well as the extent, probability and rate of promotion.
Using this data it is possible to test for the first time the assertion that
clerical promotion prospects declined during this period. The next
section is concerned with the rewards of bank employment and sets out
the complete package of benefits, which Royal Bank staff received
alongside estimates of their nominal worth, before examining the
salaries individual staff received over the course of their careers. The
outcome is then reviewed and evaluated in relation to existing accounts
and the overall aims of this thesis.
4 see the various contributions to A. Miles and D. Vincent (eds.) op. cit.
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5.2 A stable system
It is the great stability of those employment arrangements,
which James Fleming introduced that most impresses. Staffing became
part of the mutually agreed conservatism present in Scottish banking
since 1857. In an industry where competition was successfully
contained, the services provided remained essentially static, the
organisational form and technology used stayed largely unchanged and
growth occurred only gradually, the business of banking provided no
obvious impetus for change. Indeed, when change did occur outsiders
typically induced it. For instance, Hamilton Hotson, formerly of Bank of
Scotland and the Bank of Liverpool, returned to Scotland in 1886 to
manage the British Linen Bank. As Fleming had before him, Hotson
imposed a new managerial regime, replacing seniority with merit in the
allocation of salaries and promotions and moving staff more regularly
around the branch network5. At Royal Bank no outsiders were
appointed to senior positions and after Fleming resigned (retired) in
1892 the board looked no further than head office to find the next two
Cashiers. Although both had worked elsewhere - David Huie began his
working life in insurance and Adam Tait in law - they were still in their
twenties when they entered head office and were very much Royal
Bank men when they became Cashier. Both were largely content with
administering the system they were brought up in, then took charge of.
Modest changes did occur, primarily in response to the slow
down in deposit growth. Huie sought to encourage deposit gathering
by introducing commission payments for agents over and above the
salaries they already received, which were set according to the deposits
held at their branches6. Adam Tait subsequently reformed the
retirement arrangements in 1907, something influenced by the
introduction of state pensions, only to the extent that clarifying the
Bank's retirement arrangements made clear that state interference was
5 C. A. Malcolm (1950), p. 138
6 See the discussion of agents and deposit gathering in chapter 2
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unnecessary (and unwanted)7. Allowances continued to be set at the
directors' discretion, while the actuarial details of the reforms (staff
received an allowance equal to one sixtieth of their final salary for each
year of employment until a maximum of forty sixtieths was reached)
merely confirmed civil service pensions set a standard no other
employer was willing to supersede8. Rather, what was significant about
Tait's reforms was the introduction of compulsory retirement at 65.
Until then staff remained where they were receiving their maximum
salaries almost regardless of what effects old age had on their
performance. This was an incentive for staff to stay and for the Cashier
to have them retire. But without a fixed retirement age arranging the
retirement of part-time agents in the 1890s and 1900s proved a
protracted process and barrier to progress9. Compulsory retirement at
65 (although older staff could be retained at the directors' discretion)
allowed for the easy removal of the less productive and for younger,
more vigorous agents to be appointed in their place. Within a year of
the reform this occurred at five branches10.
Apart from these attempts at encouraging deposit gathering and
streamlining staffing, a few alterations were made to perfect what was
already held to be a near perfect administration11. The limit on the
guarantee fund was raised to £16,000 in 1893 then £25,000 in 1903 to
accommodate the increase in staff numbers and business of the Bank12.
The London branch, once a distinctive element in the economy of the
Bank, became a complete part of it as the first generation of staff
recruited from other banks were gradually replaced by the young Scots
clerks sent down to assist them13. Once the original manager retired in
1905 the remaining English accents belonged to the "English leaven";
7 RBM 18th Dec. 1907
8 RBM 13th Jun. 1877, 14th Nov. 1884 and 13th Jun. 1888
9 RBM 7th Jan. 1898, 6th Mar. 1899, 19th Mar. 1902, 6th Jun. 1906 and 19th Jun. 1907
10 RBM 6th Mar. and 8th Apr. 1908
11 This celebration of Scottish banking dominates the various histories of the banks published
before 1950
12 RBM 24th May 1893 and 23rd Sep. 1903
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clerks and tellers recruited locally whose accents it was hoped would
avoid offending local sensibilities14. This same reasoning in reverse
meant that with only one exception, staff recruited at London were
never transferred to Scotland. Otherwise employment at Royal Bank in
1914 was much as it had been in 1873 to the extent that the salary scales
James Fleming introduced remained intact and in place.
5.3 Recruitment, tenure and promotion
Integral to the employment reforms, which James Fleming
introduced in the 1870s was the establishment of a series of staff books
in 1873 (for a description of these, their use and limitations see appendix
1). These were maintained until 1969 and provide the first source of
continuous longitudinal data on employment at Royal bank. The name,
age and career details, including offices worked in, positions held and
salaries received, of every full-time member of the non-manual staff
was recorded in a half page entry. The details of every entrant to the
Bank up to and including 1900 and those of a 50 per cent systematic
random sample thereafter has been used to establish the basic
dimensions of employment; recruitment, tenure and the probability,
rate and extent of promotion.
Recruitment continued to take place through those methods
detailed in the previous chapter; agents would approach or be
approached by individuals associated with the Bank and leading local
figures to discuss the employment of suitable youths who would then
be interviewed. The names of successful candidates were placed on a
waiting list kept at head office for entry to the service, then they were
appointed to a branch usually close enough to allow them to remain in
their parental homes. Annual recruitment fluctuated, then from the
early 1880s rapidly increased (see figure 5.1 below). Given the increase
13 RB 17 Memo on opening of the London office in 1874 by A. S. Michie, (1926)
14 RB 17 Memo on the opening of the London office in 1874, A. S. Michie, (1926); RBM 4th
Jan. 1905; RB 684 London manager's letters, letter dated 15th Nov. 1897
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in the number of branches (see figure 5.1), it is apparent recruitment
increased to staff a growing organisation.
However, the growth in recruitment was also due to the tenure
pattern that developed. Figure 5.2 (and figure 5.3) below depicts how
long staff recruited during the period 1873 to 1900 stayed using broad
categories to overcome data limitations - a number of entries in the staff
records include an entry date, but lack a precise leaving date (the
method of overcoming this problem is detailed in appendix 2). Clearly,
after 1873 a growing majority of recruits - over 70 per cent of those
taken on in the late-1890s - left within ten years of entering the Bank. As
salaries tended to increase with length of service, these apprentices
provided the Bank with cheap labour, though not enough to contain the
increase in staffing costs experienced in the 1900s (see table 5.3 below).
Those who left the Bank did not re-enter. What became of them is
examined in the next chapter, the remainder of this section considers
what happened to those who stayed.
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Figure 5.2: The career duration of Royal Bank of Scotland staff recruited during the
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The staff books allow the assertion that for clerks the rate and
likelihood of promotion declined after the 1870s to be tested for the first
time. To do so it is necessary to establish what level of promotion to
measure. Becoming an agent provides an appropriate level as it
conferred significant economic rewards and a certain place in (local)
society. Joint-agents were also included in the "agents" category as full-
time staff frequently shared agencies with part-time agents; the former
provided the banking expertise, while the latter were often no more
than a figurehead employed to attach their connections and local
knowledge to the Bank. In addition, while few staff became Cashier,
there were a range of other senior positions they could more plausibly
aspire to; secretary, accountant, superintendent, inspector and their
various assistants and deputies (essentially all those at the three largest
offices identifiable as something other than a clerk or teller, but
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Table 5.1. The proportion of clerical recruits to the Royal Bank of Scotland who
became an agent or a senior official c. 1873-1897 (by year of entry)
Entry Senior No. of
period Agents officials entrants
1873-77 18.3 % 2.8 % 180
1878-82 17.6 " 2.5 " 204
1883-87 13.8 " 2.0 " 152
1888-92 16.7 " 0.5 " 192
1893-97 21.8 " 3.6 " 193
1873-97 17.8 " 2.3 " 921
5.2. The proportion of clerical recruits to the Royal Bank of Scotland who
stayed at least 10 years and became an Agent or Senior official c.
1873-1897 (by year of entry)
Entry Senior No. of
period Agents officials examples.
1873-77 38.8 % 5.9 % 85
1878-82 36.0 " 5.0 " 100
1883-87 32.8 " 4.7 " 64
1888-92 51.6 " 1.6 " 62
1893-97 51.9 " 8.6 " 81
1873-97 41.8 " 5.3 " 392
including clerks authorised to sign pro-cashier), which have been
grouped together to form the category "senior officials" in tables 5.1
and 5.2. It should be noted these are exclusive categories. For instance,
accountants at first class branches and tellers at the largest offices, were
paid more than the agent of a fourth class branch. However, these
other positions were excluded, as were sub-agents, due to their
subordinate status.
Table 5.1 indicates that promotion to a managerial position
though possible, was unlikely, and the promotion prospects of staff
recruited immediately after the 1870s declined. However, this does not
take staff turnover into account. By excluding all those who left within
ten years of entering the Bank (see table 5.2) so as to focus on the
prospects of those who experienced lengthy Royal Bank careers,
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reveals a substantial improvement in staff fortunes. Moreover, after an
initial dip, the promotion prospects of this group of staff recruited in the
late 1880s and 1890s were markedly better than those recruited in the
late 1870s and early 1880s. Three factors can explain this change: first,
the growing tendency for recruits to leave within ten years of entering
the Bank reduced competition for promoted posts; second, the
increased number of promoted posts available due to the continuous
expansion of the branch network; and third, the gradual phasing out of
part-time agents, which accelerated after the alteration of retirement
arrangements in 1907.
This pattern of promotion and tenure lent careers a particular
form. Figure 5.3 above charts the length of time, which staff recruited in
1880, 1890 and 1900 spent working for Royal Bank. It illustrates the
polarisation that occurred in staff tenure (the data used to produce
figure 5.3 is subject to certain qualifications, 15 of the 122 possible
subjects were excluded as their career duration could not be identified
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precisely, though we can note eight of these appear to have progressed
no further than an apprenticeship before leaving, which confirms the
following conclusion15). A majority of staff left Royal Bank during the
course of their working lives, increasingly on or shortly after
completing an apprenticeship. Amongst those they left behind a
growing majority stayed until death or retirement, effectively enjoying
a job for life. A variety of contingent events, death, poor health,
dismissal and, for entrants in 1900, the FirstWorld War, explain most of
the turnover occurring between these poles. In other words, the data
presented in figure 5.3 and table 5.2 indicates that from the late 1880s
recruits who stayed until their early to mid-twenties had embarked on
lifelong careers where the chance of eventually reaching a managerial
position was better than one in two.
The process of compiling this data also revealed that the careers
of agents and senior officials possessed distinct geographies. To avoid
double counting two subjects who held positions as senior officials and
as agents were only included as agents in tables 5.1 and 5.2 as in each
case this was the more highly rewarded position and their final career
position. Otherwise agents and senior officials followed different paths
to their ultimate career destinations. Whereas the former tended to
move between branches and major offices on a gradually upward
spiral, the latter were identified as promising material early in their
careers and brought into one of the main offices, where they stayed
within an exclusive orbit moving up the clerical ranks until reaching a
senior position. This partial segmentation of the ILM may well have
been unique to Royal Bank. For instance, David Wilson at Clydesdale
Bank moved from the Ayr branch to head office then to Leith, where he
gained first-hand experience of lending first as accountant then as agent,
before returning to head office in 1875 where he remained, eventually
15 The Staff Books of the Royal Bank ofScotland. For a discussion of this source and its use
see Appendices 1 and 2
177
Figure 5.4. Average (median) time taken from entering the service of Royal Bank to
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becoming general manager in 188716. At Royal Bank such careers were
more intimate affairs with senior officials taking it upon themselves to
nurture their eventual replacements after spotting them at an early age.
Although the likelihood of promotion increased, the changing
rate of promotion over time lends some support to pessimistic accounts
of clerical living standards. An early sign of this was in 1863 when the
General Manager of the Clydesdale Bank, asked to find a position for
the son of an acquaintance, recommended another career because in a
bank "he might be for 20 years without attaining anything like a good
position"17. By the 1870s contemporaries noted "in Scotland banking is
popularly regarded as the most dismal and hopeless of respectable
professions"18. The time taken by Royal Bank staff from recruitment to
first becoming an agent is in keeping with these pessimistic accounts.
Figure 5.4 above depicts the (median) average time taken to first
16 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 319-320
17 ibid. p. 47
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becoming an agent (or joint-agent) during five year periods beginning
in 1873 and ending in 1913. It shows that the rate of promotion declined
almost continuously after the 1870s, before stabilising in the 1900s. The
age data included in figure 5.4 indicates that the demographic character
of agents changed in the process; whereas in the 1870s staff often
became agents in their thirties, by the 1900s they had to wait until their
early forties to reach the same position. During the intervening period
their personal circumstances changed in predictable ways; many got
married and had children. Thus, towards the end of the nineteenth
century the figure of the agent (or bank manager as he became known
after 1945) as a stable and responsible family man first emerged19.
5.4 Rewards
Staff received a set annual salary paid monthly into a bank
account, an arrangement that possesses an apparent clarity when
compared to, for example, the cotton industry where the diversity of
labour use in relation to methods of payment renders generalisations
about wage trends no more than notional averages20. However,
calculating the rewards of bank employment poses its own set of
methodological and analytical challenges. First, ignoring the other
benefits staff routinely received although allowing ready comparison
with waged employment, systematically and significantly
underestimates the worth of bank work. Second, as Crossick notes,
clerks often experienced a distinctive life-earnings curve of gradual
increases with few interruptions21. Therefore, unless sensitive to this
movement and the dispersal of staff along the various salary scales
attached to different positions, averages threaten to collapse meaningful
distinctions in favour of notional measures. Bearing these points in
18 Quoted in S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p. 492
19 For a sensitive account of the character of bank managers (agents) during the first three
quarters of the twentieth century that is of relevance here see S. Halford, M. Savage and A.
Witz, Gender, Careers and Organisations, (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 112-125
20 K. Burgess quoted in T. R. Gourvish, op. cit., p. 25
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mind the following section has two aims: first, to estimate the total
monetary worth of the other benefits staff received; and second, to
detail the life-earnings curve of bank staff, giving consideration to the
rate at which salaries increased as well as their changing worth over
time.
In Andrew Kerr's opinion "A bank clerk's circumstances will
contrast very favourably with those of any other description of clerk,
with, perhaps, the exception of the Government service"22. Therefore,
achieving the first aim necessitates distinguishing between those
benefits unique to banking and the more commonplace. The tellers
allowance and free accommodation were examples of the former. The
tellers allowance involved paying £5 to £25 p.a., depending on the size
of office, to staff engaged in telling. It accumulated in a loss account that
any cash lost was deducted from. The remainder was paid to the teller
when he left the Bank or changed position. An accuracy incentive, the
worth of the eventual lump sum depended on the size of the allowance,
the length of time spent as a teller and the individual. The few examples
available indicate that it could be a substantial benefit. For instance, in
1881 a head office teller used the £654 in his loss account as security for a
£600 loan to buy a house23. Whereas the tellers' allowance encouraged
accuracy, free accommodation in a bank house began as a security
measure as it ensured a member of staff was always present to guard
the cash. For this reason when staff occupying a bank house resigned
(or died) they and families were obliged to leave. The bank house at
head office was originally for the Cashier, but gradually passed down
the hierarchy until David Huie (then Secretary) moved out in favour of
the Cashkeeper in 189024. The flats routinely built above branches
remained the agents' prerogative. Except at the largest branches where
the accountant often took the agent's place, most agents took
21 H. Kaelbe, op. cit. pp. 68 - 69
22 A. Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. Kerr, (ed.), op. cit., p. 139
23 RBM 19th. Jan. 1881
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advantage of this arrangement. Free accommodation also facilitated
movement between branches as it removed a possible barrier to staff
transfers (junior staff transferred to a new location often lived with the
agent at least until they found alternative accommodation)25. The £40 to
£60 annual accommodation allowance paid to agents at branches
without a flat is an indication of how much free accommodation was
worth.
Staff also supplemented their salaries selling insurance, the one
additional interest they were allowed to pursue due to its risk free
nature. In insurance as in banking the local influence a company could
secure was regarded as the key to success, which made bank agents
attractive as salesmen to insurance companies26. Part-time then full-time
bank agents took to selling insurance with occasionally evangelical
vigour. One Edinburgh agent introduced his customers to fire insurance
in 1863, followed by accident insurance, plate glass insurance and finally
employers' liability insurance27. A letter to the Scottish Banking and
Insurance Magazine suggested that all staff pursued this lucrative
sideline28. The correspondent explained that every time he entered a
branch the agent, then the accountant, the clerk and finally the
apprentice would try to sell him a new policy. Although the letter was
probably an exasperated exaggeration, it is plausible to assume that
accountants due to their status as office managers and frequent use as
acting agents, did sell insurance, but to an unknown extent. Presumably
staff working in the same branch did not sell rival products and in the
branch the correspondent described the agent monopolised the most
lucrative policies. If successful he could more than double his income.
24 RBM 2nd May 1890
25 See for example RBM 22nd Feb. 1888
26 J. Treble, "The performance of the Standard Life Assurance Company in the ordinary life
market in Scotland, 1850-1875", in J. Butt & J. T. Ward, (eds.) Scottish Themes, (Edinburgh:
Scottish Academic Press, 1976)
27 Moneta, op. cit., p.50; on the development of insurance products see R. Pearson, "Towards
an historical model of services innovation: the case of the insurance industry, 1700-1914",
Economic History Review, L., (1997), pp. 235-256
28 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1879, pp. 154-55
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The social consequences for the individual of the more
commonplace benefits, which staff received have tended to attract most
attention29. Wilensky, for example, suggests a career spent within an
ILM serves to integrate the individual with the organisation and
promote social stability30. Yet the characteristic features of employment
in an ILM conferred more immediate economic benefits. Khan notes the
salary earner can
"develop a different pattern of expenditure - to become, say, an owner of his
house instead of a tenant. Such a different expenditure pattern in turn
produces a further divergence of habits and tastes: differing modes of
consumption contribute, not unnaturally, to different modes of life"31.
This distinction between wages and salaries derives from the
predictability and reliability of clerical incomes and the stability of
employment. Clerks typically avoided those seasonal fluctuations in
employment, which were endemic to the building trade, or the
unemployment and underemployment accompanied by the need to
devote resources to job search induced by the business cycle in
shipbuilding32. Paid holidays similarly ensured uninterrupted earnings
and remained a particular benefit of clerical employment until
significant numbers of manual workers began receiving them in the
1930s following a series of national trade union campaigns, themselves
an indication of their perceived worth33. Furthermore, paid holidays as
well as the living allowance, which Royal Bank staff working in London
received symbolised the sheltered nature of clerical employment. While
holidays with and without pay were often timed to coincide with quiet
periods in factory, office and bank work, only manual workers bore the
29 See the discussion of ILM theory in the previous chapter
30 H. L Wilensky, "Work, careers and social integration", in T. Burns, (ed.), IndustrialMan,
(London: Penguin, 1969)
31 H. R. Khan, "The Distinction between Wages and Salaries", Scottish Journal ofPolitical
Economy, 1956, pp. 140-141
32 C. J. McKenna, "The Theory of Search in Labour Markets", in D. Sapsford and Z.
Tzannatos, (eds.), Current Issues in Labour Economics, (1990); J. Treble, Urban Poverty in
Britain, (1979), pp. 51-90
33 S. G. Jones, Workers at Play, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 18-20
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financial brunt of variations in demand. And, whereas Scottish miners
paid to have their picks sharpened - the equivalent of a clerk buying his
own ink - clerks were spared the expense of contributing to routine
overheads.
Employer paternalism ensured that the reliability and
predictability of earnings continued almost regardless of health and old
age. Royal Bank staff were particularly well catered for in these
respects. In one example a branch accountant unable to work due to
illness received his full salary for a year and a half before being put on
half salary and given two years leave34. It was not until a medical report
confirmed that there was no possibility of the accountant returning to
work that he was asked to resign and awarded a £150 grant. The
unfortunate accountant died shortly afterwards, but if he had reached
his 50s other examples suggest he would have received a retiring
allowance instead of a grant.
However, the more immediate effect of employer paternalism
was to preserve the disposable incomes of staff in that they received a
range of benefits, which it is doubtful they could have afforded to
purchase from an alternative provider. The tolerance of poor health, for
instance, meant that staff had no need to spend the weekly shillings and
pence necessary to secure a modicum of insurance against poor health
and temporary unemployment that became one of the markers of
working class respectability. The non-contributory retirement
allowance was a more significant benefit. The growing number of
workers who purchased insurance policies and joined friendly societies
rarely purchased an old age pension; instead they saved primarily to
provide for their funeral expenses. The reasons for this were
straightforward; they could not afford a pension and (rightly) judged
themselves unlikely to live long enough to enjoy it. Indeed, due to their
cost pensions remained the exception, as there were few private
34 RBM 9th Mar. 1896. See also the similar treatment of a head office clerk detailed in RBM
7th Feb. 1896
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providers. Only one working man's society - the Northumberland and
Durham Miners' Permanent Relief Society, established in 1862 - proved
able to sustain a pension scheme in the nineteenth century35. Even then
it only paid small pensions; four shillings a week in an industry where
life expectancy and therefore the number of recipients, remained low.
The introduction of a means tested state pension in 1908 did little to
alter this situation due to its modest worth and limited coverage.
Rather, before 1914 it required employers to become involved before
employees received a pension they could afford to live on. This
occurred in railway companies where arrangements and benefit levels
similar to those at Royal Bank were introduced. The main difference
was that clerks and managers contributed 2i/2per cent of their annual
salaries to a fund the railway companies then matched36. The figure of 5
per cent reoccurs amongst the affluent minority who took advantage of
tax relief on insurance policies introduced in 1853 and devoted
approximately 5 per cent of their income to saving for old age37. Thus 5
per cent provides an approximate guide to the financial, though not the
psychological worth of the non-contributory retirement allowance.
Turning now to salaries, the data on staffing costs presented in
table 5.3 below, indicates that salaries were to a considerable extent
shielded from the external market, confirming the existence of an ILM.
Over the period 1898 to 1911 the total salary bill for the branch network
(at current prices) increased by 26.2 per cent. However, this does not
take into account the actual growth of the network. The increase in the
(mean) average cost of staffing a branch during this period was a more
modest 7.0 per cent. The estimated increase in total branch staff
numbers between 1899 and 1909 indicates that this was partially due to
the number of staff working in each branch increasing from an average
of 4.7 in 1899 to 5.0 in 1909. The average salaries staff received also
35 L. Hannah, Inventing retirement The Development ofoccupational pensions in Britain,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 6-7
36 ibid. pp. 10-11
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1898 82,007 128 640.68 12,892,645 157.2
1899 83,920 129 650.54 13,338,322 158.9 611
1900 N/A 129 N/A 14,157,122 N/A
1901 88,624 131 676.52 14,127,980, 159.4
1902 89,286 130 686.82 14,039,469 157.2
1903 90,592 132 686.30 13,993,263 154.5
1904 92,278 132 699.08 13,761,281 149.1
1905 91,614 136 673.63 13,606,172 148.6
1906 94,960 137 693.14 13,666,322 143.9
1907 95314 138 690.68 14,569,781 152.9
1908 96,879 142 682.25 14,013,796 144.7
1909 99,346 143 694.73 13,861,273 139.5 719
1910 102,412 145 706.29 13,920,173 135.9
1911 103,524 151 685.59 14,455,195 139.6
Notes: * The Total cost of salaries is derived from a figure labelled "amount
actually paid" and excludes head office
* * Branch totals were taken from the establishment books
*** The figures for Total deposits were taken from RB 419
**** An estimate which includes (approximately a dozen) manual &
unidentifiable staff
Source: RB 484/13 - 26, Establishment books
increased in nominal terms, but by a more modest 0.6 % between these
two points. However, even this is significant because each pound spent
on salaries earned a progressively smaller return in terms of deposits.
In other words, while it is reasonable to assume branches were
regarded as a long-term investment and the initially high running costs
of those opened during this period would eventually fall relative to the
deposits they attracted, it appears the traditional method of increasing
deposits by opening more branches, was proving less effective and
more expensive to implement. Although the possibility existed for this
to be offset by lending resources being used more profitably, profits
varied on an annual basis, whereas the upwards drift in staffing costs
37 ibid. pp. 4-5
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proved consistent. Thus, in the short-term there was only a weak link
between profits and pay.
On the other hand the fact that the salary scales introduced in
1873 remained unchanged until after the FirstWorldWar lends some
support to Anderson's contention that clerical incomes stagnated
between 1870 and 191438. But, until the mid-1890s such rigidity was
likely to have been advantageous as the dominant influence on rising
living standards in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was the
sustained fall in the cost of food, fuel and other necessities, which began
in 1873 and lasted until 189639. However, fixed salary scales were
potentially disadvantageous when prices rose for much of the period
after 1896, though whether this reduced the worth of salaries relative to
wages is not immediately apparent. Gourvish concludes that most
manual workers experienced pressure on their economic position
during much of the 1900s, an era Beveridge characterised as cramped
and uneasy, while along Clydeside a substantial fall in real wages
during the depressions of 1904-5 and 1908-9, provided the precondition
for an upsurge in industrial militancy in 1910-1440. Furthermore, Royal
Bank staff benefited from various measures geared to preserving the
established salary scale, while counteracting the effects of what, with
some justification, was regarded as short-term inflation. Bonuses were
38 G. Anderson, (1977) op. cit., pp. 131-32
39 C. Feinstein, 'A new look at the cost of living 1870 - 1914', in J. Foreman-Peck (ed), New
perspectives on the late Victorian economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
The use of existing cost of living indices requires some qualification as they chart the changing
cost of those goods and services, which dominated working class expenditure. This is important
because arguments about clerical standards of living are essentially concerned with the extent to
which the cost of being middle class increased faster than clerical incomes, yet as Feinstein
notes throughout the period 1870-1914 the cost of renting middle class accommodation
declined. However, in the absence of a middle class cost of living index the magnitude of the
price changes that have been identified and the broad base of goods used are such that it seems
reasonable to assume the trends identified are generally applicable to a study of bank salaries.
For a discussion of the need for a middle class cost of living index see H. M. Boot, "Real
incomes of the British middle class, 1760-1850: the experience of clerks at the East India
Company", Economic History Review, LII, (1999), pp. 638 - 668
40 T. R. Gourvish, op. cit., p. 29; Wm. Beveridge quoted in Feinstein, op. cit., p. 151; A.
Mclvor and W. Kenefick, "Introduction: Roots of Red Clydeside c.1910-1914" and R. Devlin,
"Strike patterns and employers' responses, Clydeside in comparative perspective", both in A.
Mclvor and W. Kenefick, (eds.),op. cit.
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paid, individual members of staff received higher salaries than the scale
allowed for as a reward for special diligence and in 1901 the board
resolved to pay the income tax of staff41.
Within this context of falling then rising prices and relatively
static nominal salary levels, staff pursued a distinctive lifetime earnings
curve that requires consideration on two levels - within and between
cohorts. Table 5.4 below excludes the salaries received by staff working
in London as these were inflated by what was effectively a London
allowance, to concentrate on the (mean) average salaries paid to
successive cohorts of Royal Bank Scottish branch staff, an approach
allowing ready comparison between cohorts. In addition the salary data
only commences after each cohort had served for 10 years, to avoid
including the salaries of those staff who had already left, but for whom
a definite leaving date is not available.
The data presented in table 5.4 illustrates the distinctive lifetime
earnings Crossick notes. Within each cohort salaries increased almost
continuously throughout each career, rapidly during the first twenty or
so years, then slowly until tailing off almost completely as the subjects
approached the end of their working lives. Static measures, fail to
capture this movement, and consequently underestimate clerical pay.
For example, Perkin suggests only 44 per cent of those who working in
banking in 1909 earned over £160 a year (the minimum threshold for
income tax and therefore a key line of social distinction)42. This point is
illustrated below in table 5.5, which indicates that approximately three
quarters of all those who entered Royal Bank during the periods 1859-
61 and 1869-71 and who stayed received salaries greater than or equal
to £160 in the 1900s. Thus, before 1896 the intra-generational experience
of bank staff was one of almost continuous improvement in living
standards, while even after 1896 average salaries continued growing
ahead of prices. Only the 1859-61 cohort experienced a reduction in their
real earnings as approaching the end of their careers, the real
41 RBM 12th Nov. 1877, 2nd Jan. 1878, 22nd & 29th Dec. 1900 and 4th Mar. 1906. A. W.
Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. W. Kerr, (ed.), op. cit., p. 136; Form included in RB/B1/1
Instructions to the Agents and accountants of the Royal Bank of Scotland (Ayton branch copy)
42 H. Perkin, (1989) p. 98; A. Marwick, The Deluge British Society and the First World War,
2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1991), p.61
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Table 5.4 The average salaries received by successive cohorts of Royal Bank of
Scotland recruits, 1859 - 1891 (£s at current prices)
Entry Period



















10 90.00 1 101.81 22 82.97 37 80.5 30
11 85.00 2 109.77 22 87.58 33 87.78 29
12 110.00 5 119.55 22 91.94 31 92.12 26
13 114.00 5 129.29 21 94.83 29 96.60 25
14 128.33 6 133.10 21 100.54 28 104.00 25
15 136.67 6 136.50 20 103.89 27 110.00 25
16 140.00 6 137.25 20 108.46 26 118.40 25
17 154.17 6 144.50 20 113.96 24 129.81 26
18 157.50 6 148.25 20 116.25 24 136.73 26
19 160.00 6 158.25 20 120.87 24 140.38 26
20 185.00 6 161.00 20 126.52 23 151.92 26
21 195.00 6 168.00 20 161.30 23 160.77 26
22 196.67 6 168.00 20 136.09 23 166.40 25
23 196.67 6 174.25 20 140.87 23 172.20 25
24 196.67 6 178.75 20 145.87 23 179.79 24
25 196.67 6 180.00 20 150.00 23 191.46 24
26 196.67 6 187.90 19 156.30 23
27 196.67 6 202.63 19 160.00 22
28 196.67 6 202.11 19 164.00 20
29 208.33 6 211.47 17 167.00 20
30 212.50 6 218.75 16 175.50 20
31 229.17 6 224.69 16 178.50 20
32 225.00 5 224.38 16 180.79 19
33 225.00 5 230.62 16 186.32 19
34 225.00 5 258.75 16 186.11 18
35 230.00 5 262.50 16 191.39 18
36 230.00 5 266.25 16
37 230.00 5 272.67 15
38 246.00 5 275.67 15
39 246.00 5 289.29 14
40 246.00 5 298.46 13
41 246.00 5 299.62 13
42 246.00 5 303.08 13
43 250.00 5 304.62 13
44 256.00 5 317.33 15
45 261.00 5 318.00 15
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Table 5.5 The percentage of Royal Bank staff recruited in the years 1859-1861 and



















worth of their largely static salaries fell due to inflation.
Comparison between cohorts was facilitated by the decision to
concentrate on the average salaries received by distinctive groups large
enough to minimise the effects of unique and therefore
unrepresentative individuals. Even so the results are complex and
reveal no clear trends. The first point to note is the substantial
differentials that existed between each cohort. By the turn of the
century and after approximately 40 years service the first cohort
received an average annual salary of £246, compared to the £219, £127
and £80 paid to the second, third and fourth cohorts. These differentials
reduced as staff approached their final career destination and began
catching up with their predecessors. However, it is also apparent the
rate at which average salaries grew varied between cohorts despite the
branch salary scale remaining unchanged. This is most likely due to
fluctuations in the rate of promotion. Staff recruited in 1859,1860 and
1861 appear to have received the highest and fastest growing salaries
during the first 30 years of their careers. Thereafter the second cohort
overtook them, a consequence perhaps of improved promotion
prospects and an indication that low earnings during the early stages of
a career did not preclude relatively high earnings later on. However, as
the average salaries received by the 1879-81 cohort grew more slowly
and remained lower than either of the previous cohorts there are some
signs of decline, a trend exacerbated by this cohort's experience of rising
prices. However, the ongoing improvement in promotion prospects
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enabled the final cohort to recover much of the ground lost, indeed,
after 25 years service in nominal terms they were earning a fraction
more than the cohort immediately preceding them despite the latter's
additional 10 years service. This also indicates that seniority was not a
sufficient qualification for promotion or an increased salary. Thus,
although the average salaries, which successive cohorts received appear
on balance to have fallen, this process was neither continuous nor
straightforward.
5.5 Conclusion
Single examples are always subject to particular, unique or
contingent factors and it is dangerous to generalise from them. There
are undoubtedly examples yet to be found of clerks whose incomes did
stagnate and whose employment became less secure due to the reasons
set out by Anderson. But this chapter has established that participation
within an ILM conferred the substantial benefits of secure employment
and a stable income. Nor should we expect otherwise given that
imperviousness to exogenous economic factors is a defining
characteristic of an ILM. Indeed, here the establishment of an ILM
appears to have divided the labour market as a whole into protected
and precarious sectors with bank staff firmly located in the former,
insulated from the endemic seasonal or business cycle variations that
routinely impacted upon employment and wages elsewhere. Instead
the rhythm of bank work was determined by bureaucratic routines,
most obviously the spectacle of the annual salary review.
The shielded nature of bank employment was further embodied
in the numerous free and subsidised benefits, which staff received.
Consequently, existing studies that have concentrated on salaries
significantly underestimate the worth of clerical employment. Arguably
if free to do so bank staff would have chosen higher salaries over
benefits and opted to spend these in other ways. However, the growth
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of friendly societies and industrial insurance providers, which workers
less well placed voluntarily joined, suggests that this is unlikely. Even so
the actual financial worth of, for example, the retirement allowance, is
difficult to estimate given that the amounts involved were dependent
on how long recipients lived (in this respect the introduction of
compulsory retirement at 65 increased its value). Rather bank
paternalism had the immediate effect of preserving the disposable
incomes of staff, enhancing their capacity to consume goods and
services. Furthermore, it granted a degree of reassurance and, where
payments in kind were involved, provided some immunity against the
effects of modest inflation. Thus, for some, and it is likely to have been a
substantial number, the combination of a free retirement allowance, an
income tax allowance, free accommodation, subsidised widows and
benefits schemes, the tellers allowance and opportunities to sell
insurance more than doubled the worth of bank employment.
All these other benefits only gradually became available and
were closely attached to promotion rendering salary figures an
increasingly poor guide to living standards over the course of each
career. Bearing this in mind a pessimistic account would need to focus
on the substantial minority that stayed in Scotland and did not reach a
managerial position after 1896. This group had fewer means of
responding to rising prices (i.e. selling insurance) or the insulation
granted by free accommodation. They were more dependent on
salaries that do appear on balance to have grown more slowly over
time and reached lower levels. Even so compared to contemporaries in
other forms of employment their incomes still grew ahead of inflation.
Moreover, even if they eventually reached a low plateau, this still
compares favourably with coal mining, for example, where pay was
often linked to individual output as well as prices and life-time earnings
tended to peak then began a gradual decline as age affected
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productivity43. Thus, by the standards of the time few staff personally
experienced any relative decline in their living standards, at worst they
did not progress as rapidly as they might otherwise have expected or
hoped for. In light of this conclusion the movement of clerks to the
suburbs and accompanying proliferation of mass produced goods; the
bicycles, bowler hats, home furnishings and numerous journals that
came to prominence in the Edwardian era, appears indicative more of
modest affluence than social desperation at least until the 1900s.
However, this is not to suggest we merely replace an under researched
pessimism with the particularities of a case study based optimism.
Rather this examination of employment has revealed the distinctive life-
earnings curve clerks experienced and the other benefits they received
need to be taken into account in any future assessment of clerical living
standards.
43 See for example A. Slaven "Earnings and Productivity in the Scottish Coal-Mining Industry
during the nineteenth century: The Dixon Enterprises", in P. L. Payne, (ed.), Studies in
Scottish Business History, (London: Frank Cass, 1967); and S. Price, "Rivetters' Earnings in
Clyde Shipbuilding 1889-1913", Scottish Economic and Social History, vol. 1, No. 1, 1981,
pp. 42-65
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Chapter 6: Banking, emigration and empire, 1850 -1914
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified the existence of an increasing
majority of Royal Bank recruits who left on or shortly after completing
an apprenticeship. Establishing why and where they went form the
starting points of this chapter, while the emphasis on the importance of
emigration in existing accounts of Scottish bank employment provides
the beginnings of an answer. More than this, investigating how staff
regarded the locations they moved between offers an important means
of exploring the relationship between employment and the social
identity and values of the subjects of this thesis within the context of a
broader Scottish phenomenon1. Between 1825 and 1938,2,332,608
people, primarily young men, left Scotland to live and work overseas2.
Although possibly a third eventually returned the volume of
emigration remains substantial, while an additional number,
approximately 600,000 from 1840 to 1911, migrated to other parts of
Great Britain. Indeed, Scotland became an emigrant society at the same
time as it became an industrial nation, one where emigration formed an
important element in the labour market and a routine response to
economic change in Great Britain and overseas. Whereas the 1911
census recorded 491,352 males engaged in mining, textiles, metal
manufacture, shipbuilding and engineering in Scotland, in the years
1904-13, when emigration was at its peak, the total outflow of Scots
exceeded 600,000, placing the volume of Scottish emigration relative to
the population a probable second only to Ireland in Europe. Emigration
was ubiquitous. As Morris notes in Scotland "everyone seems to have a
1 S. G. Checkland, op., cit., pp. 491-93; A. W., Kerr (1926), p. 245; and C. W. Munn
(1988A), p. 109
2 For detailed discussions of Scottish emigration see M. W. Flinn et al, Scottish Population
History from the 17th Century to the 1930s, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977);
D. Baines, Migration in a Mature Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985);
M. Anderson and D. Morse, "The People", in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser, (eds.) op. cit.; and
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cousin or an uncle in Canada, Australia or New Zealand"3. Despite the
scale of this phenomenon, with the notable exception of the highland
clearances emigration remains an under-explored yet significant aspect
of recent Scottish economic and social history.
Anderson and Morse note that the effects of emigration on
Scottish culture and consciousness have proved so universal they have
rarely been reflected upon4. Recent research has begun addressing this
omission, in some instances going so far as to place emigration and
empire at the centre of Scottish public life. Finlay depicts a nineteenth
century Scotland that exported a celebrated army of empire builders -
skilled men and professionals - who equipped foreign lands with the
institutions and infrastructure necessary to bring new nations into
being5. The achievements of Scots abroad reflected well on the old
country, providing evidence of national prowess with Scottish success
constituting a distinctive contribution to the empire that validated
claims to equal status in the union. The numerous contemporary
examples of this include a Burns supper in 1906 where John Ure-
Primrose, the owner of a flour mill, ex-Lord Provost of Glasgow and
Chairman of Rangers Football Club, placed emigrants alongside
soldiers, preachers, statesmen, investors and captains of industry in the
pantheon of great Scots6. In this account emigration was an obligation,
a national duty that matched moral purposes with the pursuit of
personal gain.
However, this is emigration as seen almost exclusively from
above. To focus on the public pronouncements of the economic,
political, social and intellectual elite that stayed behind to celebrate
T. Devine, "The Paradox of Scottish Emigration", in T. Devine (ed.), Exploring the Scottish
Past Themes in the History ofScottish Society, (East Lothian: Tuckwell Press, 1995)
3 R. J. Morris, "Introduction: Scotland, 1830-1914. The making of a Nation within a Nation",
in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser, (eds.), op. cit., p. 3
4 M. Anderson and D. Morse, op. cit., p. 23
5 R. J. Finlay, A Partnership for Good? Scottish Politics and the Union Since 1880,
(Edinburgh: John Donald, 1997), pp. 14-35
6 Described in G. Walker, "Varieties of Scottish Protestant Identity", in T. M. Devine and R. J.
Finlay, (eds.), op. cit., p. 263.
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emigration is to ignore the fragmentation of families and emotional
dislocation this same success rested upon. After all emigration required
parents' watch their sons leave behind all that was familiar to them in
exchange for a new life in distant, often dangerous lands. Indeed,
emigration acquired a particular importance for a specific stratum in
Scottish society. This is evident in Careers for our Sons: A Practical
Handbook for Parents written in 1904 by a grammar school master for
"the man who desires to be strictly careful in his expenditure" and was
of that "class" of parents for whom the cost of an university education
was an (unaffordable) extravagance, in other words, what we can
loosely describe as the lower middle class of lesser professionals,
dependent white-collar employees and small business owners7. In
separate chapters the author explained how to prosper in seventeen
separate occupations with trade and skilled manual work noticeably
absent. It is the final chapter on "Colonial Openings", a topic absent
from earlier career guides, that concerns us here8. It presents
emigration as merely one more option, unexceptional, routine and
predictable, for those not attracted to the various other occupations the
author described.
This chapter provides a history from below of emigration and
the associated consciousness of emigration and empire in Late Victorian
and Edwardian Scotland9. The argument advanced is as follows: the
highly stable ILMs operated in Scottish banking were structured in
accordance with the expectation that a majority of recruits would leave
shortly after completing an apprenticeship to take employment
elsewhere. The decision to emigrate was predicated upon a comparison
of prospects in Scotland with those thought to be available elsewhere;
7 G. H. Williams, Careers For Our Sons: A Practical Handbook, (1904), p.3
8 See for example C. B. C. Amicus, Hints on Life and How to Rise in Society, (1845); and
Anon., Guide to Employment in London, 2nd ed., (1889)
9 The classic example of history from below remains the work of E. P. Thompson, (1968) and
"Eighteenth century English society: class struggle without class ?", Social History, 3, 1976;
and more generally H. Kaye, The British Marxist Historians, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984),
pp. 222-232
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what mattered was the relative differential between opportunities at
home and abroad10. Despite the broadly optimistic account of living
standards presented in the previous chapter, it is argued that those who
left were pulled abroad by the prospect of higher salaries and better
promotion prospects, becoming a key component in an international
labour market wherein Scottish banks effectively trained staff for banks
operating elsewhere. The initial clear out of recruits fed back into
employment in Scotland by enhancing the career prospects and living
standards of those who remained. This system became the routine and
was integral to the culture of bank work. Viewed from below it is
argued emigration and empire figured prominently in the emotional
lives and imagination of staff who stayed. Besides celebration, it is
argued that empire and emigration provided a focus for public and
private frustration with structures of social inequality, social
conventions and personal circumstances. Finally, it is suggested the
social origins of emigrants provide a basis for establishing a distinctively
Scottish culture of emigration and empire.
The chapter proceeds by detailing the subsequent employment
of those recruits who left Scottish banking, drawing attention to the
importance of employment in banks outside Scotland. The next section
considers the mechanics of emigration and the international market for
bank labour. The final section uses the cultural framework, which bank
employment provides to consider the consciousness of empire and
emigration, generalising from this to broader perceptions of Scottish
society.
10 For a discussion of the mechanics of emigration see N. Tranter, Population and Society,
1750 - 1940, (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 126-146 and British Population in the Twentieth
Century, (London: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 19-43
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6.2 Emigration and employment
(i) Destinations
The evidence discussed in chapter 5 suggests we can adopt a
broadly optimistic view of clerical living standards during this period. If
this is the case then the question arises why did so many recruits leave
to seek their fortunes elsewhere? Unfortunately, Royal Bank staff
records do not systematically detail what became of those who left to
take employment elsewhere. This has been overcome by using
information on the employment histories of 164 Aberdeen Grammar
School pupils who entered the service of a Scottish bank during the
period 1860 to 1909. This data in conjunction with detailed examples
drawn from the records of the Royal Bank and the Institute of Bankers
in Scotland, allows the post bank careers of those who entered then left
the service of a Scottish bank to be examined in detail and the
significance of emigration to be quantitatively established.
The Aberdeen data is subject to certain qualifications. A fee-
paying grammar school is too exclusive to capture the poor and not
exclusive enough to capture the rich. As agents often used recruitment
as an act of patronage to attract and retain business, it follows that the
social and economic origins of bank staff were a probable influence
upon their subsequent careers. Reassuringly, systematic analyses of the
social origins of bank staff in London and Liverpool generally
supported by available Scottish examples indicate banks drew a
majority of their staff from a narrow band of households headed by
lesser professionals, dependent white-collar employees and small
business owners11. This social grouping when confronted by state and
charitable institutions largely confined to the provision of an
11 M. Savage, "Career mobility and class formation: British banking workers and the lower
middle classes", in A. Miles and D. Vincent (eds.), op. cit., pp. 201-202; and H. McLeod,
"White Collar Values and the Role of Religion", in G. Crossick (ed.), op. cit., table 2.1: Social
origins of men marrying in Anglican churches, p.84
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elementary education was able and often eager to pay for its sons to
attend a grammar school at least for a few years12.
Although a grammar school can be considered broadly
representative its location need not be13. In 1890 teachers in the
Northeast were noticeably better educated than their peers in the rest
of Scotland14, but did they, for instance, provide a better quality of
education? More concretely, and as we would expect, a majority of the
subjects (93) entered the two Aberdeen based banks - the North of
Scotland Bank and the Town and Country Bank. While Checkland
noted every bank recruited more apprentices than it could permanently
employ, Munn suggests the Aberdeen banks made disproportionate
use of this employment strategy15. Thus, an Aberdeen based analysis
may overestimate the number who left Scottish banking. However, this
ensures the detailed analysis of post-bank careers undertaken below is
less sensitive to unique and therefore unrepresentative examples.
Finally, as the entry date to banking of the former pupils
approached 1922, when it appears the Aberdeen Grammar School book
was published (there is no precise publication date), the work life data
becomes increasingly truncated. To minimise the effects of this and the
FirstWorld War only those pupils who entered banking before 1910
were included in the analysis. Given that in a clear majority of cases the
decision to leave Royal Bank was taken within ten years of entering its
service (see figures 5.2 and 5.3 above), the practice of barring staff from
re-entering a bank after they left, the reluctance of the Scottish banks to
employ staff trained by a rival (and we can note here the use of age
restrictions by companies, which employed Scottish bank trained staff),
it would appear that even for the final Aberdeen cohort the decision to
12 J. A. Banks, Prosperity and Parenthood a study offamily planning and the Victorian Middle
Classes, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 189-196
13 For a discussion of how Scotland's four cities differed see R. J. Morris, "Urbanisation and
Scotland", in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser (eds.), op. cit.
14 H. Corr, "An Exploration into Scottish Education", in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser (eds.),
op. cit., p. 296
15 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 491-493; C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 109
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Table 6.1. Last known employment location ofAberdeen Grammar School pupils
who left Scottish banking, 1860-1909 (percentage distribution).
Entry
Period Scotland England Americas
Pacific
Region Africa No.
1860s 6% 29 % 35 % 29 % 0 % 17
1870s 25 " 20 " 10 " 35 " 10 " 20
1880s 35 " 17 " 17 " 13 " 17 " 23
1890s 9 " 39 " 17 " 22 " 13 " 23
1900s 7" 21 " 31 " 38 " 3 " 29
All
leavers 16 " 25 " 22 " 28 " 9 " 112
Table 6.2. Last known employer ofAberdeen Grammar School Pupils who entered
Scottish banking, 1860-1909 (percentage distribution)
Entry Scottish Banks No. of
Period Bank Elsewhere Other Examples
1860s 32% 36% 32% 25
1870s 43 " 29 " 29 " 35
1880s 33 " 25 " 42 " 36
1890s 21 " 35 " 45 " 29
1900s 26 " 46 " 28 " 39
All
entrants 31 " 34 " 35 " 164
leave Scottish banking was permanent and is likely to have been
recorded.
Table 6.1 depicts the last known employment location of the
Aberdeen Grammar School pupils and table 6.2 their last known
geographical location. They illustrate two trends crucial to
understanding employment in Scottish banking: firstly, a clear and
persistent majority (68 per cent of the total) of all those who entered a
bank left during the course of their working lives to take employment
elsewhere (table 6.1), indicating the tenure pattern at Royal Bank
depicted in the previous chapter is broadly representative of Scottish
banking as a whole; and secondly, apart from in the 1880s, a majority of
those who left subsequently emigrated (table 6.2).
199
Leaving a Scottish bank in practice meant leaving Scotland due to
the structure of the economy and structuring of the labour market.
Male employment in Scotland was heavily concentrated in the capital
goods sector of shipbuilding, coal, metals and engineering16. A bank
apprenticeship does not appear to have provided a set of skills
transferable to any of these sectors. Indeed, very few Aberdeen subjects
subsequently worked in manufacturing of any kind. Although Scotland
possessed a vibrant and innovative service sector, of which banking
was an important part, the actual numbers this employed were small
relative to England17. Scottish service providers were leading
participants in the upsurge of professionalisation that affected Late-
Victorian Britain; an Institute of Accountants was established in
Edinburgh in 1853, followed by a Faculty of Actuaries in 1856, while
stockbroking on the regional stock exchanges became an ever more
established and specialised occupation18. Professionalisation established
substantial entry barriers restricting the possibility of horizontal
mobility between the limited number of service sector occupations.
Amongst the minority who left banking but stayed in Scotland
those resources available from family and friends appear to have been
the most important factor influencing their decision. For many parents
a bank apprenticeship was a means to other ends in keeping with the
preference for experience rather than theoretical knowledge as the
essential prerequisite for a business career19. A bank apprenticeship
gave a general business training at a time when colleges and
universities were only beginning to piece together degrees in
16 C. Lee, "Modern Economic Growth and Structural Change in Scotland: the Service Sector
Reconsidered", Scottish Economic and Social History, 3, (1983), pp. 5-35
17 ibid.
18 H. Perkin, (1989). On the development of various professions in Scotland see S. P. Walker,
The Society ofAccountants in Edinburgh 1854-1914: a study of recruitment to a new
profession, (London: garland, 1988); A. R. Davidson, The Faculty ofActuaries in Scotland
1856-1956, (Edinburgh, 1956); and R. Michie, op. cit.
19 On the training of Scottish businessmen see A. Slaven and D. Kim, "The Origins and
Economic and Social Roles of Scottish Business Leaders, 1860-1960", in T. M. Devine, (ed.),
Scottish Elites, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1994)
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commerce. Hence by 1907 the senior partner in a Portobello firm had
placed four of his sons in Royal Bank to be trained, the last entering on
the understanding that he would leave after a year or so to enter his
father's business20. This use of apprenticeships helped solidify the links
between banks and customers and for important enough customers
Royal Bank allowed itself to be drawn deeply into family affairs. At
Dundee a branch accountant remained only as long as a position was
unavailable in his relative's business. When a partner died the
accountant quickly resigned to replace him returning a month later to
borrow from the Bank21. An apprentice without a business to inherit
could still capitalise upon the credit, expertise and connections, which
the networks of family and friends that dominated nineteenth century
commercial life made available, by leaving a bank to establish his own
business22.
The "Other" in table 6.2 is a diverse category that includes a
minister's son who left the Commercial Bank to become a professional
singer in London and the eventual manager of a Zululand launderette.
Time spent in a bank was clearly an opportunity for some to realise
they would rather be doing something else. Their apprenticeship over a
number of former Aberdeen Grammar School pupils entered unrelated
fields including medicine and the arts. For this eclectic group the
opportunities available in London proved particularly appealing. An
apprenticeship gave others a set of general skills and experience that
eased their entry into various service sector occupations, which lacked
professional barriers. A knowledge of book-keeping, for example,
undoubtedly assisted one subject who became a hotel manager, while
working in a Scottish bank gave an eventual editor of the Financial
Times an introduction to finance. Unfortunately the data on the
20 Hunter Square Branch letter book, B561/3/3, Letter dated 9th Apr. 1907
21 RBM 9th and 28th Oct. 1872 and 21st May 1873
22 S. Nenadic, "The Victorian Middle Classes", in W. H. Fraser and I. Mavor, (eds.), op. cit.;
and R. J. Morris, "Introduction", in R. J. Morris and W. H. Fraser, (eds.), op. cit., p. 1
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Aberdeen subjects is not detailed enough to allow any assessment of
how successful they were in their post-bank careers.
Banks operating outside Scotland provided the single most
important source of long-term employment for the Aberdeen subjects.
The recruitment of Scottish trained staff began with the Scottish
invention of joint-stock banking, which quickly attracted admirers and
imitators23. The promoters of English joint-stock banks came in the
1820s to find managers for their new concerns. Similarly in 1825 the
Provincial Bank of Ireland was established using staff recruited from
Scottish banks who took with them and applied their knowledge of
administrative procedures24. This made it possible for the relatively
inexperienced, if possessed of sufficient ability and ambition, to rapidly
reach senior positions. For instance, George Rae left the North of
Scotland Bank aged 22 in 1839 to work in the North and South Wales
Bank as its inspector of branches, then became general manager in
184525. Joint-stock banking subsequently spread throughout the English
speaking world and the number of joint-stock banks operating in the
pacific region increased from 18 in 1853 to 41 in 188326. Scots-trained
bankers figure prominently amongst the early managers of British
multinational banks. For example, R. O. Sawyers completed an
apprenticeship in the British Linen Bank, then worked in the Oriental
Bank at Calcutta, which he left in 1863 to become the Chief Manager of
the National Bank of India, a position shared from 1877 with another
23 E. J. T. Acaster, "Joint Stock Innovation: Joplin, Gilbart and George Pollard", The Three
Banks Review, 126, 1980, pp. 40-41; T. Joplin, "Reform of the Banking System", reproduced
in B. L. Anderson and P. L. Cottrell (eds) op. cit., pp. 223-237
24 C. W. Munn, "The Emergence of Joint-Stock Banking in the British Isles A Comparative
Approach", Business History, 30, (1988B), pp. 73-78; P. Ollerenshaw, Banking in Nineteenth
Century Ireland the Belfast Banks 1825-1914, (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1987), pp. 17-20
25 W. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., pp. 425-435
26 E. Green, "Export Bankers: The Migration of British Bank Personnel to the Pacific Region,
1850-1914", in O. Checkland, S. Nishimura and N. Tamaki, (eds.), Pacific Banking, 1859-
1959 East Meets West, (London: Macmillan, 1994), p.76
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Scot27. In this way emigration made Scottish banking a model for
banking throughout the world.
Once banks were established the demand for Scottish expertise
gave way to a demand for Scottish labour as throughout the empire
and South America the establishment of new concerns gave way to
concentration. Established banks became larger concerns by developing
substantial branch networks as in Australasia and the Indian
Subcontinent where the total number of bank offices grew from 78 in
1860 to 716 in 191328. The continued demand for Scots trained staff
derived from this and the use of discriminatory employment practices.
In general porters, messengers and junior clerks were recruited locally,
while managerial and supervisory positions were reserved for white
emigrants 29. Discrimination rested in part upon the assumed
superiority of white staff. In Cuba, for instance "a proportion of the
native clerks develop very well and are entrusted with the highest
administrative posts", yet still required strict supervision in their work30.
More importantly discriminatory employment practices made
commercial sense. Racist assumptions belonged to customers as well as
banks' whose employment practices were necessarily shaped by these
also. Although "natives" accepted lower salaries than emigrants, a
minute of the Mercantile Bank of India explained "it might be dangerous
and it might affect our business if the impression got abroad that we
were indianizing the Bank"31. It was in the interest of a bank to maintain
its policy of racial discrimination because, as Jones notes "British staff
were proof that these were British banks, safe and honest institutions"32.
27 G. Tyson, 100 Years ofBanking in Asia and Africa, A History ofNational and Grindlays
Bank Ltd., (London: national and Grindlays banks, 1963), p. 21
28 E. Green, (1994), op. cit., p. 79; and G. Jones, op. cit., p. 74
29 For an illuminating account of how the business of colonial banking was conducted with
indigenous populations see C. U. Uche "Foreign banks, Africans, and credit in colonial Nigeria,
c. 1890 - 1912", Economic History Review, LII, (1999), pp. 669 - 691
30 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1920, pp. 254-256
31 Quoted in ibid., p. 220
32 G. Jones, op. cit., 218-222
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The demand for labour from North America was less focused
and derived from the rate of economic development and accompanying
growth of economic institutions outstripping the ability of the local
population to supply appropriate labour. The rapid growth of the
Canadian economy in particular, opened up by the Canadian Pacific
Railway in 1886 then driven by a wheat boom in the 1890s, led to record
levels of recruitment by Canadian banks. These even began recruiting
directly from Scottish schools and in the 1900s eleven Aberdeen
Grammar School boys went straight from school into a Canadian bank.
Of this eleven, seven entered the Canadian Bank of Commerce, more
than all five of the Edinburgh based Scottish banks recruited in the same
period and by 1912 it was estimated two-thirds of all bank staff in
Canada were Scottish33.
Therefore, while a high rate of emigration was a constant feature
of Scottish bank employment, different locations moved in and out of
focus. Once established English banks gradually switched to locally
recruited staff. Australian bank staff subsequently erected a barrier
against further emigration in the 1860s when they let it be known they
were opposed to the recruitment of emigrants to all but the most senior
positions34. But, as one destination closed off the worldwide expansion
of joint-stock banking saw others open up. This, plus the use of
discriminatory employment practices, ensured that there was always a
bank somewhere willing to recruit Scots-trained staff. The following
section sets out the economics of why staff left Scotland to work
overseas then details the factors that facilitated this movement.
(ii) The market for Scottish bank staff
The prospect of greater financial rewards pulled staff abroad.
Royal Bank staff were neither obliged nor forced to leave, at least not
33 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1912, p.36
34 S. J. Butlin, Australia and New Zealand Bank, (London: Longmans, 1961), p. 227
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until the 1911 edition of the branch rule book stated "it should be clearly
understood that the engagement of apprentices terminates at the end of
three years' service, and that they have no further claim upon the
Bank"35. However, they were not expected to stay either. Rather a
proliferation of adverts, journals and contacts encouraged staff to leave
by detailing the higher salaries and enhanced promotion prospects
available overseas. At the same time a subtle selection process took
place; agents and senior officials advised staff on what their likely
prospects would be if they stayed in Scotland, nudging some towards
the door and others towards remaining with the Bank. An increasing
number heeded this advice and emigrated in ever-larger numbers,
becoming key participants in an expanding and shifting international
market that for much of the Edwardian period favoured labour over
employers. So much so that to hold onto staff otherwise intent on using
a position in a bank overseas as a stepping stone to other employment
(the "Other" category in table 6.2 above includes eleven subjects who
left Scotland and worked in banks overseas before beginning their last
known occupation), the Bank of Toronto paid its Scottish recruits travel
costs plus expenses on the condition they agreed to remain in its service
for at least two years36.
Savage notes that from childhood English bank staff were
acutely sensitive to their promotion prospects and were placed in a
bank by parents who expected them to reach a managerial position37.
The sentiment is applicable to Scotland where banking was regarded as
an "open career" and no apprentice began "without the possibility of
being a manager part of his calculations"38. But it is subject to the
qualification that promotion need not occur in a Scottish bank. In this
35 RB 269, Instructions to the agents and accountants of the branches of the Royal Bank of
Scotland, p.3
36 IOB letter bk. 5 letter dated 22nd Sept. 1911
37 To apply to Scotland (and increasingly England) Savage's claim that the parents of
apprentices were happy to place their sons in a bank in the belief that they would eventually
earn promotion to a managerial position requires the qualification this need not necessarily take
place in the bank they originally entered. M. Savage, (1993), p. 205
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respect the optimistic account of promotion given in the previous
chapter is deceptive. Although the probability of being promoted
improved, this required the initial clear out of recruits before it became
realistic. More relevant here is the slow down in the rate of promotion,
which left staff having to wait longer before reaching their goal and in
the meantime encouraged them to look elsewhere for advancement.
Pay was the other aspect of employment that influenced the
decision to emigrate. Compared to their counterparts elsewhere (with
the notable exception of Ireland) Scottish bank staff were poorly paid.
Chapter 4 described how in the 1850s the Cashier and board of Royal
Bank accepted that junior salaries were low enough to encourage staff
to seek employment elsewhere. Thereafter, Scottish banking as a whole
self-consciously acquired a reputation for low salaries. In an 1880 speech
the Bank of Scotland Treasurer earned the laughter of his audience
when he explained "it was difficult to see how labour could be
cheapened except by the employment of women"39. Little changed and
decades later the General Manager of Midland Bank on a visit to
Scotland in 1920 expressed his amazement at what bank staff were paid,
warning that unless salaries were increased staff would flock to join the
then recently formed bank trade union40. Such comments were well
justified. In the 1900s after fifteen to twenty years Royal Bank staff
earned approximately £120 p.a. (see table 5.4 above), £15 to £20 less
than their English bank counterparts41. Salaries were even higher
further afield. In 1911 the Bank of Toronto offered those aged between
18 and 25 a £120 starting salary, a £20 annual increment and various
living allowances worth up to £60 a year, while the Bank of British
North America went one better offering recruits £140 plus allowances42.
38 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1886, p. 239
39 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1880, p. 42.
40 The comments of the Midland Bank general manager are detailed in Lab 2/646/5, 7th Jun.
1920. See also the article on bank employment in the Glasgow Herald, 11th Aug. 1914
41 For a brief survey of salaries in English banking c. 1880-1906 see M. Savage, op. cit.
42 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1913, p. 197 and IOB letter Bk. 5, letter dated 22nd Sep. 1911
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South African bank salaries were higher still beginning at £200, while
banks operating in the Far East paid £300 to £3,000 p.a.43.
In what became an ever more sophisticated international market
for bank labour, activities associated with the Institute of Bankers in
Scotland firmly connected low pay and limited prospects in Scotland
with emigration in the minds of managers and men. Successive
Secretaries of the Institute claimed that the professional qualifications it
awarded were an aid in seeking posts overseas44. For some this was
undoubtedly true, but as we shall see in the next chapter, until the 1890s
the Institute attracted few candidates and most of these were mature
men more concerned with furthering their careers in Scotland than
overseas. Moreover, the importance banks, which operating elsewhere
attached to professional qualifications varied. In the British
multinational banks more weight tended to be placed on character than
exam results, and if anything managers were suspicious of applicants
willing to spend their spare time studying45. Rather, the Institute's
primary contribution to emigration was the publicity it gave to the
benefits of careers outside Scotland and the abundant information it
provided. The general managers who served as presidents of the
Institute used the (published) speeches they gave at its annual general
meetings to depict Scottish banking as a training ground for banks all
over the world and encouraged the ambitious and the adventurous (if
frustrated at their prospects in Scotland) to look elsewhere for
advancement46. Those candidates who took the Institute's exams
answered questions designed "to bring out the general knowledge of
candidates as to banking beyond the kingdom"47. Helping them revise
was an accumulation of adverts, atlases and books received on banking
43 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1914, pp. 256-257 and 1915, pp. 187-191
44 A. W. Kerr (1926), p. 245
45 G. Jones, op. cit., p. 171
46 The earliest example of this in a Presidential address is the speech by J. S. Fleming
subsequently published as Scottish Banking a historical sketch, (Edinburgh 1877). See also the
presidential speeches recorded in the 1885, 1889, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1897, 1899 and 1900
Annual Reports of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland
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and life overseas laid out on the table of the Institute's Edinburgh
rooms and circulated throughout its regional libraries. Finally, from
1909 the Institute began publishing the Scottish Bankers' Magazine, which
supplemented this information with regular articles on the banking
systems of different countries48. Each made clear whether British staff
were used or wanted and, if so, gave additional information on living
conditions and career prospects.
At a remove from the Institute senior officials played a quietly
active role in the mechanics of emigration. Customers and foreign
banks in search of staff often approached the banks. On these occasions
the general managers sounded out possible recruits - staff described by
the Royal Bank London manager between the wars as "average good
men"49. No great loss to Scottish banking, they were unlikely to cause
embarrassment either as senior officials used this action to sustain and
improve links with important customers. Ideally the staff selected
already held senior clerical positions, but, judged incapable of anything
more responsible, were unlikely to progress further. In this way
customers gained experienced staff who, attracted by the higher salaries
and enhanced promotion prospects on offer, left behind promoted
posts to be filled by younger, cheaper clerks.
Within a system where movement between banks was
ultimately decided by the written opinions of general managers and
senior officials, staff used their own initiative and resources to find other
employment. Beneath the general managers lay a shifting pool of
senior officials known to know about other banks. Staff seeking advice
on how to gain a position in banks overseas regularly approached such
individuals who included a Union Bank Superintendent of Branches
47 IOB letter bk. 4, letter dated 9th Jul. 1902
48 See for example the articles on banking in South Africa, Canada, Tasmania, the West Indies,
Egypt and Argentina published in Scottish Bankers Magazine between 1909 and 1912
49 IOB letter bk. 4, letter dated 24th Nov. 1902 and RB 94/5, letter no. 6763 dated 1st Feb.
1929
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who had a reputation as being an expert on South Africa50. The 'friends
and relatives effect' was also significant. In formal terms this involved
previous migrants from the origin region in the destination region
facilitating emigration by lowering travel and accommodation costs,
providing information on employment opportunities, smoothing the
process of adjustment and generally reducing uncertainty51. Hence, on
learning that one of his favourite clerks was leaving for Canada a Royal
Bank agent gave him a letter of introduction to a Canadian Minister and
encouraged him to attend church by explaining there was "no better
way of making friends, as well as a way of making yourself useful"52.
The agent introduced the clerk to a ready-made infrastructure of
familiar institutions including Burns clubs and St Andrews' Societies as
well as religious institutions ready to receive new arrivals and ease their
transition to a new culture.
The international market for bank staff gradually acquired more
bureaucratic features in keeping with developments in the wider British
labour market in order to accommodate the growing volume of
emigration53. Helping staff decide in the 1900s was a constant stream of
advice and information published in banking magazines on how to gain
a position in a bank overseas alongside adverts placed by foreign banks
for staff wanted. The Secretary of the Institute became a recruiting
agent for the Bank of Toronto after being regularly asked for advice by
clerks seeking a position overseas. In competition with other recruiting
agents the Secretary advertised for staff, distributed information on
Canadian working conditions, gathered references and co-ordinated the
travel arrangements of successful applicants54. The London Institute of
50 IOB letter bk. no. 4, letter dated 5th Nov. 1901
51 G. R Boyer and T. J. Hatton, "Migration and labour market integration in late nineteenth-
century England and Wales", Economic History Review, L, (1997), pp. 697-734
52 B561/3/9, letter dated 24th Mar. 1913
53 For a recent discussion of changes in the labour market and labour market behaviour in
Edwardian Britain see D. Vincent, "Mobility, bureaucracy and careers in early-twentieth-century
Britain", in A. Miles and D. Vincent, (eds.), op. cit.
54 For example during a few weeks in 1913 the Secretary sent 16 youths out to Canada. IOB
letter bk. 6, letter dated 23rd Jul. 1913
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Bankers avoided such direct involvement, but published a guide on
how to gain a position in banking overseas, reflecting the apparent
spread of the "Scottish" approach to staffing to England55. Green
identifies large contingents of bank staff leaving London, Liverpool and
Manchester to work overseas in the late-Victorian era, and has shown
that of the 673 staff who entered the London based City Bank from
1855 to 1898, 252 resigned before they retired of which 77 (31 per cent)
found employment in banks overseas56. English emigration made for a
more competitive labour market and in a move that made his staff
more appealing to other employers, the Chairman of the Midland Bank
introduced language courses and exams in 190757. When these proved
too popular - 200 staff applied for the 80 available places in 1911 - the
chairman persuaded the London Institute of Bankers to introduce
special language courses58.
No Scottish bank so overtly equipped its staff to leave, but they
had less reason to do so. Scotland had already established a reputation
for providing good staff: it was the birthplace of joint-stock banking;
the Institute of Bankers in Scotland was the first permanent professional
association of bankers in the world; and the broad training, which
apprentices received was widely respected. The retention of the note
issue also made Scottish staff uniquely appealing to other note issuing
banks, particularly in South America59. Although the Scottish Institute
did offer papers in French and German, this was more a status-driven
desire to provide a liberal education than a means of facilitating
emigration. Thus, when offered funds by a South American bank
hoping to encourage interest in Portuguese by establishing an annual
55 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1914, pp. 256-257
56 E. Green, (1994), pp. 80-81 and (1979), pp. 79-80
57 E. Green, (1979), pp. 89-90
58 ibid., p.93
59 D. Joslin, A Century ofBanking in Latin America, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1963), pp. 22-23.
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Portuguese essay competition, the Secretary of the Institute politely
refused what he regarded as an unwanted and unsightly precedent60.
6.3 The consciousness of empire and emigration
(i) The personal
This section moves from discussing the economics and mechanics
of emigration to consider the cultural consequences of emigration and
empire and its significant presence in the emotional lives of Scots. The
importance of empire registered widely in Scotland, perhaps most of all
in Glasgow where the sculpting of Queen Victoria surrounded by
figures representing the countries that made up the empire above the
entrance to the city chambers symbolised the importance of the city's
imperial interests. Empire provided Scotland's export oriented staple
industries with raw materials and customers and furnished investors
with a growing range of profitable opportunities. Scottish capitalists
invented investment trusts in 1873 to facilitate investment overseas and
during the Edwardian period invested more per head than any other
part of Britain61. Scottish companies also shared in the governance of
the empire's economic life, for instance, the Glasgow merchant house
James Findlay and Co. added regular directorships of the National Bank
of India to its already substantial foreign interests in 189562. Emigration
flowed through these links. While grand symbols articulated the public
consciousness of empire, emigration lent it an acutely personal
dimension, sufficient to render abstract events recorded in share prices,
company accounts and newspapers, knowable as subjects of intimate
and immediate concern to a wider audience than merchants,
manufacturers, investors and politicians.
60 IOB letter bk. no. 7, letter dated 19th Oct. 1920
61 For discussions of Scottish and British overseas trade and investment see G. Jackson and C.
W. Munn, "Trade, Commerce and Finance", in W. H. Fraser and I. Mavor, (eds.), op. cit.; C.
Schmitz "The nature and dimensions of Scottish foreign investment, 1860-1914, Business
History, 39, (1997), pp. 42-68; and M. Edelstein, "Foreign investment and accumulation,
1860-1914", in R. Floud and D. McCloskey, (eds.), op. cit.
62 G. Tyson, op. cit., p. 101
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Empire formed a recurring element in the culture of bank work
as emigration achieved the status of a near daily routine. To the
members of the Scottish Bankers Literary and Debating Society in the
1860s and 1870s the annexation by Great Britain of barbarous
territories, Chinese emigration to the colonies and British foreign policy
in general, were subjects worthy of debate on a par with banking,
political and cultural topics63. Once the Institute was established in 1875
the debating society faded away leaving a void, which Royal Bank staff
filled in 1895 with the Royal Bank Magazine. Less didactic than the
debating society the magazine partially overcame the anonymity of
working in a substantial and geographically dispersed organisation by
listing the movement of staff within and from the bank, allowing the
movement of friends and colleagues to be charted. One contributor
discussed what he described as an exodus of apprentices to the colonies,
while another noted "there would seem to be some strong fascination in
Allahabad, India for Haddington Royal bank people"64. The magazine
appropriately ceased publication when its editor left to work in the
Bank of Africa at Capetown. Witnessing such departures joined poor
health, marriage, and the death of relatives as predictable and
acceptable reasons for time off work. This same routine was
periodically interrupted by visits from "old R.B. friends in furrin parts"
including David Paterson who left the Glasgow Duke Street branch to
manage a Queensland National Bank branch at Thargomindah in the
1890s, then returned to Scotland on home leave in 1895 to visit his
former colleagues65. That emigration was intrinsic to the psyche of staff
is indicated by an eyewitness account of a Scottish accountant's office in
the 1900s, another occupation that exported a substantial number of its
practitioners66. Instead of golf, girls and football the conversation of
trainee accountants was dominated by discussions of which foreign
63 IOB 4/3/4, Scottish Bankers Literary Association Minute Book
64 RB 147, Royal Bank Magazine, 1895, p.5 and p. 31
65 ibid., p. 3 and p. 99
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destination offered the best career prospects. The questions asked
concerned when to emigrate and where to, not whether to emigrate at
ah.
This consciousness of emigration, readily understandable given
its routine importance to bank employment as well as the personal links
it created, adds an intimate dimension that modifies Price's
predominantly structural account of clerks and the politics of jingoism67.
We can explore this using the correspondence of William Baird,
Clydesdale Bank Agent and Secretary of the Institute of Bankers in
Scotland from 1897 to 1917. Baird does not necessarily deserve the
pejorative title jingo, although the letter he wrote to a South African
correspondent expressing personal concerns for the health of his
beloved Queen exemplifies an apparent adherence to the presumed
beliefs and values of his social superiors in keeping with Price's
findings68. Another letter discussing the Boers is more revealing: "They
will I hope soon realise the benefits of a wholesome British authority
and learn submission"69. Elsewhere Baird described Scottish emigrants
as "leading in the van of civilisation". Price describes such assertions of
national supremacy as an irrational response to economic, social and
cultural attacks upon clerical claims to respectability70. Yet Baird was
also the father of a then recent emigrant to South Africa, which he
regarded as a dangerous place to work, while another of his sons lived
in Canada71. Acknowledging such parental responsibilities and
associated concerns gently subverts Price's account of jingoism. Support
for the empire may have allowed a sense of 'belonging' to a code of
elite values emphasising selfless duty, sacrifice and individual
achievement. But, it was also a means of preserving a system that
66 S. Walker, op. cit., pp. 47-48
67 R. Price, "Society, Status and Jingoism: The Social Roots of Lower Middle Class
Patriotism, 1870-1900", in G. Crossick (ed.)
68 IOB letter book 4, letter dated 22nd Jan. 1901
69 ibid., letters dated 8th Jun. 1901 and 14th Feb. 1903
70 On clerical/lower middle class concerns over respectability see also A. Mayer, op. cit.
71 IOB letter book 4, letters dated 24th Nov. 1902 and 14th Feb. 1903
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seemingly allowed these to flourish and an attempt at defending the
tangible interests, even lives of friends and family gone overseas as well
as the prospects of those yet to leave.
Between youthful ambition and parental concerns emigration
made possible other, imaginary lives. A Royal Bank agent in Edinburgh
was an avid traveller and eager participant in the nineteenth century
commercialisation of foreign travel, using his allotted time off to
holiday in Europe and North America every few years72. The
correspondence he maintained with former clerks working overseas
provided a pleasantly distracting opportunity to reminisce about his
own travels73. For others this emotional engagement assumed a more
structured form, becoming what Vincent describes in a discussion of the
1902 Education Act as shadow careers74. The 1902 Act gave unsettling
glimpses of alternative lives exemplified by the miner who as a youth
wanted to attend university then enter the church until financial
constraints intervened. These ambitions became youthful frustrations
carried into and vividly remembered in old age. Emigration similarly
provoked shadow careers. Here is how Robert Service described his
resignation from a Glasgow branch of the Commercial Bank of
Scotland:
"I entered the Manager's room with meek serenity. "I want to give in my
resignation." He looked at me in amazement - "Resign! What are you going
to do?" "I'm going cattle ranching in Canada." Further amazement then
"Well, I suppose you know your own business best." I wondered if I did.
Suddenly it was borne on me that I was doing something incredibly foolish,
but it was too late to draw back. I then thought of my fellow-clerks, their
pallor and grey hairs, and all waiting for their pension. When they gained
it they would be ready to die. They often did poor souls. I said "I want to
live an open-air life." "Humph," he replied "I suppose you know the bank
72 On the commercialisation of holiday making in the nineteenth century see F. M. L.
Thompson, op. cit., pp. 260-263; See for example B561/3/9, letter dated 12th Jul. 1902.
73 See for example B561/3/9, letter dated 5th Feb. 1903
74 D. Vincent, op. cit., pp. 223-224
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offers you a safe and permanent position. You may even rise to be a Manager
like myself. I also suppose you know that if you serve another forty years
you may retire on a pension." "I quite appreciate that I said " but I want a
free life. I've always been interested in horses and cattle." He stared out of
the window - after a little he turned to me, "Well you know best. I only wish
I had your years, then by Goad, my lad, I'd go along wi'ye."75
Setting aside the author's desire to establish the uniqueness of his
actions, it is the regretful tone of the manager's (agent's) final response
that is significant, the wistful awareness of what might have been
implicitly contrasted with the drab grayness of what he had become.
(ii) Scottish society, emigration and the empire
The contested history of the Highland Clearances provides
ample evidence of how emigration has provoked critiques of Scottish
society ranging from the pointedly political to a simmering resentment
towards landowners and the Scottish aristocracy76. By contrast the
celebration of the Scot abroad offered a psychological palliative and lent
a certain glamour and pride to a mass process of emotional dislocation
and social disruption. The cultural imaginaries of emigration and empire
in Edwardian Scotland connect this personal experience to public
understanding. By cultural imaginaries I mean the networks of inter¬
linked themes, images and discourses that provide ways of seeing and
making sense of the social77. The imaginary imbued social relations with
meaning independently of any particular individual. Those of
emigration and empire; the combination of celebration and consolation,
presented, for example, in virtually every speech given at the AGMs of
the Institute of Bankers' in Scotland, on closer inspection proves to be
75 Quoted in R. N. Forbes, "The Poetry of Banking", The Three Banks Review, December
1974, no. 124
76 For critical accounts of the Scottish clearances and emigration see A. MacKenzie, The
History ofthe Highland Clearances, (1883); N. MacLeod, GloomyMemories in the Highlands
ofScotland, (1892?); and T. Johnston, History of the Working Classes in Scotland, (1922)
77 For a discussion of cultural imaginaries see G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes British Adventure,
Empire and the Imagining ofMasculinities, (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 48-52; and P.
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open to other critical meanings. This section examines how in contrast
with other cultures, particularly the North American, the cultural
imaginaries of empire and emigration supported perceptions of
Scotland as an unequal society. The particular social origins of those
who espoused this gave it much of its force, and I suggest, provide a
basis for constructing a distinctively Scottish understanding of empire
and emigration,
Canada possessed a uniquely important place in the Scottish
imagination. The Canada the correspondents of the Scottish Bankers
Magazine described was an elemental land where it was possible to lead
a good outdoors life with high salaries the reward for work as hard as
the winters78. The rawness of Canada had an obvious appeal to youths
stuck behind the heavy counters of a Scottish bank and was closely
associated with "the new". By 1909 correspondents were describing
how Canadian banks possessed lady typists, adding machines, desk
telephones and filing cabinets, labour saving novelties rarely seen in
Scotland. New technology supported practices then considered
inappropriate in Scotland including advertising and savings accounts.
This greater receptivity to innovation stopped, then reversed the flow
of information and expertise between Scotland and North America and
between the wars Scottish bankers travelled to the United States in
search of new ideas.
Thus the distinction between the old country and the new
gradually acquired other less sentimental meanings with the old
increasingly understood to mean no more than that. More critically the
Canada of the Scottish imagination lacked the traditional inequalities as
well as the traditions of the old country. A point regularly made was
that in Canada promotion was a reward given to the able and the
Joyce, Democratic subjects The selfand the social in nineteenth-century England, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 4-6
78 On banking in Canada see articles published in the Scottish Bankers Magazine 1910, p. 99,
1912, p. 4, 1920, p. 130, 1933, p. 277 and 1935, p. 194
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hardworking79. By implication these attributes were an insufficient
guarantee of success in Scotland, while if the United States - the most
common destination for Scottish emigrants - was a land of boundless
opportunity, what was Scotland?
In banking one answer was provided by the constant criticism of
nepotism, patronage and favouritism understood as "influence".
Whereas the sceptical merely emphasised the importance of luck in
getting on, Andrew Kerr - described by friends as possessing a deeply
felt abhorrence of wire-pulling - sustained a wide ranging critique of
influence in all its forms80. Using the lectures, textbooks and articles he
produced for the Institute of Bankers in Scotland and public
consumption Kerr detailed the varieties of influence and its insidious
effects upon staff morale and the business of banking81. In these he
linked the limitations of Scottish bank employment to emigration:
"the Scottish field is but a poor training school. No doubt successful bankers
from all quarters of the habitable (and uninhabitable) globe hail from
Scotland. But it was as clerks they left their native land; they learned to be
bankers elsewhere. The Scottish banks are good nurseries of the raw
material; but they do not manufacture bankers in any considerable
quantity."82
Others joined in the critique, linking inequality in banking to broader
social patterns. One magazine article declared that in banking:
"it is sufficient to point out that hereditary managerships, pocket
secretaryships, and other family preserves, are as carefully cultivated as
any nobleman's shootings in Arran or the neighbouring isles"83.
Then in 1904, the anonymous Moneta scandalised Edinburgh's bankers
by describing how a general manager of the National Bank earned his
79 For an early example of this see the article reproduced in the North British Economist, 1891,
p. 253 which explicitly linked Canada to promotion on the basis of merit.
80 Scottish Bankers Magazine 1935, pp. 309-311,
81 See his various essays on banking, published as A. W. Kerr, (ed.) Scottish Banking During
the Period ofPublished Accounts 1865-1896, (London: A. and C. Black Ltd., 1898),
82 A. W. Kerr, "Arrangements and Functions", in A. W. Kerr, (ed.), op. cit., p. 127
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position using social graces to win the favour of the Treasurer of Bank
of Scotland and his National Bank director brother: "he always dressed
in the pink of fashion.... He went along the line of least resistance .... He
was courtly and deferential: he knew whom to cultivate and whom to
avoid"84. By discussing this gossip in public Moneta ensured that all staff
knew at least one prominent banker whose success could be considered
due more to who than what he knew. Moneta and others ensured the
critique of influence became part of how staff understood their position
and prospects.
However, social inequality affords too narrow a perspective.
Imagining barbarous countries was also a means of vicariously living
the imperial ideal of a vigorous, virile and independently achieving
masculinity. After the success achieved by the American James
Cooper's The Last of the Mohicans, more literary accounts of frontier life
were swamped during the tremendous commercial expansion of the
1880s and 1890s by adventure stories for which the wild west and the
empire were recurring locations85. Cowboys and Indians and millions
of toy soldiers modelled on imperial regiments marched into the public
imagination, heightening the cultural presence of empire and the
Americas in Britain. This mass produced culture shared as it shaped the
imperial masculine ideal, yet remained susceptible to other meanings.
What some projected as imperial-testing grounds provided imaginary
playgrounds for Scotland's youth where the masculine was present to
be sure, but subordinate to the adolescent pursuit of pleasure. In this
context the autobiography of Robert Service, his actions and the
manager's response (see above), is evidence of a vague dissatisfaction
with prevailing social conventions and conditions with emigration
serving as a means of accessing more adventurous ways of living than
83 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1881, p. 232. See also the letter sent to the North
British Economist, no. 105, 1887, which emphasised how favour not merit was a key factor in
promotion decisions.
84 Moneta, Scottish Banks and Bankers, (Edinburgh, 1904), pp. 41-42
85 ibid., p. 42
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were possible in Scotland. This is evident in the popular novels ofWilkie
Collins, wherein imagined other countries were linked to moral attacks
on prevailing social norms86. In The New Magdalene (1873) a former
prostitute unable to put her past behind her after marrying a clergyman
due to social prejudice, finally leaves to start a new life in Canada.
Similarly, Fallen Leaves (1879) uses a Utopian community in the United
States - based on the New England Onedia communities - as another
setting in which to question Victorian morality. Thus, the cultural
imaginaries of North America and empire sustained ideals of personal
freedom thought unobtainable in Britain.
However, both the celebration and critique of empire
necessitated a certain selectivity about the character of emigrants and
their motives. Emigration and empire were also means of disposing of
the incapable, the criminal and, in an era of tuberculosis, the unhealthy
advised to move to warmer climes for the sake of their weak chests87.
These were all long-standing and recurring factors in banking, for
instance, George Kinnear resurfaced in Australia as the Sydney
manager of the Australia and New Zealand Bank after the Edinburgh
private bank Kinnear, Smith and Co. failed in 183488. On a smaller scale
a Royal Bank agent at Monifeith later arranged a £500 overdraft to
assist a long-standing customer whose daughter was forced to emigrate
to Australia after her bank clerk husband was caught stealing £1389. The
language used to describe such incidents; the son-in-law did not steal he
misappropriated, constructed a polite silence around enforced
emigrations, as did the practice of asking staff to resign to avoid the
ignominy of dismissal. There were exceptions to be sure. Scottish
accountancy journals depicted emigration as an option for the second
rate and Walker has shown before 1910 that those who fared poorly in
86 A. Gasson, Wilkie Collins An Illustrated Guide, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998),
pp. 59-60
87 J. Harris, op. cit., p.5
88 S. J. Butlin, Australia and New Zealand Bank, (London: Longmans, 1961); p.30;
S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p.350
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their exams or lacked capital or connections were the most likely
members of the Edinburgh accountants' association to emigrate90. But
in general competing accounts of emigration were left free to account
for the absence of the unproductive and undesirable in ways compatible
with their own logic, whether this entailed celebration or critique.
The shared trajectories of the Scottish and English institutions
that promulgated positive notions of empire questions the salience of
any national distinctions. For instance, the Scottish Boys Brigade,
although closely linked to the Church of Scotland, shared in the Boy
Scouts' militaristic fascination with empire. But when the National Review
in 1907 described emigration as tarnished due to its association with
transportation and empire as a dumping ground for public school
wastrels, the cultural references used were less keenly felt in Scotland
than in England91. However, these distinctions had already begun to
give way towards the end of the nineteenth century in favour of a
British wide celebration underpinned by the growth in the volume of
emigration. The latter was due in part to other employers adopting an
approach to employment comparable to that of the Scottish banks' for
what we can assume were similar reasons. Thus, from the 1890s the
growing numbers of Aberdeen Grammar School pupils who entered
insurance pursued migratory careers indistinguishable from their
banking peers. At the same time the professional and social status of
emigrants also improved. Entrants to the Edinburgh accountancy
association from 1910 to 1914 who subsequently emigrated were as
likely to have passed their exams as they were to have failed and by the
1920s emigration was regarded as an option only the most able should
consider. As this transition took place empire attained a prominent
position in public life with Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee in 1897 a
notable turning point at a time when the monarchy itself achieved a
89 B555/6/1, letters dated 7th & 11th Aug. 1914
90 S. Walker, op. cit., pp. 45-48
91 Quoted in S. Walker, op. cit., p. 45
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grand and popular appeal92. The jubilee was an imperial occasion for an
imperial queen attended by colonial premiers and troops, a spectacle
that prompted the political commentator Henry Norman to write
"We are imperialists first, and Liberals or Tories afterwards. I said this, for
my own part, years ago, when the sentiment was not quite so popular"93.
Imperial service became a British ideal and the (male) youth of Britain
were advised "Greater Britain beyond the seas needs a share of the best
of our sons and offers them vast and splendid opportunities"94. As
confirmation of the respectability empire achieved, in Joseph Conrad it
acquired a literary critic whose short stories transformed the civilising
mission into a grotesque pursuit of profit95.
Empire became a national event. In England the particular
association between a social elite, empire and emigration achieved near
hegemonic status. Agencies such as the Public School Emigration
League were expressly formed to raise the status of emigration and
help change emigrants from public school wastrels to public school
heroes. This and the export of the public school ethos complete with
rugby and cricket produced cultural affinities between England and the
empire less resonant in Scotland because the public schools themselves
were less significant96. This is not to say Scotland was entirely
unaffected. As well as the modest number of Scottish schools
established along public school lines, the English public schools formed
a national system and drew pupils from all over Britain97. Yet it is
possible to write a social history of Scottish education without
92 D. Cannadine, "The Context Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and
the 'Invention of Tradition', c. 1820-1977", in E. J. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, (eds.), The
Invention ofTradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983)
93 Quoted in the introduction to J. Conrad, Heart ofDarkness and Other Tales, edited with an
introduction by C. Watts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. viii
94 G. H. Williams, op. cit., p. 193
95 For example "An outpost of progress" first published in Cosmopolis in June and July 1897
96 J. Nauright, "Colonial Manhood and Imperial Race Virility: British Responses to Post-Boer
War Colonial Rugby Tours", in J. Nauright and T. J. L Chandler, (eds.), Making Men Rugby
andMasculine Identity, (London: Frank Cass, 1996)
97 E. Royle, Modern Britain A Social History 1750-1985, (London: Edward Arnold, 1987),
p.361
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mentioning these elite institutions at all, something unthinkable for
Britain as a whole, indicating sufficient space was left for other groups
to shape the meaning of emigration and empire98.
It is here that we can identify a distinctively Scottish
consciousness of emigration and empire. McCrone identifies the social
strata of skilled artisans and lower middle class as the main makers and
sustainers of myths of 'Scottishness'99. But, I have argued above that the
meaning of emigration examined here; the "getting on by getting out"
McCrone suggests substantiated a belief in Scottish egalitarianism,
possessed distinctively critical features. Scots may have perceived
themselves as egalitarian, but the Scotland many left behind was
regarded as a cold, conservative place, where influence rather than
ability was the key to success.
The social difference between Scots and English emigrants
subsequently became apparent in the rarefied atmosphere of
multinational banking100. Drawing on his experience of working in the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank before the FirstWorld War P. G.
Wodehouse described in Psmith in the City how:
"Most of the men in the bank, with the exception of certain hard-headed
Scotch youths drafted in from other establishments in the City, were old
public school men"101.
In this dichotomy of public school or Scotch, the exoticness of being
Scottish politely masked lesser social origins. The behaviour of the
archetypal 'Scotch' was also distinctive. Hard headedness, or what
another eyewitness described as toughness, signals an obvious vigour
in contrast with the effortless superiority public schools produced102.
Another facet of the Scottish self-image was a tendency to retain a
98 See for example H. Con, op. cit.
99 D. McCrone, Understanding Scotland: The Sociology ofa Stateless Nation, (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1992), pp. 118-120
100 G. Jones, op. cit., pp. 170-172
101 Quoted in C. Cook, "The Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation on Lombard
Street", in F. H. King, (ed.), Eastern Banking Essays in the History of The Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation, (London: The Atholone Press, 1983), pp. 199-200
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modest silence. Thus, when discussing the promotion of a clerk to a
post that involved interviewing foreign bankers the London manager
of Royal Bank explained: "like many of our countrymen, is a little
diffident when he meets people"103. Alternatively diffidence was the
response of individuals who found themselves working as equals
alongside those they had been brought up to treat with deference.
In the parlance of the public school these traits marked Scottish
staff out as players rather than gentlemen. The distinction mattered
because the culture of multinational banking was dominated by public
school sensibilities104. Despite frequently reaching the highest levels,
Scottish staff remained social interlopers subject to values formed by
socially superior others105. The common response was to conform; to
learn, for example, that a black coat and white trousers was suitable
evening attire in Bombay whereas a white coat and black trousers
should be worn in Calcutta and all points east106. By playing the part
expected of them in team games and office pranks including, for
example, the Porridge Trap, which was specifically devised to test
Scottish recruits, the successful achieved the status of honorary
gentleman who wore tartan instead of old school ties.
Yet regardless of their precise social origins Scottish bank staff
pursued social mobility via emigration on terms indistinguishable from
their English counterparts. The ruggedness of Canada had a certain
charm, but banks operating in India, China, Hong Kong, South Africa
and South America proved consistently more appealing and absorbed
more emigre bankers than any other single location (see table 6.5
above)107. Besides higher salaries these destinations catered to a
particular form of social opportunism. The Scottish Bankers Magazine
102 C. E. King, "The First Trip East - P&O Via Suez", in F. H. King, op. cit., p. 210
103 RB 94/5, letter no. 6733, dated 1st Jan. 1929
104 C. Cook, op. cit., p. 198
105 On the social background of English bankers and bank directors see Y. Cassis, (1994)
106 The etiquette of working in multinational banking is described in C. E. King, op. cit.
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correspondent working in India who described how every evening he
attended a country club where he met judges, engineers and other
professionals for dinner, bridge, tennis and gossip, depicted a social life
well beyond what all but the most successful could enjoy in Scotland108.
Tennis and golf were also popular in South Africa whereas polo was the
South American game of choice. That bank staff aspired to this style of
life is evident in the cynical, yet envious account of an Edinburgh tennis
club written by a Royal Bank clerk, which featured a young Edinburgh
Advocate who earned £800 a year and proved popular with the lady
members109. Emigration offered to carry this Edinburgh hanger-on to
the centre of Hyderbad, Capetown or Hong Kong society. In all these
places Scottish clerks joined Orwell's public school educated English
lower-upper middle class for whom empire had a particular meaning:
"The people who went there as soldiers and officials did not go there to
make money, for a soldier or an official does not make money; they went
there because .... with cheap horses, free shooting, and hordes of black
servants, it was so easy to play at being a gentleman"110.
Distinctive concerns with inequality or national virtue gave way before
this shared social ambition. Rather, what distinguished the Scot abroad
was the greater social distance he hoped to travel and the novelty of the
life-style experienced on arrival.
6.4 Conclusion
This chapter began by identifying emigration as a significant
factor in late-Victorian and Edwardian Scotland and as being of
particular importance to what were loosely described as members of
the lower middle class. The example of the Aberdeen Grammar School
pupils was then used to establish that the turnover pattern observed at
107 This preference is exemplified by the clerk who only accepted a position in the Bank of
British Columbia after being rejected by the National Bank of India, B561/3/9, letters dated 18th
Dec. 1902 and 31st Jan. 1903
108 Scottish Bankers Magazine 1916, pp. 96-102 and 1919, pp. 28
109 RB 147 Royal Bank Magazine, 1895, pp. 105-106
110 G. Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier, (London: Penguin edition, 1989), pp. 113-115
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Royal Bank occurred across the sector and that a majority of those who
left banking during the course of their careers emigrated from Scotland.
The economics of this decision were then considered with Scottish bank
staff identified as an important part of an international market that
favoured bank labour over employers. This was due to the
establishment then growth of banks elsewhere, and the inability and
unwillingness to source labour locally. Consequently, a majority of
Scottish bank emigres were pulled overseas by the prospect of higher
salaries and enhanced promotion opportunities. In banking at least
emigration was more than a response to fluctuations in the Scottish
economy, rather it was integral to a system of employment predicated
on the assumption that a majority of recruits would leave, which served
to reduce staffing costs and benefited those staff who remained via
enhanced promotion prospects. This approach to employment appears
to have spread to other sectors of the Scottish then British economy.
Emigration and empire became intrinsic to the Scottish psyche.
Viewed from the perspective of those it directly affected emigration lent
an otherwise national and nationalistic triumph tangible personal
meaning. Furthermore, emigration added an emotional investment to
the imperial interests of Scottish capital with probable political
implications. Along with empire it formed a regular topic of debate and
conversation, as well as a distracting daydream.
An examination of the cultural imaginaries by which empire and
emigration were known adds a critical element to this account. It
demonstrated various ways in which bank staff exercised a capacity for
critical and creative thinking about themselves in relation to the
structures and conventions of Scottish society as the imagined presence
of other countries, particularly North American, made knowledge of
alternative social forms readily available. Social inequality understood
as influence was particularly important in this respect and subject to
regular criticism. There was also a less focused dissatisfaction and bored
frustration with social as well as business conventions. Recognising
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these critical elements affords a more nuanced account of the public
consciousness of emigration and empire, presenting it as something
more than merely nationalistic pride. Amongst emigrants themselves,
although an adolescent fascination with the new and the different can
be noted, there is little sign of a frontier spirit or much sense of imperial
duty. Both were perhaps acquired later in life. Until then emigrant bank
staff appear to have been primarily motivated by the individualistic
pursuit of advancement and social ambition. With hindsight the fact this
was often supported by commercially astute racism tempers any self-
congratulatory celebration, though this initially distinguished the place
of empire in Scottish as opposed to the British or English imagination.
However, this distinction soon gave way and an increasing number of
Scots overseas joined their English counterparts living a life they knew
of but could not afford in Scotland. Accents aside the remaining
distinction was the greater social distance Scottish emigrants hoped to
travel.
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Chapter 7: Status and the professionalisation of banking in
Scotland, 1875-1914
7.1 Introduction
The preceding analysis of employment and emigration has
revealed that the subjects of this thesis exercised a greater capacity for
critical thought than has previously been assumed. The current chapter
continues this exploration by examining the role of critique alongside
personal ambition in the attempt to professionalise banking in Scotland.
It is ostensibly about the Institute of Bankers in Scotland, the first
permanent association of its kind in the world and what follows
examines its origins, establishment and development. However, it is
also about how bank staff saw themselves in relation to others in
society. Individual achievement, meritocracy and social identity were
key issues in the professionalisation of banking; thus it provides an
appropriate means of accessing this history of bank staff and the social.
Yet ways of seeing society differ according to the situation at hand, class
is of particular importance to those perceptions of the social derived
from the experience of work1. Therefore, class here receives perhaps
undue attention. So be it. It is an approach that allows old, yet still
influential shibboleths concerning what Lockwood described as the
class-consciousness of clerks to be examined2.
Status is inextricably bound up with class in existing accounts of
clerks and assumes a particular form and significance due to the
assumption that clerks were only marginally better off than the highest
paid workers, while sharing their dependent proletarian condition. In
keeping with this the consciousness (or values) of clerks has
subsequently been defined as follows: a commitment to individual
endeavour and a belief in promotion on the basis of personal worth
1 P. Joyce, "A people and a class: industrial workers and the social order in nineteenth-century
England", in M. L. Bush, (ed), op. cit., p. 199
2 D. Lockwood (1989)
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closely linked to the perception of society as being meritocratic3. Status
is seen to have driven these beliefs and accompanying forms of
behaviour4. However, this was status of a peculiar kind. In Perkin's
account clerks did not strive to acquire the "social prestige and power
over their neighbours that went with property", status as the icing on
the cake that drove men to take commercial risks5. Rather status was
primarily a means of social differentiation. Hence, Perkin describes how
clerks "distinguished themselves so obsessively from the working class.
They were, literally, trying to get away from them, in income, status,
appearance, and physical residence ... Their obsession with status,
necessary for their work, often drove them to spend more on dress,
rent and children's education than they could afford"6. In other words
clerks struggled to live a middle class lifestyle on a working class wage.
There is room for scepticism towards this account. Crossick's
suggestive depiction of the nineteenth century petite bourgeoisie,
another group traditionally regarded as marginal and as being
ambiguous in its relations with social superiors and inferiors, indicates
there is no reflex connection between marginality, status anxiety and
social differentiation7. Moreover, the weight attached to status can itself
be questioned. The logic of the above argument sees clerks attaching
greater weight to status than material well-being and accordingly
choosing employment that paid more in status than money. But
Chapter 5 argued that in banking at least the economic distinction
between clerks and workers was more real than apparent. However,
banking is generally regarded as one of the more highly rewarded
3 B. Waites, op. cit., p. 240
4 ibid.; see for example F. M. L. Thompson, (1988), p. 260
5 H. Perkin, (1989), p.85. As an aside this account of businessmen and their motives requires
the qualification that risk-taking, building a business and besting a commercial rival each had
their own innate appeal.
6 ibid. p. 100
7 G. Crossick, "The Petite Bourgeoisie in Nineteenth Century Britain", in P. Thane and A.
Sutcliffe (ed), Essays in Social History Volume 2, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); G.
Crossick and H. Gerhaud Haupt, The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe 1700-1914: enterprise,
family and Independence, (London: Routledge, 1998); D. Lockwood (1989), p. 127
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forms of clerical employment (although in the absence of comparable
studies it is impossible to prove or disprove this)8. Even so clerks were
typically engaged in recording financial transactions and noted for their
saving habits, rendering such behaviour implausibly inconsistent and
irrational given the apparent refusal of others to recognise the status
claimed. For instance, clerks, commercial travellers, insurance salesman,
shop assistants, teachers and other lesser professionals formed a social
stratum regularly mocked for wearing a "fur coat and no knickers".
Despite this historians have remained largely content to share in what is
a criticism of consumption patterns, seemingly oblivious to its
puritanical and envious aspects9.
in this chapter I argue the desire for material advancement -
promotion - was key to the establishment of the Institute, and identify
professionalisation as an attempt to transform the operation of bank
ILMs. The Institute of Bankers in Scotland was originally envisaged as a
device for acting upon the culture of bank work, changing its values by
putting in place meritocratic arrangements. Consequently, the
subsequent development of the Institute was shaped by an often heated
debate about the relationship between qualifications and promotion.
The extent that professionalisation affected bank employment is then
established. Finally, I consider the clerical mentality, concentrating on
how the subjects of this thesis saw themselves and were seen by others.
I suggest those who worked as clerks may be comprehended as more
self-confident, indeed, more socially disruptive figures than has been
assumed, as well as more modest in their aspirations and less concerned
with those they regarded as socially inferior, than has been claimed.
8 see for example H. M. Boot (1999)
9 For a sensitive discussion of the frequently romanticised Puritanism of class analysis and its
alienating consequences see Carolyn Steedman, "Stories", in T. Lovell, (ed), British Feminist
Thought A Reader, (London: Blackwell, 1990)
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7.2 The origins of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland
This section argues that the Institute as originally envisaged, was
a means of fulfilling career ambitions by transforming the allocation of
pay and promotion within bank ILMs. As Johnston has argued
professionalisation is about power: a profession is a means of coupling
high levels of formal education with highly prized occupational
rewards, thereby transforming human capital into material gain10.
Andrew Kerr, founder and first Secretary of the Institute as well as its
ideologue and publicist drew upon various cultural currents to
legitimise his claims for a banking profession. In an era of capital the
professionalisation of banking would increase efficiency and profits: in
an era when even democracy was a religion, professionalisation
constituted a moral exercise; and in an era attached to notions of
scientific progress, banking was cast as another science possessed of
theories to be discovered and mastered.
Mid-Victorian Edinburgh provided an atmosphere conducive to
the formation of professional associations. By 1874 it was already the
professional capital of Scotland having a well-established Faculty of
Advocates, a Royal College of Physicians, an accountants' association
and Faculty of Actuaries. The form, methods, objectives and, more
importantly, achievements of these organisations were an example and
inspiration to others at a time throughout Britain when there was a
growing appreciation of the dispassionate study of commerce. In
Edinburgh itself this saw the appointment of Thomas Hodgson to a
newly created chair in Commercial and Political Economy and
Mercantile Law at the University of Edinburgh in 187011.
At the same time the 1872 Scottish Education Act by widening
access to education posed a long term threat to the scarcity of literate
and numerate labour that had supported clerical incomes during the
10. T. Johnston, Professions and Power, (London: Macmillan, 1972)
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first half of the nineteenth century. In light of this the controls over
entry, which professional associations strove to put in place offered a
means of defending the interests of existing bank staff.
The idea of a professional association was not new to banking or
a Scottish invention. In London a Banking Institute and an
Incorporation of Bankers were formed in 1851 and 1862 respectively12.
The fortunes of the former remained tied to its main protagonist; his
poor health proved fatal to it. Those of the latter suffered from an
identity crisis; its supporters remained unsure if it should be a
philosophical or a professional society until it eventually collapsed.
Neither of these hurdles were present in Scotland where the idea for an
Institute emerged from the Scottish Bankers Literary Association
(SBLA) established in Edinburgh in 1863 to facilitate the intellectual
improvement of bank staff. The Association's annual syllabus of
lectures and debates included political, literary and social subjects as well
as banking. This would cater to the philosophical needs of staff, leaving
Association members to give their collective support to the projected
professional association. However, it still remained for key individuals
to bring the professional ideal into being.
Professionalisation embodied a distinct set of personal attributes,
which the biographies of Charles Gairdner, David Huie and A. W. Kerr
reveal were shared by key proponents of the Scottish accounting,
insurance and banking professions. Although each began their business
careers with the assistance of familial connections, all three were born
on the fringes of the occupations they subsequently sought to
professionalise. Gairdner came from Ayrshire and trained as an
accountant in a Glasgow firm, which his father dealt with. In 1853 he
was one of the young accountants who successfully petitioned their
seniors to establish a Glasgow Institute of Accountants and Actuaries.
11 The Institute of Bankers in Scotland later formed mutually beneficial links with the
department of Economics at Edinburgh University. From 1876 until 1902 economics lectures
were held at 5 p.m. to allow bank clerks to attend after work.
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Huie, the son of an Edinburgh surgeon, was already a part of
Edinburgh's professional elite when he began his business career in
insurance in 1848. In his late twenties he became an original associate of
the Faculty of Actuaries in Edinburgh, a Fellow in 1863 and eventually a
Vice-President of the Actuarial Society of Edinburgh. Of his sideways
move into banking it was noted "he had sufficient influence to be
nominated to something higher than a mere clerkship in the Royal
Bank"13. Kerr's path was more straightforward. He followed his father
into the Royal Bank head office, then joined the SBLA where he
proposed establishing a bankers' institute. That all three were ambitious
to varying degrees is apparent in Gairdner's decision to volunteer to
become a liquidator of the Western Bank, which in turn brought him to
the attention of the Union Bank board. Similarly, Huie successfully
campaigned to become Secretary of Royal Bank (see chapter 3). Finally,
all three shared an interest in associational life, particularly societies
concerned with the furtherance of knowledge. Gairdner established an
Adam Smith Club in Glasgow, while Kerr by 1916 was a Fellow of the
Scottish Society of Antiquities, Treasurer of the Scottish Natural History
Society, a Fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and a founder of the
Scottish Society of Economists14.
The professional associations they helped establish used a
common intellectual preoccupation to fashion vehicles intended to
transport them to the upper reaches of their chosen professions. All
three achieved notable success as practitioners of rational social enquiry.
The table Huie compiled to accompany his 1868 paper Remarks on the
Valuation of Widows Funds with Tables to assist the Actuary in such
investigations, based on the Experience of the Widows' Funds of the Ministers
and Schoolmasters in Scotland remained in use for decades. Gairdner
published numerous papers on banking and economics, while Kerr's
12 E. Green, (1979), p. xix
13 Moneta, op. cit., pp. 16-17; C. W. Munn and N. Tamaki, op. cit.
14 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1919, no. 29
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History of Banking in Scotland first published in 1884, remains a standard
work on the subject, and was followed by numerous other books and
papers. Integral to professionalisation was a new conception of banking
that stemmed from these preoccupations. Kerr challenged established
notions of banking as a trade with theories of science and system.
Banking as science was knowable in the abstract, its component parts
and actions identifiable and amenable to documentation. When
combined and set in motion these constituted a discrete economy
possessed of principles and logic to be charted using the series of
published accounts begun in 1865 of which Kerr was an early student.
These representations of banking plus the accompanying bureaucratic
paraphernalia; the rule books, ledgers and head office returns, were to
be learnt and the aptitude shown by individuals in so doing assessed
under the auspices of an Institute that would examine staff and award
professional qualifications.
The members of the SBLA broadly matched the profile of
professional pioneers given above. In 1877 half the first, second and
third class Royal Bank head office clerks were SBLA members,
indicating it was primarily an association of serious, young men in their
late-twenties to early thirties already marked out as promising material
and working in the Edinburgh bank head offices (see discussion of the
process and data used to reach this conclusion in appendix 2). The
geographical, social and hierarchical distance that featured in Gairdner,
Huie and Kerr's early careers was also a factor as the Association was in
part formed to give staff transferred to Edinburgh the opportunity to
meet like-minded youths from a similar social background15. That the
Association's members were ambitious is evident in the purposeful
direction of its activities towards promotion. A letter to attract new
members explained:
"by essay writing an exact expression of thought is obtained and by debates a
readiness and fluency of speech is promoted - a faculty often difficult to
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acquire and frequently of great service ... being n the highest degree useful for
business"16.
It continued by noting that many of those had benefited from this
opportunity were "now high in their profession"17.
The idea for a Scottish Institute emerged from this milieu,
beginning with an article Kerr (then Secretary and Treasurer of the
SBLA) published in the MoneyMarket Review in May 1874 proposing
that:
"Some systematic action should be taken for the better training of young
bankers by the institution of classes and lectureships with examinations in
connection with which certificates should be awarded"18.
The details of what professionalisation would entail were subsequently
developed through an extended critique of existing employment
arrangements, which need to be seen in relation to those changes in
employment made at Royal Bank (see chapter 4 above) where Kerr
then worked.
In his writing Kerr focused on the limitations of those staff
involved in assessing merit and the process of assessment itself. The
routine assessment of staff was primarily the responsibility of agents,
yet agents were rarely chosen for their ability to train or assess staff, or
even their ability to manage a branch. It was enough that an agent was
popular in his community and able to attract deposits. Thus, even in the
nineteen twenties a solicitor asked to become an agent in Crieff was
informed "(w)e would of course, appoint an experienced accountant
who would relieve you of the technical work"19. Such inexperience drew
Kerr's critical attention20. Then there was the process of assessment,
which began with the report compiled when an apprentice had served a
15 IOB letter bk. 1, letter dated 19th Jan. 1882
16 Letter dated 29th Nov. 1877 included in SBLA minute book
17 ibid.
18 Quoted in R. N. Forbes, The Institute ofBankers in Scotland, (Edinburgh: Pillans and
Wilson, 1975), p.6
19 RB/61/8, letter dated 11th Sep. 1928
20 A. W. Kerr, "Staff Aspects and the Institute" in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 147
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six month probation, followed by an ongoing series of assessments on
which every salary, promotion or transfer decision was based. In the
absence of any instructions agents used rules of thumb to assess staff.
Surviving reports reveal dedication and demeanour were frequent
concerns, as were handwriting, accuracy, manners and appearance with
particular attention paid to height21. As banking entailed dealing with
the public and keeping accounts, these were appropriate measures, yet
their relative importance was unclear, while specific concerns competed
with vague estimates of overall ability. For instance, the phrase "good
clerk" was frequently used, but what at or what for was unclear. The
sheer size of the banks compounded these difficulties, indeed it
prompted Kerr to sympathise with the general managers: "(n)o one is
more liable to be imposed on than the manager of a large
establishment. It is utterly impossible that he can know those by whom
he is surrounded throughout the extended system, of which he is the
centre"22. But this merely served to reinforce their reliance upon agents
whose inexperience and ignorance left them incapable of properly
attending to the task. Professionalisation would remove such
imperfections, allowing those with appropriate experience to
substantiate and measure merit.
As described in the previous chapter influence was a more
widespread, though less focused grievance, which professionalisation
was intended to resolve. Due to its tacit, typically unwritten nature,
various forms of influence appear more often as accusation than fact in
the historical record. However, the play written by staff about bank
work, which included the office favourite amongst its cast of archetypal
characters is suggestive23. As is the apparent grip certain families had on
senior positions. Thus, at National Bank in the 1910s the son of a former
general manager served as Assistant London manager, the son of a
21 RB 484/S
22 A. W. Kerr, "Staff aspects and the Institute", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 146
23 RB 147, Royal Bank Magazine 1895, Sep.
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former secretary was an inspector and the son of a former Glasgow
manager was Bank secretary24. Such coincidences were perhaps the
natural outcome of recruiting the relatives of existing staff, however,
less ambiguous written attempts were made by customers to bring staff
to the attention of senior officials. For instance, in 1911 the Royal Bank
Cashier received a letter from "influential quarters in Glasgow"
concerning a member of staff who after 20 years remained a clerk in the
main Glasgow office25. The salary that the clerk received had only
increased by £20 in eight years, an indication his superiors were
unimpressed by his abilities. Nevertheless the letter's author regarded
this as a result of the clerk having "absolutely no influence with the
Directors" and explained "In view of his service and the important work
he does, Mr. (clerk) considers that his salary is utterly inadequate"26.
However, Kerr never regarded such iniquitous practices as being
the sole preserve of the affluent and the powerful. In what remains a
guide to promotion for the unscrupulous he described how
"persevering, unwavering toadyism" was probably "the most certain
method of all" for achieving promotion. Hypocrisy was another "old
and generally admitted method" while the "poor mouth" (to constantly
plead poverty) was a "great institution, wonderfully helpful in a life
career"27. Kerr also explained "a clique of underlings, by engineering a
policy during a series of years, practically monopolise the appointments
... by means of a consistent policy of commendation on the one hand
and of detraction on the other"28.
Kerr argued that without professionalisation such practices
would continue and business would suffer. In banking "(t)he round
pegs are allowed to roll about indiscriminately until they topple into
square holes, and the square pegs have their edges jarred by being
24 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1916, no. 28, 1918, no. 36 and 1922, no. 58
25 RB 61/2, letter no. 10582, dated 20th May 1911
26 ibid.
27 A. W. Kerr., "Staff Aspects and the Institute", A. W. Kerr (ed), pp. 142-145
28 ibid. p. 148
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rammed into round holes, adjustment being left to the chapter of
accidents"29. This was significant because: "the success of business
depends not alone on the few minds and bodies who have the direction
of it, but to a large extent on the combined and mutually aiding efforts
of all who are engaged in it"30. The imperfections present in banking
meant "one establishment is, over a series of years, stationary or
retrograding, while its neighbours, or some of them, are expanding in a
more or less satisfactory manner"31. Instead "Young bankers. From the
time of their entrance into the service they should have reason to feel
that they are in a current of promotion, from the benefits of which only
their own incompetency can exclude them"32. The Institute would foster
an esprit de corps that would motivate staff, encourage effort and
loyalty and ultimately improve performance and profitability.
However, Kerr's was also a moral economy wherein profit and loss
were inseparable from right and wrong. Existing arrangements
consigned some to a tedium against which they responded using
influence, those who did so "debase their minds, expose themselves to
continual humiliation, and sacrifice the highest pleasures of life for a
reward, which never satisfies them"33. Thus professionalisation would
expose and thereby curtail the immoral to preserve the moral well-
being of staff.
Kerr's vision was akin to Weber's ideal bureaucracy wherein
officials are appointed to positions in a hierarchy solely on the basis of
technical competency and possession of appropriate credentials34.
Examination would create a standardised shorthand for measuring
individual ability, supportive of the existing distribution of authority
(Kerr noted "some must rule over others ... thus the desire for
advancement is not only a matter of justifiable self-interest, but is even
29 ibid.
30 A. W. Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 139
31 ibid.
32 ibid., p. 138
33 A. W. Kerr, "Staff Aspects and the Institute", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 151
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a public duty"35), as it would allow general managers to know their staff
directly.
But, the ideal was in conflict with systemic flaws induced by the
otherwise successful operation of bank bureaucracies. As individual
branch running costs were used to assess the performance of agents it
was in their interest to be sparingwith their praise to avoid upsetting
the ratio of costs to deposits. Furthermore, if a clerk was judged to be of
good appearance, well mannered, able and enthusiastic, could he be
easily replaced? A good clerk was an asset, for an agent it was tempting
not to give a report so favourable that its subject would be promoted
elsewhere. Commercial imperatives imposed further constraints. When
customers did intervene in support of staff, employment matters
became commercial decisions. Thus in Orkney the National Bank was
forced to reach a compromise after deciding to appoint a solicitor to its
Kirkwall agency to the surprise of the popular full-time agent and the
annoyance of customers36. The Bank relented when several important
customers threatened to take their business elsewhere; the appointment
of the solicitor was rescinded, the agent was made assistant manager at
Glasgow and replaced at Kirkwall by his accountant. Accounts of this
event circulated freely, becoming part of the folklore of banking.
Watching from the sidelines the Royal Bank's Kirkwall agent
commented "(n)eedless to say these diplomatic appointments incur the
pleasure and favour of Orcadians, which was no doubt one reason
among others of their being made"37.
Furthermore, bankmanship, when it involved using recruitment
to attract and retain business, induced a perverse capacity to reward
incompetence via promotion. Observers noted agents:
"were continually admitting most ineligible specimens of humanity out of
34 R. Bendix, Max Weber An intellectual portrait, (London: Metheun, 1959), pp. 423-430
35 ibid., pp. 141-142
36 RB/406/38
37 RB/406/38 letter dated 7th Mar. 1934
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deference to fathers whose goodwill they desired to cultivate. Finding very
soon the practical disadvantages accruing to themselves from the presence of
such insufficient subordinates, they readily adopted the plan of at once
relieving themselves of the incubus and propitiating the fond parent by
recommending the protege for advancement to the head office"38.
In one instance a young clerk, despite receiving a letter of complaint
from a general manager, remained incapable of accurate work39. His
agent, plagued by complaints from head office and customers, sought
only to confine the youth to duties where his mistakes would be less
inconvenient until a transfer was arranged to another branch. Rural
branches, where the pace of work was not considered so taxing, joined
the back rooms of major offices, where an endless supply of routine
work could be found, as dumping grounds for the incompetent, the
inaccurate, the infirm and, amongst older members of staff, the
alcoholic. This retention of the less able formed an accepted part of
banking. It was observed:
"Each bank carries on its staff a considerable number ofmen who can at best
be classed as average, and who will never prove themselves capable of
taking positions of responsibility. For these however, the large branches of
the bank can always supply plenty of routine work where no more is required
than industry and mechanical accuracy"40.
Ad-hoc solutions were found to overcome these problems.
Above all general managers relied on their own judgement and
experience; an agent's report was only worth having if his opinions
were trusted at head office. Consequently, certain locations acquired
reputations as training grounds for staff, for instance, Leith, was
regarded as the Aldershot of the Clydesdale Bank41. Professionalisation
called this approach into question. More than this its offer to
substantiate and regulate employment threatened to restrict the
38 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, Sep. 1882, p. 193
39 B 561/4/1, letter dated 1st Mar. 1911; B561/4/2, letter dated 20th Jul. 1911
40 W. Leaf, op. cit„ p. 239
41 Moneta, op. cit., p. 136
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discretion of senior officials, a tension that was to persist throughout the
subsequent history of the Institute.
7.3 Establishing the Institute
Kerr was a practical man as well as a theorist. To establish the
profession he and his supporters used successful politicking to advance
their claims. In the process the ambitious vision of the SBLA was made
over to those already in charge of the banks who then decided the
scope and pace of change. Consequently, the development of the
Institute was dominated by a debate between the Institute's council,
ordinary members and the general managers about the relationship
between professional qualifications and promotion. Much of this
focused upon the worth of theoretical knowledge as opposed to
practical experience. The SBLA had stated "it would not be judicious to
establish examinations unconnected with any ulterior end"42 and the
staff who took an interest in the Institute during the first fifteen years of
its existence wanted promotion as a reward for exam success. This was
something no general manager would give and a position the executive
of the Institute proved unwilling to support. As a result the initial
enthusiasm amongst staff for the Institute soon gave way to disinterest.
It required the introduction of a cash bonus scheme in 1890 before an
eventual majority of new recruits took its professional qualifications.
The bonus was an effective compromise that ensured the survival of the
Institute, however, the rush to secure it swept aside the disputed links
between promotion and professional qualifications as well as Kerr's
moral concerns.
The SBLA took up Kerr's idea, establishing a provisional
committee to gain support from former members that were described
as "now high in the profession", including John Gifford, then Manager
of the National Bank. Gifford gave direct access to the General
42 SBLA minute book, 14th Dec. 1874
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Managers' Committee where he carefully cajoled his peers into
proffering at least half-hearted support for the venture and eventually
the Institute of Bankers in Scotland was founded in July 187543. Each of
the Edinburgh and Glasgow banks gave the Institute a £100 donation
and a £25 annual subscription as well as free use of rooms above the
Glasgow clearing house44. Equipped with this and an additional £100 to
buy books, the Institute furnished libraries and reading rooms in
Edinburgh and Glasgow, subscribed to various newspapers and
journals and began arranging lectures and classes in support of a
curriculum consisting of two qualifications45. The Associate's Certificate
was designed for apprentices and consisted of ten papers on arithmetic,
algebra, geography, English composition, bookkeeping, the note
exchange and the clearing house, note circulation, interest and charges,
the negotiation of bills of exchange and the history and present position
of banking in Scotland. Whereas the Associateship gave an introduction
to routine bank work by building upon a secondary education, the
Member's Degree was for those intent on pursuing a career in Scottish
banking. Its eleven papers were on French or German, British History,
the British Constitution, English literature (these 4 papers later became
optional), the principles of political economy, the history and principles
of banking and currency, the theory and practice of the foreign
exchanges, the principles of Scots law and conveyancing, mercantile
law, bankruptcy law and the law as it affected bills and cheques. The
content of these subjects reveal a desire to attach the status of a liberal
education to the banking profession, while ensuring staff were able to
interpret economic phenomena from the perspective of a banker.
Perhaps more importantly the emphasis on law indicates that the
Member's qualification was geared to ensuring staff were well-placed to
43 RB 153 "Letter to the Managers of the Banks in Scotland", 11th Oct. 1875
44IOB minutes 19th Nov. 1875 ; "Abstract of Accounts 1875-76" reproduced in R. N. Forbes,
(1975), p. 8
45 IOB minute book, 12th Oct. 1875
241
protect a bank's interests when lending and handling negotiable
instruments.
However, support came at a cost. The 94 members of the SBLA
did not consider themselves capable of establishing an independent
professional association and instead regarded the fate of the Institute to
be dependent upon "what the banks are disposed to do in answer to the
application"46. The response was not in keeping with their original
plans. Whereas the SBLA provisional committee had recommended that
the Institute should be "representative of the profession as a whole in all
its grades over the country" and include "all ranks of the profession", the
first Institute council was dominated by senior officials including two
general managers, two secretaries, two accountants and two
inspectors47. The SBLA, having contributed six members to the
provisional committee, was refused any formal representation, the sole
recognition of its involvement being free use of the Institute's
Edinburgh rooms48. Apart from this the SBLA could do no more than
send recommendations, which the council might choose to consider.
Even this ended when the SBLA disbanded in the 1880s49. Other than
the occasional agent, branch and clerical staff were and remained
noticeably absent from the Council and an understanding was soon
reached that every bank would have equal representation on the
Council with "the higher officials as far as possible to have the
preference"50.
Thus, to secure the support of the banks the Institute acquired a
form that reproduced the existing bank hierarchy. To secure further
assistance and funding the Council strategically used its authority to
confer membership without examination by inviting agents and senior
officials to join as Members at an annual cost of a guinea, while
46 SBLA minute book (special general meeting of the SBLA), 15th Jun. 1875; IOB letter bk.
1, letters dated 3rd Sep. & 13th Oct. 1875
47 SBLA minutes, 3rd Jun. 1874; R. N. Forbes., (1975), p. 7
48 IOB minutes, 21st Aug. and 4th Oct. 1876
49 SBLA minutes, 7th and 14th Mar. 1881
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subordinate staff who had served at least ten years in a Scottish bank
were eligible to join as Associates, a privilege that cost 5 shillings a year.
Finally, in keeping with tradition the Council elected the Treasurer of
Bank of Scotland as its first President. The Council hoped for more than
money from elected Members, conferring Membership without
examination was and remained a tactic used to secure support. Specific
favours were asked as when the Glasgow Cashier of Royal Bank in his
capacity as a council member, was requested "to secure a good
attendance of members" for a lecture given by the President of the
Institute in Glasgow51. Later, when an examination centre was being
established in Dundee the Council decided:
"Membership of the Institute should be offered to the Agents of the principal
bank offices who are already underrepresented in the Institute with a view
to securing their services by attaching them to the Institute"52.
Numerous elected Members assisted by giving lectures, establishing
and running regional libraries, study centres and examinations. It was
hoped that the less enthusiastic would at least draw the Institute to the
attention of their juniors and encourage them to participate.
Once the service clause ran out the Institute's fate was largely
determined by its appeal to the "younger gentlemen" of the banks.
The figures depicted in figure 7.1 show staff eager to sign up as
Associates before the deadline on the service clause ran out served to
secure a record membership of 925 in 1878, a total unsurpassed until
1895. After 1878 membership declined continuously, reaching an
eventual trough of 642 in 1888, despite the increasing numbers
employed in banking. Forbes has suggested the failure of the City of
Glasgow Bank was a major cause of this decline53. It undoubtedly was a
factor, but with only 107 members drawn from that Bank in 1878 and
50 IOB letter bk. 5 22nd May 1908
51 IOB letter bk. 1, 20th Sep. 1881
52 IOB minutes, 17th Dec., 1889
53 R. N. Forbes (1975), p. 11
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Source: Annual Reports of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland
many subsequently re-employed by other banks, it is an inadequate
explanation. Rather, staff took little interest in the Institute because they
did not believe it was of any benefit to their careers.
They were right to do so. Despite the polite efforts of the
Council, the general managers collectively attached little value to the
Institute's qualifications and would not countenance linking exam
performance to promotion. Kerr argued banking was a science or at the
very least a profession, but highly placed others remained unconvinced.
Indeed, Alexander Bogie, sometime Commercial Bank general manager
and Institute President always referred to banking as "our trade"54.
Even Kerr, though he remained an ardent supporter of the Institute,
regarded "character" not the "cleverness" exams measured, as the
primary qualification for promotion. Others adopted a more overt anti-
intellectualism. Speaking as President of the Institute, Adam Tait
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warned that "cleverness was just as likely to lead astray" and
"promotion by merit is not at all the same thing as promotion by
ability", something "clever men are apt to forget"55. Indeed, cleverness
could even hinder careers. Discussing the promotion of his staff one
Royal Bank Glasgow Cashier explained how a candidate "although
exceedingly clever, has developed slight idiosyncrasies, which would
preclude me from thinking of him"56. This scepticism was encouraged
by disciplinary concerns; it was rumoured that agents discouraged staff
from taking the Institute's exams as they felt qualifications tended to
make clerks conceited, a sentiment Moneta conveyed when he noted
"nowadays young men rather think they can teach their elders"57.
Scepticism aside bankmanship dictated that the service of a bank
should remain open to youths regardless of their academic ability if
they had important enough supporters. This periodically made banks a
dumping ground for the less academically inclined sons of the affluent
and influential. At Royal Bank's Hunter Square branch a place was
booked two years in advance for the son of a company secretary whose
employers were described as "amongst our most valuable customers"58.
The youth subsequently fared better at school than his father expected,
winning a place in a solicitor's office, yet the agent still suggested to
head office "itmight be advisable to retain his name on your list in the
meantime".
Furthermore, scepticism about the worth of exams together with
a desire to preserve managerial discretion in staffing matters is evident
in the actual use banks made of their own entry exams. Candidates and
senior officials alike regarded these as a mere formality because "the
youth's nominee is his guarantee of admission into the service"59.
54 IOB letter bk. no. 5, 3rd Nov. 1908
55 IOB annual report 1915
56 RB 61/5 letter dated 10th Oct. 1922, letter no. 721
57 Bank Notes, vol. II, 1906 Aug.; Moneta, op. cit., p. 93
58 B561/3/10, Hunter Square special letter book, letters dated 5th Oct. 1931, 20th Mar. & 6th
Dec. 1933 and 15th Jun. 1934
59 Bank Notes, Feb. 1907, vol. Ill
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Various examples drawn from other banks organised along Scottish
lines and staffed by Scotsmen indicate that entry exams were typically a
concession to meritocratic ideas used to bolster established prejudices.
One former employee of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation explained "it came very obvious when you came to sit the
written examination. They seemed to be more interested in your
manners than your intelligence"60. Another reached a similar
conclusion; "Really it was a sorting device. Some chaps I know had
taken it two or three times and failed but it was merely a means of
keeping out those they didn't like to rule out on any other score"61.
Confronted by the collective indifference of the general
managers members of the Institute's Council opted to translate the
original desire for promotion into more anodyne goals: "a higher
culture and tone" and the "improvement and elevation in status and
influence of those engaged in banking"62. The benefits of the Institute
and the profession were accordingly described in exclusively moral
terms. The Institute was a cause and professionalisation a mission to
improve the individual and through him make each bank a better place.
Such arguments failed because staff were more concerned with matters
material than spiritual and did not believe that the Institute catered to
these. Thus, when no material benefits were forthcoming Associate
members began resigning in droves, for example, 14 Royal Bank clerks
resigned in May 1878 alone63. Few came forward to replace them and
after attracting 52 candidates to the inaugural exams in 1876, by 1884 a
larger and more established Institute could only attract 49 candidates.
Among the minority who took the qualifications mounting
dissatisfaction became outright dissent in 1886. The year began with the
council contemplating opening up membership to the staff of banks
60 Quoted in C. Cook, op. cit., p. 195
61 ibid.
62 These aims were repeatedly stated, see for example the Annual Report of the Institute of
Bankers in Scotland, 1877
63 IOB minutes, 7th May 1878
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operating elsewhere. Instead a round of Associate members who had
subsequently been promoted were elected full Members64. This secured
the finances of the Institute, but left intact the belief that in staffing
matters it was an irrelevance. This and the continued fall in membership
provided the background to the 1886 Institute AGM. Those Royal Bank
staff recruited before 1885 who took the Institute's exams provide a
guide to the character of the audience. They were a distinctive group
having already spent on average nine or ten years working in a bank
and only a minority were drawn from any of the Bank's major offices
(see discussion of the data and procedures used to reach this conclusion
in appendix 2). In light of the tenure and career patterns detailed in
chapters 4, 5 and 6, these were men likely to be spending the rest of
their working lives in a Scottish bank who had already been passed
over as not especially promising material. For them professionalisation
was an opportunity to change their superiors' minds and further their
Scottish careers.
Seemingly oblivious to these concerns James Wenley, Treasurer
of Bank of Scotland and Scotland's most senior banker, adopted an
optimistic tone in his presidential speech:
"the increased number presenting themselves for examination was a sign that
the work of the Institute now generally engaged the interests of bank
employees throughout Scotland"65.
However, when questions were taken from the floor the polite theatre
of the meeting broke down. A Clydesdale Bank clerk shrugged aside
the weight of traditional authority to demand tangible benefits for
those who passed the exams66. At this the audience divided. Kerr, then
Secretary of the Institute, tried to restore calm by asking for all
grievances to be given in writing to the Council for further
consideration. The audience ignored him until peace was restored by
James Wenley promising to give the issues raised his personal attention.
64 IOB minutes, 6th Jan. & 11th May 1886
65 IOB annual report 1886
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Wenley was true to his word and led the first formal attempt by
the Institute to play a part in the regulation of bank employment. In
1887 as a representative of the Institute Council he submitted two
suggestions to the General Managers Committee67. The first was the
appeal from the AGM floor for the promotion of those who passed the
Institute's exams; "the Council are well aware that this is a difficult and
delicate question, and that it would be unreasonable to expect that even
a high pass in the Examinations ought in every case necessarily to lead
to promotion", but nevertheless "believe that the Examinations of the
Institute would, in many cases, give a fair indication of the qualities of
the men who pass them creditably"68. The second suggestion, made
without qualification, was for the Associate exam to replace the banks'
own entry exams with passing it to become a condition for admission
into the permanent service of a bank. Eleven months later the general
managers replied. The first suggestion was quickly dismissed, as to the
second:
"The managers considered that practical difficulties prevented the
adoption of the proposed examination for all entrants ... but requested that
each Manager be specially informed of the names of the employees in his
Bank who might pass the Institute's examinations"69.
This was a promise to do very little; the information requested was
printed in the annual reports, which every general manager already
received. Rebuffed, the Council elected another round of senior officials
as Members after which the general managers indicated that they were
contemplating including a note of those who studied for the Institute's
exams in their staff records70. Few staff responded to the circular sent
round the banks informing them of this latest concession. Finally, the
66 IOB minutes, 1st Jan. 1886
67 Letter to the general managers of the Scottish banks dated 11th Mar. 1887, included in IOB
minutes vol. 1, 6th May 1887
68 ibid.
69 IOB minutes 23rd Feb. 1888
70 IOB minutes 3rd Jul. and 18th Dec. 1888
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general managers' agreed in 1890 to pay £5 to all those who qualified as
an Associate and £10 to those who qualified as a Member.
The bonus quickly secured the continued existence of the
Institute, yet the records of the Institute do not detail why it was
introduced. However, two factors were arguably key. First, pride was
at stake; membership remained low, indifference high and the
possibility of the Institute failing is suggested by the periodic mass
nominations made by the Council. All this would undoubtedly have
affected the status if not the balance sheets of the banks and
embarrassed the Institute's prominent supporters. Second and more
importantly, an increase in the number of qualified staffwould help
preserve the high turnover of junior staff the banks relied upon. The
idea for a bonus originated in England where the English Bankers'
Institute established in 1879 had also suffered from staff indifference.
Banking in England still lacked the collectively induced inertia present in
Scotland. This allowed one bank to introduce a bonus scheme in 1885,
then another71. The practice spread and in 1888 the Commercial Bank of
Australia began offering a £25 salary increment to all staff who qualified
as members of the English Institute72. Clearly not all banks shared the
Scottish antipathy towards professional qualifications and membership
of the English Institute grew as a result at the same time as an
increasing number of its members began following Scots abroad,
intensifying the competition for positions overseas. Therefore,
encouraging Scottish staff to take the Institute's qualifications ensured
that they remained appealing to other employers.
However, the bonus left intact existing attitudes towards the
Institute. The exams remained voluntary and there was no guarantee
that the successful would receive any other reward. But, the chance of
earning £10 or £15 was enough of an incentive to increase the number
of candidates from 115 in 1889 to over a thousand in 1909. The character
71 E. Green (1979), pp. 65-67
72 ibid.
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and ambitions of candidates changed in the process. Those drawn from
Royal Bank were younger than their predecessors and as likely as all
recruits were to leave within 10 years of entering the Bank. Their
younger peers overwhelmed the frustrated older clerks who had
dominated proceedings until 1890 and for whom the Institute had
provided a focus for career dissatisfaction. Vocal concerns over
promotion were drowned out by a rush of youths intent on wining the
bonus before they left Scotland.
So was Kerr's moral ideal; immediate, tangible and announced
every year in a special notice, the bonus was presented as hard evidence
of the interest taken by the general managers in the professional
education of staff. Yet few candidates were convinced the worth of the
Institute's qualifications was measurable in anything other than pounds,
shillings and pence. The following comment by a candidate of the
English Institute is appropriate to Scotland: "Oh well, it doesn't matter if
I don't pass, but if I do, I get £20"73. The instrumental orientation of staff
towards the Institute soon became apparent. From 1896 it was a matter
of concern and by 1900 a public regret "that material attraction was
necessary to induce anything like a fair number of candidates to come
forward", while candidates were regularly criticised for being poorly
prepared and too willing to try too much too quickly74. Membership of
the Institute came to resemble a revolving door. Hundreds passed the
exams, joined the Institute, won the bonus then cancelled or stopped
paying their subscriptions on leaving Scotland. For instance, in 1911 229
or 10.1 per cent of the membership resigned75. But with hundreds more
coming forward each year membership of the Institute grew to 2,670 in
1914, a total unreflective of the actual numbers passing through its
books, but enough to guarantee its survival.
73 Quoted in C. E. King, "The First Trip East - P & O via Suez", in F. H. King, op. cit., p.
210
74IOB annual reports for 1890, 1896 and 1900
75 See for example, IOB no.3 27th May 1899, no. 4 21st Dec. 1907
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The foregoing discussion has emphasised how the
professionalisation of banking was prompted by a combination of
moral and economic concerns. But what began as an attempt by junior
staff to reform the basis on which pay and promotions were allocated
within bank ILMs was made over in exchange for practical support
from senior officials unwilling to concede any of their authority and
unimpressed by the worth of professional qualifications. Consequently,
before 1914 qualifications were not necessary for a successful bank
career. Indeed, the Council's practice of nominating senior staff for
membership to secure support meant professional honours tended to
follow career success achieved by other means. Thus, in 1904 the
Edinburgh Secretary of the Union Bank was "probably the only banker
in Edinburgh who has won his way into the Institute by examination"
and in 1912 only five of the Council's 23 members had taken either of its
qualifications76.
7.4 The professionalisation of banking
The above account supports Perkin's comment that bankers, as
opposed to say engineers or accountants, failed to establish an
autonomous body able to regulate their employment77. Indeed, when
approached by the Ministry of Labour during the FirstWorldWar the
Institute Secretary explained it had "absolutely no jurisdiction in respect
of staff matters ... the adjustment of the staff is of course entirely a
matter for the Scottish Bank managers"78. Collins offers a more positive
assessment wherein the education and training the British banking
institutes provided made a significant contribution to the great stability
of British banking after 187879. A more convincing account, for Scotland
at least, lies between these two poles where changes of a more subtle
nature occurred at an uneven and gradual pace. The Institute became
76 Moneta, op. cit., p. 93; IOB Annual Report, 1912
77 H. Perkin (1989), p. 85
78 IOB letter bk. 6, 5th Feb. 1918
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integral to the economy of banking and with this the conduct of the
employment relationship. Its activities and organisation clarified the
boundaries of bank employment, fostering a definite sense of banking
as an exclusive occupational category eventually adhered to at every
level. Finally, the meritocratic ideal Kerr originally espoused became a
factor negotiated with in staffing decisions.
The same commitment to collective agreement that prevented
the standardised use of the Institute's qualifications left each general
manager free to determine their worth according to personal
preference. This rendered the rate of change uneven. Kerr said of James
Wenley that with regards to the Institute:
"No important step was taken which was not either suggested by him or first
receiving his approval. He threw himself into the work with an amount of
ardour and personal exertion which must have occasioned him much self-
sacrifice"80.
Unsurprisingly the 356 candidates Bank of Scotland provided from 1889
to 1895 was the largest number drawn from any Scottish bank81. By
comparison the similarly sized Royal Bank provided 197 candidates
over the same period and only 11 per cent of the 295 staff recruited
during the years 1873 to 1885 passed even a single exam, indicating
professional education was not a priority in Scotland's second bank.
However, even the most sceptical general manager could agree
that professional honours confirmed that an individual had reached the
banking elite. The Council itself formed an exclusive club, while the
lesser honour of Membership without examination lent status within
banking to that authority gained via promotion. The behaviour of a
North of Scotland Bank general manager is evidence that this was
regarded as being worth something. Having taken little interest in the
Institute he applied for membership in 1902 after the Caledonian Bank's
79 M. Collins (1988), pp.85-86
80 Quoted in R. N. Forbes (1975), p. 9
81 Candidate figures derived from North British Economist, 1895, pp. 103-04
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general manager became an elected Member82. The matter was allowed
to "lie on the table" until the applicant agreed to mark the annual essay
competition after which he was nominated83.
The involvement of senior officials made the Institute a stage on
which the bureaucratic paternalism of the banks was remade as a more
personal affair. As Checkland noted senior officials were already near
mythical figures known more through legend than personal
experience84. The orchestrated spectacle of the Institute's annual general
meeting served to overcome the hierarchical and geographical distance
of bank organisations, making authority identifiable with the individual.
The president's speech lent the general managers a platform they used
to express their views, and audiences an opportunity to see for
themselves those who sat in judgement over their careers. This
management of the profession made the ritual issuing of certificates by
the president a symbol of the organic links fostered by membership of
a professional community at the same time as the ordering of the
ceremony preserved the hierarchical differentiation of the banks.
Involvement in the Institute let Scotland's leading bankers shape
the profession much as they shaped their own banks, achieving self-
expression through activities that embodied their personal interests and
values. James Fleming, a founding member of Charles Gairdner's
Adam Smith Club, was one of the more didactic general managers and
in 1877 donated 15 guineas as a prize for the best essay "On the
Principles and Practice of Banking in Scotland" to see if "there existed an
amount of literary talent sufficient to warrant the formation of a
permanent fund"85. A new tradition was established the following year
when Charles Gairdner donated prize money for another essay
competition86. Thereafter the general managers took turns to provide
82 IOB minutes 30th Sep. 1902
83 IOB minutes 5th May 1903
84 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. pp. 502-505
85 IOB minutes 5th Nov. 1877
86 IOB minutes 4th and 5th Jun. 1878
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the prize money and set the essay topic, each one reflecting what they
regarded as being of importance to staff. For instance, in 1880 James
Wenley asked entrants to write about the "Effect of the AmericanWar
of Secession 1861-65 on the Trade of the World"87. The essay
competition enriched the employment relationship by presenting the
general managers as benefactors of the profession. Yet an acute
consciousness of authority permeated the process. The 1888
competition on "The Multiplication of Bank branches: its advantages and
disadvantages as it affects the public, the shareholders of banks and
bank officers" only attracted one entry because as a council member
explained "as its treatment necessarily involved a criticism of the actions
of the Banks some competitors had been prevented from coming
forward"88.
The place of authority in the Institute became more explicit
following the introduction of the bonus and Council members more
assertive in their attempts at encouraging staff interest. Before the
bonus when a president claimed "(t)hose who were disposed to educate
themselves and to advance the interests of their employers by making
themselves acquainted with the laws of banking were, in his opinion,
more worthy of promotion than others who relied altogether on
seniority for advancement", most ignored him89. Afterwards candidates
were regularly chastised and occasionally subject to heavy handed
displays of authority such as the following note sent to a Clydesdale
Bank apprentice:
"Your refusal to pay the very first subscription cannot be allowed to pass
without me giving you a warning, in a friendly spirit, that such conduct may
be detrimental to your interests and prospects, as it will be my duty to report
the matter to the General Manager, and I know that he is anxious that his
staff should all be on the roll of the Institute"90.
87 IOB minutes 1st Jun. 1880
88 IOB minutes 19th Oct. 1887 and 5th Jun. 1888
89 IOB annual report 1887
90 IOB letter bk. 5, 6th Oct. 1916
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Thus, professional education and identifying with the spirit of the
profession became additional obligations that staff were expected to
meet. The establishment of the Scottish Bankers Magazine in 1909 under
the auspices of the Institute and editorial control of the Council, was a
less threatening means of achieving the same goals. In the opinion of
one senior banker it would bind staff together to form a single,
coherent profession and, given free to members, hopefully stop the
flow of resignations91. The magazine was also intended to raise the
public standing of the Institute and the profession. There are signs that
this occurred as other agencies began using the Institute as a source of
expert opinion. For example, it produced a paper on the limitations of
shipowners liability for the Board of Trade in 191292.
This accumulation of professional paraphernalia made for a new
found self-confidence when dealing with other professionals who
ventured into banking. The long-standing suspicion staff held towards
outsiders remained, indeed it prompted the author of a history of the
Commercial Bank who trained as a solicitor before becoming that
Bank's legal clerk, to identify himself as an outsider and apologise for
his transgression93. Under the auspices of the Institute the distinction
gained greater salience, particularly when the professional education of
bank staff was involved. Discussing the establishment of a study centre
at Dumfries the Council debated involving the town's agents for
months because they were deemed "more law agents than bankers"
and only eventually relented; there were not enough full-time agents to
support the centre and excluding the part-time agents would have
caused offence94.
91 IOB letter bk. 5, 3rd Nov. 1908; IOB minutes 11th May 1908; IOB annual reports for 1908
and 1910
92 IOB annual report 1912
93 J. L. Anderson, The Story of the Commercial Bank ofScotland Limited, (Edinburgh, 1910)
94 IOB letter bk. 4, 6th Nov. and 28th Dec. 1900
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Kerr set aside the self-serving aspects of this opposition too cast
it in exclusively moral terms. He asked those trained to other
professionals and involved in banking:
"would they consider it a safe or judicious proceeding to entrust their
respective businesses (in which, presumably, they served long and laborious
apprenticeship) to the direction of men bred to other trades ? Without doubt
they would condemn such an action as unwise, and, if done to their prejudice,
as unjust"95.
This concern with who was and was not a banker reoccurred when the
general managers debated throughout 1909 and 1910 who would hold
the first Lectureship in Banking at the University of Edinburgh, a
position funded by a £5,000 bequest from an Edinburgh banker96. Allan
McNeil was a suitable applicant, indeed the only applicant for the post.
He was an established Institute lecturer, a leading authority on banking
and the law (his book on the subject first published in 1894 remained in
use until the 1970s) and had managed the Bank of Scotland law
department97. However, he was also a qualified lawyer who entered
then left Bank of Scotland to practice on his own account. The
symbolism of the lectureship was not lost on the general managers
amongst whom there was a "serious prejudice" against McNeil because
of his professional background. For this public representative of the
banks and the profession the preference was for a retired banker of
some standing and experience98. When none were found Alexander
Wright was proposed as an alternative99. Wright politely refused
leaving the general managers no alternative but to recommend
McNeil's appointment.
Similarly, this pragmatic acknowledgement of professional ideals
increasingly featured in employment matters. The influence of the
95 A. W. Kerr, "Bank Officers", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 138
96 The debate is detailed in IOB letter bk. 5. 7th & 24th Sep. & 5th Oct. 1909 and 1st Feb.
1910
97 For a discussion ofMcNeil see Moneta, op. cit., pp. 99-106
98 IOB 24/9/9
99 IOB letter bk. 6, 1st Feb. 1910
256
Institute nudged the banks towards Weber's bureaucratic ideal to an
extent revealed by the following incident involving AlexanderWright
whose career epitomised meritocratic success. Wright began as a
Perthshire apprentice and eventually became Cashier of Royal Bank as
well as President of the Institute from 1921 to 1924. In 1930 an
important business associate asked Wright for his son, a Royal Bank
clerk, to be promoted100. Wright refused after repeated investigations
revealed the youth turned up late most mornings (when he turned up
at all) to do half a clerk's work and had the habit ofwalking round the
office smacking other clerks on the back. He was, in the opinion of the
Bank's highest officials, not fit and never will be, an embarrassment, not
suitable, boyish and irresponsible. The clerk's father died leaving his
wife and an uncle - a Duke - to continue what became an eight year
campaign. After Wright died his successorWilliamWhyte, another
meritocratic success, continued refusing. Finally, Whyte after making
sure no business would be lost, arranged for the youth to receive a
lump sum in lieu of a pension to help him begin some other career "it
being unfortunate that he has been allowed to remain in the bank so
long". In this clash between influence and meritocracy an assertive sense
of what a banker was and should be was deployed, one that saw the
traditional claims of inherited wealth and title pragmatically, tactfully,
but firmly rejected.
7.5 Clerks, status and society
(i) How bank staff were regarded by others in the nineteenth century
The above discussion has focused upon the Institute primarily in
relation to the operation of bank ILMs; however, it was more than this.
Through its qualifications, lectures and magazines, it was also a means
of acting upon the social, indeed the goal of raising the status of the
profession and its practitioners was written into its constitution.
100 RB/l 16/6
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Therefore its history provides a basis from which to consider the issue
of clerks and status and with this broader issues concerning the content
and conduct of social relations. But first it is necessary to consider why
we have at best a partial, but more often than not a prejudicial
understanding of how the clerk viewed society and his social self.
Much of the material used to understand the social character of
clerks is antipathetic towards the subjects it purports to describe.
Despite this uncritical use has been made of contemporary accounts to
(re)produce a particular, prejudicial account101. An exception to this is
Young who has charted a sustained campaign beginning in the mid-
nineteenth century to bring the gent; the self-important nonentity that
provided the stereotype used to characterise low level clerks and office
workers, into universal contempt102. Henry Pooter, the main character
in Grossmith and Grossmith's classic The Diary ofa Nobody is a direct
descendent of the gent, yet remains a key source of historical insight.
There are other examples including an entire genre of detective fiction
written in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries wherein
reassuringly superior figures solved crimes beyond the wit of
bumbling, typically lower-middle class, police inspectors103.
As for the gent, numerous books and journals produced what
Young describes as a semiotics of dress; a set of indicators that allowed
the gent to be distinguished from the gentleman without the
inconvenience of engaging in conversation104. As social critique this did
no more than lay a veneer of taste upon the habit of ridiculing the less
affluent for being less affluent; the gent could be spotted by the
101 See for example J. F. C. Harrison, Late Victorian Britain, (London: Fontana, 1990)
102 A. Young," Virtue Domesticated: Dickens and the Lower Middle Class", Victorian Studies,
39, (1996), pp. 483-511
103 Indeed "lower middle class" snobbery remains a key source of humour in Britain as
exemplified by the BBC situation comedies Dads Army, Fawlty Towers and Keeping Up
Appearances. The point to bear in mind when considering these is that many of the key
characters involved who were embarrassed, infuriated and amused by the excessive displays of
snobbery around which much of the humour revolves are also recognisably "lower middle
class".
104 ibid., pp. 487-491
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cheapness of his clothes and the old clerk identified by his frayed collar
and cuffs, shiny pants and worn boots. Both were also faulted for their
effeminate attention to detail, yet this is exactly the behaviour they
provoked in others. Indeed, Young argues this desire to ridicule is
indicative of a profound social anxiety on the part of a then recently
formed middle class that sought to amuse and thereby distance itself
from those whose collars and ties compromised the visual cues they
themselves used to support their own claims to a superior social status.
This desire for distance subsequently acquired various forms of
institutional expression. For instance, across Scotland the intricacies of
the social order were recreated in a carefully arranged hierarchy of golf
clubs, each one geared to keeping out those regarded as undesirable105.
More than this, by following rules clerks routinely challenged the
social status claimed by otherwise superior others. This can and has
been understood in terms of the bureaucratic personality; the individual
who insists upon a literal interpretation of every rule defining their
scope of action within an organisation106. There is ample evidence of
this. For instance, in 1902 Royal Bank tellers were instructed to become
more flexible and "ready to serve any of the bank's customers without
reference to the initial letter of his name"107. Yet much of the frustration
such behaviour prompted arose from the uncomfortable sensation that
through their actions and bearing the tellers made clear how they
regarded their customers. On one occasion this ability to deny the status
claimed by others involved a Sir, an ex-lord mayor of Liverpool, who
complained about the treatment he received at the hands of a Lerwick
bank agent during a cruise around Scotland108. The incident began
when the captain of the yacht asked to cash a cheque wearing what
105 J. Lowerson, "Golf and the making of Myths", in G. Jarvie and G. Walker (eds) Scottish
Sport in the Making of the Nation, (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994)
106 R. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", in A. Etzioni, (ed), Complex
Organisations A Sociological Reader, (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1961), pp.51-
54
107 RB 285, Letter to Tellers, 1902
108 CS 149, Complaint about an agent's conduct, (1883)
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passed in Liverpool as nautical garb. As the agent wired Liverpool the
Sir entered to present another illegibly signed, cheque. The agent later
observed that before he could explain, the Sir "left the Bank fuming at
all and sundry for not at once cashing his cheque". Called to account for
his actions the agent explained the "name and fame" of the Sir though
well known in Liverpool was less so in Lerwick, indeed this was the first
time he had ever heard of him, but if the directors insisted he would
apologise. Viewed from a distance the particular charm of bank staff
(and clerks) lay in this ability to prick egos, however, it was not
something that made them popular.
The fog of professional politeness complicates matters further.
Staff were subject to rules, which:
"required of all clerks that they apply themselves with zeal, activity, and
assiduity to the business of their several stations; that they pay implicit
obedience to the directions of their superiors in office; that they behave to
the public with the utmost civility and good manners, without showing
partiality or preference to any persons, and that they attend to and serve
each in turn"109.
These demands made them a part of what Wright Mills described as a
personality market wherein:
"they sell not only their time and energy but their personalities as well.
They sell by the week or month their smiles and their kindly gestures, and
they must practice the prompt repression of resentment and aggression. For
these intimate traits are of commercial relevance and required for the more
efficient and profitable distribution of goods and services"110.
In the personality market deference and servility were as much the
clerk's tools of the trade as a hammer and chisel were to a carpenter.
Despite what contemporaries often assumed these were not innate
traits111. Rather, the habit that developed amongst young clerks of
participating in the raucous fun of the music hall, indicates they were
109 B567/1, Rules and orders to be observed at the London office of the Royal Bank of
Scotland, dated the 10th Aug. 1874
110 C. Wright Mills, op. cit., (1951), p. xvii and pp. 182-188
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things set down at the end of each working day112. The finite constraints
professional courtesy placed upon self-expression are apparent in the
following incident, which occurred in a Greenock branch in the 1920s.
Every week a customer deposited a bag of silver by sliding it as hard as
he could towards whichever clerk served him, smacking the clerk in the
stomach. Winded, the clerk would smile through gritted teeth at the
customer, thank him, and begin counting the coins. Finally, one clerk
fired the bag back at the customer who immediately complained to the
agent. The agent, knowing the customer well, only mildly rebuked his
staff. The story illustrates how professional courtesy - the forced smile -
obscures our understanding of the clerical mentality.
However, the point is the clerk who relayed this story learned to
manage his personality by constructing a professional and a private self
to which he accorded greater authenticity. In the privacy of the
interview, as in the back office, he freely described the bag wielding
customer as a ridiculous figure, a vain and self-important man who,
after a spell in the Territorial Army, insisted on being addressed as
colonel. The interviewee did not believe that the customer deserved to
be called a colonel, a detail that supports the assertion of Gray and
Thompson that clerks adopted an archaic version of those values they
understood their social superiors adhered to113. But it adds the proviso
that this knowledge was used critically and selectively; values had to be
conformed with and adhered to. Consequently, deference was not
always forthcoming; rather it was awarded to those who complied with
clerical expectations. Thus, the same interviewee described another
customer who invited bank staff to his house for warm drinks and a
game of curling on his frozen tennis court every winter. This, in the
111 B. Waites, op. cit.; C. Hosgood, op. cit., pp. 520-522,
112 C. W. Hill, Edwardian Scotland, (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1976), p. 60; G.
Stedman Jones, "Working class culture and working class politics in London, 1870-1900:
Notes on the remaking of a working class", in G. Stedman Jones, (ed), Languages ofClass,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 205-206
113 R. Gray, "Religion, Culture and Social Class in Late Victorian and Early Twentieth
Century Edinburgh", in Crossick, p. 150; F. M. L. Thompson (1988), p. 260
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opinion of the interviewee, was a real gentleman and another example
of what, viewed from above, was the unforgivable presumptuousness
of clerks.
In various ways, then, the clerk formed a disruptive presence
that discomforted those who expected their status claims to remain
unchallenged. The clerk also regularly refused to remain inside his
allotted social space, something Kerr experienced during the
establishment of the Institute:
"I fear that with a good many of the clerks there is too much imawareness of
an inferior position. They are unwilling to recognise the fact which it is
impossible to deny that their position is as ... subordinate to that of the
leading officials in the world as in the office and that consequently it is
quite appropriate that the same should hold in the Institute"114.
When these aspects of clerical behaviour are taken into account The
Diary ofa Nobody appears less a comic, quasi-sociological account of
clerical life and more a potent weapon in a status war. The authors
display little sympathy or empathy with Henry Pooter whose character
serves as revenge for the slights meted out by clerks on a daily basis to
those who expected preferential treatment only to be politely asked to
wait in the queue. The novel concludes with Pooter's master giving him
the freehold to his house as a reward for honest and faithful service, an
act presented as a paternalistic gesture devoid of any economic
rationale. As such it flatters the reader, granting him the satisfaction of
sharing in the forbearance and charity necessary for dealing with such
silly little men. Moreover, it fails to acknowledge the fact that much of
the law governing commerce in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries was developed in response to misdemeanours perpetrated by
clerks. Thus, the ineffective, dependent and meek clerk Grossmith and
Grossmith depict appears as wishful thinking an array of paternalistic
devices were used to induce to preserve the integrity of commercial life.
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(ii) Clerks and bankers
Therefore there is a need to bypass the comments of others and
a self-imposed professional silence to find the authentic voice of bank
staff. This is what makes the essays, debates and articles associated with
the Institute so significant. However, their use is subject to certain
qualifications. Much of the material produced was subject to self if not
actual censorship due to the presence of hierarchical authority. But, this
was less of a factor when staff discussed society as a whole. Indeed the
social was a recurring concern of the aspiring professional as
professionalisation presupposed a hierarchical model of society
necessary for achieving the goal of raising the status of those involved
in banking, while also assuming social mobility was both possible and
desirable. The social model most often used depicted a stable hierarchy
of three classes: the labouring classes; the middle classes; and the upper
classes115. The labouring classes were also "the wage earning classes -
those who earn wages by labour of hand"116. The middle classes
worked, but used brain instead of brawn and received salaries or drew
profits instead of wages. The upper classes were men of means whose
ownership of capital conferred economic independence. This
consciousness of class was grounded in relationships to the means of
production, but also distinguished between the labour market position
of the middle and working classes. The following section discusses how
the component parts of this social model were perceived and related to.
Morbid fear and social anxiety are noticeably absent from
accounts of what were variously described as the labouring, working
and wage-earning classes. In the 1870s members of the SBLA debated
whether strikes were injurious to the working classes - they were - and
whether high wages had a good effect on the working classes - no,
114 IOB letter bk. no. 1, letter dated 29th Dec. 1875
115 1904 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/17, p. 40
116 1896 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/31, p. 1 and 1904 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/16, pp.5-13
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because they were "spent on luxuries which had the opposite of a good
effect"117. The subject matter and outcome of these debates suggests
neither fear nor revulsion, instead it exemplifies a self-confident ability
to know the working classes as a lesser group amenable to disinterested
scrutiny. Above all they identified the working classes as a distinctive
and homogeneous other. Differences within the working class of skill,
respectability or pay, though acknowledged, were subordinated to a
presumed unity predicated upon what were perceived as common,
childlike character traits, an attribution of psychological simplicity
reminiscent of how others viewed clerks.
The interaction between industrial unrest and social theory in the
Edwardian period produced a new terminology of class deployed
alongside the existing three class model. Masters and men became
capital and labour; a dichotomous model imbued with a sense of
industrial conflict and frequently accompanied by references to class
war118. This terminology contained the social forces it described. Capital
and labour confined class conflict to the economic, rendering its effects
upon social and political life potential rather than actual. Awareness of
whatmight occur centred on socialism and, in keeping with notions of
the working classes as childlike, socialists were found guilty of leading
strikers astray:
"The spread among the lower classes of disturbing theories of property and
the growing envy by the proletariat of the riches that other classes possess,
cannot but be regarded as indicating a danger, even it maybe, a menace to
society"119.
Socialism in this account formed an alien presence that threatened to
disrupt a stable social order, though as we shall see in the next chapter,
opposition to socialism was never absolute or unthinking120. However,
even these fears require qualification. Clerical anxieties focused upon
117 SBLA minutes 27th Jan. 1873 and 1st Feb. 1875
118 North British Economist, 1893. no. 12 and 1894, no. 1
119 1894 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/36, pp.3-4
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what might be and were rarely omnipresent. They ebbed and flowed in
this instance in relation to the state of industrial relations in Britain as a
whole. Even then Scottish bank staff were largely unmoved by the
explosions in trade union activity that occurred in the late 1880s and
early 1890s and again in the 1910s121. The railway strikes that took place
in 1891, for example, were merely an inconvenient disruption to be
endured. Indeed, when discussed in more detail the personal
circumstances of strikers were regarded sympathetically, though not
with empathy, as there was seen to be an element of justice to their
demands. Moreover, both sides in the dispute were criticised, as the
strike was the 'blunder of the men and the blame of the masters"122.
Industrial disruption prompted some to suggest solutions that
derived from the experience of clerical employment. Above all the
potentially disruptive spectacle of class conflict was to be avoided. For
this reason the conciliatory efforts of the TUC in 1891 made it the only
praiseworthy party to the dispute and a "wholesome educative
influence on the country"123. Industrial peace and social calm required
the incorporation of labour more fully into the capitalist process, a
change necessitating both sides mend their ways, though capital was
expected to take the lead as "the Capitalist must cultivate closer relations
with labour"124. If need be concessions should be given in exchange for
appropriate behaviour, for instance, an article on slum improvement
concluded:
"Tax-payers would not grudge any few pence the realization would cost, if
only the people put in the houses would keep them tidy"125.
120 For a critical discussion of right wing politics and clerks see M. Savage (1995), pp. 196-
197
121 For surveys of trade union development and industrial disputes during this period see R.
Devlin, "Strike Patterns and Employers' Responses: Clydeside in Comparative Perspective", in
Mclvor and Kenefick, (eds), op. cit.; and J. Lovell, British Trade Unions 1875-1933, (London:
Macmillan, 1977)
122 British Economist, 1890, no. 10; North British Economist, 1891, no.3
123 British Economist, 1890, no. 10; North British Economist, 1891, no.3
124 1 893 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/40, p.62; British Economist, 1889 no. 7; North British
Economist, 1891. no. 3
125 North British Economist, 1894, no. 1
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However, the necessary changes amongst the working classes were to
occur at a deeper level than personal habit. In the industrial arena profit
share schemes were proposed as a means of making workers realise a
more efficient capitalism was in their self-interest. This intellectual shift
would be accompanied by emotional change, for instance, the co¬
operative movement drew praise as its dividends made every recipient
a capitalist and incited "the love of accumulation" that was "a bulwark
against the spread of unsettling Socialist theories"126. Thus
collectivisation per se was not automatically regarded as a threat to the
social order, quite the reverse in fact. It was only when such necessary
institutions fell under the leadership of socialists and threatened to
disrupt the capitalist process that they became a cause for concern.
Whereas the working classes constituted a separate entity
deemed to be in need of reform and able to be acted upon, the upper
classes formed a vague category of social description lacking either
critical or complimentary nuances. The unfairness of upper class
privilege frequently drew critical attention, as did the behaviour of the
affluent and influential customers staff came into contact with.
However, this primarily focused upon specific individuals, leaving the
upper classes as a whole intact and known from an accepted distance as
a fact of life that served to clarify the boundaries of clerical social
horizons. Gray ascribes to clerks delusions of grandeur, arguing that
their use of pretentious and overly complex prose provides evidence of
a status driven desire to emulate their betters127. Alternatively this
constituted a didactic attempt at developing a distinctive form of self-
expression. Set against this is the fact that clerks and their wives became
voracious consumers of society gossip contained in the developing
popular press and read guidebooks on how to behave in polite
126 1898 IOB Prize essay, 2/1/12, pp. 2-55m
127 R. Gray (1977), p. 150
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society128. Yet Young emphasises the bounded social ambition of the
bungalow cum semi-detached dwelling suburbanite as exemplified by
Dickens's character Mr. Wilfer in OurMutual Friend who refused to use
his Christian name because it was "too aspiring and self-assertive"129.
This modesty also features in the exchange between Robert Service and
his agent quoted above where becoming the manager of a branch
constitutes the summit of clerical ambition. Indeed, rather than
providing evidence of social aspirationmuch of what has been
identified as clerical behaviour can instead be regarded as harmless,
social observation. Peer pressure prevented it becoming anything else;
a recurring theme in accounts of bank work is the ridiculous spectacle of
the socially ambitious and the pretentious. For instance, in a series of
character sketches on bank clerks past and present the "Chip off the Old
Block" was chided for his continual attempts to associate himself with
any member of the aristocracy, however, distant130. More routine was
the ridicule of staff who returned from working in London with an
English accent, an unpalatable adoption of airs and graces. The ideal was
instead set out in a sketch of the "Old Clerk" whose relations with the
upper classes were conducted on the basis of mutual respect founded
upon an implicit recognition of static social differences131.
Whereas the working classes were an intermittent subject of
debate and the upper classes a vicarious opportunity to learn about
lives of unobtainable exoticness, the middle classes were the primary
concern of bank staff and where they located themselves. The frequent
use of classes instead of class denotes a sense of the middle classes as a
fragmented, complex mass. For instance, bank directors were drawn
from "the professional, mercantile, and independent classes", illustrating
the significance of vertical divides based upon ownership and forms of
128 K. Flint, "Introduction", to G. and W. Grossmith Diary ofa Nobody, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), pp. Xvii - xviii
129 A. Young, op. cit., p. 494
130 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1882, Oct.
131 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1882, Jul.
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capital that were in turn cut across by horizontal distinctions based on
income, status and authority132.
Within banking the horizontal was primary. In Royal Bank and
Institute records the intricate grades used to order and motivate staff
routinely gave way to a basic dichotomy between those at the top and
everyone else. The following couplets were routinely used - officers and
staff, senior officials and employees and managers and clerks. The term
clerk was of particular significance because of its broader social
meaning, which reoccurred in banking in ways that served to
emphasise the subordinate status of staff. When Primrose Kennedy
recommended the appointment of John Bishop, he explained this was
despite his being a clerk and when Kerr lamented the scale of
emigration he explained "it was as clerks they left their native land, they
learned to be bankers elsewhere"133. This way of knowing facilitated the
exercise of authority; a clerk's opinions were not so much unwanted as
irrelevant. Staff shared in this critical understanding, usually describing
themselves as clerks only when they were under-paid, over-worked or
under-valued.
Self-pity and self-immolation provided much of the impetus for
attempts to forge a new identity devoid of negative connotations.
Professionalisation was also an attempt to bring into being a new,
positive identity. The Institute began as a means of transforming the
clerk into a banker who would rank alongside the lawyer, the engineer
and the surgeon in the professional middle classes. The first step was to
define what a banker was:
"Strictly speaking, a banker is one who, having funds of his own employed in
banking business, does himself take an active part in managing the business
... In point of fact, only members of private banking firms can be properly
called bankers. But as in Scotland there are no private bankers, and as it
would be an absurdity to say that there are no bankers, it is usual to consider
132 Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine, 1881, Nov.
133 A. W. Kerr, "Arrangements and Functions", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 127
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all bank officers endowed with official powers as bankers. In this category,
then, will be included general managers, secretaries, local managers or
agents, and all other officers who have the right to sign in name of the
companies whose business they are conducting"134.
This was Kerr's definition, its details capture the transformation Scottish
banking underwent in the first half of the nineteenth century, exploiting
the shift in emphasis from ownership to authority to appropriate an
existing identity grounded in the performance of a specific function.
However, ambition did not translate into success.
In theory agents were the most numerous bankers, but although
agents were positioned gatekeepers to the massed resources of the
banks, charged with filtering credit applications, refining and adding
recommendations to submissions eventually sent to head office for
approval, in practice they had only limited involvement in lending.
Rather with only six customers, for example, operating cash credits at
the Royal Bank Kilmalcolm branch during the period 1888 to 1892, for
most agents lending was an afterthought and deposit gathering their
primary concern and responsibility135. Thus the actual nature of bank
work worked against the establishment of the positive, professional
identity Kerr aspired to. Furthermore, as Collins explains "the strongest
cultural resources for the formation of a dominant group are those that
involve a great deal of ritual impressiveness", with social distance an
additional contributory factor136. The element of ritual belonged to the
banks' alone, most obviously that surrounding the grand head offices,
leaving a staff-customer relationship founded instead upon personality,
intimacy and convenience. Ultimately it proved too much to ask of
customers to equate agents, let alone the errand running apprentices
and polite tellers with the grand, wealthy and powerful figures already
known as bankers.
134 A. W. Kerr, "Bank Agents", in A. W. Kerr (ed), pp. 128-129
135 RB 495, Abstract ofcorrespondence between branch agents and head office, 1888-1892
136 R. Collins, The Credential Society, (London: Academic Press, 1979); p. 174; T. Johnston,
op. cit., p. 65
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The persistent implausibility of the professional project provoked
introspection and self-doubt. A recurring concern in magazines written
by and for bank staff was clarifying who or what they were. Readers of
Bank Notes were asked to contribute essays on the differences between a
banker and a bank clerk while being addressed as bankmen, an
Edwardian invention intended to avoid the stigma attached to clerk137.
Similarly, the various titles adopted by bank trade unions before 1918
regarded elsewhere as evidence of a status-driven desire to avoid
anything that smacked of the working classes, exemplify this
uncertainty and the fragility of those identities assumed (the
development of these organisations is considered in the next chapter).
The proposed Federation of British Bank Clerks in 1907 eventually
became the London based United Bankmen's Club, while in the North
of England a National Association of Bank Clerks was renamed the
Bank Officers Guild due to fears that promoted staff would not join an
organisation with clerk in its title. Scottish trade unionists avoided this
by calling their union the Scottish Bankers Association, while
scrupulously referring to staff as bankmen at all times.
Bank staff mid-career were left inhabiting an uncomfortable
limbo somewhere between the disdain directed towards clerks and the
material comfort gained on promotion to an agency. Although
uncertain as to what they were, staff were certain about what they were
not. Here, however, the greatest status anxiety was provoked by the
seemingly innocuous figure of the insurance salesman and to a lesser
extent the commercial traveller. Insurance was the industry most akin
to banking; the parity of the two is evident in the establishment of an
annual golf competition between Edinburgh bank staff and insurance
officials. It was precisely this proximity which made bank staff more
intent on claiming superiority over their golfing rivals than anyone else:
"
it is one thing for an insurance agent to endeavour to secure a specific
transaction which might be carried through in a thousand different ways,
137 Bank Notes, 1907, Oct.
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all requiring explanations to be understood by most persons, and an
altogether different thing for a bank agent to seek surreptitiously to
undermine a continuous business relationship. A bank agent should attract
business; he should not require to solicit it... were he to call at private
houses and solicit orders, he would become a pedlar, and would thus fall in
the social scale"138.
This guide to the character and conduct of bank staff provides evidence
of status claims based upon character, bearing and respectability with
little economic foundation. Its paucity, as with the defiantly
instrumental orientation of staff towards the Institute, reveals status
divorced from material rewards was not especially important.
More significant was achieving promotion from clerking to
management. Chapter 5 discussed how staff joined a bank with the
expectation of eventually reaching a managerial position: "(t)he
culminating point of the bank clerk's business is in management. It is his
ideal, his goal, the terminus of his ambition"139. A majority of recruits
emigrated to achieve this goal; indeed emigration was a far more
potent source of social distance and differentiation than status
consciousness or claims to professional status. Among the minority
who stayed behind (certainly at Royal Bank) a majority eventually
reached a managerial position. To achieve this bank staff and clerks
typically received the following advice:
"his natural course to promotion is, as we have before hinted, by making
himself indispensable to his employer; the head must, sooner or later, take
the right hand into its confidence"140.
In banking where the organisation replaced the master staff also got on
"by appearing to display excessive zeal for the Bank, - a most
reprehensible feature, although unfortunately successful at times"141.
Career success required the adoption of habits and forms of self-
138 A. W. Kerr, "Bank Agents", in A. W. Kerr (ed), pp. 132-133
139 Bank Notes, 1907, Mar.
140 Quoted in D. Lockwood (1989), p. 22
141 A. W. Kerr, "Staff Aspects and the Institute", in A. W. Kerr (ed), p. 151
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expression deemed compatible with promotion. As an article in the
Scottish Bankers Magazine titled the "Road to Success" explained:
"Cranks - artistic, scientific, hygienic, antiquarian, religious, or political -
seldom succeed"142.
Clear lines were drawn between right and wrong / success or failure;
whereas the successful were noted as active, capable, steady and of
temperate habits, those judged flighty, inconsistent and bombastic fared
badly143. Thus, career success required staff subordinate their social
selves to their employer within the confines of a personality market
whose participants were expected and encouraged to smooth away the
rough edges of their character.
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter has used an examination of the Institute of Bankers
in Scotland to consider what Lockwood describes as the class
consciousness of clerks. We can now return to assess the outline of this
set out in the introduction and the role of status in explaining the social
behaviour of clerks. On the basis of the evidence presented here it has
been argued much is in need of modification, while other elements need
to be disregarded altogether.
Contemporary accounts of clerical employment often noted the
importance of patronage, describing it along with influence as "the
crowning curses of clerkships"144. In keeping with this there is little
sense in what Kerr wrote that he perceived banking or society to be
especially meritocratic or that promotion occurred primarily on the
basis of individual ability. Rather merit was located in the normative
framework of bank staff as an ideal to be brought into being, with Kerr
an exception essentially because he sought to transform what others
merely criticised.
142 Scottish Bankers Magazine, 1910, Jan.
143 For numerous examples of the assessment of agents and their personalities see RB 406/S
144 Quoted in D. Lockwood (1989), p. 25
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Then there is the role of status. The profile of the professional
pioneers developed above revealed a decidedly instrumental
orientation towards education in keeping with the predilections of
ambitious men who lacked the resources or guile others used to achieve
career success. They and the Institute's first generation of candidates
hoped the qualified man was a promotable man, a notion that brought
the professional ideal into conflict with the existing distribution of
authority over employment matters. The general managers were
willing to subsidise the Institute and organise its affairs, but, sceptical
about the worth of theoretical as opposed to practical knowledge and
unwilling to accept any constraint on their authority, refused to link its
qualifications to promotion. Consequently, the appeal of the Institute
was based on an education devoid of any material benefits, plus the
status and sense of worth it conferred; as the fourth secretary of the
Institute was fond of saying "(t)he reward is in the race we run, not in
the prize"145. The majority of staff instead wanted prizes and took little
interest in the Institute, leaving it with greater appeal to senior officials
whose status in banking it confirmed, than their subordinates. What
periodically became a heated debate about the worth of the Institute
was finally resolved by the bonus scheme, which ensured the Institute's
survival and preserved the high turnover integral to Scottish bank
employment by ensuring staff remained attractive to other employers.
All this questions the importance of status in existing accounts of
clerks. It was shown in the previous chapter that promotion plus
incremental salaries and a wide range of paternalistic benefits, resolved,
and emigration removed, the assumed discrepancy between the
economic position and status of clerks. Furthermore, we know clerks
were obsessed with status primarily because their observers reached
this conclusion. But, such accounts require careful use asmuch of the
detail they provide provides a guide to the concerns and prejudices of
145 Quoted in R. N. Forbes (1975) pp. 12-13
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the observers not the observed. The careers and comments of staff
support a different account in which modesty was important and the
threat posed by the working class perpetually confined to the future
leaving the precise location of bank staff within the middle classes of
more immediate importance. However, even this modest form of
status anxiety requires qualification. Membership of the Institute, an
organisation geared to raising the status of bank staff and little else,
provides a test of how important status was. The answer is simple: not
very. This is not to deny the significance of status altogether, but it is to
insist that for the subjects of this thesis status divorced from material
rewards was more often than not an afterthought and rarely an
obsession. Perhaps this lends some support for Crossick's comment
that clerks adhered to a striking disbelief in the value of action146.
However, the account of emigration and its motives discussed in
chapter 6 indicates that a cautious pragmatism is a more fitting
description, with emigration providing evidence of a willingness to take
dramatic, life-changing actions that placed bank staff amongst
Scotland's imperial pioneers.
My final conclusion concerns the social identity of bank staff, or
to be more accurate social identities. Professionalisation inaugurated a
wave of experimentation and active attempts at constructing new
identities. The history of the Institute, unlike, for example, accountancy,
is an account of the failure to establish a coherent, collective identity.
There were some notable achievements: the Institute became integral to
the economy of banking, a source of expert opinion, fostered an
exclusive sense of who was and wasn't entitled to work in and
represent the banks and encouraged meritocratic ideals to be adopted
in staffing matters. However, the banker continued to reside in the
upper reaches of society where few of his subordinates were able to
join him. For the majority career success required that staff exhibit
146 G. Crossick (1977), p. 17
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certain qualities deemed appropriate by their superiors. Thus in practice
to be a professional involved cultivating a public persona largely devoid
of self-expression.
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Chapter 8: Trade unionism, the professional worker and the Scottish
Bankers Association, 1918-1939
8.1 Introduction
The peculiar consciousness of clerks has long been used to
account for the development and character of clerical trade unionism.
Between the wars Klingender deployed the Marxist concept of false
consciousness to explain the disproportionately small number of clerical
as opposed to manual trade unionists1. He argued that clerks refused to
recognise that as dependent employees they held the same class
position and therefore same objective class interests as manual workers.
Lockwood subsequently rebutted the charge of false consciousness,
offering an alternative Neo-Weberian schema, wherein status
consciousness explained much the same phenomena2. In this
formulation false consciousness instead became a question of priorities;
clerks were more concerned with status than economic rewards, which
was why despite frequently earning no more than skilled workers, they
refused to join trade unions due to their association with the working
class.
However, chapter 6 argued the dissonance between economic
position and social behaviour these approaches assume largely
disappears when the incremental benefits that routinely accrued over
the course of a career are taken into account. Moreover, in chapter 7 it
was argued that bank staff displayed a resolutely instrumental
orientation towards the Institute of Bankers in Scotland, which
questions the assumption that clerks were more concerned with status
than material rewards. Finally, there is the traditional characterisation of
the middle class and lower middle class in particular as being committed
to individualism as opposed to working class collectivism, an outmoded
1 F. D. Klingender, op. cit.
2 D. Lockwood, op. cit.
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approach that threatens to obscure more than it reveals3. A primary
goal of the Institute was to provide methods of knowing and acting
upon the individual, to overcome the anonymity of bank organisations
by creating individuals knowable beyond the borders of their
respective branches, associates and / or communities. Yet the origins of
the Institute can only be described as collectivist; it emerged from an
association after all where the individual was subordinate to a collective.
The individual certainly had his place, for instance, the eleven laws and
bye-laws governing Association meetings made sure of that by stating
that those who opened debates "shall be allowed five minutes for reply
after the other members have spoken, none of whom shall be allowed
to speak twice in the same debate unless for the purpose of
explanation"4. Thus, the Association then the Institute were collective
means of bringing the individual into being, a regulated
interdependence based upon creating and structuring acceptable forms
of individuality and identification.
What remains is an imperfect account of industrial relations due
to the apparent absence of employers. Indeed, Lockwood followed by
Anderson argue the removal of masters from the daily working lives of
clerks due to the development of large-scale bureaucracies, broke the
moral and social checks that had previously impeded the development
of independent clerical organisations5. Yet the development of bank
organisations and bank trade unionism does not follow this pattern,
quite the reverse in fact. First, the development of bank organisations
effectively stopped in the mid-nineteenth century with no subsequent
transition thereafter from a personal to a bureaucratic capitalism.
Instead head offices remained intimate places, while branches had
always been distant places governed by rules. Second, in England it was
possible to begin a career in the 1870s in a bank employing a few dozen
3 P. Joyce (1994)
4 Laws and Bylaws ofScottish Bankers Literary Association, p, 4
5 D. Lockwood, op. cit.; G. Anderson (1976)
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staff and end up lost amongst the thousands employed by each of the
Big 5 in 1918. Yet what follows identifies bank trade unionism in
England as less militant and, in terms of union density, less appealing
than it was in Ireland where the banks were far smaller - they
employed hundreds not thousands - and more stable. Scotland was
situated somewhere between these two poles.
Thus, there is a need to consider factors other than consciousness
when seeking to understand the origins, development and meaning of
bank trade unionism. To begin with, arguments concerning the
consciousness of clerks routinely take for granted the formation and
existence of stable, collective institutions organised by and for workers.
More recent research has identified these as a historical problem
requiring explanation, especially when the postulates of individualism
are taken into account6. Conventional wisdom favours the idea that
collective action was most likely among socially and occupationally
homogeneous groups living in self-enclosed communities, where dense
ties could be easily sustained and individual behaviour readily
monitored and subjected to effective, communal sanctions7. Hence
collective organisation needs to be approached as a spatial process,
which here refers to the geographical and hierarchical space that
occurred within bank organisations.
Second, there is the issue of what trade unionism meant. The
sociologists Stewart, Prandy and Blackburn provide some help here8.
6 B. Barnes, op. cit., pp. 175-182; M. Savage, The Dynamics ofWorking Class Politics: The
Labour Movement in Preston, 1880 - 1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987)
pp. 12-15 ; D. Gilbert, Class, Community and Collective Action: Social Change in Two
British Coalfields, 1850-1926, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 16-30
1 M. Savage, "Space, networks and class formation", in N. Kirk (ed.), Social Class and
Marxism: Defences and Challenges, (London: Scolar Press, 1995), pp.71-72
8 A. Stewart, K. Prandy & R. M. Blackburn, Social Stratification and Occupations, (London:
Macmillan, 1980), pp. 139-152, in which the failure to be promoted is described as "a most
important factor determining a turn to trade-unionism". Again, however, while this and related
studies acknowledge the importance of employers, in particular employer recognition, for trade
union development, the overall approach tends to focus upon the consciousness of white-collar
workers, for example, K. Prandy, A. Stewart & R.M. Blackburn, White-Collar Work, (London:
Macmillan, 1982). For the importance of employer recognition see G. S. Bain, The Growth of
White Collar Trade Unionism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970).
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They identify white collar workers (for our purposes clerks, although
the terms are not directly interchangeable) who joined unions as
individuals who did so only after failing to secure promotion by their
own efforts. This is an important insight; it illustrates how the possibility
of promotion can influence organisational behaviour. Yet it requires
cautious use as it presents trade unions as repositories for personal
failure, trade unionism as sour grapes writ large. More importantly,
meanings, in this instance of trade unionism, are fluid. Trade unionism
was an entirely new development in banking; the Scottish Bankers
Association constituted a proactive force intent on changing the content
and conduct of long-standing industrial relations arrangements9. Thus,
the meaning of trade unionism Stewart et al identify required to be
made. Barnard's conception of management is valuable here, where
shaping and communicating a set of values that underpin the culture of
an organisation, defining and assigning meaning to the actions of
employees, is a key managerial function10. This conception of
'workplace culture' sees it as contributing to the effective management
of output and labour, in the process it restores employers to the
account. The construction of culture in this way is a contested process as
it disempowers as it enables, producing boundaries of the unacceptable
as well as the acceptable, which can reinforce established distributions of
9 On the role of trade unions in labour history more generally see T. Adams, "Market and
institutional forces in industrial relations: the development of national collective bargaining,
1910-1920", Economic History Review, L, (1997), pp. 506-530; H. Gospel, "Markets,
institutions, and the development of national collective bargaining in Britain: a comment on
Adams", Economic History Review, LI, (1998), pp. 591-596; and T. Adams, "Employers,
labour and the state in industrial relations history: a reply to Gospel", Economic History
Review, LI, (1998), pp. 597-605
10 C. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, discussed in T. Watson, Management,
Organisation and Employment Strategy, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986), pp.58 -
71; G. Hofstede, "The Usefulness of the 'Organizational Culture' Concept, Journal of
Management Studies, 23:3 May 1986, pp. 253-257; M. Lebas and J. Weigenstein,
"Management Control: The Roles of Rules, Markets and Culture", Journal ofManagement
Studies, 23:3 May 1986 pp. 259-272; and J. Melling, "Employers, Workplace Culture and
Workers' Politics: British Industry and Workers' Welfare Programmes, 1870-1920" in J.
Melling and J. Barry, Culture in History, Production, Consumption and Values in Historical
Perspective, (Exeter: Exeter University Press, 1992)
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authority by excluding certain groups from the means of expression
and effective construction of meaning11.
What follows seeks to account for the origins and development
of trade unionism in Scottish banking by focusing on four factors; first,
what impact geographical and hierarchical mobility within and from
banks had upon the possibility of collective action; second, the active
role played by employers in defining acceptable forms of workplace
behaviour; third, the tactics used by the SBA to secure a legitimate place
in the economy of banking; and fourth, the rationale underpinning the
decision by staff to participate in trade unionism.
It is argued that before 1914 career mobility and emigration
mitigated against trade unionism as did the expectation enforced by
senior officials that staff should defer at all times to their superiors.
Consequently, the origins of trade unionism are located outside the
workplace among the cultural practices of a distinctive minority of
staff12. So long as this remained the case collective organisation
remained untenable. However, the First World War brought about
significant change. The demands of war engendered an unprecedented
willingness to question established forms of authority, while public and
state attitudes towards trade unionism also changed. More importantly
rapid inflation adversely affected the living standards of all bank staff
simultaneously. This common grievance provoked an outburst of trade
unionism that culminated in the threat of strike action to force
recognition in 1920. This failed largely because of the tactical
incompetence of the SBA when confronted by the vigorous opposition
of the general managers. The latter involved various forms of
intimidation and the manufacture of a newly expansive and inclusive
culture. These two approaches together re-established acceptable forms
11 J. Barry and J. Melling, "The Problem of Culture: An Introduction", in J. Melling and J.
Barry (eds.), op. cit., pp.5-6
12 For recent accounts of (lower)middle class politics that reach a similar conclusion see A.
Heath and M. Savage, "Political alignments within the middle classes, 1972-89" and P.
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of behaviour, in particular they served to define trade unionism as
being incompatible with career success. Interest in trade unionism
subsequently waned until the 1930s when the SBA experienced a revival
that derived from various factors. Emigration reduced dramatically
after the FirstWorld War creating a more stable and homogenous staff.
The numerous points of contact between senior officials and staff
created after the FirstWorld War had been allowed to lapse, limiting
communication between the ranks. However, the ability of trade
unionists to exploit the unchecked effects of rising prices again proved
key. Senior officials again responded vigorously to the threat of strike
action made in 1937. When this collapsed so did interest in trade
unionism. Thus, the course of bank trade unionism in Scotland between
the wars was determined by the failure of trade unionists to secure
recognition from vigorous opponents, in circumstances where staff
tended to regard the long-term costs of SBA membership as
outweighing any benefits that might accrue.
8.2 The possibility of bank trade unionism before 1914
The development of trade unionism in banking was limited by a
concern with status to be sure, as a correspondent of Bank Notes
explained trade unionism was the "working man's weapon" and
therefore inappropriate to the genteel profession of banking13. But in
itself this is an inadequate explanation. For instance, when a bank trade
union was proposed in Bank Notes in 1907, a Scottish correspondent
dismissed it as something only a few unmarried clerks would ever
join14. This comment indicates the appeal of trade unionism before 1914
was shaped by factors other than status, primarily career concerns and
routine financial obligations, which it was regarded as having the
potential to adversely affect. The following section examines these other
Bagguley, "Middle-class radicalism revisited" in T. Butler and M. Savage, Social change and the
middle classes, (London: UCL Press, 1995)
13 Bank Notes, Aug. 1907
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concerns. It considers the possibility of collective organisation in relation
to employment in bank ILMs, then the content and conduct of the
employment relationship. Finally, the origins of trade unionism are
located in the cultural practices of staff outside the office.
First, where individuals are spread over wide areas so that they
rarely come into contact with their peers, then it will probably be
difficult for them to form the stable bonds and social ties necessary for
participation in forms of collective action15. Exactly this situation arose
in banking where most staff were scattered across geographically
dispersed branch networks, and pursued "spiralist" careers that
involved a fusion of hierarchical and geographical mobility. Driven by
ambition or transferred by head office staff put down shallow roots as
they moved from parental homes into digs, then from one suburb
hopefully onto a larger house or bank flat in the next16. Much of the
culture of bank work developed in response to the emotional
consequences of this mobility. Transfers, promotions, resignations and
retirements were celebrated at dinners that typically ended with
presentations of silver plate or writing paraphernalia paid for by staff
collections, while to meet a felt need to remain in contact with or merely
aware of former friends and colleagues every staff magazine listed the
movement of staff. Even so geographical mobility often proved an
isolating process with rural Scotland routinely depicted as a nice place to
visit, but a lonely place to work. One account of working in the fictitious
town of Entepfuhl described "the blues" of sitting and dreaming in a
rural branch, spending afternoons hoping for a transfer to an urban
office17. Another account conveyed much the same sense of isolated
boredom until an incident allowed the author to develop a close
relationship with the agent18. The transfer of staff then, fragmented
14 Bank Notes May, 1907
15 M. Savage and A. Miles, op. cit., p.57
16 H. Perkin, (1989), pp. 266-270 and H. Wilensky, op. cit., pp. 128-135
17 RB 147, Royal Bank Magazine, May 1895
18 RB 147, Royal Bank Magazine, Jan. 1895
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social lives, but could also see staff isolated from their peers develop
close bonds with their immediate superiors. However, on balance
geographical mobility worked against the formation of stable
relationships. When asked for advice on how to establish a bankers'
institute, the Scottish Institute secretary suggested involving senior
officials because subordinate staff tended to move around too much to
be able to attend to any other responsibilities19.
Career mobility impeded collective organisation in other ways.
In his discussion of bank trade unionism Savage argues that promotion
meant staff were engaged for much of their careers in a process of
becoming, moving upwards between positions and therefore unwilling
and unlikely to become attached to any one20. Consequently, they
failed to develop a "clerical consciousness". The argument is similar to
Edward's who argues the reality (and prospect) of movement through
the complex hierarchies integral to ILMs encourages individualistic
behaviour incompatible with the formation of a collective
consciousness21. Both accounts indicate a reduction in the rate or
likelihood of promotion is likely to engender a collective consciousness
supportive of trade unionism. Indeed, Savage argues that it is the
occurrence of such a slowdown, which accounts for the emergence of
English bank trade unionism during the first half of the twentieth
century22. However, it is apparent (see table 8.1 below) that promotion
rates at Royal Bank remained relatively static from the 1900s until the
1930s, except for a short-lived slowdown during the FirstWorld War
when experienced agents were retained. This finding can be considered
broadly applicable to Scottish banking as a whole; as the rate of
promotion was influenced by the rate at which the branch networks
grew, the expansion of bank organisations between the wars means it is
unlikely that in Scotland the rate or likelihood of promotion (see
19 IOB letter bk. 3, letter dated 20th Apr. 1899
20 M. Savage (1993), p. 197
21 R. Edwards, op. cit.
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Table 8.1. Time taken from entering the service of Royal Bank to first becoming an













1900 - 04 27.2 25 43.9 42 15
1905 - 09 28.1 29.5 43.5 44 36
1910 -14 29.7 31.5 45.9 45 26
1915-19 33.3 34 47.1 50 23
1920 - 24 29.3 28 43.9 43 40
1925 - 29 27.4 28.5 42.0 43 28
1930 - 34 31.1 32 46.3 46 27
1935 - 39 27.3 26 42.1 41 15
chapter 6) gave much impetus to the development of trade unionism.
The importance of staff turnover to bank employment has been
a key theme throughout the preceding three chapters, and had
important consequences for the development of trade unionism. The
conclusions reached concerning turnover can be summarised as follows:
an increasing majority of those who entered banking left within ten
years of whom a majority left to work in banks operating outside
Scotland. The resultant attachment of most recruits to Scottish banking
was therefore transitory and instrumental. Emigration gave access to
greater economic rewards and a style of life thought unobtainable in
Scotland. It was also a means of critically responding to perceived social
and economic inequalities. In both these ways it lessened the need for
other, collective responses. This combination of factors made bank
apprentices and young clerks a poor source of trade union recruits as a
majority could only be relied upon to leave. Bearing in mind the
positions staff held remained closely related to age, the first two
columns in table 8.2 below indicate that before 1914 approximately half
the Royal Bank branch staff fell into this category. It is likely that this is
broadly representative of Scottish banking as a whole.
The content and conduct of the employment relationship also
worked against the development of trade unionism. In particular, the
22 M. Savage (1993), p. 197
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Table 8.2. The composition of the branch staff of the Royal Bank of Scotland, 1899-
1935
1899 1909 1925 1935
Position (%) (%) (%) (%)
agents 23 23 21 19
promoted non-managerial 25 24 21 21
clerks 23 25 37 44
apprentices 28 27 14 11
manual staff 2 1 1 1
lady clerks 0 0 6 4
Total staff 620 741 1,082 1,316
Source: The establishment books of the Royal Bank of Scotland, RB 484/S and RB
528/10
accumulated benefits of bank employment gradually rendered staff
unemployable elsewhere. Staff were unattractive to alternative
employers because banks were able to spread the cost of incremental
salaries and paternalistic benefits out over entire careers. The retirement
allowance was particularly important in this respect. A secretary of the
Institute suspected that as employer pension contributions were non¬
transferable and staff did not make any contributions, no other
employer would recruit experienced bank staff as they were unwilling
to take on board the entire cost of the eventual allowance23. It is
therefore unsurprising that banks operating overseas only recruited
Scottish staff aged in their early-twenties to mid-twenties, while
traditionally no Scottish bank would employ staff trained by a rival24:
23 IOB letter bk. no. 5, letter dated 5th Oct. 1910
24 It should be noted banks did occasionally poach staff and that the general managers felt it
necessary to agree not to recruit staff from rival banks during the series of mutually agreed
branch closures. The reason for this would appear to be that as customers were often attached to
staff poaching them could see business being transferred from one bank to another. In England
before the advent of arrangements comparable to the general managers' committee legal
restraints served a similar purpose, for exmple, the National Provincial Bank took a clerk in its
Cardiff office to court to prevent him becoming manager of the South Wales Union Bank at
Cardiff in 1888, despite the clerk offering to pay £1,000 to 'buy his freedom', see "Restraint on
Employment - A Word of Caution", in North British Economist, 1889, June
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"Every Bank in Scotland mostly keeps its own staff and very seldom, except
occasionally in the higher appointments, takes in officials trained in
another Bank"25.
Bearing all this in mind Robert Service's account of his former
colleagues waiting for their pension, suggests staff were mindful of the
benefits of their position and disinclined to indulge in any activity likely
to threaten it. However, the behaviour of Robert Service and the advice
he received from his agent reveals the obedience, deference and loyalty,
which staff displayed were the outcome of a pragmatic exchange, the
terms of which were learned during the course of each career. The
General Manager of the Glasgow Savings Bank bluntly conveyed this
and the particular labour market position of staff when he advised a
clerk in his 30s who threatened to resign after arguing with a colleague,
to stop being so stupid because he was unlikely to find another job that
would ever pay him as much as he already received26.
This meeting was notable in itself as senior officials typically
mapped out subordinate careers without discussion27. Seated behind
desks, agents and managers would summon subordinates to inform
them of their next transfer, promotion or salary increase. Staff made
little or no direct contribution to what were often life changing events.
Instead, they were obliged to defer to their superiors, trusting them and
the banks they worked in (the lists of staffwilling to work in London
compiled at Royal Bank in the 1900s were a modest exception to this28).
The following quote taken from a letter sent by the Glasgow Cashier of
Royal Bank to Alexander Wright exemplifies this process:
"The proposed scheme for the staff here will, I think, be acceptable to the
staff themselves. Possibly Mr. (staff) may feel disappointed that he is to
take charge of the ledger department instead of the securities, but should he
25 IOB letter bk. no. 3, letter dated 4th Jul. 1898 and letter bk. no. 4, letter dated 29th Sep.
1904
26 M. Taylor, op. cit.
27 see for example R 61/5, letter no. 721 dated 10th Oct. 1927 and RB 94/6, letter no. 6961,
letter dated 1st Oct. 1929
28 Establishment books of the Royal Bank of Scotland, RB 484/S
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refer to the matter I feel that I shall be able to satisfy him that all is for the
best"29.
Staff did as they were told. The following poem by a clerk
conveys the outcome of this ascriptive culture:
"The bank clerk leads a quiet life
He sits upon a stool,
He generally takes a wife
And always acts by rule
And when his sons are aged sixteen
Within a bank they too are seen"30.
However, no deviation from this pattern was tolerated. The English
bank clerk who published a pamphlet in 1902 critical of bank directors
and suggesting the formation of a union, the first evidence of any
interest in bank trade unionism, was dismissed for his troubles31.
However, the predominant fear was not of dismissal, rather it was of
being overlooked at the next annual pay round or for a promotion,
losing out on the incremental improvements central to bank
employment.
The operation of bank ILMs and the conduct of the employment
relationship, then, presented substantial barriers to trade unionism.
Unsurprisingly, the origins of trade unionism are to be found outside
work in the cultural practices of staff where it began as an expression of
firmly held socialist beliefs. Although a socialist bank clerk is something
of an oxymoron, studies of early socialist organisations have repeatedly
identified a significant proportion of clerks and lesser professionals
among their members32. Before 1914 British socialism was a broad
based cultural activity, a religion in Yeo's account complete with socialist
29 RB 61/5, letter no. 780, dated 5th Nov. 1927
30 Bank Notes, Aug. 1906
31 R. M. Blackburn, Union Character and Social Class, (London: Batsford, 1967), pp. 133-134
32 C. Levy, "Education and self-education: staffing the early ILP", in C. Levy (ed.), Socialism
and the Intelligentsia 1880-1914, (London: Routledge and Kegan Pal, 1987); W. Knox,
"Introduction: A Social and Political Analysis of Scottish Labour Leadership Between Two
World Wars", in W. Knox, (ed.), op. cit., pp. 15-22
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churches, Sunday schools, choirs, cycling clubs and reading groups33.
Waters identifies the clerk as the typical believer and suggests they
influenced the character of the various activities34. Clerks were
ideologues and organisers as well as members, the most famous being
Sidney Webb, the hairdresser's son and former civil service clerk, who
became a leading Fabian Society member and Labour government
minister. The various tracts and pamphlets published by the Fabian
Society bring us back to our subject as they profoundly influenced A. B.
MacKay, the dominant figure in Scottish bank trade unionism between
the wars.
MacKay was the son of a parish schoolmaster and had neither a
working class upbringing nor life. Rather, his socialism was a moral and
intellectual response to those inequalities he understood society
possessed35. Flis banking career began at the age of fifteen in 1897 when
a family friend secured him a stool in the Glasgow Savings Bank.
MacKay was also an ardent Christian and "joiner" of organisations. In
1901 he became a deacon of his local church where in 1908 he found
himself unwillingly speaking in favour of Fabian socialism at a YMCA
literary society debate. MacKay lost the debate, but was converted to
socialism. In this instance career mobility facilitated a political career as
MacKay subsequently moved to Glasgow where he joined an already
established circle of like-minded associates, becoming one of the few
Labour Party activists to speak out publicly against the FirstWorldWar
in 1914. MacKay's political career peaked during the war when he
chaired a public debate between Ramsay MacDonald and Willie
Gallacher. After the war he stood unsuccessfully as a Labour candidate
in council and parliamentary elections, however, by this time trade
unionism had become the mainstay of his political life.
33 S. Yeo, "A New Life: The Religion of Socialism in Britain 1883-1896", History Workshop
Journal, no.3, 1977, pp.5-56; H. Pelling, Origins of the Labour Party, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965)
34 C. Waters, British Socialists and the Politics ofPopular Culture, (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1990)
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The early life of James MacDougall is similar in many respects to
MacKay's, but illustrates the potential cost of political beliefs and the
constraints, which managerial authority imposed on trade unionism36.
Aged fourteen MacDougall joined the Pollockshaws Progressive Union
where he met the Marxist educator John MacLean, who he
subsequently joined in the Social Democratic Federation. MacDougall
was also the son of a former Pollockshaws Lord Provost, which made
him an ideal Clydesdale Bank recruit. However, banking and socialism
proved incompatible when a local businessman complained to the agent
about his new apprentice's political activities. Despite receiving repeated
warnings from his father and the agent, MacDougall persisted with his
politics and there were rumours he was intent on establishing a clerical
trade union branch in the Bank. At this MacDougall was dismissed. In
other trades, heavy engineering, for example, political activism
intensified already endemic cyclical unemployment:
"The socialists were always the first to be paid off. In a place like Howden's
there would be six or nine months work followed by a slack period... They
were good skilled workers and when trade was busy they would be taken on
again; but at the next pay-off it would be they who went first again"37.
However, when MacDougall left the Clydesdale Bank he permanently
left Scottish banking and subsequently meandered through a succession
of poorly paid jobs before ending up a clerk in a jam factory. In other
words clerks risked paying a higher price for their political beliefs than
the skilled working men who dominated Scottish trade unionism and
socialist politics before 1914.
35 A. B. MacKay, "Autobiography of A. B. MacKay", UGD 129/7/1/32
36 The life of James MacDougall is described in W. Knox, op. cit. For additional details of his
dismissal see Bank Notes, Nov. 1909; A. Mclvor, "Were Clydeside employers more autocratic
?: Labour management and the 'labour unrest', c. 1910-1914", in W. Kenefick and A. Mclvor,
(eds.), op. cit., p. 48; and A. Mclvor and H. Paterson, "Combating the Left: Victimisation and
Anti-Labour Activities on Clydeside, 1900-1939", in R. Duncan and A. Mclvor, (eds.),
Militant Workers: Labour and Class Conflict on the Clyde, 1900-1950, (Edinburgh: John
Donald, 1992), p. 131
37 Quoted in A. Mclvor and H. Paterson, op. cit., p. 130
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Thus, bank trade unionism began in debating societies, church
halls and public reading rooms as an ideal then injected into the
workplace. In Weber's terms MacDougall's and MacKay's beliefs were
wertrational: "determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own
sake of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or some other form of
behaviour, independently of its prospect of success"38. This was a source
of strength and weakness. Earnest idealism informed then sustained the
proposals to form bank trade unions during the 1900s and 1910s. At the
same time the political ideals espoused by MacDougall and MacKay
marked them out as the kind of cranks career guides advised staff to
avoid. Moreover, their intellectual concerns were alien to the self-image
of banking as a predominantly practical profession. While they chaired
political meetings their peers engaged in more popular leisure pursuits.
If staff, particularly agents, insisted on taking an interest in politics they
were advised to adopt those of customers not their conscience if they
hoped to become a leading member of the rotary associations, golf
clubs or any of the other local bastions of conservative Conservatism
(or Liberalism, depending on location) they joined in search of business.
Thus, this period did not see what Savage describes as an upturn
in clerical unrest; the organisations formed were too ephemeral to
warrant such a grand description39. The first of these emerged from the
magazine Bank Notes, started in 1905 as the "organ of banking
throughout the British Isles, India and the Colonies". In 1906 the editor
revealed Bank Notes was the first step towards a Federation of British
Bank Clerks he invited his readers to join40. When less than a thousand
responded the Federation was quietly dropped and Bank Notes became
the "Official Organ of the United Bankmen's Club". In Sheffield a
National Association of Bank Clerks was formed in 1914, but collapsed
the following year when many of its younger members left to serve in
38 Quoted in D. Gilbert, op. cit., p. 29
39 M. Savage, (1993)
40 Bank Notes Feb. Apr. 1906, and May. 1907
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the armed forces. Trade unionism clearly took hold during this period,
but as an ideal lacking firm foundations or widespread support.
8.3 The FirstWorld War, inflation and the state
Before 1914 there was no bank trade union in Scotland. In 1918
the SBA was established and by the summer of 1920 claimed over 50
percent of all those working in Scottish banking as members, a majority
of whom subsequently voted in favour of industrial action in support of
a claim for recognised collective bargaining rights. The following section
examines this monumental transformation in the conduct, content and
form of industrial relations. It describes how the demands of war
produced a staff more willing to question traditional hierarchies and
amenable to trade unionism. However, it is argued rapid wartime and
post-war inflation was the most significant determinant of trade union
support. Confronted by this and the tardy response of employers' bank
ILMs effectively broke down, leaving inflation to strip away decade's
worth of incremental increases and promotions. In this way inflation
overcame the hierarchical, generational and geographical divisions that
had impeded collective action at a time when the traditional safety valve
of emigration temporarily broke down. The state was also a factor. The
SBA used the joint negotiating councils set out in the 1917Whitley
Report as a model for collective bargaining machinery in banking, while
Ministry of Labour officials became involved in its attempts to secure
recognition.
i) Attitudes and the FirstWorld War
Waites describes how the sacrifices ordinary people made during
the war compared to the profiteering of an affluent few encouraged a
greater willingness to challenge the established forms of authority on
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which institutional and social life in Britain was based41. During the war
trade unions won substantial improvements for their members in pay
and conditions, contributing to the erosion of those differentials that
had existed between manual and non-manual workers before the war
as well as an example of how these might be restored. Furthermore,
Waites explains this gave rise to a sense among the lower reaches of the
middle classes of being crushed between capital and labour and of being
excluded from the polity due to the close links formed between trade
unions, big employers and the state - in other words an antipathetic
response to the beginnings of the corporatist state charted by
Middlemass - during the FirstWorld War42.
Divining such a change in attitudes amongst bank staff is no easy
matter, but there are definite signs of discontent. Due to the youthful
nature of bank staff many - approximately two thirds of Royal Bank
staff - went to war43. Recruitment increased to replace them (see the
example of Royal Bank depicted in figure 8.1 above), but as new recruits
41 B. Waites, op. cit., pp. 47-49
42 ibid.; K. Middlemass, Politics in Industrial Society, (London: Andre Deutsche, 1979)
43 N. Munro, op. cit., p. 318
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came of age they too left leaving banks perpetually short-staffed and by
1915 staff were complaining about their working conditions in the
Scottish Bankers Magazine44. Overwork took numerous forms. In his
letters the Royal Bank Hunter Square agent complained to customers
and friends of working long hours at the counter, on the ledgers and at
his desk, and of struggling to recruit and retain staff he was continually
having to train45. Eventually lady clerks were recruited from 1917 in
much the same way as their male counterparts. This was dilution, but
on a strictly temporary basis. The men were promised (and
subsequently given) their positions back when they returned. With this
agreement in place, and after some initial misgivings, lady clerks
quickly became a welcome source of assistance. Widespread industrial
unrest after the FirstWorld War prompted fears of class war. The
Hunter Square agent wrote:
"I hope things may quiet down soon. The working classes are getting out of
hand. They will kill the goose but they will unfortunately do for us also"46.
He described a letter received from the National Laundry Workers
Union on behalf of his cleaner in the following terms:
"I would not like to be considered hard, but I think to want the wages to
double is too much, also the dictation of the union is unpleasant"47.
But, it was not only capital and labour in conflict; subordinate
staff were also restless. A general secretary of the Civil Service Clerical
Association between the wars described the effect of military service on
clerks:
"Contact with workers of all kinds of industries in the Army broadened their
outlook. When the war ended they returned full of the spirit of revolt"48.
Scattered comments in the Hunter Square agent's letters indicate that
staff who returned exhibited an unwelcome surliness. Furthermore, the
agent's comment that of the five whom returned to his branch "there
44 See for example Scottish Bankers Magazine during 1915
45 B561/4/2, letters dated 10th May 1915 and 4th Apr. 1916; B561/3/4, letters dated 15th Oct.
& 2nd Nov. 1915, 9th May & 24th Jul. 1917 and 9th Jan. 1918
46 B 561/3/4 letter dated 12th Feb. 1919
47 B 561/3/8, letter dated 10th Sep. 1919
48 W.J. Brown, preface in F. D. Klingender, op. cit.
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was only one I would care to have here again", suggests a degree of
mutual antagonism49. However, this willingness to challenge the
previously polite authority of the banks did not automatically translate
into mass support for trade unionism. Above all it was the effects of
rapid inflation during and immediately after the war that drove staff
towards the SBA.
ii) Inflation
Inflation was a profoundly affecting event. Indices produced by
Feinstein depict average earnings increasing from 100 in 1914 to 209 in
1918, and the cost of living rising from 100 to 21050. Full employment
allowed the unemployed to move into employment and the low paid to
move into more financially rewarding occupations. Wage increases,
paid overtime, night work, bonuses and enhanced piece rates enabled
the average worker's real income to keep pace with rising prices. Few
of these options were available to bank staff, yet the response of the
general managers was to wait and see. Finally, temporary bonuses
were introduced in 1916, an ad-hoc concession granted to avoid
permanently increasing staffing costs in expectation of a swift return to
pre-war conditions51. The bonuses continued throughout the war, but
remained subject to annual review. This reluctance to permanently raise
salaries gained an uncomfortably comic element when Royal Bank staff
were allowed to use the ground behind the head office to grow their
own vegetables, an inflation proof gesture incompatible with the
greater demands being made on their time52.
The ILMs that had insulated staff from the vicissitudes of the free
market for decades proved too rigid to respond to the rising cost of
49 B 561/3/4, letter dated 17th Jan. 1919. In one incident a clerk resigned without giving notice
much to the agent's displeasure. The agent responded by stating "I think he can leave when I
return from the weeks holiday I am getting", in B 561/3/8, letter dated 9th Aug. 1919
50 For a succinct discussion of living standards see S. Pollard (1983), p. 43
51 Each bonus, concession or any other measure intended to benefit staff was announced in the
Scottish Bankers' Magazine, for instance, one of the first announcements came in December
1916 when Royal Bank staff were informed they were to receive a Christmas bonus equal to 10
per cent of their salaries (if earning less than £500)
52 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p 565
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Figure 8.2. annual earnings of 4 subjects who entered Royal Bank in 1876, 1886, 1896
and 1906, c. 1900 - 1937
£
Year
Source: the staff books of the Royal Bank of Scotland
Figure 8.3. Annual earnings of 4 subjects who entered Royal Bank in 1876, 1886, 1896
and 1906 adjusted using the Ministry of Labour wholesale price index, c. 1914-1937
index
1910 1920 1930 1940
Year
Source: the staff books of the Royal Bank of Scotland
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living. The differentials, which the social superiority of clerks rested
exchange for loyal and faithful service were wiped out. Those nearing
the end of their working lives were perhaps worst affected as they
faced an uncertain future after the salaries their retirement allowances
were based upon fell sharply in value (see figures 8.2 and 8.3 above).
Throughout Britain the original proponents of trade unionism re-
emerged to take advantage of mounting staff discontent over salaries
and conditions. In February 1918 the founders of the NABC regrouped
to form the Bank Officers Guild (BOG). The Scottish Bankers
Association, open to all full-time staff followed in November 1918 using
the constitution of the BOG as a guide53. The basic platform of the SBA
then and for the rest of the period between the wars was the
achievement of recognised collective bargaining rights, the introduction
of national salary scales, pensions as of right and an end to the
employment of part-time agents. A. B. MacKay was an early SBA
member and quickly became the Glasgow Savings Bank staff
representative54. The public meetings he and others organised across
Scotland drew enthusiastic crowds; for instance, at a meeting of British
Linen Bank staff in Glasgow 37 of the 40 staff who attended enrolled.
The six hundred members who attended the first SBA annual meeting
in March 1919 voted for it to register as a trade union and in April a
solicitor was appointed as its first general secretary55.
The rapid progress of the SBA galvanised the general managers
into action. The bonuses were continued and, more importantly, staff
began receiving permanent salary increases. Royal Bank staff benefited
from an extra salary round in August 1919 followed by the usual round
in December. That the extra round was intended to appease staff
became apparent when the Cashier made an unprecedented enquiry to
find out what a certain clerk, a member of the SBA's Edinburgh
53 SBA minute bk. 1, 26th Nov. 1918
54 SBA minute bk. 1, 7th Feb. 1919
55 SBA minute bk. 1, 28th Mar. and 9th Apr. 1919
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executive, thought of the increase56. With some justification the SBA
claimed the increases were a response to the indirect pressure its
existence brought to bear, indirect because no general manager would
have any formal dealings with trade unionists. Unofficially, the general
managers made themselves aware of who the leading trade unionists
were. In one incident the Royal Bank board agreed to meet a staff
delegation that included known trade unionists. First a round of salary
increases was approved then the delegates were ushered in and
informed their presence was unnecessary57. The trade unionists present
thought otherwise and embarked on a prolonged campaign to secure
recognition.
iii) The State
The state via the 1917Whitley Report provided a blueprint for
what recognition would entail. The report envisaged industrial unrest
being replaced by state sanctioned arbitration, the joint negotiating
councils it proposed, made up of employers and employees would
ensure "the progress and well-being of the trade from the point of view
of those engaged in it, as far as this is consonant with the general
interest of the community"58. Established trade unions were suspicious
of the report, regarding its councils as a threat to their existing collective
bargaining rights. In banking and other sectors where there were no
established trade unions let alone collective bargaining rights the report
and accompanying involvement of the Ministry of Labour were instead
seized upon as a means of achieving recognition.
In banking the state origins of the report were used to confer
legitimacy upon claims for recognition and to encourage staff to join.
For instance, the BOG issued a circular explaining "(t)he government
56 B 561/3/8, letters dated 5th and 6th Aug. 1919
57 Royal Bank of Scotland Jot Minute Book (uncatalogued), 24th Jun. 1920
58 quoted in K. Middlemass, op. cit., p. 137; R. Lowe, Adjusting to Democracy: The role of
the Ministry ofLabour in British Politics, 1916-1939, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp.78-
95; and T. Adams, op. cit., pp. 515- 516
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have definitely accepted the principle that employees should be
organised into associations to represent their point of view"59. In
Scotland the SBA commitment to Whitleyism led to the executive
involving the Ministry of Labour in its campaign for recognition and in
January 1919 it held the first of numerous meetings with a Ministry
official60. The official made clear the government could persuade, but it
could not compel employers to agree to a Whitley Council.
This was something no general manager would agree to then or
for the rest of the period. In May 1919 a Ministry of Labour official
passed on the SBA's request for recognition to the directors of the
Scottish banks. The directors and the general managers refused to
recognise the SBA or have any dealings with it. The letter the Ministry
received from Alexander Wright was typical of the response (the official
who read them, unaware of the General Managers' Committee, noted
the uniformity of the replies)61. Wright argued against the
establishment of a Whitley Council largely on the basis of propriety,
ignoring the establishment of a civil service council by explaining that
they were only suitable for large industrial concerns. Nor was Wright
aware of any felt need for change; the existing arrangements worked
well enough and he was always willing to listen to any reasonable
request from staff. Given this it was simply "inappropriate" for the SBA
to claim any right to "interfere" in the employment relationship, as this
would only cause "trouble" and "confusion". The general managers were
not wholly opposed to change, but only if it was on their terms. One
59 LAB 2/646/2, reference to BOG circular dated 14th May 1918
60 SBA minute bk. 1, 23rd Dec. 1918, 4th & 21st Jan. 1919
61 The SBA executive regarded the general managers as the strongest opponents of recognition
and it is probably for this reason that they made their first formal request for recognition to the
directors of the banks instead; the general managers regarded this as an insulting attempt to go
behind their backs. Although it is doubtful an initial appeal to them would have been anymore
successful; this action exemplifies an apparent unwillingness on the part of the SBA executive
to inform Ministry officials about the differences between banking in England and Scotland, the
first of many tactical errors that in this instance left Ministry officials to find out for
themselves when presumably they could have been engaged in more productive activities see
LAB 2/646/3, 1919 "Scottish Bankers Association requests the Assistance of the Ministry of
Labour with a view to the formation of a J.I.C."; LAB 2/646/5, entry dated 3rd Jan. 1920
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suggestion was to establish a committee of junior staff to assist in
managing the Institute62. The committee would be wholly consultative
and have absolutely no powers; anything else was an unwanted,
unwelcome and irrelevant infringement upon managerial authority.
8.4 Recognition: trade union tactics and strategic opposition
i) Tactics
The SBA was part of a broader upsurge in public and private
sector clerical trade unionism after the FirstWorld War63. To
understand the tactics it adopted it is necessary to consider how bank
trade unionism developed in Ireland and England and Wales as events
in these other locations influenced and informed the actions of the SBA
and the Scottish general managers. The distinction between tactics and
strategy is important here, it signifies the frequent shifts in approach
taken by the SBA as opposed to the sustained and coherent opposition
of the general managers.
a) Ireland
The Irish Bank Officials Association (IBOA) was more militant,
political and ultimately more successfully than its English or Scottish
counterparts64. The IBOA achieved and retained formal collective
bargaining rights and enjoyed a consistently higher level of union
density than the BOG or SBA ever experienced.
Before 1918 Irish bank salaries were the lowest in the British Isles,
after recognition they remained consistently higher than in Scotland.
This was reason enough for recognition to be refused. However, more
relevant to our present purposes, the managers and directors of the
Scottish and English banks were aware that recognition in Ireland
would challenge the contention that trade unionism was inappropriate
62 IOB minute bk., 10th Nov. 1921
63 F. Klingender, op. cit., pp. 25-56; D. Lockwood, op. cit., p. 140
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to banking. To prevent events in Ireland becoming an example to staff
elsewhere the most vigorous opponents of trade unionism in Ireland
were the directors of banks then recently acquired by English banks65.
However, the threatened suspension and dismissal of trade unionists
was perceived as English led opposition and lent substance to the
nationalism that was already a part of IBOA tactics (it was in the habit of
holding meetings immediately after nationalist groups in halls still
bedecked in the previous occupants' regalia)66. There was also a socialist
element to the IBOA that produced several manifestos calling for bank
nationalisation. Finally, the executive of the IBOA chose to harness the
militancy of its members immediately after the war. At public meetings
the membership drove the industry towards industrial conflict,
demanding the right to take a strike ballot. The executive complied,
regarding any other course of action as likely to frustrate, even alienate
members while strengthening the will of those directors intent on
refusing recognition.
The IBOA was socialist, nationalist and led by an executive that
sought to harness the militancy of its members. In November 1919 it
counted 3,000 of the 3,700 staff working in the Irish banks as
members67. Recognition was finally conceded in December 1919 after
the membership of the IBOA voted overwhelmingly in favour of a
strike.
b) England
Bank trade unionism began in England where the BOG was the
first of the three unions to be formed. The Guild adopted its own set of
tactics: politics were eschewed; it was led very much from the top; and,
despite the inclusion of a strike clause in the Guild's constitution, the
64 A serialised history of the IBOA was published in thcScottish Banker throughout most of
1930
65 On Irish bank affiliations see W.F. Crick and J. E. Wadsworth, op. cit., pp. 348-365
66 LAB 2/646/2, entry dated 8th Jul. 1919; SB Jan. 1920
67 LAB 2/646/1, entry dated 17th Nov. 1919
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executive sought to avoid militant action in favour of portraying itself
as a moderate organisation. The Guild failed to secure recognition.
The resolutely apolitical stance adopted by the Guild saw it
approach MPs from all three parties to secure parliamentary
representation. It also remained outside the TUC because of the latter's
close Labour Party links68. Finally, the first BOG President regarded the
politics of the IBOA with distaste, and went so far as to inform Ministry
of Labour officials about the activities and political backgrounds of
leading Irish bank trade unionists.
The Guild adhered to achieving recognition in accordance with
the Whitley Report: recruiting a majority of staff as members after
which recognition would be automatically granted. To do so the
executive worked closely with the Ministry of Labour, whereas in
Ireland events moved too rapidly for civil servants to have much
involvement. There was an element of faith to this: in the willingness
and ability of the Ministry of Labour to assist; in being able to recruit
enough members; and in recognition being granted without the
additional threat of a strike. However, industrial action in England was
not a plausible option. In December 1919 union density in England and
Wales was only 25 per cent compared to 81 per cent in Ireland69. But, a
strike was not seriously considered either. Indeed, the Guild's executive
was opposed to industrial action. When the IBOA requested support in
the run up to its threatened strike - to help prevent the importation of
strike-breakers - the Guild refused, then acted to restrain its more
militant members70. In May 1920 Welsh Guild members (1,785 of the
68 R.M. Blackburn, op. cit., pp. 134-135
69 A basic problem with figures detailing union density is that no one knew exactly how many
were employed in banks operating in England, Scotland, Wales or Ireland. For example, in
November 1919 the Ministry of Labour estimated 70,000 worked in banking in England, six
months later this had been reduced to 40 to 50 thousand. LAB 2/646/1, figures derived from an
entry dated 9th Dec. 1919
70 LAB 2/646/1, see Memo, dated 25th Nov. 1919 in which Ministry officials identified the
BOG as a restraining influence on the Irish and Scottish trade unions.
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2,000 bank staff employed there) demanded a strike ballot71. The
executive refused, fearing staff would be brought in from Liverpool
where the Guild had few members. Instead, it recommended
concentrating upon recruiting more members leaving Welsh trade
unionists to discuss the methodology of industrial action. However,
throughout England and Wales trade unionists, staff, managers and
directors acted with one eye on the increasingly tense situation in
Scotland.
c) Scotland
The Irish and English bank trade unions marked out much of the
terrain on which the campaign for recognition occurred in Scotland. To
this Scottish trade unionists added a visionary attempt to establish a
clerical alternative to the TUC. Apart from this the SBA vacillated
between the politicised militancy of the IBOA and the moderate appeal
of the BOG, displaying a tactical incompetence exacerbated by
ideological divisions and a woefully bad sense of timing. The inability to
adhere to a coherent strategy carried over into a failed attempt to force
recognition via the threat of industrial action.
At first the SBA adopted the apolitical reliance on persuasion
favoured by the Guild. The SBA also approached members of all three
political parties for parliamentary representation and remained apart
from the TUC and STUC. Again this has been explained in terms of the
status driven desire of clerks to avoid any association with the working
class. There is something to this, but not enough. It is implausible to
disassociate mainstream trade unionism at this time from the Labour
Party. Yet politics of any kind remained incompatible with the
occupational identity of banking. Moreover, setting aside the limited
71 Events in Wales are described in LAB 2/646/4, see in particular a memo dated May 1920 and
entries dated 25th & 31st May, 3rd & 6th Jun. 1920
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electoral support for the Labour Party between the wars72, even a
cursory examination of its policies reveals that they had no obvious
appeal to bank staff, quite the opposite in fact. In local government the
Scottish Labour Party was committed to municipal banking and
introduced small schemes in a number of towns in direct competition
with the banks, indeed, it required an act of parliament to prevent a
Glasgow municipal bank being formed in 193473. Nationally, despite its
appeal to workers by hand and brain, clause 4 of the Labour Party
constitution threatened to nationalise banking during a period of state
sponsored rationalisation. Hence, there was scope for Labour policies to
be perceived as curtailing the expansion of the banks and branch
networks and therefore reducing the possibility of promotion.
Despite the careful concern with avoiding any overt political
allegiances, the politics of the SBA remained enough of an issue for the
executive to make regular public pronouncements disavowing any
political affiliations. Yet the SBA remained viewed by staff as a socialist
organisation. Again this can be explained in terms of misguided clerical
sensibilities, however, a subsequent policy memo set out more
substantive reasons; bank staff knew well enough before they joined
that most of the Association leaders were avowed socialists74. For
instance, reports of MacKay's political career in the union journal The
Scottish Banker made clear where his political sympathies lay while
numerous contributors used a distinctively Marxist terminology to
identify themselves as members of a professional class who, as wage
slaves of the middle class, needed a strong union to obviate the
exploitation of their labour and appropriation of surplus value75.
72. R. McKibbin, "Class and Conventional Wisdom: The Conservative Party and the 'Public'
in Inter-war Britain", in R. McKibbin, (ed.) The Ideologies ofClass, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1991)
73 W. Hamish Fraser, "Labour and the changing city", in G. Gordon, (ed.), Perspectives of the
Scottish City, (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1985), p. 176
74 SBA minute bk. 5, policy memorandum dated November 1936
75 See for example Scottish Bankers Association Bulletin, Dec. 1920 and Scottish Banker for
Nov. 1922, Jan. and Oct. 1924, Nov. 1927 and Jan. 1934
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This Marxist analysis sought to politicise the workplace, using a
language of class to bring into being those antagonistic relations, which
were understood to originate in irrevocably incompatible economic
interests. The identification of bank staff as part of a distinctive class of
professional workers also underpinned the decision to avoid formal
links with the labour movement; an approach justified by actual
contacts made with the TUC. In 1919 an SBA delegation visited the TUC
in Glasgow with the intention of "strengthening our position as a
fighting machine and gaining their influence on our behalf". The
delegation was advised to avoid a strike at all costs and join the
National Union of Clerks instead76. Rather than disband the SBA led
attempts to create a National Federation of Professional Workers - a
white-collar TUC sensitive to the particular demands of clerical trade
work, which it was felt the TUC was incapable of meeting77. Links were
formed with other professional workers in insurance, local government
and shipping. However, once the initial outburst of white-collar trade
unionism that followed the FirstWorld War faded away the NFPW
disappeared. Despite this the SBA remained committed to establishing
links with other organisations and was instrumental in the
establishment of the International Federation of Bank Officials
Associations, a reflection of MacKay's internationalism during the First
World War.
Turning from the grandiose to the practicalities of gaining
recognition the executive divided over how to achieve this goal. It
supported the Irish strike, but opposed similar action in Scotland. This
was despite the will of the membership. A Ministry official who
attended a meeting in Glasgow in August 1919 described how:
"The situation in Scottish banking is becoming somewhat strained ... The
temper of Scottish bankmen especially in Glasgow has been steadily
76 SBA minute bk. 1, 9th & 11th Sep. 1919
77 SBA minute bk. 1, 22nd Nov. 1919
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hardening the past 6 months, and there is a considerable element prepared to
go on strike"78.
The chairman of the meeting repeatedly tried to discuss other matters,
but the possibility of strike action was continually raised from the floor.
Afterwards the executive acknowledged this by demanding recognition
within two weeks and the implementation of the salary scale it had
devised within a month79. It was unclear what would happen if the
ultimatum was ignored. When it was the SBA took no further action.
This was the worst of both worlds: the SBA had established itself as a
passive militant, reassuring to general managers and frustrating to
members.
MacKay now intervened, arguing at a branch delegates meeting
in January 1920 that the choice was between peaceful persuasion, which
he regarded as having failed, or forcible action, which he favoured80.
The delegates voted unanimously in favour of forcible action and
MacKay was elected SBA president at the AGM in March where speaker
after speaker from the floor called for a strike. Under a new president
the executive began arranging a strike ballot, informing the Ministry of
Labour, the press and the general managers of their decision81. The
possibility of a strike, discussed openly since August 1919, did not
prevent staff from joining the SBA. During the ballot the membership
increased from 4,638 to 4,989, yet the executive doubted those who
pledged to strike would actually come out. To remove any doubt it was
decided that only an eighty per cent vote in favour of a strike would be
binding82. However, no plans were made in the event of the strike
going ahead. There was no agreed timetable, no wish to disrupt the
provision of banking services (for this reason as in Ireland agents were
excused from the strike) and no discussion of strike pay, publicity,
sloganeering or picketing. It appears that the executive hoped that as in
Ireland, the vote itself would be a sufficient display of intent. The strike
pledges were sent out in May and the count set for June. The result was
78 LAB 2/646/3, entry dated 21st Aug. 1919
79 SBA minute bk. 1, 7th, 14th & 21st Aug. and 9th Sep. 1919
80 SBA minute bk. 1, 24th Jan. 1920
81 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., p.584
82 SBA minute bk. 1, 25th Apr. 1920. A more cautious member of the executive suggested 90
per cent, even higher than the 75 per cent level originally set out in the BOG constitution
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Table 8.3 Votes in favour of the SBA strike, as of the 6th June 1920 and exclusive of
agents
Bank Votes
Bank of Scotland 560
Royal Bank 525










or 77 % of eligible members
Source: SBA minute bk. 1, p.273
a black farce that set the terms of industrial relations until after the
Second World War.
Despite having called the ballot the SBA executive remained
deeply divided over industrial action. Moreover, these divisions having
previously delayed the possibility of strike until a point when its
support was less assured, resurfaced as the results were announced,
plunging the union into disarray. The SBA was already a victim of its
own success when the ballot was called. Staff were already receiving the
various bonuses and additional salary rounds granted following the
formation of the SBA, questioning the need for a strike. The temporary
lifting of age restrictions on entry to the service of banks operating
overseas meant the disenchanted could emigrate once more and in an
unusual tactic the SBA set up a bureau to help members find positions
overseas. Furthermore, the timing of the ballot appears to have been
decided solely on the basis of MacKay's election and subsequent
decision to push the executive towards industrial action. Consequently,
it took place during the holiday season when business in the branches
was traditionally slack and staff not on holiday moved around the
networks providing temporary cover, making them difficult to contact
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let alone organise. Even so, 73 per cent of the membership pledged to
strike or 77 per cent after the 278 Agent members were excluded from
the ballot83. The final result was too close to reject, but not enough to
persuade the more reluctant members of the executive. Rumours
surrounded James Macauley, who had lost the presidency to MacKay,
of leaks from executive meetings and when the 28th of June was set as
the day of the strike the former president acted84. It was against SBA
policy to have anything to do with the internal associations then being
established in a number of banks. But when an internal association was
proposed in the Commercial Bank where Macauley worked, Macauley
set about promoting it through circulars and staff meetings and
complained in detail about the SBA executive to the Glasgow evening
papers. His actions undoubtedly damaged the morale of SBA members.
The general managers prepared for a strike even if the SBA did
not85. In Aberdeen there were rumours of a lockout and the permanent
replacement of strikers by lady clerks. Bank of Scotland staff were
interviewed and ordered to answer yes or no to the question "are you
willing to stand by the Bank in the event of a strike?". Royal Bank
agents were asked to inform head office if they would be able to carry
on with business as usual and to supply the names of staff willing to
work through the strike. At Hunter Square the agent, after securing
promises of assistance from two former lady clerks and his long serving
accountant, stated on the 25th: "It appears that we do not need to dread
a strike now"86.
The final factor in the dispute was the Ministry of Labour, which
brought its own agenda - the avoidance of industrial disruption. The
Chief Conciliation Officer in Scotland invited the general managers to a
meeting to discuss a peaceful solution to the threatened unrest. The
Bank of Scotland, British Linen, Royal, Commercial and National Bank
general managers attended and, with the exception of James Tuke of
the British Linen bank, agreed to another meeting, which SBA
8-' SBA minute bk. 1 , pp. 273-274
84 SBA minute bk. 1, 5th, 11th & 18th Jun. 1920
85 SBA minute bk. 1 24th Jan., 18th, 22nd & 25th Jun. 1920; and Scottish Bankers'
Association Bulletin, Aug. 1920
86 B561/3/8, letter dated 25th Jun. 1920
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representatives would attend on the condition that the strike was called
off. Clearly the threat of a strike was taken seriously even though it is
unclear what the SBA executive actually envisaged. Thus, with a
probable sigh of relief the SBA executive agreed to the general
managers' proposal and cancelled the strike. The general managers
then withdrew from the proposed meeting claiming that they had only
agreed on the understanding that every bank would be represented.
The Chief Conciliation Officer had no recollection of this condition and
described the general managers' contention as erroneous87. Erroneous
or not no meeting took place leaving the SBA to claim a moral victory
as disappointed and disaffected members began resigning in droves88.
By August conciliatory salary increases had been paid and Ministry
officials, having decided the threat of strike action had passed, left the
two sides to themselves89. Unsurprisingly no strike ballot was held in
Wales.
The debacle of the aborted strike prompted a return to the
moderate tactics practiced by the Guild, so much so that a failed attempt
was made to merge the two unions in December90. Afterwards the
Guild continued its search for non-confrontational means of gaining
recognition and in 1922 won a majority of seats on the Council of the
Institute of Bankers in England91. The SBA executive voted against this
tactic in 1922 before adopting it in 1923, requesting two seats on the
Institute's council92. The council refused and "in view of the probability
of renewed advances by the Association, the president and the vice-
presidents were appointed to a committee to advise the secretary in any
further directions necessary"93. The advances came at the 1923 AGM
87 LAB 2/646/5, memo dated July 1920
88 In mid-July the general managers of Union Bank, Bank of Scotland and National Bank
accepted a Ministry of Labour invitation to another meeting on the condition every other
general manager attended. The other managers refused and the meeting did not go ahead. See
LAB 2/646/5; ibid.; Scottish Bankers' Association Bulletin, Jul. and Aug. 1920;
89 LAB 2/646/5, memo dated July 1920
90 The SBA executive voted against amalgamation in October 1920. By December a majority
of members were in favour of the move. In January 1921, however, the BOG for unspecified
reasons rejected the SBA's overtures. SBA minute bk. 1, 24th Jan & 19th Dec. 1920 and 25th
Jan. 1921
91 M. Savage, (1993), pp. 205-206; E. Green, (1979)
92 SBA minute bk. 2, 6th Jun. 1922
93 IOB minute bk. 3, 9th May 1923
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when two junior staff were proposed for election to the council. At this
the President, AlexanderWright, intervened. There was, he said, no
disguising the fact that these were Association men and that the
Association should not interfere. The Institute was not about capital
versus labour or employer versus employed, rather it was a wholly
disinterested, educational body and "such a thing as class antagonism is
quite unknown in its administration"94. The speech was a passionate and
spontaneous attack on the class analysis of bank employment
developed by trade unionists by perhaps the most prominent Scotland's
banker of the time. It failed to prevent the two SBA candidates being
elected.
Afterwards measures were taken to ensure no more trade
unionists were elected to the Institute's Council. The ballot papers used
in the Institute elections were not anonymous and all council members
had the right to examine completed ballot papers. The Commercial
Bank council member drew up a list of all Commercial Bank staff who
voted for the SBA candidates, and asked them to inform head office in
writing why they had acted in this way and what faults they considered
there to be in the Institute's management95. The SBA complained about
this to the Secretary of the Institute. The secretary acknowledged the
complaint, but could not guarantee voting arrangements would be any
different in future96. Members of the Institute were accordingly more
circumspect in their voting the following year. Whereas in 1923 the SBA
candidates had polled 800 votes, the two candidates put forward in 1924
only received 266 votes97. After this no more SBA candidates were put
forward, its membership had declined steadily since 1920 and after 1924
survival became the executive's prime concern98.
94 Scottish Bankers Magazine Jul. 1923
95 SBA minute bk. 2, 28th Jun. 1923; and Scottish Banker, Jul. 1923
96 IOB letter bk. 8 contains a useful synopsis of the letters exchanged by the SBA and the
secretary dated 6th Oct. 1923
97 SBA minute bk. 2, 20th May 1924; Scottish Banker, July 1923 and July 1924; and Scottish
Bankers Magazine, Jul. 1924
98 SBA membership fell from 4,550 in June 1920 to 3,031 in January 1924, then 1,986 in
May 1930 where it remained for much of the 1930s. On various occasions the executive debated
disbanding the SBA see SBA minute bk. 3, 10th Sep. 1927; SBA minute bk. 4, 9th Jun. 1934
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ii) Strategic opposition
In various ways the SBA executive made its own misfortune.
Divisions over tactics, a poor sense of timing and an apparent naivete
when dealing with the general managers, were not conducive to
success. By contrast the general managers united to present a vigorous
and vehement opposition. This was in part ideological. For instance,
AlexanderWright, Norman Hird and George Scott of Bank of Scotland
supported the Economic League; a right-wing employers organisation
committed to preserving a capitalism unfettered by socialism or
organised labour". More importantly, the general managers were
grand figures unwilling to tolerate any outside agencies interfering in
what they very much regarded as their affairs. At the same time they
were institutionally equipped and well used to taking collective
decisions about matters of common interest. Autocratic and anti-trade
unionist, the general managers' opposition to the SBA took two forms -
intimidation and inclusion.
a) Intimidation
The dismissal of trade unionists was the most overt form of
opposition, but when asked about this and other forms of victimisation
a Ministry of Labour official suggested that there was "rather an
unnecessary fear of this among bank officials"100. There was
undoubtedly an element of theatre when the original SBA Edinburgh
Secretary announced he had intended to refuse the post for fear of
being victimised, but changed his mind on witnessing the strength of
feeling amongst staff101. Yet such fears were justified. Besides the early
example of James MacDougall, shortly after the SBA was formed three
Lalkirk Savings Bank staff were dismissed for being trade unionists and
" IOB letter bk. 7, letters dated 20th Oct. and 7th Nov. 1922. On the Economic League see A.
Mclvor and H. Paterson, op. cit.; and R. Benewick, The Fascist Movement in Britain, (London:
Allen Lain, 1972). The appeal from the Economic League for support placed the general
managers in an uncomfortable position. The secretary of the Institute described the League as an
organisation that savoured of the political and it was therefore inappropriate for a general
manager to associate with. But the League drew support from important customers in the West
of Scotland. As a compromise Norman Hird attended League meetings in a personal capacity
and was impressed by what he heard as he subsequently arranged for League speakers to address
staff debating society meetings, which he personally chaired.
100 LAB 2/646/2, note dated 17th & 23rd Dec. 1918
101 SBA minute bk. 1, 17th Dec. 1918
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two British Linen Bank representatives resigned from the Glasgow
District Executive claiming they had been threatened by their
superiors102. However, obvious aggression soon lost its appeal once the
involvement of newspapers and the Ministry of Labour made dismissal
a potentially embarrassing action.
English bankers were also an important influence and example in
this respect. The leading opponent of bank trade unionism in England
was the Chairman of Midland Bank Sir Edward Holden, who was
quoted as saying "A serpent has raised its head in banking ... I'll smash
the BOG or die on the attempt", and favoured an aggressive
response103. His death and the failure to prevent recognition in Ireland
encouraged a more conciliatory approach consisting of salary increases
and internal staff associations formed with the explicit intention of
rendering the Guild an irrelevance. English bankers encouraged their
Scottish counterparts to follow suit. Norman Hird did so establishing a
staff association in 1919, which explains the low strike vote amongst
Union Bank staff in table 8.3 above. Edward Holden's replacement at
Midland Bank, Reginald McKenna, subsequently visited its Scottish
affiliate the Clydesdale Bank in June 1920 and personally arranged for
staff to move onto the higher Midland Bank salary scale. On leaving he
warned that unless salaries were increased in every bank "the staffs
were bound to become members of the Scottish bank officials
association"104.
However, management support for staff associations varied,
eventually giving way once the threat of industrial action passed
leaving an attachment to more vigorous forms of opposition. Any
advance the SBA made was quickly attacked. In 1923 the SBA
established the Scottish Bankers Educational Association (SBEA) to
provide distance learning materials for staff taking the Institute's exams.
The SBEA quickly proved a success, preparing 775 of the Institute's
1,789 candidates by 1928105. SBEA members became an important
102 SBA minute bk. 1, 23rd Oct. 1919 and 8th Jan. 1920
103 quoted in R. M. Blackburn, op. cit., p. 142
104 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 175-183, LAB 2/646/3, comments of Reginald McKenna dated
7th Jun. 1920
105 SBA minute bk. 2 17th Feb. 1923; SBA minute bk. 3, 31st Mar. 1928; and IOB in
Scotland Annual report 1928
311
source of new SBA recruits, so much so that in November 1924
Commercial Bank apprentices were informed that resigning from the
SBA was a condition of entry to its permanent staff106. Once publicised
this condition was rescinded, but in 1925 staff received a letter from the
superintendent, backed up by interviews conducted by inspectors,
suggesting they resign from the SBA107. Again, once publicised the
letter was retracted, but over the next two years similar measures were
taken to encourage staff to resign from the SBA108.
This measure contradicted as it confirmed what general
managers' thought about trade unionists. Since the establishment of the
SBA it had been dismissed as an organisation for disappointed men,
mediocre grousers not worthy of promotion who, were it not for the
tradition of permanent employment, had no place in banking109. The
levels of union density in Scotland, Ireland and Wales before June 1920
indicates that this was simply not true as does the frequent recourse to
intimidation. Moreover, although only approximately a fifth of all
agents were members (in 1920 278 agents were members at a point
when the banks operated 1283 Scottish branches), a substantial
proportion of agents were part-time thus ineligible for SBA
membership. Therefore, promoted full-time agents were only
marginally less likely than unpromoted staff were to join the SBA.
Rather, the main difference concerned attitudes towards industrial
action as only six per cent of agents who were SBA members voted in
favour of the strike in 1920. Even so it is apparent in the opinion of a
general manager that there was no place in a successful career for SBA
membership. This assumption acquired humorous overtones in
England when the branch manager who led the BOG was informed by
an unsuspecting superior to be on the look out for trade unionists110. In
Scotland the connection between career success and avoiding trade
unionism was made explicit at Royal Bank in 1926 following the
involvement of the SBA in salary negotiations - afterwards staff were
106 SBA minute bk. 2, 8th Nov. 1924
107 SBA minute bk. 2, 4th Jun. 1925; SBA minute bk. 3, 15th Oct. 1925
108 SBA minute bk. 3, 28th Jan. 1926, 15th Mar and 19th & 30th Apr. 1927
109 Ministry Officials described this as the directors and general managers' 'usual line'
110 R. M. Blackburn, op. cit., p. 135
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informed resignation from the union was a condition of being
promoted to an agency111. Chapter 7 described how staff moulded
themselves into a form deemed compatible with promotion. Such
formal links between promotion and non-involvement in the SBA
served to bring the general managers prejudices into being by ensuring
the promoted and the ambitious would shun any involvement in the
SBA. It fell to well-meaning agents to warn staff that membership of the
SBA threatened to consign them permanently to the clerical ranks112.
The SBA had few means at its disposal with which it could alter
how it was perceived. In the Scottish Banker the trade unionist was
described as a principled man whose ability to withstand material
incentives was evidence of a moral fibre even a general manager could
respect and one day reward. The argument was much the same as that
used by the Institute's supporters before the introduction of the bonus
and proved equally unsuccessful. To substantiate it every leading SBA
member who was promoted was seized upon and presented as
evidence that trade unionism was compatible with promotion. That
James Macauley was used for this is more an indication of desperation
than conviction113. More impressive was the well-publicised promotion
of A. B. MacKay to the inspector-ship of the Glasgow Savings Bank in
1934114. However, unreported aspects of MacKay's career illustrate the
unappealing precariousness of the bank trade unionist. A trustee of the
Glasgow Savings Bank, after reading newspaper reports of a speech
given by MacKay, demanded his dismissal in 1932 (MacKay then
managed the Bank's largest branch)115. The demand was ignored, but
the dismissal of MacKay was not a realistic option; besides being a
dedicated employee who invented various new administrative
procedures, he was a public figure and well connected to the labour
movement116. Aside from these notable exceptions it was rumoured
111 SBA minute bk. 3, 3rd May and 9th Oct. 1926
112 SBA minute bk. 2, 27th Apr., 31st May and 9th Jun. 1923
113 Scottish Banker, Apr. 1924
114 Scottish Banker, Apr. 1934
115 MacKay had already been disciplined for his political activities in 1920. See GSB minute
bk. 9, 30th Jan. 1920; GSB Private Minute bk. 13th May and 10th Jun. 1932
116 UGD 129/7/1/32, Autobiography ofA. B. MacKay
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that an unwanted 'promotion' to the far north of Scotland was the trade
unionist's usual reward117.
b) Inclusion
Together with various forms of direct opposition the organised
pastimes and pleasures of staff were harnessed to establish boundaries
of the acceptable. Before the war the general managers and directors
had encouraged staff to participate in the volunteers movement, a
militaristic pursuit compatible with the structured order of the banks.
After the war an unprecedented array of clubs and associations catering
to every taste were formed, extending the world of work into the social
lives of staff to enrich the employment relationship. This discovery of
leisure saw disputes concerning pay, promotion and working
conditions recast as a singular problem of communication. A process of
inclusion, the various activities served to bind staff to their respective
banks. Each was regulated by tacit exclusions, above all, of anything
that implied the existence of antagonistic relations between staff and
their superiors.
Before 1914 staff had established a range of work-related clubs
and associations to fill their leisure time. The relationship of senior
officials to these was straightforward; they may have been involved as
youths, but in promoted maturity tended to have more important
matters to attend to. After the SBA was established what had been signs
of cultural autonomy were drawn into the exercise of hierarchical
authority. Senior officials encouraged the revival of old activities and led
in the formation of new ones. Whereas agents - the banks' middle
management - had run most of the associations existing before the war,
afterwards none was complete unless headed by a general manager, his
assistant or at least an Edinburgh or Glasgow manager.
117 Scottish Banker, Oct. 1927. For example one of the SBA members elected to the Council
of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland at the time of his election worked for the North of
Scotland Bank at Dundee. In between being elected and taking up his seat on the Council he
was transferred to Wick. On arriving at the first Council meeting he was eligible to attend he
and his associate proposed the Institute should pay the travelling expenses of Council members.
Every other member opposed the proposal.
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Leading bankers used leisure to make themselves an immediate
part of their staffs' lives, taking advantage of every opportunity to meet
and greet their subordinates. Respectful of the event's origins the
National Bank annual Glasgow staff dinner continued being chaired by
local officials and agents, however, the array of banking luminaries who
sat at the top table were the real stars. In 1934 these included the
general manager and his immediate predecessor, four head office
officials, four directors and the Lloyds Bank Chief General Manager -
the National Bank's English affiliate118. Each year the Chairman gave
way allowing the General Manager to address his staff. There was no
single message to be heard: in 1934 the General Manager argued
against the nationalisation of banks; and in 1936 advised an audience
smoking cigars after a 7-course meal, "living extravagantly was not the
way to get on in a bank"119. Rather, there was an underlying purpose;
to encourage staff to identify with each other, their superiors and the
banks they worked for through what the National Bank governor
described as "contact between the members of a corporate body, who,
through necessity scattered in actual space, are nevertheless bound
together by the ties of a common interest - that of the Institution which
they serve"120. Between the wars an annual dinner became a means of
"fostering the good feeling that exists amongst our men and also in the
easy relations between staff and the executive", while a golf club
"undoubtedly assisted and cemented a good esprit de corps among the
members of the staff"121.
To bind staff together bank sponsored leisure put in place a
structured normality of contact and understanding congenial to the
existing distribution and exercise of authority. It was not necessary for
senior officials to be interested in the clubs they led, although many
were, rather they should seen to be interested. Alexander Wright, for
example, was President of the Royal Bank Golf Club from its revival in
1920 until his death in 1933, but preferred fishing and was only ever a
118 NS 25, Social Club Minutes
119 ibid.
120 The Teller, Aug. 1929
121 ibid.; RB 291/23, letter dated 17th Feb. 1936 concerning the establishment of an Aberdeen
branch of the Royal Bank Golf Club
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non-playing member. Similarly when William Whyte was brought up
from London to became the Royal Bank Assistant General Manager, he
also became Captain of the golf club, an honour for another non-
playing member that painlessly introduced him to his Scottish
subordinates. In these ways leisure was drawn into the reproduction of
senior management, thickening the sense of hierarchy. When links
between superiors and subordinates could not be made in person other
methods were found. Thus, every issue of The Teller, a magazine
produced for National Bank staff began with a profile of a leading
official, a feature copied directly from the Scottish Bankers Magazine.
However, this reassertion of managerial authority and its
extension into new domains did not impose a unified culture of loyalty
and unquestioning obedience, though it did increase the amount of time
work related activities took up in staff lives. Few people belonged
exclusively to one social circle; most enjoyed different pursuits provided
by different groups and organisations122. Moreover, the hierarchy of
the banks was spread so broadly that it stifled as well as allowed
communication between the ranks. For instance, a critic of the National
Bank golf club noted members only ever talked to those of a similar
standing in the Bank123. Nor was the presence of senior officials always
appreciated. Despite the lure of a snooker table and cheap tea and
coffee, the Institute's Edinburgh rooms were unpopular with staff who
regarded the atmosphere as too managerial124. Rather, when it suited
them staff chose to participate in the broad range of activities on offer,
playing their part in the theatre of the various events at the banks'
expense. However, the involvement of senior officials established the
legitimacy of the various events and associations, confirming their
compatibility with career success. For instance, a good golf swing
swung on behalf of a bank club became regarded as one of the sure
routes to promotion.
Thus, each bank gained an enlarged, official culture in which
senior officials were always interested in their subordinates and where
122 T. C. Smout, "Patterns of Culture", in A. Dickson and J. Treble, (eds) People and Society
in Scotland, Vol. Ill, (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992)
123 The Teller, Aug. 1930
124 LAB 2/646/3, "General Notes on Scottish Banking"
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the experience of work was described exclusively in terms of
camaraderie and fellowship. The series of articles and pictures on "the
Old Brigade" (former staff) published in The Teller, manufactured this as
tradition. Indeed, readers of the banks' official histories, the Scottish
Bankers Magazine or The Teller could be forgiven for thinking bank trade
unionism did not exist. It did, just.
Excluded from this official bank culture the SBA enjoyed a
subterranean status. Its members built up a range of counter attractions
including branch football teams, dinners, dances, whist drives and guest
lectures. These also served to bind members together, encouraged
interest in the union and through the General Secretary's Cup awarded
to winners of the annual golf competition, allowed for the celebration of
an alternative pantheon of heroes125. But this self-conscious mimicking
of bourgeois including bank etiquette - usually with fewer courses and
cheaper wine - had limited appeal. One exception was at Inverness
where a member of the local Bank of Scotland board inherited from the
Caledonian Bank was an early supporter of the Association and chaired
the meeting at which the Inverness SBA branch was formed126. In the
more tolerant atmosphere this afforded 61 of the 75 staff working in the
town's eleven bank offices were fully paid up SBA members as late as
1924127.
8.5 The revival of bank trade unionism in the 1930s
i) Overview
The 1930s witnessed the revival of the SBA due to three factors.
First, changing tenure patterns and the resultant shift in staff
composition increased the capacity of staff to engage in collective action.
Second, the reluctance of the general managers to respond to the
adverse effects of inflation once again gave rise to staff discontent.
Third, the SBA gained a new, more aggressive executive intent on
exploiting any staff grievance.
125 SBA minute bk. 1, 16th Jan. and 14th Dec. 1921, 14th Dec. 1922; SBA minute bk. 2,
21st Mar. 1923; social events organised by the SBA were regularly detailed in Scottish Banker
126 The director was profiled in Scottish Bankers Association Bulletin, Jan. 1922
127 Scottish Banker, Dec. 1924
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ii) Staff tenure and composition
Checkland suggested that there was a bulge in recruitment in the
1920s to staff the extension of the branch networks128. There is little sign
of this at Royal Bank where a rapid increase in the volume of
recruitment was confined to the FirstWorld War. Recruitment declined
thereafter relative to the total number of staff, then absolutely
throughout the inter-war period (see table 8.2 and figure 8.1). Indeed,
the First World War stands out as a transitory window of opportunity
for men as well as women as after 1921 recruitment became more
socially exclusive, a maiden aunt with a few hundred pounds on deposit
receipt was no longer sufficient qualification for an apprenticeship.
Agents at small branches were barred from recruiting staff and at those
where recruitment continued the size of the business attached to
individual applicants determined whether or not they made it onto the
growing waiting list for an apprenticeship129.
The reason for the decline in recruitment was straightforward;
there was little space for new recruits. This was due to the rapid change
in tenure patterns that began immediately after the war (see figure 8.4
below). Although senior officials were initially concerned about staff
leaving, by October 1920 the Secretary of the Institute noted an
increasing number were opting to remain in the 'home trade'130. In part
this was a direct consequence of the War. Every bank honoured its
promise to reinstate staff who had served in the military, of whom an
unknown number returned as 'broken men' incapable of meeting the
demands of life overseas and unable to leave (within a few years the
banks began paying retiring allowances to those who, still suffering the
physical effects of military service, were forced to resign early due to
poor health)131. Of greater significance was the increasing number of
staff unable and unwilling to leave due to a range of international
economic, social and political factors, which had the single effect of
curtailing emigration. South America lost its appeal when rapid inflation
128 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp.648-649
129 See for example B561/3/8, letters dated 1st Dec. 1922 and 8th Jan. 1923; and B 561/3/10,
letters dated 23rd Feb. & 8th Oct. 1931, 10th May 1932, 20th Mar. & 6th Dec. 1933 and 15th
Jun. & 12th Dec. 1934
130 IOB letter bk. 7, letters dated 9th Dec. 1918, 5th Feb. 1919 and 11th Oct. 1920
131 N. Munro, op. cit., pp. 318-320
318
Figure 8.4. The career duration of staff who entered the Royal Bank of Scotland
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left salaries there worth less than those paid in Scotland132. Banking in
South Africa lost much of its lustre when one bank failed immediately
after the FirstWorld War and another was taken over by Barclays after
a few more difficult years133. Elsewhere, colonial banks and bankers
became targets for violent supporters of independence. In India before
and during the Armritsar riots, mobs surrounded and destroyed bank
offices, in one incident killing three National Bank of India staff, while in
Shanghai in 1925 a British businessman was killed during anti-British
demonstrations134. The pursuit of independence subsequently became
less violent, but in its later forms continued the attack on immigrant
labour. In the 1930s Indian staff began passing the exams of the London
Institute of Bankers qualifying themselves for managerial positions. An
Indian Institute of Bankers was established as was a bank staffed
132 Scottish Banker, Jan. 1924
133 S. Jones, "The Apogee of the Imperial Banks in South Africa: Standard and Barclays, 1919-
1939", English Historical Review, CIII, (1988), pp. 892-916
134 C. MacKenzie, Realms ofSilver: One Hundred Years ofBanking in the East (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 234-236
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entirely by Indians, which benefited from the nationalistic sentiment of
native businessmen and politicians135. Social unrest in the 1920s gave
way to economic uncertainty in the 1930s following the world-wide
depression and Canada, a key destination for emigrant Scottish staff,
barred immigration.
Unable and unwilling to leave staff increasingly opted to stay
where they were with consequences for the composition of staff readily
observable in table 8.1. The most important change involved the
increase in the number of clerks at the expense of apprentices. This had
important long-term cost implications; not least the eventual cost of
paying pensions to those who stayed. The eventual reintroduction of
lady clerks combined with mechanisation provided a long-term solution
to this dilemma. Lady clerks, whose temporary attachment to
employment could be relied upon and readily enforced, provided an
alternative source of cheap labour. When young women were
envisaged operating the labour saving machines first introduced in the
1930s significant savings were expected to be made. However, in
Scotland these changes only became significant after the Second World
War136. Until then the expansion of the branch networks was left to
absorb the growing numbers of experienced staff. However, this was
not an option for those banks with slow growing networks. Instead the
Union Bank, then the North of Scotland and Clydesdale Banks, made
passing the Associateship of the Institute a compulsory condition of
entry to their permanent staffs, a measure that had the effect of
inducing turnover. In the opinion of the Clydesdale Bank general
manager this was a fair way of getting rid of unwanted staff:
"In applying this regulation without exception we have had one or two cases
of young men being required to leave who were quite good workers but to have
made exceptions of these cases would have weakened our position in securing
the expulsion of the undesirables"137.
The North of Scotland Bank, which operated the smallest and slowest
growing branch network, went one step further, acquiring an
135 Scottish Bankers Magazine Apr. 193o; G. Jones, op. cit., pp. 217-221
136 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 166-167; NS 133/1 Chief Accountants Letters on
Mechanisation
137 C. W. Munn (1988A), pp. 177-178
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international reputation in the process for being eager to rid itself of
clerks. In 1923,1924 and 1932 a number of clerical staff received
dismissal notices while others were vigorously encouraged to resign138.
However, the universal response during a difficult period for the
banks appears to have been a mounting reluctance to concede salary
increases. This varied between the banks. In the 1920s SBA studies
revealed that Reginald McKenna's intervention had left Clydesdale
Bank staff in receipt of the highest salaries in Scotland139. This caused
particular concern in Aberdeen where at the other Midland Bank
affiliate - the North of Scotland Bank - staff complained they received
lower salaries, yet performed the same duties. In response the North of
Scotland general manager suggested:
"the Clydesdale rates should be reduced, but of course, it would not be easy to
put reduction into operation, although a beginning might be made by their
putting new entrants upon somewhat lower scales"140.
The tensions likely to follow such a measure were avoided throughout
the 1920s because steadily falling prices preserved staff incomes.
Moreover, during a period of mass long-term unemployment a secure
position in a bank had a definite appeal141. However, when the cost of
living began to rise after 1933, salaries once again became a focus for
discontent among an increasingly stable staff no longer able to emigrate
in search of greater rewards.
iii) The Scottish Bankers' Association: militancy, opposition and
affiliation
During the 1920s the SBA redefined the scope of its activities. In
the 1930s a new and aggressive executive that vigorously sought to
exploit mounting staff discontent led it. Membership of the SBA
increased for the first time since 1920 prompting the executive to call a
strike of Union Bank staff in 1937 that was swiftly put down by a
familiar mix of opposition, conciliation and inclusion. The collapse of the
138 Scottish Banker, Apr. 1923 and Oct. 1924; SBA minute bk. 3, 13th Feb. 1932; and IOB
letter bk. 9, letter dated 23rd Oct. 1928
139 See for example the survey published in Scottish Banker, Oct. 1922
140 RB 61/4, letter no. 313, dated 25th Mar. 1927
141 S. Pollard (1983), pp. 186-188
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second strike took with it any qualms about associating with the
mainstream trade labour movement and the prospect of an
independent Scottish bank trade union. After 1937 the SBA formed links
with the Scottish Trades Union Congress/ eventually merging with the
BOG to form the National Union of Bank Employees in 1945.
After 1924 the SBA operated more as a pressure group than as a
trade union, subjecting the Scottish banks to an unprecedented degree
of scrutiny and criticism. A range of contacts and informants ensured
that any injustice suffered by staff was seized upon and publicised142.
For example, a teller convicted of embezzlement became an indictment
of the lax supervision only a part-time (always referred to as alien)
agent could give143. Alongside this a benevolent fund was established
and dismissed staff began approaching the SBA for assistance. The SBA
also drew attention to staff dismissed for breaking the marriage bar,
which prevented (male) staff from marrying until they had reached a
certain salary or age. It was approached by the March of Time newsreel
about this and the no-politics rule144. Discussions about these issues saw
a new language of citizenship being deployed to present recognition as
a civil liberty and trade union membership as "the full and unfettered
democratic freedom of Bankmen"145. In these ways the SBA made itself
an unofficial niche as a last resort for staff. Although certain individuals
were undoubtedly grateful, the majority remained unmoved and SBA
membership remained at little more and usually less than 2,000
throughout the period 1930 to 1935146.
MacKay resigned from the SBA presidency in 1933, to be
replaced by a new, more ideologically determined executive intent on
using growing staff discontent over salaries to force recognition147. The
existing network of SBA branches was used to organise meetings and
142 For various examples of this see SBA minute bk. 3 3rd & 12th Sep. 1931; SBA minute
bk. 6, 30th Jun. & 10th Aug. 1938
143 Scottish Banker, Nov. 1936
144 The most prominent example involved a Mr. Notman of the Commercial Bank, see SBA
minute bk. 5, 3rd, 10th & 28th Jun. and 20th Sep. 1936
145 Scottish Banker, November 1929; for a discussion of citizenship see R. Crompton, op. cit.,
pp. 138-165
146 SBA minute bk. 3, 10th Jan. 1930; SBA minute bk. 4, 7th Dec. 1935
147 SBA minute bk. 4, 1st May 1933; SBA minute bk. 5, 19th Apr., 17th Jun. and 27th Dec.
1936
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rallies across Scotland and wherever possible SBA members involved
themselves in salary discussions in individual banks. Membership
increased from a record low of 1,700 in the middle of 1935 to
approximately 3,700 over the next twelve months148. Given the
reduction in recruitment and changed tenure patterns, many of these
new members had previously resigned from or shunned the SBA.
Staff now joined in increasing numbers an SBA led by an
executive whose politics had moved sharply to the left, a shift indicated
by the vocal support it gave to the Independent Labour Party after it
disaffiliated from the Labour Party 149. The moderate tactics of the BOG
were set aside once more by an executive that asked when to strike not
if. Prompted by fears that salary increases negotiated at Royal Bank
would be deliberately withheld to precipitate a strike, the executive
decided in May 1936: "we must in other words bluff our way through
the summer" after which it was hoped the membership would be larger
and more easily organised150. A publicity agent was engaged to ensure
regular newspaper coverage, appeals were made for a Whitley Council
and the possibility of industrial action was talked up to involve the
Ministry of Labour - anything to ensure that any anti-trade union
measures would be subject to public scrutiny. The salary increases at
Royal Bank were eventually paid in July and an attempt at including
National Bank staff in the ongoing series of campaigns failed. This
staggering of salary discussions left Union Bank the sole focus of SBA
activibes.
All those factors that affected bank employment between the
wars were present at Union Bank to an exaggerated degree. Norman
Hird stood out amongst the general managers for his autocratic ways.
This is how a recent historian of Union Bank has described him:
"the impression which comes down the years is of a man sure of his own
abilities, who saw no reason to temper his views either for other general
managers or for directors. He was also impatient and imperious with his own
148 SBA minute bk. 5, Policy memo dated November 1936
149 For a discussion emphasising the importance of ideology in the disaffiliation of the ILP see
W. Knox, James Maxton, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), pp. 94 - 106
150 SBA minute bk. 5, 23rd May 1936,
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senior officials and, like all general managers of his time, Olympian to
lesser mortals"151.
Lacking an English affiliate Union Bank remained dependent on the
depressed west of Scotland economy for its lending business and lost
ground to rivals in terms of advances. Such difficulties did little to
disturb Hird's self-confidence. Indeed, rather than open new branches
he sought to increase the range of services available in its existing
network only to be held in check by the "A and Us". This meant there
were fewer promoted posts for the growing number of clerks to fill and
little need for their increasingly costly experience. With methods of
inducing turnover already in place additional solutions were
implemented. Recruitment was cut back and junior clerks moved
around the network in place of locally recruited apprentices. Neither
measure proved popular and staff complained about being forced to
move out of their parental homes into digs without any compensatory
salary increases152. Then in May 1936 an apprentice was appointed on a
£20 salary, £10 less than the minimum paid since the FirstWorld War;
the following month a clerk was replaced by a girl on a lower salary153.
Staff grew increasingly concerned about their present situation and
future prospects, yet the internal association had been allowed to lapse,
leaving only an appeal to the board or Hird as an option for the
foolhardy. Lacking any means of airing let alone resolving a growing
list of grievances staff turned to the SBA, which became involved in
salary negotiations in June 1936 and by 1937 claimed 80 per cent of staff
as members154.
The goal of the SBA executive was to initiate a strike at Union
Bank to secure a published salary scale, but it was hoped this would
spread to every bank and become a mass strike for recognition155. In
February 1937 the executive called upon Union Bank staff to strike on
the 30th of April. Now it was the general managers' turn to act. At
every bank lists were compiled of SBA members and agents began
151 A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 178
152 SBA minute bk. 5, 4th May 1936
153 SBA minute bk. 5, 28th Jun. 1936
154 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 589-590; SBA minute bk. 5, 28th Jun. 1936
155 SBA minute bk. 5, 28th Feb. and 7th Mar. 1937
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summoning staff into their offices to discuss how membership of the
SBA might affect their future careers. At Union Bank appeals were
made for outside help in the event of a strike and existing staff were
ordered to sign a no-strike agreement156. Finally, Norman Hird stated
that the employment of all those who striked would be terminated and
their pensions forfeited157. The threat worked; the strike collapsed on
the morning of the 30th of April. The other general managers now
acted quickly to prevent unrest spreading. For instance, at Bank of
Scotland a general salary increase was paid and the rules governing
staff marriages were relaxed158. Some months passed. Union Bank staff
had already benefited from a generous salary round whenWilliam
MacPherson, the leader of the strike on the Union Bank staff, was
dismissed and one of his associates taken aside and informed that he
had "no future" with the Bank159. The SBA executive rejected the
suggestion of industrial action to force MacPherson's reinstatement;
two failed strikes it seems were enough160.
In the aftermath of the second abortive bank strike membership
of the SBA declined rapidly once more prompting the executive to give
up trying to win recognition by its own efforts and instead seek new
allies more in keeping with its ideological leanings. Some opposition
remained, but as the National Federation of Professional Workers had
long since disappeared there was no alternative but to form links with
the Scottish labour movement. The dismissal of MacPherson (he later
found employment with the Civil Service Clerical Association)
persuaded a majority of members to vote in favour of affiliating to the
STUC and the executive encouraged SBA branches to affiliate to their
local trades councils (MacKay, who had returned to chair an SBA action
committee in 1936, forged even closer links when he was elected to the
STUC General Council in 1941)161. Affiliation brought new and
156 SBA minute bk. 5, 28th Jun. 1936, 9th Mar., 11th Apr. and 1st May 1937
157 S. G. Checkland, op. cit., pp. 589-90
158 S. G. Checkland, ibid.; A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 184
159 SBA minute bk. 5, 29th and 31st Oct. 1937; 41st Annual Report of the STUC, 1938, p.
177
160 SBA minute bk. 5, 7th & 20th Nov. and 5th Dec. 1937, 9th & 16th Jan. 1938
161 SBA minute bk. 5 , 6th and 27th Mar. 1938; SBA minute bk. 6, 29th May 1938 ; and
Scottish Banker, Apr. 1941
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influential allies. A general manager had once used his position on the
board of an insurance company to stop it advertising in the Scottish
Banker162. In 1938 the SBA was able to respond in kind when Scottish
Co-operative societies withdrew their accounts from Union Bank
branches163. However, the SBA executive still considered its members to
have particular needs and in 1939 approached the STUC about
establishing "a special committee for the purpose of organising
professional and clerical workers into appropriate trade unions"164. The
proposal was rejected to avoid an atmosphere in congress that clerical
and professional workers "needed to be specially coddled to be brought
into the general movement" and "anyway such workers were no worse
organised in Scotland than was women labour generally"165. Affiliation
certainly brought the SBA new and supportive allies, however, closer
ties it seems did not immediately produce greater mutual
understanding.
8.6 Conclusion
The desire of bank staff to remain apart from the working class
and the British labour movement undoubtedly influenced the appeal,
character and development of bank trade unionism. However, this was
always more than a matter of status. Trade unionism in Britain was
inextricably bound up with politics and the Labour Party. The former
was incompatible with the carefully watched apolitical occupational
identity of bank staff, while the latter in local and national government
espoused policies inimical to the interests of banks and bank staff.
Furthermore, the various encounters between the SBA, the TUC and
the STUC reveal that neither side was especially sympathetic towards or
intent on understanding the interests of the other. Thus, when the SBA
did eventually affiliate to the STUC it was an act of desperation after a
second abortive strike and in the absence of what were regarded as
more compatible allies. All this exemplifies the fact that the
162 SBA minute bk. 6, 29th May 1936
163 SBA minute bk. 6, 2nd Oct. 1938; NC 25, "Minutes of Meeting of the Committee of
Scottish Bank General Managers, 4th Jul. 1938; and A. Cameron, op. cit., p. 184
164 Motion No. 18 submitted to the 1939 Scottish Trades Union Congress detailed in its Forty
Second Annual report, pp. 196-198
165 ibid.
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development of bank trade unionism was a more complex process than
has been previously assumed.
Those additional factors identified in the introduction are key to
understanding this complexity. The geographical and hierarchical
dispersal of staff within bank organisations along with their routine
movement during the course of their careers (plus emigration) militated
against any form of collective action at least until the mid-nineteen
twenties. So did the emphasis on following orders within organisations
geared to manufacturing the dependence of each employee in the
interest of encouraging loyalty and with this an unquestioning
deference that facilitated the exercise of hierarchical authority.
More than this, senior officials routinely intervened to define
meaning within the workplace. This became apparent after the SBA was
established, then excluded from the official culture of banking in
Scotland. The SBA itself proved an unsuccessful rather than a passive
agent, which lacked the tactical ability or resources to overcome the
opposition it encountered or the cultivated common sense that trade
unionism was incompatible with career success.
Consequently, the rationale underpinning staff attitudes towards
trade unionism can be specified in more detail. Mass support for trade
unionism originally derived from the failure of bank ILMs to protect
staff from the effects of inflation during and immediately after the First
World War. However, the subsequent inability of trade unionists to
secure recognition called into question the worth of the SBA. After 1920
the meaning of trade unionism was defined by the pointed use of
intimidation, which drew direct links between SBA membership and
career failure. Consequently, the SBA became an organisation
understood as having no legitimate function and SBA membership as
something that could adversely affect the financial well-being of staff. In
these circumstances bank staff rightly concluded that the potential costs
of trade unionism outweighed any tangible benefits. To be sure the SBA
subsequently sought to secure any available niche, taking an interest in
staff education, welfare and civil liberties. But these were lesser,
typically transitory or else isolated matters compared to the basic and
ongoing concern with salaries and promotion. In this way trade
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unionism coalesced on the fringes of banking, as a last resort called
upon only after the existing paternalistic structures of the banks failed.
The temporary revival in SBA fortunes during the 1930s confirmed as it
threatened to change this. It was only after the demand for increased
salaries during an inflationary period was rejected that staff turned once
more to the SBA. However, the failure to translate occasional successes
into widespread recognition saw the SBA remain a last resort.
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Chapter 9: Conclusions
This thesis has used the example of bank employment to
examine the social identity of clerks and the lower middle class during
the period 1850 to 1939. It is a significant contribution to knowledge in
that it has adopted an inter-disciplinary approach to deepen our
understanding of a then growing social stratum, which has been the
subject of limited (negligible with regards to Scotland) academic
historical research. More specifically, the individual chapters of this
thesis have made the following contributions.
First, the analysis of social identity and employment required an
examination of the business of banking that was undertaken in chapters
2 and 3. Although largely derived from existing studies, this presented
new data to substantiate, build upon and modify many of the
conclusions reached therein. This also entailed producing the first, albeit
brief, academic history of the Royal Bank of Scotland, a key Scottish
institution.
Second, the analysis of employment undertaken in chapter 4
introduced theories drawn from economics to historical research, which
were then assessed and applied to illuminate processes of interest to
both disciplines.
Third, the standard of living experienced by a specific group of
workers was assessed. In the process, analytical and methodological
issues of relevance to the broader assessment of historical living
standards were highlighted.
Fourth, it has provided a quantitative analysis of careers
unparalleled in duration and detail. This allowed existing conclusions
based primarily upon qualitative data to be assessed, and entailed
developing and applying computer based prospographical techniques
to produce a substantial career database based upon staff records that is
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now available for future research, as well as identifying appropriate
methods of interrogating this data and presenting findings.
Fifth, on discovering that a majority of subjects left the case
study organisation shortly after commencing employment within it,
where and why they left was identified then related to the broader issue
of how emigration affected Scottish culture and society, another key
aspect of the recent Scottish past that has received limited academic
attention. The example of bank emigres was then analysed as a cultural
and emotional phenomenon to illustrate processes of broader interest
and applicability.
Sixth, a history of bank professionalisation and source criticism
was used to produce a critical alternative to existing status based
accounts of how the subjects of this thesis viewed and were viewed in
society.
Finally, it has provided the first account of Scottish bank trade
unionism. This focused upon the content and conduct of industrial
relations, while remaining sensitive to insights gained from the
sociology of collective organisations as well as white-collar trade
unionism.
Turning now to the argument of this thesis. As Crossick notes
the term clerk provided a convenient shorthand for a social group to
which social and moral meanings have been attached1. Flowever, it has
been argued that as with the term lower middle class, the term clerk
requires careful use due to its imprecision in relation to the work
content and labour market experience of specific groups of clerical
employees. Moreover, it was shown that clerk was frequently
accompanied by pejorative connotations, rendering it a term of abuse
as well as description, qualifying its analytical worth. Finally, it was
argued that the term clerk only refers to one position amongst several
others, which the subjects of this thesis regularly passed through during
1 G. Crossick (1991), p. 166
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the course of their careers, an important aspect of clerical employment
the term fails to acknowledge.
Thereafter, the subjects of this thesis emerged as more
adventurous, pragmatic, anxious, cynical, critical, frustrated and
successful. In other words, more complex figures than the established
characterisation of clerks as little more than status obsessed drones
allows. Given the detail of the analysis this is perhaps unsurprising.
However, it derives from an approach, which involved setting out the
key postulates that dominate the current understanding of clerks and
the lower middle class, then subjecting these to a sustained and
systematic critique. Consequently, it has been claimed that much of
what has previously been assumed about the economic experience,
values and social attitudes of clerks, and concomitant social theorising, is
in need of significant modification, more cautious use or else being
discarded altogether.
The first task of this thesis was to establish the economic
experience of bank staff. This necessitated outlining the development of
banking in Scotland, which was seen to have occurred over three
phases. During the first phase beginning with the 1844-45 Bank Acts,
Scottish banking came to be dominated by a single tier of substantial
joint-stock concerns, a structure that essentially remained intact until
after the Second World War. Disagreement between the banks about
the conduct and scope of competition was resolved in 1857 by the
failure of the Western Bank of Scotland. This removed the main
opponent to the "Edinburgh" desire to avoid price competition as well
as damaging the stability and reputation of the Glasgow banks that had
previously challenged the hegemonic authority claimed by the public
banks. The General Managers Committee that followed epitomised and
expressed the crucial role the general managers played in the strategic
management of the banks, a distinctively Scottish characteristic. The
dispute over the opening of Clydesdale Bank branches in the North of
England and accompanying opening of London offices saw the
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geographical scope of the banks' business clarified in the 1870s, an era
the City of Glasgow failure brought to a close.
Compared to events during the preceding three decades the
period 1878 to 1918 was marked by an unremitting pursuit of control
and an apparent conservatism. In a growing economy and with no new
entrants to Scottish banking there was only limited pressure on the
banks to change their ways. Furthermore, the collective control
exercised by the general managers withstood external and internal
challenges to the resultant status quo, as well as exercising a
conservative influence capable of holding innovation in check. The
trauma of the City of Glasgow failure was also a factor; afterwards
every bank adopted an approach to asset management that favoured
liquidity over risk. The banks as a result grew slowly relative to the
British economy, while in England a process of merger and acquisition
comparable to what occurred in Scotland in the first half of the
nineteenth century took place, but was carried much further. The
resultant giant English banks subsequently became another
conservative influence on banking in Scotland.
Between the wars Scottish banking entered a third phase. It
continued to be dominated by a static number of well-run, stable and
substantial organisations whose structure and cautious approach to
asset management, which saw increased lending to government during
the war continue thereafter, confer on each one the capacity to
withstand the vagaries of a troubled Scottish economy. Indeed, on a
balance sheet basis the banks thrived compared to other established
sectors in the Scottish economy. At the same time there was an element
of frustration, with limited opportunities to undertake acceptable forms
of lending to be sure, but also with the continued commitment to
collective agreement. Driving this was an apparent concern with scale
made tangible by the English affiliations that occurred immediately
after the War. The subsequent pursuit of scale saw the remaining
independent banks regain a degree of individuality. Besides the
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common strategy of opening more branches, which Commercial Bank
undertook on an unprecedented scale, Bank of Scotland made repeated
attempts to merge with other Scottish banks, Union Bank struggled to
introduce new services, while Royal Bank acquired three English
concerns. However, in other respects when change occurred, it did so
gradually, as with the introduction of savings accounts, and
incrementally, for example, the modest experiments made with
advertising. Consequently every bank grew larger, but in Scotland they
remained much the same organisations in 1939 as they had been in 1918
or 1878 for that matter.
One final transition, which commenced before 1918, concerned
the conduct and nature of Scotland's bankers. The growing complexity
of bank organisations and the business of banking saw every bank
confine the recruitment of chief executives to its own staff. In the
branches too a similar transition occurred as part-time agents gave way
to full-time staff. Here, however, additional factors featured. The new
breed of agents offered the banks a safe, controllable pair of hands in
keeping with the emphasis on branches as primarily functioning to
gather deposits.
Within this overall account the history of the Royal Bank of
Scotland was examined to establish that as an organisation it can be
considered representative of Scottish banking as a whole. In addition,
this allowed various events detailed in the preceding chapter to be
considered in more detail, while illustrating the conduct of management
and how this was a crucial determinant of organisational form and
performance. In broad terms the development of Royal Bank
conformed to the three phases set out above, moving rapidly towards a
common model, which was subsequently conformed with, then
departed from in key respects between the wars.
During the first phase Royal Bank was transformed by the
adoption of joint-stock banking. This was largely the work of Lawrence
Robertson who rapidly built a branch network, then oversaw the
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necessary adaptation of the head office using the remains of the
Western Bank - its branches, agents and key head office staff - to make
Royal Bank Scotland's largest bank on a balance sheet basis. In doing so
Robertson overcame the reticence of the board to make the Cashier an
official possessed of executive powers subsequently utilised by James
Fleming when he completed the organisation of the nineteenth century
bank by successfully opening a London office in 1874.
The second phase saw Royal Bank conform to the collectively
agreed conservatism that affected every Scottish bank. Its uniqueness
during this period largely derived from a distinctive Edinburgh identity,
which left it operating at an increasing remove from trade and industry
in the west of Scotland, then the main driver of the Scottish economy.
Instead much of the new business taken on involved lending in London,
to the financial sector in Edinburgh and eventually, following a number
of key managerial appointments, to those engaged in speculative
financial activities in Glasgow. Despite these areas of growth Royal
Bank fared relatively badly and for much of this period Scotland's
second bank held the fourth largest share of Scottish bank assets and
liabilities.
During the final phase Royal Bank regained its position as
Scotland's premier bank. Growth began immediately after the war with
more intensive use made of an expanding Scottish branch network.
However, this pursuit of deposits necessitated finding additional
lending outlets. This need undoubtedly encouraged the unique policy of
acquiring and affiliating with English banks, a strategy facilitated by the
Bank's independent Scottish status, the earlier difficulties experienced in
lending in Glasgow and the close links the Cashier formed with leading
financial figures. Nevertheless, in Scotland the organisation of the Bank
and the services provided remained indistinguishable from every other
Scottish bank.
Employment was considered in chapter 4. It was shown that
what economists define as an Internal Labour Market (ILM) was put in
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place at Royal Bank during the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Use was made of competing theories drawn from economics to account
for this development. To begin with in key respects the account of
banking set out in chapters 2 and 3 was identified as being in keeping
with the outlines given by Williamson and Kanter of the type of
organisations where ILMs occur; banks were substantial, stable
organisations that operated with the capacity to shift resources from
more to less profitable activities in response to demand. In addition,
their structure and approach to asset management served to insulate
them from the vagaries of the Scottish economy, while the collective
establishment of effective controls over interest rates contained the
potentially destabilising consequences of unrestricted price competition.
Thus, banks were in a position to offer long-term employment, while
the absence of any dramatic or rapid changes to their organisations or
services meant the quantity and quality of labour demanded remained
stable.
Again the development of an ILM at Royal Bank was identified
as a cumulative process that occurred over three phases and can best be
understood as a consequence of several factors. First, it was shown that
throughout the first half of the nineteenth century staff were typically
recruited as apprentices from a pool of youths already connected to the
Bank as the friends and relatives of staff, shareholders, customers and
directors. Employment was frequently long-term; in some instances
lasting an entire working life during which staff participated in what
was described as a benevolent autocracy wherein they received a range
of paternalistic benefits. In keeping with Williamson's transaction cost
approach it was argued that this regime served routine business
objectives. In circumstances where monitoring was expensive, time
consuming and imperfect, and opportunistic behaviour costly, a range
of benefits were used to elicit loyal and faithful service, which can best
be understood in general terms. This paternalism was accompanied by
rules governing the economic lives of staff intended to prevent them
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from being tempted to steal or otherwise be distracted from their
duties. These rules were also influenced by the social expectations of
customers, senior officials and directors. Prospective rewards -
incremental salary scales and promotion - were introduced to give staff
an incentive to stay at minimal cost during a period when the labour
market favoured sellers over buyers and the scope for offering
immediate benefits was constrained by the effects of unrestricted
competition on bank profits. It was argued that prospective rewards
remained in place alongside the various paternalistic measures to
encourage loyal and faithful service.
The second phase was initiated by the adoption of branch
banking, which posed unprecedented problems of control. Due to the
limited administrative capacity of head office, employment was left to
occur in a head office core and branch network periphery. However, in
both locations a switch to internal promotion for a majority of
promoted posts completed the ILM. This was due to four factors.
Firstly, cost - internal candidates typically received lower initial salaries.
Secondly, capacity - the rapid expansion of the branch network gave
Royal Bank the ability to meet its staffing needs internally. Thirdly,
preference - the proven loyalty of existing staff. And fourthly, the
explicit and influential attachment of staff to seniority in the allocation of
salaries and promotions. In addition, staff tenure acquired a distinct
pattern. While a majority of promoted, long-serving staff stayed a
growing number of inexperienced and therefore cheap, apprentices and
clerks began passing through the Bank in increasing numbers due to
the limited opportunities available in an organisation that possessed ill-
defined career structures, a stable, relatively youthful cohort of senior
officials, and made continued use of external recruitment to fill
promoted posts in the branches.
The final phase began with the appointment of a new Cashier -
James Fleming - who transformed employment as part of a broader
series of measures intended to minimise cost and maximise efficiency.
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Fleming introduced new procedures for recording staff details that
allowed careers to be monitored with precision and staffing to be
managed with greater ease. These new bureaucratic resources along
with the introduction of bank-wide salary scales recreated employment
as a system geared to managing hundreds of geographically dispersed
staff. More than this they embodied an attempt to secure the Cashier
the right to manage staffing matters as he alone saw fit, which required
ending the influence of seniority. Instead, managerial estimates of
ability would provide the sole criteria on which allocative decisions
were based. Securing this discretion freed up prospective rewards to be
used to encourage individual effort. All this entailed transforming the
culture of the Bank, which involved making the entire staff part of an
enhanced benevolent regime. In so doing the staff came into being as an
abstract, collective whole, replacing the individuals that had previously
received the Cashier and the board's personal attention. At the same
time the staffwas made subject to a new, more authoritarian discipline
grounded in routine assessment and epitomised by the shift from
expecting to assuming subordinates would do as they were told
without question.
In chapter 5 how staff fared until 1918 was related to the broader
issue of clerical living standards, which have generally been viewed in
pessimistic terms. This pessimism was assessed using a quantitative
analysis of careers during the period 1873 to 1914. Unsurprisingly, it
was observed that as the organisation of the Bank grew annual
recruitment also increased. However, a key finding was the tenure
pattern that emerged during the third quarter of the nineteenth century
intensified and a growing majority of recruits left on or shortly after
completing an apprenticeship. This saw the careers of those who stayed
acquire a particular form; a majority moved around the branch
network on a gradual, upward spiral that saw organisational,
hierarchical and geographical mobility merging to form careers that
typically lasted an entire working life. Approximately half of those who
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stayed became agents. Most of the remainder only progressed as far as
branch accountant. However, a small number were brought into one of
the major offices early on in their careers where they remained to
become senior officials charged with managing the entire bank.
Although the rate of promotion declined until the 1900s, the likelihood
of promotion gradually improved. This improvement in career
prospects supports a more optimistic view of clerical living standards.
In addition all staff were incorporated into the Bank's
paternalistic regime and began receiving a broadened range of free or
subsidised allowances and benefits. These significantly increased the
worth of bank employment and disposable incomes of staff. Thus,
salaries were only ever part of a more substantial package of rewards.
The worth and range of this package increased during the course of
each career, as did salaries. Consequently, staff experienced a distinctive
life-time earnings curve made up of gradual increases resulting from
movement along incremental salary scales and promotion to more
highly rewarded positions. This persisted throughout the first two or
three decades of each career then flattened out as each subject reached
his final career destination. During the last quarter of the nineteenth
century falling prices rather than rising wages have been identified as
the main cause of improved living standards. Therefore, the earnings
curve staff pursued served to enhance their living standards during this
period. After 1896 most staff, the exception being those already at the
top of their earnings curve, received incremental increases that grew
ahead of rising prices. So there is little evidence that any individual
cohort experienced a significant decline in its living standards relative to
manual workers. However, there were intermittent signs that the rate
at which successive earnings curves grew fluctuated and periodically
slowed down, trends likely to have left staff more susceptible to
inflation in the 1900s.
Besides these particular concerns it was established that career
mobility - routine promotion to more highly rewarded positions, plus
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progression along clearly defined salary scales - and the monetary
worth of the additional benefits staff received, pose a distinctive set of
analytical and methodological challenges for any assessment of clerical
living standards. When they are not taken into account, then the worth
of such employment will tend to be significantly underestimated.
Turning now to what became of those who entered then left a
Scottish bank during the course of their working lives before 1914; in
chapter 6 it was possible to identify the fact that only a minority
remained in Scotland or Britain for that matter. There were few service
sector jobs in Scotland and many of these were in the process of
acquiring professional barriers to entry. However, this was not the
point. The system of employment outlined above was geared to
managing and perpetuating a high rate of turnover amongst junior
staff, which was used to provide a source of cheap labour to perform
the routine tasks that dominated bank work. This made Scottish
banking a training ground for other banking systems; a majority of
those who entered then left a Scottish bank during the course of their
working lives subsequently found employment in banks operating
elsewhere in the English speaking world. Scottish staff were initially
recruited to assist in founding these other concerns, then became a
source of expert labour. The worldwide expansion of joint-stock
banking and bank organisations, plus widespread use of discriminatory
recruitment and employment policies ensured that there was always a
bank somewhere willing to recruit Scottish staff who were pulled
overseas by the relatively greater salaries and promotion prospects on
offer.
The volume and routine nature of emigration made it intrinsic to
the psyche of bank staff. Furthermore, emigration was an intimate part
of staff lives and coloured their views of empire. This occurred at an
economic, social, political and emotional level. Indeed, for some, the
latter was perhaps the most important as emigration and empire were
primarily known through distant sons, successful friends and
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opportunities foregone in favour of the known and the secure clung to
in Scotland. However, it was also argued that the cultural imaginaries of
emigration and empire, because they were dominated by praise for
emigrants and the countries they went to, by implication entailed a
critique of Scottish social and moral conventions. Indeed, this emphasis
on praise introduced the idea of a distinctively Scottish culture of
emigration. In simplistic terms empire serving as a testing ground for
national heroes, rather than, as in England, a dumping ground for
criminals and public school wastrels. However, this distinction
dissipated towards the end of the century, as empire became a source of
British glory. What remained were social distinctions that derived from
the character of the emigrants themselves. In banking at least, although
the aspirational motives involved were universal, Scottish staff were
marked out by their dress, demeanour and accents, but above all by
their lesser social origins, while their frequent success overseas
supported a belief in Scottish meritocracy.
This history of emigration served to refine the claim that clerks
adhered to a belief in society as being meritocratic. Certain Scottish
institutions were not perceived as being meritocratic. Instead,
meritocratic structures existed elsewhere with those who participated in
them the true meritocrats. The history of the Institute of Bankers in
Scotland presented in chapter 7 confirmed this interpretation.
Professionalisation emerged from the career ambitions of young men
intent on achieving success in Scotland. They sought to realise this by
forming an Institute that would introduce professional qualifications to
allow human capital - gained through a professional education - to be
transformed into economic rewards - promotion. Furthermore, the
formation of the Institute revealed that bank staff were willing to act
collectively to bring meritocratic structures into being. It was founded
by an association of bank clerks and drew much of its impetus from
what became a sustained critique of existing staff assessment methods
as well as the inequalities these were seen to allow. However, the
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limited organisational and financial resources of the Institute's original
proponents, meant that the professional ideal was almost immediately
made over to those already in charge of the banks.
The subsequent history of the Institute illustrates what
importance staff attached to status without any economic foundation
and education without any financial benefit. The answer is very little.
Andrew Kerr claimed that professionalisation was necessary on moral
and economic grounds, those who ran the Institute rejected the
necessary restrictions over their authority it would entail. Indeed, in its
ceremonies and administrative arrangements the Institute served to
reinforce existing structures of authority, transforming senior officials
into grand, sponsors of the profession. Despite this those charged with
managing the banks and the Institute attached little weight to its
qualifications, believing character was more important than the
cleverness exams measured. Consequently, in the absence of any
material rewards a majority of staff ignored the Institute, while those
who took its exams regularly complained about their worth. Thus it
was necessary to introduce material rewards - the bonus scheme - to
secure the success of the Institute, preserve the reputation of Scottish
banking and ensure Scottish bank staff remained attractive to
alternative employers. Only then, and in the absence of any further
concessions, did the Institute secure an eventual majority of new
recruits. Even so many of the candidates who came forward only
remained attached to the profession for as long as it took to claim the
bonus.
However, what began as a grand project did affect some
changes. Although character remained key and in career matters the
general managers' opinions remained final, some technical knowledge
came to be regarded as integral to a successful career. Moreover, at
every level the existence of the Institute heightened a sense of banking
as a distinct and exclusive occupation. Along side this banking became
more meritocratic. The role of influence was self-consciously reduced
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and ability, though not necessarily that shown by passing exams,
instead became the primary determinant of career success.
Between the wars bank staff established a trade union; the
Scottish Bankers Association, another institution intended to influence
bank employment in Scotland and the subject of chapter 8. Some
historians and social scientists have depicted the limited scope, size and
influence of clerical trade unions as being primarily a result of status
concerns. Clerks, so this argument goes, were more concerned with
status than material rewards and would not associate with any
organisation that smacked of the working classes. The account of
professionalisation given above revealed this peculiar obsession with
status was neither as pressing nor as pervasive as has been supposed,
while the history of the SBA introduces a range of other pertinent
factors. As Lockwood originally noted the circumstance of bank
employment militated against the formation of collective organisations;
staff were geographically dispersed over a large area and worked in
small units of production. In addition staff regularly moved within and
from each bank. All this served to reduce the possibility of forming the
links necessary for collective organisation as well as severing those ties
that were formed. Furthermore, career mobility and emigration
provided the individual with a plausible means of improving his
economic position without recourse to collective action. While all this
reduced the potential for staff to engage in collective action, the
emphasis on, and occasionally vigorous assertion of, hierarchical
authority discouraged them from doing so. Nor, given the summary of
livings standards set out above, was there any pressing need to
challenge the status quo. Indeed, the origins of bank trade unionism
were located outside the workplace where it began as an expression of
a few idealists' firmly held political beliefs, which conflicted with the
resolutely practical and apolitical self-image of banking. This also served
to undermine the appeal of trade unionism.
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Circumstances changed. Rapid wartime then post-war inflation
substantially reduced the worth of bank employment. The reluctance of
senior officials and directors to respond saw staff turn en masse to trade
unionism. This and the eventual threat of strike action forced substantial
salary increases. The subsequent tactical failure of trade unionists when
confronted by resolute and aggressive opponents left the SBA,
following the first abortive strike, at a remove from a carefully
constructed legitimate bank culture intended to strengthen the ties
between superiors and subordinates and between staff and the banks
they worked for. Furthermore, this process of inclusion plus the
periodic use of intimidation ensured that trade unionism was regarded
as being incompatible with career success. Much the same set of
circumstances reoccurred on a smaller scale in the 1930s. As the general
managers strove to contain the resultant increase in staffing costs by
inducing turnover, freezing or reducing salary scales and moving
towards the introduction of mechanisation and cheap female labour,
staff acquired a growing list of grievances. At the same time the
composition of the banks' staffs had changed. Tenure patterns changed
after the war due to the reduced appeal and availability of employment
overseas, and within a few years staff were more likely to stay than
leave. This greater stability enhanced the capacity of staff to engage in
collective action. It also increased the cost of failure; with few alternative
sources of employment, most were unwilling to risk salaries and
pensions for the less certain benefits of trade union recognition.
Consequently, the second attempted strike for recognition also failed
before it started, taking with it what remained of the SBA's credibility
and the desire for a trade unionism that operated at a remove from the
mainstream labour movement.
Turning now to the social identity of those who worked in
Scottish banking. In social history postmodernism has served as a useful
corrective by drawing attention to previously subordinate identities.
Postmodernism and the associated linguistic turn has contributed to the
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fall of class and encouraged interest in other ways of knowing2. Indeed,
as stated in the introduction the category of social identity was
deliberately adopted to avoid many of the theoretical and practical
difficulties associated with the study of class. Moreover, by its very
nature class is outwith the scope of a study focused upon employment
within a single occupation. Nevertheless, a singular concern with social
identity can imply the desire to replace one over-arching category with
another; class by another name as it were. But in a narrowly based
study this is less of an issue. More importantly, the lack of identity let
alone identities is itself a key issue that derives in part from the fact that
those understood to have resided in lower middle class and worked as
clerks were typically described by others, not themselves. Hence, the
remainder of this conclusion considers this lacunae, seeking to account
for something where it has often been assumed there was nothing.
Bank staff participated in whatWright Mills described as a
personality market, selling their personality as well as their labour.
Much of what contemporary and subsequent observers have described
unwittingly records the consequences of this. Christopher Cauldwell,
for example, noted that the petite bourgeoisie "has no traditions of its
own and it does not adopt those of the workers, which it hates, but
those of the bourgeois, which are without virtue for it did not help
create them"3. Such an account disregards the possibility that traditions
can be appropriated and incorrectly assumes they exist as hermetically
sealed entities. Nor was much evidence of hatred found during the
course of this thesis. Rather, at most there existed an unchallenged
aloofness at least until 1914. Finally, given the ideological importance of,
for example, Samuel Smiles who lived much of his early life clinging to
the coattails of the bourgeoisie, such an account is simply wrong4.
2 ibid.; P. Joyce (1994)
3 Crossick and Haupt, op. cit., p. 191
4 A. Briggs, 'Samuel Smiles and the Gospel ofWork', in A. Briggs, (ed),Victorian People,
(London: Penguin, 1954)
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More importantly Cauldwell and others miss the crucial point
highlighted by Wright Mills that business demands shaped the public
persona of bank staff and of clerks more generally. As much as the
great columns adorning bank head offices, the demeanour and dress of
those inside impressed upon customers that these were reliable, secure
even rather boring institutions. However, to imply that clerks
possessed an anterior self of greater authenticity, though appealing is
false. How staff behaved at work was part of their social identity,
indeed an important part that was intended to influence how others
saw and related to them as well as the institutions they worked in. But,
it is necessary to recognise much of what this entailed was cultivated,
then deployed to meet commercial imperatives. For example, deference
was not innate; rather it was something picked up then set aside each
working day, allowing an other self to be lived in private.
Even so the public guise adopted by staff was never completely
alien from their private selves. The social criteria that informed
recruitment as well as the selection opportunities, which emigration
subsequently afforded were used to ensure as much as possible that
banks were staffed with the right sort of people. This was a matter of
personality, attitude and interests as well as social background. Indeed,
while the post-bank careers of some individuals record the decision
banking was not for them, the subtle selectivity that accompanied
emigration was a means of dispensing with those deemed to be not for
the banks. Nevertheless, this thesis has shown that selection and
personal inclination only went so far.
Banks sold and sell services. The quality and appeal of a service is
intimately related to the personal characteristics of its providers. In
banking the importance of this relationship was magnified by the
prevailing competitive environment, the prominence of the banks in
public life and the nature of bank customers. These factors made the
identity and character of staff key business concerns and staff were
accordingly obliged by various rules to live social, political, cultural and
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economic lives that were as inoffensive as possible. Various rulings
barred staff from participating in any other form of economic activity,
an expression of authority that served to confirm their dependent
status. They were also barred from participating in politics, a ruling,
which casts new light on Crossick's observation that before 1914 the
lower middle class did not play a significant part in the polity (though
this of course ignores their importance as voters)5.
The position of staff and pressures they were subject to is
exemplified by the marriage bar, which forbade male staff from
marrying until they had reached a specified salary level (that marriage
bars are usually understood solely in relation to women illustrates how
little is known about clerical employment). The bar was the outcome of
numerous concerns. It ensured that staff would not attempt to raise a
family on an income so low they could not afford to live a style of life in
keeping with the sensibilities of senior officials or customers. Security
was also a factor; the fear was married staff on low salaries would be
tempted to steal to support their families. It was also in keeping with
careers; single staff with few ties or responsibilities, could more easily
move around the networks and had less reason to stay in Scotland. In
these ways the marriage bar exemplifies the assumed right of senior
officials to intervene in the private and emotional lives of their
subordinates in ways that determined key aspects of their social
existence. Such interventions shaped how others perceived staff. For
instance, Banks suggests that the rise in the age at which clerks married
was a consequence of them postponing marriage until they had reached
an acceptable income, whereas here this same behaviour can be
explained as a natural consequence of a slow down in promotion rates6.
More than this, Young depicts a bourgeoisie intent on standing
on the shoulders of those just beneath them, raising themselves up
while holding others down. There is something to this, but not enough.
5 G. Crossick (1991), pp. 173-174
6 J. A Banks, op. cit.
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Bank staff functioned as gatekeepers who stood between the great
resources of the Scottish banks and customers. This conferred power
and granted daily access to the upper echelons of society. It also
involved judging the status claimed by more affluent others,
scrutinising much of what made up their sense of self and periodically
finding it wanting. Indeed, as a rule banking involved taking a greater
interest in the quantity than the quality of wealth. Status was all very
well, but it was a poor security and no evidence of business acumen.
The offence such presumptuousness caused undoubtedly affected how
staff were perceived as it entailed rejecting those limits imposed on their
social behaviour. Taking these additional factors into consideration
allows much of what has been taken to be social analysis to instead be
regarded as self-serving, often vitriolic disdain. But again, such accounts
cannot be set aside, as they were integral to the making of the social
identity of bank staff.
In significant ways then during the nineteenth century more
affluent, vocal and powerful others shaped the social identity of bank
staff and of clerks more generally. Indeed, the clerk, whether
understood as dependent, inoffensive and politely deferential, or
officious, small-minded and pretentious, was largely a construct
moulded to serve the social and commercial interests of these others,
whether this entailed the social aggrandisement of Young's emergent
bourgeoisie, or the more immediate commercial imperatives observed
in banking. As such "clerk" as a social identity was implicated in the
conduct of social relations as an intervention that served to disempower
and contain an often-disruptive social presence.
Thus the shaping the subjects of this thesis were subject to was
predicated upon the right assumed by others to intervene and impose
rules governing their lives outside the workplace. No indication was
found in the historical record before the 1930s that these rules or this
right were either challenged or even questioned, indicating at the very
least that staff accepted them. Areas of tacit agreement supported this
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acceptance. A mutual interest in the banks, which all depended upon for
employment was one such tacit agreement, which was intensified at
Royal Bank between the wars by the introduction of a staff share
scheme to coincide with the 200th anniversary of the Bank. More
importantly the logic of the rules was accepted as an equitable part of
the employment relationship, although in the case of the marriage bar
this was partly due to a majority leaving before it had any meaningful
effect upon their lives (consequently between the wars the concern with
civil liberties derived in part from the change in tenure patterns). Thus,
when this reciprocity was absent, as occurred repeatedly after 1917 the
authority the functioning of bank organisations depended upon was
repeatedly challenged.
However, although staff were moulded to be sure, they also
moulded themselves into a form deemed compatible with career
success. While this primarily occurred within parameters set by the
rules and regulations governing bank employment, it also involved a
search for other ways of being known. Indeed, professionalisation was
in part a reaction by staff to how others saw them and an attempt at
constructing a new, positive identity. The clerks who initiated the
Institute of Bankers in Scotland hoped to become bankers and as such
rank alongside other professionals. The hoped for transformation did
not occur. However, the desire remained and in the run up to the First
World War staff began describing themselves as bankmen and bank
officials, while simultaneously debating what these new terms meant.
These are all signs of creativity; bank staff sought to influence how they
were perceived by others and by themselves. They are also evidence of
an independent sense of self that remained uncertain, fragile and
fragmentary.
The concern with who and what staff were continued between
the wars. At the Institute the nature and status of the banker became a
recurring subject of debate. Norman Hird and others proposed
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applying for a Royal Charter, provoking a debate on the relationship
between status and "practical business efficiency"7:
"the Council have tried to get from the members who have brought the
suggestion a statement of the advantages which are to be expected from such
an application if successful. All they succeeded in obtaining, however, is a
vague hope that in some way not clearly explained the existence of a
Charter would improve the status of the men employed in banks and place
them in a position nearer to that occupied by professional men such as doctors
and lawyers"8.
The critics were right to be sceptical. With the Institute held at a remove
from the allocation of labour, banking lacked an autonomous body
capable of directly influencing employment matters, which remained
very much the prerogative of the general managers. Banking
constituted a profession essentially because it had acquired the
trappings of one. Apart from this the professional banker remained a
relatively private matter, of some importance within banking, but of
limited significance outside where customers had little reason to pay
attention to the qualifications of those they dealt with.
Outwith the Institute the search for new forms of social
description took a novel theoretical turn. There is little sense of banking
having been perceived as an industry engaged in manufacturing a
product; rather it carefully and politely provided a service. Hence the
importation of Marxist terminology from other industrial disputes and
its crude use by trade unionists to depict staff as proletariats subject to
capitalist exploitation, proved more jarring than it did accurate or
7 IOB letter bk. 6, letters dated 6th, 8th & 17th May and 31 st Aug. 1918; IOB letter bk. 7 20th
Nov. 1919; IOB minute bk. 4, 23rd May 1933 and 14th Apr. 1939. Hird also proposed
introducing a more elaborate range of educational activities, making passing as an Associate of
the Institute a compulsory condition of employment and ending nominated memberships. These
measures, although less radical than the proposal in England to stream staff into managerial and
clerical grades on the basis of their exam performance, were all rejected: "the passing of an
examination is not necessarily the test for banking efficiency" and "in all the banks there are
men holding responsible positions who are not associated with the Institute, and it is felt that
the granting of a Degree or Diploma to their fellows might affect adversely the harmony which
is well known to exist among Bank men"
8 Memorandum on Proposal for Royal Charter, in IOB letter bk. 10, March 1939
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inspiring9. A more qualified socialism underpinned the introduction by
trade unionists of the "professional worker". As with Klingender's 1935
account of "clerical labour", professional worker acknowledged as it
qualified a shared proletarian status. However, conventional wisdom
suggested otherwise. To Brian Aldiss's bank manager father between
the wars workers were feckless, lazy, scroungers, what he called "our
non-banking friends"10. Setting aside the pejorative nature of this
description it illustrates the acute and persistent sense of difference
wherein worker (and labour) denoted a social group no bank staff felt a
part of. Again this can be seen in terms of status, yet the economic and
cultural experience of bank staff did place them at a remove from those
they regarded as workers. Moreover, the promotion that featured in
every career typically carried staff to a social world no worker was a
part of. Finally, what a professional worker was remained ill defined.
The short-lived National Federation of ProfessionalWorkers, which
offered to give the term an institutional basis, exemplified this. It was
founded on the belief that organised labour did not appreciate the
particular nature of clerical employment, yet what this was remained
unclear.
Other terms were introduced, most obviously capital and labour,
that assumed the existence of distinct sides. Yet the acceptance and
sharing of interests described above questioned the meaning of such
distinctions. So did the careers staff followed as promotion ensured that
any lines drawn between managers and men were routinely blurred.
This had important ideological consequences. George Bernard Shaw
once explained that when he worked as an estate agent's clerk he and
9 On the frequently alien nature ofMarxist terminology see G. Orwell, "The Road to Wigan
Pier Diary", in S. Orwell and I. Angus (eds.), The Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of
George Orwell Volume /, (London: Penguin, 1968) p. 201; that an eminent Edwardian critic of
Marx, Professor J. Shields Nicolson of Edinburgh University, was responsible for teaching
economics to Institute students indicates opposition to Marxism also possessed more
substantive intellectual foundations, see E. J. Hobsbawm, Dr. Marx and the Victorian critics, in
E. J. Hobsbawm (1964), p. 243
10 quoted in R. McKibbin, "Class and Conventional Wisdom", in R. McKibbin (ed.), op. cit.,
p. 273
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his peers strove to think like managers11. What Shaw gave, as evidence
of clerical self-delusion instead appears here an entirely reasonable
assumption given the likelihood of promotion identified in chapter 5.
Promotion had other consequences; it ensured the attachment of staff
to any one position remained transitory. Instead the possibility of
realising career ambitions provided a superordinate structure linking
the numerous positions staff held. Hence, the deliberate identification of
subjects throughout this thesis as staff rather than as clerks or tellers to
accommodate the hierarchical movement careers entailed and avoid
focusing upon precise positions and grades.
What remained were the banks themselves, indeed, as staff
moved within each organisation the banks became one of the few
remaining constants in their lives. What many of the other identities
devised during the period covered by this thesis had in common was
the prospect of detaching or distancing staff from the banks. Yet this
was exactly how staff identified themselves. For some this identification
focused upon individual banks, so much so it allowed for the
construction of collective identities. For example, National Bank staff
called themselves the Nationalists. To outsiders the difference between
Nationalists and RB men [Royal Bank staff] were imperceptible, but to
staff they were real enough to allow inter-bank golf, football and
bowling tournaments. The banks themselves formed a significant
presence at these events as each dinner organised by staff to celebrate a
retirement, promotion or transfer typically beginning with a toast to
the appropriate bank. In this way staff found a tacit, but palatable
means of acknowledging their economic dependency12.
More than this, staff as participants in a personality market
personified the banks they worked for, especially agents who carefully
crafted public personas to attract business. There were some exceptions
particularly amongst the substantial minority who stayed in Scotland,
11 quoted in G. Crossick (1977), p. 24
12 NS/25 Social Club Minutes, 1888-1951
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but did not reach management. These included the quiet, grey men
employed for "life and good conduct" that Robert Service watched
waiting for their pensions before deciding to emigrate (see chapter 6
above). These grey men retreated each night into the privacy of their
homes, gardens and local church halls, to all intents and purposes
abdicating from the social world13. Yet even they shared in the
obligation to be as reassuringly inoffensive, dull even, in other words to
maintain a public persona that served to engender confidence in and
supported the business of the banks. This process was encouraged by
the autocratic paternalism practiced in banking, which produced an
employment relationship wherein staff were expected and rewarded
for subordinating their social selves to their employers. Thus, the social
identity of bank staff was defined by and in relation to the great
institutions they worked for. In the absence of either plausible or
appealing alternatives, the subjects of this thesis became of the banks
rather than for themselves.
Further study
The economic and social history of clerks, lesser professionals
and the lower middle class more generally remains seriously
incomplete. As this study has focused on a single example, paying
particular attention to the economics and culture of employment, it
cannot by itself do more than begin to address this omission, while the
broader applicability of the conclusions reached remains to be
ascertained. Therefore we need studies of other forms of clerical
employment and other aspects of lower middle class life. In addition
certain topics considered in this thesis have significant implications for
other areas of historical enquiry.
The history of work in particular, its meaning, content,
conditions and rewards remains seriously incomplete. It still retains its
13 Bank Notes, Feb. 1907
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focus on trade unions and manual work within large, heavily capitalised
environments, resolutely omitting other forms of work and other
locations. To be sure there are, for example, business histories of
insurance companies and legislative histories of welfare institutions. But
there are few social histories and even fewer labour histories of such
organisations. Similarly, studies of employment rarely consider the
existence and operation of ILMs, or where and why they were
established. Although the well-developed study of employment in
railway companies is one exception to this, the subject matter otherwise
conforms to the traditional canons of labour history, for instance, the
detailed attention already paid to the Triple Alliance formed in 1914 by
railway, coalmining and transport workers' trade unions. Given the
post-war shift towards non-manual employment and the replacement
of the factory by the office as the typical working environment, this
focus threatens to render the history of work increasingly antiquarian.
Moreover, the need to examine the historical antecedents of current
works forms is made even more pressing by the recent and well
publicised changes made to office work including downsizing, the
ending of jobs for life, homeworking and hot desking. In other words,
we need a better understanding of practices that are currently in the
process of becoming history.
A particularly Scottish concern is emigration and the empire. The
frequent use of geographically defined case studies tends to impose an
analytical framework that is self-selecting in its subject matter, focusing
more on subjects who stayed than left. While further study of
emigration as a macro-phenomenon is needed, case studies would
allow a more detailed understanding of the processes involved. Here
the use of a single occupation has produced significant results. The
study of other occupations and professions either individually or on an
inter-occupational and/or Scottish-English basis would make it possible
to establish whether the conclusions reached here are of broader
applicability. Indeed, it remains to be established whether the close links
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between emigration and employment in banking were replicated
elsewhere and formed a distinctively routine aspect of Scottish labour
market behaviour.
Finally, this historical study has benefited from an inter¬
disciplinary approach. As the study of white-collar workers and/or the
(lower) middle class remains a substantial sociological cottage industry,
the historical study of the same group can only encourage greater
communication between the two disciplines. Similarly, the frequent
emphasis in economics on theory and acceptance of data as a given
rather than a phenomenon of interest in its own right, means the
historians' study of economic phenomena and use of source criticism
can provide a context, encourage further dialogue between the two
disciplines and allow detailed empirical analysis. Such relationships are
mutually beneficial. By testing and applying theory drawn from other
disciplines the historian, while remaining firmly embedded in the
analysis of change over time using detailed historical material, is
equipped with new questions to ask and new ways of illuminating
findings.
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Appendix 1: Researching Careers
Introduction
Formal careers, by which I mean careers that involved moving
through a succession of related positions ordered in a hierarchy of
prestige and authority, were intrinsic to bank employment. From the
outset this influenced the methodology used in this thesis, necessitated
finding longitudinal data that recorded appropriate career information
and devising effective methods of analysing this data. How each of
these issues was addressed is discussed below.
Sources
The great strength of longitudinal data is it allows the researcher
to examine the movement of historical subjects through the various
stages of their life-cycle, understood here in a more narrow sense as a
formal career1. Thus, it becomes possible to consider how historical
subjects conceived of and acted in relation to their own past and future.
The challenge is to find data that provides enough detail and is of
sufficient duration to support this type of analysis.
The substantial bureaucratic organisations that developed in the
later nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries provide one source.
These include the Scottish banks, substantial, private bureaucracies, that
in a number of cases had already achieved a notable degree of
longevity by the mid-nineteenth century. Amongst the various banks,
the Royal Bank of Scotland archive contains four successive (and
accessible) volumes, which succinctly detail the entire Royal Bank
careers of full-time, non-manual staff. The form and range of data is the
same in each book; half page entries record the name of each subject
1 For an account sensitive to life-cycles and there effects see R. J. Morris, The Middle Class
and the Property Cycle during the Industrial Revolution" in T. C. Smout (ed), The Search for
Wealth and Stability: Essays in Economic and Social History presented to M. W. Flinn,
(London: Macmillan, 1979)
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and either directly or indirectly enable their year of birth to be
identified. Thereafter the positions they held and offices they worked in
are listed, as is the year each position was taken up. In addition when
staff began receiving specific salary levels is detailed along with any
other allowances they received. This data makes it possible to consider
the organisational, geographical and salary careers staff experienced.
Database design and construction
Computers were early on identified as an appropriate research
tool due to the volume of data and the fact it was presented in a
standardised form, as well as the type of analysis to be undertaken.
Database software was used as it provides an effective means of
analysing the combination of numerical and nominal data contained in
the staff books. The particular package chosen - Microsoft Foxpro version
2.5, for the Apple Macintosh - was used to produce a relational database
based upon the staff records. This also allowed information drawn from
other sources to be readily incorporated into the analysis. In addition
data was moved into and out of other packages: Excel, to undertake
more complex arithmetical procedures than could be readily
undertaken using Foxpro; and Cricket Graph, to produce graphs.
When modeling the database attention was paid to the benefits
of Entity Relationship Modeling (ERM). ERM sets out a method of
incorporating actual relationships between individuals and
organisations into data structures2. The major building blocks of the
universe under scrutiny are identified as entities that are reproduced as
tables, then the relationships between these entities specified and used
to provide a basis for linking the various tables. Arguably this is an
intuitive approach that renders the eventual database a model of the
universe it represents. However, at a pragmatic level it is time-
consuming as it involves producing a substantial number of tables.
2 J. Bradley, "Relational Database Design and the Reconstruction of the British Medical
Profession: Constraints and Strategies", History and Computing, 6, (1994), pp. 71 - 84
356
More theoretically the resultant data model reifies positions, practices
and organisations that are themselves analytical subjects. Consequently,
Bradley's comment that in a database of doctors constructed in
accordance with ERM principles practitioners and positions would
require separate tables because positions "have an existence
independent from the practitioner", is incompatible with the conception
of organisations as the ongoing achievement of agents3. In other words
take away the incumbents and the positions cease to exist, while
different holders of positions that share the same title can affect how
that position was perceived and what it involved.
The data structure eventually used is set out in see figure A.l
below. It corresponds to what Bradley describes as a "simple semantic
model"4 That is it merely reflects the employment relationship
(represented by the salaries and positions tables) between the subjects
and the Bank (the branches table). This design allowed the benefits of
relational database software to be secured; data derived from additional
sources and structured in different ways can be readily incorporated by
the creation of additional, linked tables5. First tables were produced
using the staff records, then other information culled from post office
directories, the records of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland and the
Scottish Bankers Literary Association and a gazetteer (the process of
linking this data is described in Appendix 2) was used. This additional
information was held in separate tables, thus, its unique origins were
preserved in the data structure in tables designed to accommodate the
particularities of each source. Additional tables were also compiled
containing various coding schemes used to categorise the data to
facilitate analysis. Before data entry commenced in earnest the above
structure was tested via a pilot study that involved 26 subjects.
3 ibid.
4 ibid.
5 D. Greenstein, "Multi-sourced and integrated databases for the prosopographer', in E.
Mawdsley et al (eds) History and Computing III, (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1990)
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Figure A1 Model of the basic data-structure used in the analysis of careers in the
Royal Bank of Scotland
Source Limitations and solutions
Few manual staff (primarily messengers and porters) or part-
time agents were included in the staff books. But, as neither of these
groups was either numerically large or central to the analysis, their
omission was not considered a significant problem. However, there
were a number of other more important systematic omissions.
As discussed in chapter 4 the staff records appear to have been
established by John Fleming when he became Cashier in 1873.
Unfortunately it appears career information is only available for a
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minority of staff recruited before 1873 who still worked in the Bank by
this date, while those who entered and left before 1873 are not
recorded. Therefore, the staff records are a poor guide to careers before
1873. Thereafter it was considered necessary to establish how
representative the staff records were (see the discussion of what this
entailed in Appendix 2).
Thereafter the available career information is truncated due to
various factors. First, there was an apparent tendency to omit the date
that staff recruited in the 1890s and 1900s left the Bank. The analysis of
career duration undertaken in chapters 5 and 8 sought to accommodate
this by using three categories: under 10 years; 10 to 40 years; and over
40 years, instead of precise figures. Although somewhat arbitrary these
categories were intended to distinguish between those who left early on
in their working lives, those who left during their working lives and
those who remained at Royal Bank from adolescence until retirement
or death. A leaving date was available for a majority of those placed in
the first category, most of whom left within 5 or 6 years of being
recruited. As most of the subjects with no leaving data do not appear to
have progressed very far up the salary scales or the organisational
hierarchy, it was assumed they too left shortly after being recruited and
for this reason were placed in the under 10 years category. This
judgement was supported by the fact it was not possible to find most of
these subjects in additional staff lists compiled independently of the staff
books. The probable explanation of this omission is that so many staff
passed through the Bank at this time, there was little inclination to
maintain a detailed record of their careers. Even so it was possible to be
more confident about the assumption that a majority of these subjects
left within 10 rather than 6 years of being recruited.
Secondly, the staff records appear to have remained in use until
the Royal Bank of Scotland merged with the National-Commercial Bank
in 1969. Consequently, it is not possible to identify when staff who were
recruited after 1925 and stayed until after 1969 (as appears to have
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routinely occurred) actually left the Bank. Because of the probable
reasons for this omission where it appeared appropriate these subjects
were placed in the over 40 years category. Here, as above, it was
apparent that to have done otherwise ran the risk of inducing an
unjustifiable systematic bias into the analysis.
Thirdly, another apparent consequence of the reorganisation
undertaken by James Fleming was the removal of information about
careers spent in head office from the bank records. Consequently, very
little information is available on employment at head office after 1873.
This created three possible problems concerning staff who spent their
entire careers at head office, staff who entered at head office then
moved into the branch network and staff who moved to head office
from the branch network. As recruitment appears to have become
confined to the branches before 1873 the first two problems do not
appear to be significant. The third was overcome by linking the staff
records to information on senior officials contained in the Edinburgh
Post Office Directories. This additional source did not provide
information about those that went to head office, but did not become a
senior official. However, by default it can be assumed they remained
clerks.
The staff records understandably provide the greatest amount of
information on those who spent their entire working lives as Royal
Bank staff. This has the potential overemphasise continuity and stability.
This was significant because before 1914 the attachment of most of the
subjects to Scottish bank employment was only transitory. Moreover,
the two distinctive types of career that emerged and were identified in
chapter 5 were closely related to one another. The solution to this
discussed in chapter 6 was to undertake a complementary analysis of
data derived from the records of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland
and Aberdeen Grammar School on subjects who entered then left
Scottish banking. This enabled the relationship between Scottish bank
employment and emigration to be considered.
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Finally, the framework to be adopted when analysing
longitudinal data posed a number of further challenges. At its most
basic the choice is one of emphasis, whether to adopt a chronological or
cohort-based perspective. This can be illustrated by considering the
assessment of promotion rates. Savage argues a slow down in
promotion rates contributed to the rise of bank trade unionism before
1914. He found that 37 per cent of those who entered Lloyds Bank
during the period 1890 to 1901 were promoted with 22 years, whereas
for those who entered during the period 1902 to 1913 this fell to 15 per
cent. This perspective focuses upon the experience of distinct entry
cohorts and refers to events that possibly overlapped during a period
extending from 1890 to 1941. This is arguably too broad a period to
relate directly to more chronologically precise behavioural information.
Instead, here the length of time taken by staff to be promoted during
specific periods was measured as this was considered a more
meaningful guide, particularly when considering the likely relationship
between promotion and staff turnover. Moreover, as a majority of staff
emigrated within a few years of entering the bank, they were only able
to use those promotions that occurred during this window of
opportunity to assess the rate of promotion. However, the ideal
solution is to select whichever perspective can be judged more
appropriate to the issues under consideration.
Conclusion
This appendix has described the main source used in this research
- the staff books of the Royal Bank of Scotland - as part of a broader
discussion of longitudinal research. The pragmatic approach to
exploiting this data using information technology was then set out;
primarily the creation of a relational database. For pragmatic and
theoretical reasons the key concern when developing a data structure
was to ensure additional information derived from other sources could
be readily incorporated into the analysis.
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Issues encountered in using this data were then considered. In
part these derived from the traditional historian's task of source
criticism, examining how, why and when the staff records were
produced, and what implications this has for their accuracy and use.
Then longitudinal data was identified as posing a distinct set of
analytical challenges, particularly when considering what perspective to
adopt, which it was argued can only be resolved in relation to the
questions being considered.
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Appendix 2: Record Linkage
Introduction
The core of this thesis is the simple statistical analysis of career
information contained in the staff books of the Royal Bank of Scotland.
Initially record linkage was considered unnecessary; the staff books by
themselves would suffice. However, record linkage was used: to
supplement and enhance the data these contained in three ways: first, to
ascertain the reliability of the staff books; second, to provide an
alternative source of career information; and third, to enrich the
information contained in the staff books so as to support additional
lines of enquiry. The additional data this involved was derived from
other Royal Bank records, Institute of Bankers in Scotland records and
the Edinburgh Post Office Directory. The following sections outlines the
method of record linkage used and details how and why it was used to
address a series of methodological and historical issues.
Record Linkage
All historical research involves record linkage, linking together
information from independent sources in which individuals are
distinguished by name. Following Elkit, record linkage is worthwhile
when it is possible to determine when a link can be considered true or
false and when linkage can support conclusions that could not
otherwise be reached1. Linkage is subject to two risks: making a false
link between information that refers to two or more different
individuals; and failing to make a link between information that refers
to the same individual. These risks are magnified in prospographical
analysis where linkage can involve hundreds, even thousands of
individuals.
1 J. Elkit, Nominal Record Linkage and the Study of Non-Secret Voting: A Danish Case",
Journal ofInterdisciplinary History, (1985)
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Mass semi-automatic rule-based linkage refers to a range of
computer based techniques devised to link information about many
individuals culled from different sources2. All involve exploiting the
ability of computers to manipulate large amounts of data to speed up
the linkage process. This benefit needs to be set against the practical cost
of acquiring the necessary skills and software/hardware needed.
Moreover, to quote Adman et al:
"It is our belief that no systematic algorithm, however sophisticated, can
perform this task as well as an experienced team of researchers assisted by
an appropriate set of software tools"3.
From the outset it was decided that the small number of subjects
involved did not warrant the above costs. Instead computer use was
limited to sorting and selecting candidates for linkage.
Rules about when to accept or reject a link are central to record
linkage. Morris explains rules merely formalise judgements based upon
the historian's appraisal of the sources and appreciation of the social,
administrative and political processes their production involved4.
Moreover, the apparent facticity of rules when incorporated into
computer based procedures threatens to obscure their expert, but
ultimately subjective origins. In addition, rules tend to be closely linked
to the kinds of data at hand and the range of question for which they
were designed5. However, the rigidity of rules can overcome the
frequently partial nature of judgements made on an ongoing basis.
But, issues arise when information other than names is used to
assess the validity of a link. Criteria central to the purposes of an
enquiry cannot be involved in this process as this may induce
systematic bias. For instance, it would be reasonable to assume an agent
called John Smith included in one list was the same John Smith listed as
2 See the variety of approaches outlined in the record linkage issue of the journal History and
Computing, 4, (1992)
3 P. Adman et al, "Computer-Assisted Record Linkage: Or How Best to Optimize Links
Without Generating Errors", History and Computing, 4, (1992), p. 2
4 R. J. Morris (1994), p. 301
5 ibid. p. 3
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an agent in a later source on the basis of their shared name and status.
However, this would incorporate assumptions about job stability into
the linkage process, inducing an element of systematic bias. And yet the
use of names in isolation may not be sufficient. The tendency in banking
to confine recruitment to those already connected to each bank and
their kin. Thus, false links could be made, for example, between fathers
and their sons. For this reason additional information was cautiously
used when necessary to allow the maximum number of links to be
made.
The actual linkage process involved compiling lists of candidates,
then establishing links on the basis of names, while bearing in mind
various contextual factors. In general where there was more than one
candidate for a link additional information was used, primarily age data,
for instance, staff did not get younger over time. In addition the timing
of certain career events was also used. For example, it was only possible
to be an apprentice once. Neither of these additional criteria was
considered capable of inducing any significant distortions due to their
nature and restricted use.
The uses of record linkage
(a) Reliability
The previous appendix outlined how the staff books were
introduced in 1873 and only contains information on a minority of those
who worked in the Bank at this time. Indeed, even after 1873 it is
difficult to reconcile the small number of staff recorded as working in
the Bank with the substantial number listed in an establishment book.
Therefore record linkage was used to establish what proportion of staff
recorded in the staff books were also listed in successive establishment
books. This provided a means of assessing how representative the staff
books were.
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Table A2.1. The results of linking successive establishment books to the staff books
Establishment
Books (A)* (B)** (C)*** (C) as a % of (B)
1858 -1862 279 270 33 12%
1869 -1872 575 198 198 39"
1887-1888 556 419 419 78"
1899 611 611 539 89"
* The number of entries in each establishment book
* * The number of individuals in each establishment book after linkage
*** The number of individuals in the staff books linked to each establishment
book
The first step was to link individuals recorded more than once in
the same establishment book. This was necessary because each book
was maintained for a number of years, making it possible for the same
individual to appear more than once as he moved between branches
and positions. Linkage also allowed the number of staff who worked in
the Bank at a given moment in time to be identified. The four
establishment books contained 2021 entries. After linking the entries
within each establishment book it was estimated these represented 1927
individuals (see table A2.1 above). The second step was to link the staff
books to the establishment books. Of the 1,199 individuals identified in
the establishment books and linked to the staff records, 803 (67 per
cent) were linked on the basis of their name. The remainder was linked
using name, age and career data.
The small number of linkages made between the first two
establishment books and the staff books indicate the latter have limited
worth as a source of representative career information before the mid-
18805. Reassuringly the coverage of the staff books improves
dramatically thereafter. Moreover, even though the staff books do not
provide a complete guide, this is less significant than it appears. For
instance, two thirds of the 130 agents recorded in the third
establishment book could not be linked to the staff books. The most
likely explanation is that they were part-time agents and therefore
incidental to the aims of this thesis, moreover their career paths (they
were recruited as agents, remained attached to a single branch, then
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retired) is straightforward. Thus, by the 1880s the staff books can be
considered a highly representative source of information on the careers
of full-time non-manual staff.
(b) Alternative career information
Close inspection revealed the staff books possessed certain
limitations record linkage was used to overcome. Linking lists of head
office staff contained in bank minutes to establishment books was used
to generate approximate measures of staff turnover during the third
quarter of the nineteenth century (see chapter 4 above). It was also
possible to identify how many staff were employed at certain points in
time and how branch staff were distributed across the various ranks of
the bank hierarchy.
(c) Enriching the analysis
Finally, the staff records were linked to data derived from the
records of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland and the Scottish bankers
Literary Association. This made it possible to identify who joined these
organisations and at what point in their careers, information central to
the analysis of bank professionalisation in chapter 7.
The surviving minute books of the SBLA included annual
membership lists. The 1872 and 1875 lists were linked to the second
Royal Bank establishment book on the basis of the names they
contained. In this way it was possible to identify 14 Royal Bank staff
who were members of the SBLA in 1872, of which 11 were still
members in 1875. A further 6 Royal Bank staff who were SBLA
members were identified using the 1875 list. The career details of these
subjects were summarised in chapter 7. This summary was based upon
the following information - Every subject worked at the Royal Bank
head office, 11 had moved there from another office and by the time of
their first appearance in the SBLA membership lists they had worked
for an (median) average of 10 years in the Bank. All this indicates clerks
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in their late twenties and early thirties who had moved to Edinburgh to
work in the head offices of the banks dominated the membership of the
SBLA in the 1870s.
Table A2.2. The proportion of Royal Bank recruits listed in the staff books who
passed an examination set by the Institute of Bankers in Scotland, 1876 - 1898
% who passed any Total no. of Royal
Entry Period Institute exam bank recruits
1876-1880 8% 189
1881 -1885 6" 173
1886 -1890 27" 191
1891 - 1895 32 " 172
1896 -1898 35 " 152
Table A2.3 (a). The average time taken from entering the Royal Bank of Scotland to
passing as an Associate of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland (in years)
(Partial Associate) (Associate)
Median time No. of Median time No. of
Entry Period taken examples taken examples
1876 -1880 6 years 9 4 years 10
1881 -1885 6 " 7 7" 6
1886-1890 2 " 46 4 " 31
1891 -1895 2 " 49 3 " 33
1896 - 1898 2 " 47 2 " 18
Table A2.3 (b). The average time taken from entering the Royal Bank of Scotland to
passing as a Member of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland (in years)
(Partial member) (member)
Median time No. of Median time No. of
Entry Period taken examples taken examples
1876-1880 4 years 3 8 years 5
1881 -1885 8 " 2 11 " 5
1886-1890 8 " 2 6 " 14
1891 - 1895 4 " 8 4.5 " 8
1896 - 1898 3 " 1 4 " 3
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A similar approach was taken to linking the staff records to the
records of the Institute of Bankers in Scotland. Lists of all those who
passed any part of the Institute's two qualifications were included in the
Scottish Banking and Insurance Magazine and the Annual Reports of the
Institute of Bankers in Scotland. Although more staff sat the exams than
passed them, over 90 percent of the candidates passed at least a single
exam, therefore the pass lists can be considered reasonably
representative of all candidates6. As it was possible for the same
individual to appear in successive lists as a partial associate, associate,
partial member, and then member, it was necessary to link these
occurrences to produce individual subjects, which were then linked to
the staff books. Of the links made between the exam results and the 184
staff recorded as entering the Bank during the period 1876 to 1898, 68
per cent were on the basis of their names, 23 percent involved branch
data and the remaining 9 per cent branch and career data. All this made
it possible to identify the proportion of Royal Bank recruits who took
an interest in the Institute and at what point in their careers they did so.
The data presented in tables A2.2, A2.3 (a) and A2.3 (b) above indicate
that until the 1890s only a small minority of recruits took either exam,
and the introduction of the bonus encouraged an increasing number of
younger, less experienced recruits to come forward.
Conclusion
This appendix has surveyed the use made of record linkage in
this thesis. For pragmatic reasons an essentially manual approach was
adopted. To minimise bias, links were primarily made on the basis of
name data, although other criteria were taken cautiously into account
where it was deemed appropriate to maximise linkage, while
minimising any possible causes of systematic bias.
6 This figure derives from a comparison of the number of candidates recorded in each annual
report with the number of candidates listed as passing any part of either qualification
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The resultant dataset was then used to address a range of
methodological and historical issues. First, it was used to assess the
reliability of the staff records. Second, it was used to generate additional
quantitative measures of staffing before 1873. Third, linking staff
records to Institute and SBLA records was used to consider the
relationship between careers and professionalisation.
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Appendix 3: Oral History
Introduction1
Bank records conform to the general rule that most historical
sources contain more information on the affluent and influential than
about average or low-status individuals. It was possible to construct an
approximate account of the view from head office using minute books
and the correspondence of senior officials, while the use of branch
records - agent letter books, gave an insight into the view from the
agent's office. However, non-managerial staff rarely featured in either
location other than as a cost or as an object to be acted upon and with.
Thus, oral history was identified as a means of producing a more
rounded account of bank employment.
Indeed, it was originally intended to make substantial use of oral
history. But resource limitations meant that only one subject was
located and interviewed. The subject had begun working for the Royal
Bank in Greenock in 1926 aged 26, and eventually became an agent in
the small town of Drymen. A number of semi-structured interviews
were conducted (the resultant tape recordings are currently held by the
author), which addressed themes central to this thesis. The intervals
between the interviews were used to refine this approach, clarify
further lines of enquiry and check to see the original questions had been
addressed. The entire process was assisted by the written biographical
details the subject voluntarily produced. The interviews provided a
range of facts, stories and impressions. The following discussion
illustrates the value of each of these and how they were used.
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Facts
This refers to the biographical details the subject provided along
with the intricate details of bank work. The former established the
credentials of the subject as well as indicating what issues he was in a
position to discuss. The latter gave an insight into the nature of bank
work, filling in the gaps as it were between formal written descriptions
and rules and actual routines. For instance, the author learnt that even
in the 1930s not all branches had typewriters and instead remained
reliant on hand-written letters, blotting paper and letterpresses. Neither
biographical details nor descriptions of routine work processes need be
considered particularly untrustworthy.
Stories
Stories refer to those specific incidents the subjects described in
some detail. The questions these prompted were deliberately left open
ended to allow the subject to provide as much detail as he wished
without being unduly led.
The material this produced was highly particular, influenced by
hindsight and chronologically and geographically imprecise. And yet
this form of material was the most valuable. The story concerning the
bag-wielding customer described in chapter 7 epitomised the social
milieux and attendant pressures the subjects lived within and was
subject to. Whereas the subject was too afraid to fire back the bag, the
clerk who did was the son of an affluent businessmen, which lent him
the self-confidence and financial security to retaliate. Thus, the unique
perspective of the subject gave precise access to broader structures, in
this instance illustrating how the background and wealth of staff
influenced their behaviour in the workplace.
1 For a discussion of the methodology and uses of oral history see P. Thompson, The Voice of
the past: oral history, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988)
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Impressions
Certain events were of particular importance to the subject.
Indeed, much of what was gained from the interview derived from the
manner and bearing of the subject when he answered questions about
these issues. Consequently, the oral evidence was accompanied by
impressions that derived from the interview process itself. Despite these
proving to be transitory and unrecorded, they were also important.
It was possible to develop a more nuanced understanding of the
culture of bank employment. A discussion of politics was particularly
instructive. The subject proved adept at not giving any clear indication
of what his own political preferences were. While drawing attention to
the fact he read a newspaper traditionally associated with the
Conservative Party, he also emphasised the fact his father was a strong
Liberal Party supporter. Such inconclusiveness substantiated the
apolitical stance of the professional banker, illustrating the outcome of
that advice regularly given in the Scottish Bankers Magazine to avoid any
overt form of political commitment.
Thus, those emotions and attitudes thrown up during the course
of the interview produced a range of meanings unlikely to be found in
any written record. This had the general effect of enhancing the
author's appreciation of the written record. In addition the opportunity
to observe the behaviour of the subject produced significant new lines
of enquiry. The most important concerned the manner in which he
responded to a letter sent on my behalf by the archive section of the
Royal Bank of Scotland. More important than the fact that this
confirmed I was a bona fide researcher, to the subject the origins of the
letter - it was sent from the former head office - made it a significant
event. During the interviews the letter was periodically brandished by
the subject, then read closely. This near militaristic display of obedience
- the subject's back often straightened as he read the letter, gave rise to
questions concerning how head office was perceived by branch staff as
well as related to. Again impressions gained from interviewing one
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subject provide a unique and therefore atypical view. Nevertheless it
constitutes a beginning rather than an end, which opened up new lines
of enquiry that might otherwise have been ignored.
Conclusion
Limited use was made of oral history due to resource limitations.
However, the interview that was undertaken proved to be a valuable
heuristic device that provided an otherwise unobtainable set of facts,
stories and impressions. Oral history remains subject to problems of
representativeness and the imperfections of memory, here perhaps to
an exaggerated degree due to its limited use. However, viewed from a
different perspective the uniqueness of the subject proved to be
significant, it gave focused access to patterns of behaviour and social
pressures that can be judged to be of broader applicability. Moreover,
oral history formed only one research methodology that produced
findings and raised issues it was possible to then explore in other ways
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